by Row, David
The Japanese also made a much larger impression on the staff when at 0320 a number of unknown aircraft were spotted by radar heading for Singapore. These were 17 G3M Nells (a total of 65 had been sent out, but this group was the only one to find the island given the bad weather). While the air defences of Singapore had been put on alert, only three night fighters were currently ready - these were sent up at 0345 to intercept the planes. The radar control was still unpractised at vectoring fighters into a close enough range that they could use their own radar to intercept the bombers, and as a result only four of them were shot down. The fighter pilots were surprised at how readily the Japanese bombers burst into flames compared to the bombers the Luftwaffe had been using over Britain. Also due to inexperience, and despite the drills, the civil defence and AA of Singapore did not perform well. While sirens were sounded at 0350, the response was poor, and for some reason the city was still not blacked out when the bombers arrived. The AA was ineffective, and no bombers were shot down. For their part, although some 50 people were killed, the bombers spread their attack between the naval base, the city, and two of the airfields, instead of concentrating on one target. As a result of this, no serious damage was done.
A reconnaissance flight had been sent off north just before dawn, to report on what it could find at the most likely landing places. It was anticipated that these would be close enough to French Indo China for the Japanese to have arranged some sort of fighter cover, so a Whirlwind was used rather than a Hudson. While it was hoped to get photographs, the plane was ordered to radio immediately if it found Siam being attacked, as that would allow Alexander to order his forces into the country. As soon as the ships had been detected, a strike would be sent off from Singapore, hopefully not only catching some of the ships but some of the troops as well.
At 0600, the first report was received from the Whirlwind - "Transport ships close inshore at Patani, looks like a landing is taking place". While Alexander had already been in contact with the British embassy in Siam to try and find out what was happening, he had obtained little useful information. But in any case, the presence of the transport ships was enough to release the waiting strike squadrons. He also authorised the columns to head off into Siam, in particular the one from Kroh headed for the 'Ledge'.
Reports were also coming in of confused fighting at various coastal areas in Eastern Siam, which were considered to be the rest of the invasion convoy. The landings most worrying were the ones at Patani and Singora, as they had usable airfields. Accordingly, the Cormorant squadron readied at Singapore was ordered to attack the ships lying off Patani. The longer-ranged Beaufighters would attack the landings at Singora.
Three transports had been assigned to land troops of the 42nd Infantry Regiment. In retrospect, attacking Patani was the wrong decision - the landing at Singora was much larger, although at long range for the Cormorants. By the time the attack arrived, the assault troops had been landed and the ships were unloading their supplies and transport. The arrival of 16 dive bombers was a very unwelcome surprise - while air support had been planned, there had not yet been time to bring the fighters forward onto captured airfields. While the Japanese AA from the transports was accurate, there were no planes to stop the bombers turning over into their near-vertical dives. The 1,000lb bombs shattered the transports, leaving two sinking and one burning and obviously out of control, along with much of the Japanese equipment. One Cormorant was damaged by AA fire, but managed to limp to Kota Bharu where it landed with some difficulty, the plane being a write-off.
Further to the north, fifteen torpedo-armed Beaufighters had found their targets, the shipping unloading troops of the Japanese 5th Division at Singora. Originally, the Japanese had hoped to fly fighters into the airfield there at dawn, but unexpected resistance had made this impossible. Instead, some of the Ki-27 Nate fighters due to base themselves at Singora were instead covering the landing. Twelve of the Japanese army planes were in the air.
Without the benefit of radar, the Beaufighters were not spotted until some of them had started to make their attack runs, and the first six planes managed to drop their torpedoes without interference, hitting two of the transport ships. The next flights were intercepted by the fighters, who despite their weak armament managed to shoot down two of the Beaufighters as they attacked - the torpedo planes were not expecting fighters so far from the Japanese bases in French Indo China, and were taken by surprise. The fighters also disrupted the attack, and disappointingly, only one more transport was sunk. Once their torpedoes were gone, the Beaufighters turned to engage the Japanese. This proved difficult at low level, as the Beaufighters, not the most manoeuvrable of aeroplanes, found that the light and agile Japanese planes very difficult to hit. This was balanced by the difficulty the Japanese had of doing serious damage of the Beaufighters with their two 7.7mm guns. A number of the Beaufighters simply escaped combat by flying away from them - the torpedo plane was noticeably faster than the Japanese fighter was when unloaded. The result was a further three Beaufighters shot down for the loss of seven Ki-27's - the RAF pilots found that the light Japanese planes came apart when hit by the Beaufighter's heavy armament. The Japanese fighters for their part had seemed surprised that torpedo planes would attempt to attack them. Although the landing was not stopped, considerable disruption was caused and part of the 5th Divisions transport and artillery destroyed as well as numbers of the support troops killed.
In retrospect, both formations were lucky to find their targets, as in general the weather east of Siam was poor, with heavy and frequent rain showers that blinded the crews and made it impossible to navigate with any accuracy. Aircraft were also sent from the airfield at Sungei Patani. At 0645, a force of Beaufighters had headed for Patani, but was unable to locate the invasion force amid torrential rainstorms.
Also with daylight came the first Japanese air attacks against the airfields in Malaya. At 0700, shortly after the Beaufighter force had disappeared into the northeast, the forward observers at Sungei Patani reported a small formation of planes heading towards them from the west. This was an unexpected direction for an attack, and only the four ready Sparrowhawks were scrambled. They were still clawing for altitude when a formation of five Ki-21's arrived at the airfield. The Ki-21 was fast for a bomber, and the Sparrowhawks were not in position to attack them before they attacked. Despite being close to the border, shortages had meant that the base only had eight 40mm Bofors for defence.
The bombers made their attack runs ignoring the AA fire, which only managed to damage one plane, although this did cause it to break off its attack run. The other four carried on to bomb the revetments holding the rest of the Beaufighter squadron and the other Sparrowhawks. A number of ground personnel were killed, one Beaufighter being destroyed and two Sparrowhawks being damaged. Due to the rain soaked ground around the airfield, the aircraft could only be dispersed in a limited fashion. The concrete runway was also hit by two bombs, but would still be long enough to operate fighters, although loaded Beaufighters would be unable to take off until the damage was repaired.
The bombers were intercepted on their escape by the defending Sparrowhawks. Considerably faster than the Japanese bombers, they shot down three of them, the other two managing to escape and hide in cloud. Without radar control, once visual contact had been lost there was little hope of finding them.
The airfield at Koto Bharu was also to see a visit by the Japanese. It had been realised early on that the airfield was far too exposed and close to the border to be useful if the enemy established himself, but it had not been expected to face serious air attack so early on with the Japanese air force not yet established in Siam. Bomber raids from French Indo-China had been expected, but it was thought too far for fighter raids from those airfields. The airfield was keeping four fighters on patrol in case of bomber attacks, but like Sungei Patani, it depended on a visual observer, the radar net not covering the airfields this far north.
The original Japanese plans had in
cluded constant raids on Koto Bharu to suppress it, but while the transports were coming under attack most of the planes allocated had been reassigned to cover the ships until they had unloaded. However at mid-morning eight fighters were seen approaching the field. These were A6M Zeros from Soc Trang. This would be the first time British fighters had encountered the Zero, and being outnumbered they climbed to get a height advantage before attacking. This was to prove very useful. The Sparrowhawks dived on the Japanese planes as they approached the airfield, presumably intending to strafe as they were at quite a low altitude. Two of the Zeros were shot down in the initial surprise attack, both of the planes breaking up under the heavy fire of the Sparrowhawks four 20mm cannon. After this, the fight broke up into a melee as the Zeros turned to engage the fighters in a turning dogfight. This was to prove an unpleasant surprise for the British pilots, the agile Zero being able to outturn and outmanoeuvre them in a low speed fight. The Zero also had a heavy armament, and as a result was able to inflict serious damage on the heavier and more durable Sparrowhawks. Three of the four were shot down, although one pilot bailed out and another survived a crash landing (although injured) for the loss of only one more Zero. The fourth Sparrowhawk, outnumbered five to one, dived away, finding that the Zero could not stay with his escaping fighter.
Force Z had sailed at dawn under the command of Admiral Holland, even though the main covering force for the invasion had not yet been found. It was thought better to have them at sea than caught in Singapore harbour, which the Japanese had already shown they could attack. The force consisted of the fast battleship HMS King George V, the light carrier HMAS Melbourne, the cruisers HMAS Canberra, HMS Gloucester and HMS Bonaventure, six RN and two RAN destroyers. Its course of action would depend on locating the covering force and determining how powerful it was. If it was weaker or similar to Force Z, Holland's orders were to engage and destroy. If the covering force was too powerful, he was to damage and slow it (in conjunction with the RAF's land based planes if possible), causing the maximum damage for the minimum loss while Somerville's more powerful Eastern Fleet came up in support.
Orders had also been sent out before dawn to two of the T-class boats operating south of Formosa to move southward to try and sink Japanese shipping operating out of French Indo China. While positioning them there pre-war had been considered, it had been thought too provocative and could cause an incident the British didn't want. Now the Japanese had invaded, it was likely they would be trying to reinforce and resupply from there.
Also after dawn, a heavy reconnaissance patrol was sent out. Twelve Hudsons and twelve Blenhiems were to search well out to sea to try and discover where the Japanese covering force was hiding. The search was not helped by the bad weather, but just after noon one of the Blenhiems found a force reported as 'at least six ships, three probably cruisers' heading west. This was the Japanese 7th Cruiser squadron of four heavy cruisers and three destroyers, part of the naval escort for the invasion fleet. Force Z changed course north, keeping within range of fighter cover from the coast, as Singapore attempted to get more information about the Japanese ships. This was proving difficult, as the poor weather that was helping the Blenheim hide was also making it difficult to observe the Japanese.
It was not only the British who were responding to the attack on Pearl Harbor; the American command at Manila had also received news of the attack. General Brereton had put his pilots on alert at 4am local time, ready for a planned attack by his B-17's against the Japanese air bases on Formosa. However, this was postponed by General MacArthur and his staff, who insisted on a reconnaissance mission before a raid was sent off. Despite a cable from Washington directing him to execute the Rainbow 5 War Plan immediately, and a report from Admiral Hart's HQ that Japanese carrier planes were already attacking a seaplane tender, he continued to refuse Brereton permission to attack.
The Japanese were themselves unable to launch the dawn attack they had planned for the Philippines, but this was due to the weather rather than the Americans - thick fog made it impossible to take off. At 0715 (PI local time), the radar at Iba reported unidentified aircraft approaching. The available P-40 fighters and B-17's were scrambled, but this warning proved to be a false alarm. The B-17's were left circling, while MacArthur's Chief of Staff again refused Brereton permission to strike at Formosa.
At 0900, 32 Japanese bombers attacked the airfields of Baguio and Ruguegarao in northern Luzon. The fog had by now cleared in Formosa, and 192 planes of the Japanese Navy's 11th air fleet were on their way to the Philippine Islands. Despite the raid, yet again Brereton was refused permission to land his planes, load them with bombs and raid Formosa. It took another hour to inform him he could send another reconnaissance plane, and then if it located targets he could make an attack. This allowed him to land his B-17's and refuel and arm them.
Shortly after noon, the radar at Iba detected the incoming raid. However the mechanism for informing Clark field proved dysfunctional, and both the airfields fighters and bombers were caught on the ground. Although a few fighters managed to get off the ground, they proved ineffective. By the time that the bombers left, an hour later, there were only 17 B-17's left serviceable and 80% of the fighters had been destroyed.
The Japanese air force also attacked the US island of Guam from its bases in Saipan. The island had no AA guns, and the raid sank a number of the ships in the harbour as well as destroying the Marine barracks.
In Malaya, the orders to implement Operation Krohcol had led to the Australians of 9th Australian Div starting out at first light. The main thrust was a lorried assault, let by three tanks, for a feature known as the 'Ledge', which would give them a good defensive position to help hold the airfields on the west coast. It was a six-mile stretch of road cut through a steep hillside and bounded on the other side by a sheer drop into a river; demolishing the hillside on to the road would cause the Japanese invasion force considerable delay. The force left some five hours after the Japanese attack on Kota Bharu, and ran into some opposition from armed Thai constabulary. This caused a number of casualties in both sides as the Australians responded with some enthusiasm. The police tried to block the road for the lorried infantry with a number of felled rubber trees, but these were quickly pushed out of the way by the accompanying tanks. However this did slow them, and they did not reach the town of Betong, five miles inside Siam, until afternoon. This time they did not meet any opposition, and pressed on, reaching the Ledge just before dawn on the following day, where they covered the engineers setting the charges on the road.
The second column consisted of lorried infantry and an anti-tank section. This headed towards Songkhla to delay the enemy. It reached a position at Ban Sadao, some ten miles north of the frontier, at dusk, and dug in. The final column was in fact an armoured train, which set off into Thailand until it reached Khlong Ngae in Siam, where it destroyed the 200-foot bridge, and slowly returned south, the Australians destroying the railway and anything else they could reach as it did so.
The airfield at Kota Bharu had always been considered to be by Air Marshal Park to be extremely exposed if there was a Japanese landing on the East coast, and his experience with far-forward RAF bases in the Battle of Britain had made him decide to treat it as an expendable field. Indeed, if it had not been so well positioned to attack an invasion he would have turned it into a flak trap with dummy aircraft. As it was, the number of aircraft had been limited, as was the support for them. Many of the maintenance crews had been evacuated some days ago, along with all non-essential personnel, leaving only enough to patch up a lightly damaged plane sufficiently for it to fly south clear of immediate danger. The airfield (and its satellite fields) was not just set for destruction, but heavily booby-trapped as well. Park was specific that the Japanese would not get anything useful out of the base after he had been forced out of it.
At the start of the invasion, it had been home to three small squadrons - twelve Hudsons, twelve Beaufighters (intended for use as torpedo plane
s) and twelve Sparrowhawks. During the night and early morning, they had already lost one Beaufighter, three Sparrowhawks and a Hudson, and four more Hudsons had been damaged. Two of these had been patched up and sent south, the other were irreparable in any reasonable time and were positioned as decoys.
The original Japanese plan had been to keep mounting small raids on the airfield as soon as they had landed (having assumed that they would be able to operate fighters almost immediately), but delays meant they would not be in this position until tomorrow. As a result, it was decided to send a heavy raid of 24 Ki-21 bombers escorted by twelve Ki-43 'Oscar' fighters to close down the base temporarily. They did not want to do too much damage as the Japanese wanted to use the base themselves (while their intelligence had informed them that the British intended to destroy it, they were not aware of how comprehensive Park's instructions had been). The bombers were loaded with 100lb bombs, the intention being to destroy as many planes on the ground as possible without causing serious damage to the runways.