On 14 October the besieged of Toulon became aware of a general hullabaloo stemming from the republicans’ positions and accompanied by a continuous discharge of weapons. At Fort Malbousquet the defenders were convinced that an all-out assault was imminent and, on Mulgrave’s order, an offensive patrol was sent out. In crossing the flat land between the little rivers Neuve and Las, the patrol, under Captain Wemyss, was attacked by French sallying quickly from the high ground of Les Arènes. Accounts again vary, but the situation was apparently saved by the timely arrival of fifty Piedmontese chasseurs. All were then compelled to retire smartly on Malbousquet as larger numbers of conventionnels issued from the neighbouring height of Les Français. The final phase of the withdrawal had, in turn, to be supported by the deployment of even more of the fort’s garrison.
What could have developed into a pitched battle on terrain unfavourable to the allies was, with difficulty, restricted to no more than a hot skirmish. As a first military success for his troops, however, Carteaux over-stated its significance. Mulgrave’s report blamed it on ‘the affectionate Emulation [i.e. rivalry] of the British and Piedmontese’.
The reason for all the initial jubilation had been the news of the fall of the royalist stronghold of Lyon following another protracted siege. An inland city, Lyon’s only hope had lain in a relief column that never materialized. Toulon had its back to the sea and, at least for the moment, could be fully supported by the allied fleets, and there appeared no cause for alarm.
Success at Lyon, however, gave the republicans a great boost in morale and, more materially, released considerable numbers of seasoned fighting troops to strengthen further the grip on Toulon. The republicans were also faring well in Piedmont, so any further reinforcement from this source for the Toulon garrison was unlikely.
General Carteaux’s success encouraged Lapoype to make an effort against the Cap Brun position. This strongpoint, which was the object of considerable allied effort would, when completed, accommodate a battery that could command much of the Grande Rade. Its garrison would also be able to assist in any defence of Fort la Malgue. As they were separated by a long cannon shot, however, General Lapoype considered that, in its unfinished state, the position could be seized before decisive assistance could arrive from La Malgue.
Thus, at first light on 15 October, 2,000 republicans successfully surprised about 250 men of the French Royal Louis regiment who garrisoned the works. The unit was formed mainly from various line regiments that had acted as marine detachments aboard the ships of Trogoff’s squadron. They were seasoned regulars and strongly resisted their undisciplined attackers. Numbers inevitably told, none the less, and, overwhelmed, the defenders were driven to retreat, leaving about fifty dead. A small column sent from La Malgue ensured the survival of the remainder but Lapoype’s men were now apparently firmly installed on Cap Brun.
Mulgrave had other ideas: his forces at La Malgue were powerful, and he reacted quickly and in strength. The weakness of the enemy at Cap Brun was that they were located far in advance of their established lines. In addition, their line of retreat, along the road through La Garde, was flanked by the high ground of Thouar.
An allied column was directed straight at Cap Brun, therefore, while others departed Toulon for Thouar and the village of La Vallette. The latter location, at the foot of the eastern end of the Faron Ridge, was something of a republican stronghold.
Bearing in mind that the latter columns had farther to travel, the movements were poorly coordinated for maximum effect. The news of that marching from La Malgue was sufficient to put the republicans at Cap Brun to flight, and their retreat took them past Thouar long before it was occupied by an advancing Spanish force. Although the Cap Brun position had been regained, therefore, its late conquerors successfully eluded the trap that should have closed on them. The thrust at La Vallette also led to a precipitate withdrawal on the part of its garrison. For the allies, this settlement was too exposed to be held and, having left their mark, they pulled back.
Mulgrave was later emboldened to make a further punishment raid, however. A Neapolitan battery was, therefore, sited temporarily atop the Thouar heights and, using the distant outwork of Sainte-Marguerite as an anchor on its left, covered a large patrol which cleared the village of La Garde. This, abandoned and slighted, was also then left for the enemy to reoccupy at leisure.
With Cap Brun recovered, the allied command had good reason to feel confident, based on its success to date. The enemy, although everywhere superior in numbers, appeared to be unable to cope with the cool discipline of regular troops. Mulgrave, none the less, raged to Hood about this ‘unfortunate skirmish [which] has cost us three most valuable officers’. Politically, it was always necessary to give equal opportunity to British and Spanish, and he referred to ‘the unfortunate circumstances of the Spanish having the turn of being upon the right [and] by the sloth of their movements prevent[ing] our occupation of both [Thouar and La Garde]’. He concluded: ‘I much fear till we have absolute command in English hands, and good troops entirely at British disposal, that no real good effects can be produced by efforts of sortie.’
Lord Mulgrave, unfortunately, had inadvertently done great damage with his earlier and over-optimistic reports to the British government. Desperate to find troops for at least four major hotspots, ministers looked carefully at the forces allocated to Admiral Hood and decided that, as all was apparently still progressing so well, he could actually be robbed of some of his strength. This was at a time when the existing dearth of British line troops in Toulon was causing major problems in the organization of an effective defence. It also coincided with something of a silent power struggle between the British and the Spanish. This came about because, at any particular time, a considerable proportion of Hood’s naval strength was absent on detached duties. Not so affected, Admiral Langara could keep his fleet concentrated at Toulon, invariably outnumbering the British.
Hood’s first setback had resulted from his request for reinforcement from Gibraltar. With Spain currently an ally, this stronghold was in no way under threat yet, because the British government directed him to spare Hood ‘as many troops as possible’, the aged governor, Sir Robert Boyd, cautiously despatched 750, just half of what Hood had requested and including few of the much-needed artillery specialists. This contingent would arrive, together with General O’Hara, on 27 October.
Their arrival came as little relief to the now-weary Hood who, just the day previously, had received a despatch from the Admiralty. In a lesser man this would have induced despair, for it was an order that Rear Admiral Gell and his squadron were to embark the men of the 30th Regiment, transport them to (of all places) Gibraltar, whence they would be shipped to the West Indies. The move had been precipitated by an approach to the British government from royalist administrations in the French islands, also proposing to defect. Once again, Pitt’s men sought to rob Peter in order to pay Paul.
With the extremely slow communications of the day, Hood and Mulgrave could only write of their dismay at the directive and, belatedly, attempt to paint a less rosy picture of the situation at Toulon. ‘There are not two hundred British troops in the town’, wrote Mulgrave, ‘Officers’ Servants and Musicians included.’ Fortunately, it was possible to delay the move inasmuch as the Admiralty had specified the use of Gell’s squadron, obviously overlooking that it was absent on its mission to Genoa.
In the meantime, Hood ‘humbly’ appraised Their Lordships of the fact that there were already ‘upwards of a thousand Seamen doing duty on Shore’. Including these, three-quarters of all British personnel were manning outposts ‘which would be in great danger … were they with drawn’. Rather boldly, he went on to inform Dundas that Gell’s squadron would sail for Gibraltar ‘without a Soldier or Marine’ unless General O’Hara consented.
WITH THE ONSET of autumn came the Mediterranean rainy season, making life miserable for besiegers and besieged alike. Mulgrave complained to Hood that isolated garrisons were be
ing poorly provisioned: Malbousquet had received nothing for two days while outposts on the Faron Ridge, being supplied from the town, enjoyed meat that was ‘stinking’ and bread ‘full of maggots’. Hood noted widespread dissatisfaction among the troops and stated that, if things did not improve, he feared ‘very considerable desertion’.
With the republicans having cut off much of the water flow to Toulon’s flour mills, the admiral ‘was obliged to send to every port in the Italian and other States for provisions, as the town … has no flour and but a few days’ biscuits’. The sad fact was that, while the least useful personnel remained in the town, comparatively well-provisioned and billeted, the best were manning the exposed perimeter works, where their health was deteriorating and the sick lists lengthening by the day.
Major Generals O’Hara and Dundas* arrived on the same day, the first from Gibraltar, the other from Genoa.
Charles O’Hara, much to Hood’s dismay, came as a replacement for Lord Mulgrave. Being the senior and also a Spanish speaker, he had been given a specific commission as ‘Governor of Toulon and its Dependencies, and Commander of the Combined Forces’. This was in accordance with the continuing power struggle with the Spanish.
On 23 October Hood was informed by Admiral Langara that the Spanish king had been pleased to promote Gravina
to the rank of Lieutenant General of his fleet and to confirm him in the general command of the allied forces in the possession of which he has been, by the agreement between your Excellency and me. And by the same royal order, Major General Raphael Valdés is to remain with the command of the Spanish troops.
Hood responded on the following day, diplomatic phraseology masking much of his exasperation:
No one can more sincerely rejoice than myself at my much esteemed friend’s promotion, but His Sardinian and Sicilian Majesty [sic] having been graciously pleased to confide their respective troops entirely to my disposal, or to act under such British officer as I may judge fit to put them, I am very much at a loss to conceive upon what ground admiral Gravina can take upon him the title of commander-in-chief of the combined forces at Toulon … [I] feel it my duty to put the Sardinian and Sicilian troops, together with the British, under the command of major general O’Hara, the moment he arrives.
More such genteel verbal swordplay failed to resolve the situation, which the Spanish worsened with a note from their ambassador in London to Lord Grenville. The latter replied through Lord St Helens, the British ambassador in Madrid. His note pointed out that Toulon had, in the first instance, been surrendered to the British alone, ‘the Spanish admiral having expressly declined to concur in the original enterprise’. It followed that joint military government in the unique circumstances of Toulon ‘would inevitably endanger the possession of the place itself’. Military government could be vested only in that power to whom the surrender had been made and which, subsequently, had mustered the greater force and incurred the greater expense. Finally, it stated that the Sardinian and Sicilian troops had been entrusted by their respective rulers to officers of King George III and that this monarch was not empowered to place them at the disposal of a further party.
Such diplomatic wrangling would have rumbled on interminably had not events on the ground progressed such as to relegate it to a side issue. At local level, however, it resulted in some quite unpleasant incidents. Hood’s fleet, for instance, had been so reduced by detached commitments that its strength at Toulon was barely half that of the Spanish. Langara decided to resort to crude intimidation. Having three first rates at his disposal (his own and two divisional flagships), he placed his own close aboard, and parallel to, Hood’s Victory, the others on her bow and stern quarters. Allowing the Victory barely space to swing at her anchor, Langara conveyed the clear message to the old enemy that he could blow him out of the water at will. The British admiral was, however, no hothead and, with enviable sang froid, ignored the Spanish until they eventually tired of it and again shifted berth.
One vitally important and unresolved question was what Admiral Hood intended to do with the French Toulon squadron should the defences of the town suddenly crumble, allowing the enemy to break in. As already noted, a small number of ships had been permitted to be armed and manned by royalist seamen under Rear Admiral Trogoff. A few non-line ships had also been given British crews to undertake local tasking. The remainder, and the bulk of the French strength, lay in the inner harbour and the basins without armament or crew and, in many cases, without masts.
Hood, of course, had every honourable intention to hold the squadron, its arsenal and infrastructure in trust for eventual return to a France ruled by Louis XVII. But, beset as his defenders were, and with the knowledge that General Kellermann was marching south with the army that had just taken and punished Lyon, he must surely have entertained some reservations with regard to his mission’s eventual outcome. It is far from clear, however, exactly what contingency plan, if any, he had in mind in the face of sudden collapse.
This was not the case with the Spanish. During October their foreign minister informed both Lord St Helens and Admiral Langara of the action that should be taken.
As the case, tho’ remote, may possibly occur in which the Spanish and English squadrons may be obliged to abandon the anchorage of Toulon … His Majesty’s pleasure … has been signified to Admiral Langara … to settle and resolve, in concert with Lord Hood, whatever may, according to the existing circumstances, be found most advisable.
In the meantime, however, ‘[it] is enjoined to him … to have all French ships …which are fit for navigation, armed and brought into the road, in order to put to sea, when necessary.’ They would be manned by the minimum necessary complement of Spanish and British seamen commanded, as in garrisons ashore, by an officer from the predominant nationality. In emergency, their crews would be brought up to strength by the addition of loyal French seamen and if
the unexpected event of abandoning the port should occur, Admiral Langara should sail, with all the French ships that can be put to sea, to the islands of Hieres [i.e. Hyères], or whatever other place he may appoint in concert with Lord Hood … carrying in them all artillery, ammunition, arms and stores which they can bring.
A full inventory and notification of the place of refuge would be delivered ‘at a proper opportunity, to their lawful sovereign’.
Those French ships that were unfit for sea should, it was proposed, be used as floating batteries for the defence of the port, ‘stationing those of the combined squadron where they cannot be damaged’. In the event of the port’s enforced abandonment, all vessels that could not be removed would be scuttled or burned to deny them to the enemy, ‘for which purpose, preparations shall be made before hand’ [author’s italics].
The document concluded with the instruction that, if abandoned, all fortifications should be destroyed and all artillery spiked, ‘particularly in all batteries that command the port’. Admiral Langara was charged to communicate all this to Lord Hood ‘in order that they may proceed in concert in this business which the two Monarchs have taken under their joint care and direction’.
Although the Spanish proposals were prudent, unequivocal and suggestive of a degree of urgency, Hood’s priorities appeared to lie elsewhere. Whether it was through over-confidence, or a simmering hostility and lack of trust between the two admirals, or Hood’s over-developed sense of honour and his wishing not to cause the Toulonnais concern about ulterior motives, no action appears to have been taken.
That this was the case was evident a month later when Lord Mulgrave had returned to London and reported to Henry Dundas. His opinion regarding the ability of the garrison to withstand a real assault was obviously not what the minister had either expected or wanted to hear. On 23 November he wrote to Hood from London:
… I am sure I need scarcely remind Y. Lp. of the propriety (in case of any disaster happening) of having the French ships captured at Toulon so situated that if you was obliged to abandon the place, none of the ships
or arsenals … should be permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy …the ships [should be] burnt if they cannot be carried with you. I hope they may be brought away, and in such circumstances …this would be perfectly justifiable under the nicest and strictest interpretation of the terms of the agreement entered into by Y. Lp. with the people of Toulon.
With letters often taking a month and more between despatch and delivery, there is every possibility that Admiral Hood never received the above reminder in time for it to be acted upon. Unfortunately, neither could he have seen that sent from the Admiralty on 20 December. Marked ‘secret’, it took the earlier Spanish proposals as its starting point and clearly instructed Hood on the extent to which he should comply with them.
IN ORDER TO PRESERVE equality of rank, the British government was obliged to promote Charles O’Hara to lieutenant general, as which he arrived at Toulon. Of the Irish aristocracy, he had already accumulated over forty years experience in the army, which he had joined at the age of just 12. A brigadier during the American War of Independence, he was captured with Cornwallis’s capitulation at Yorktown, but returned to Britain on exchange. He became colonel of the 22nd Foot but, commonly for the time, his financial affairs were in such a disastrous state that he was obliged to live abroad to escape his creditors. Despite this, his cultivation of influential friends, including Horace Walpole, saw him reinstated in society and his being made governor of Gibraltar in 1792.
O’Hara’s manner with his peers was liable to be short and bad-tempered, but he was personally courageous, looked every inch the soldier and was very popular with his troops, to whom he was known as the ‘Old Cock of the Rock’. In Toulon, his demeanour and appearance brooked absolutely no nonsense from the Spanish.
A final significant detachment of Neapolitans, over 1,500 of them, arrived at Toulon at the end of October. With so many sympathisers in the allied camp, the republicans’ intelligence was consistently updated. The following, accurate, appreciation of allied dispositions was produced at the end of October:
The Fall of Toulon Page 27