by Row, David
While both sides were keeping their main carrier forces back, the first surface engagement was between the cruiser and destroyer forces that had been sent out; the IJN force to cover the invasion convoy, the Allied force to intercept it. The weather was not good for spotting ships, with too much cloud cover; in addition, the Allied planes were either keeping an eye on the convoy or being held back for the invasion. So the first contact was at 1100 when a lookout on HMS Exeter spotted the masts of the Japanese cruiser Haguru. The forces were fairly even. The IJN force consisted of the heavy cruisers Haguru and Nachi, the light cruisers Naka and Jintsu and 14 destroyers. The Allied force consisted of the heavy cruisers HMS Exeter and USS Houston, the light cruisers HMAS Perth, HMAS Hobart, HMS Dragon and HMS Danae, with 9 destroyers. The Japanese cruisers had been constructed with scant regard for the treaty limits and in balance outweighed the Allied squadron. However the first act of the captain of HMS Exeter had been to make a sighting report, and as a result HMS Colossus, held some 50 miles to the rear of the advancing cruisers, was preparing her torpedo planes for a strike.
Additional information on Japanese forces came from US cryptographers at Pearl Harbor. They had informed Nimitz some days previously that they suspected a Japanese carrier force was heading for the area of New Guinea, and a task force built around the USS Lexington and the USS Enterprise had been sent to cover the area. The sighting of the invasion fleet heading for Java and the news of fresh attacks in Malaya made Nimitz suspect that the suspected Japanese force was either another diversion, or perhaps (given the Japanese proclivity for complicated multiple operations) covering a follow-on invasion of New Guinea. In fact the shortage of available troops and transports had forced the IJN to make the operation just another diversion, and the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku with the light carrier Ryuju, supported by a cruiser force, were northeast of the island. Both carrier forces sent out search planes throughout the day, but no contacts were made until late in the afternoon when a Japanese seaplane sighted the Lexington. Due to clouds, she missed the Enterprise, and only one carrier was reported to Nagumo.
Somerville now has two main tasks; to fix and destroy the Japanese carrier force reported behind the invasion convoy, and to sink as many of the transports as possible. He intends to use his carriers to search the area for the carriers, while he prepares an anti-shipping strike. The RAF is ordered to attack the transports again.
In Malaya the Japanese attacks are still making ground in the gaps between the Imperial defence lines, but are slowing down as the Australian troops counterattack their rear. The RAF has established superiority in the air, and in addition to keeping the Japanese planes away from the ground troops, they are attacking any supply dumps and artillery parks the Allies have been able to find - some by air, some found using small patrols of Special Forces and locals infiltrated past the Japanese lines. Alexander and Blamey suspect the Japanese supply situation is not all it could be, and are intending to use the Japanese tendency to advance as far as possible to cut off and destroy as many men as they can. The armoured force is being prepared to cut off the Japanese spearheads, although small numbers of tanks have been used to delay the Japanese attacks.
The cruiser forces off Java start firing at 1155. Both sides' gunnery is unimpressive in its accuracy, and the Japanese force starts to manoeuvre for a massed torpedo attack. This commences at 1225, and the force fires off some 90 Long Lance torpedoes at long range. The result is less than devastating and only one ship, HMAS Perth, is struck. The heavy torpedo wrecks her bows and her forward turrets, and the cruiser is forced to turn away and slow to a few knots to avoid further damage. The rest of the Allied force moves to cover her, and at last a number of hits are made. HMS Exeter is hit on her rear turret, rendering it inoperable, and HMS Danae receives two 6" hits which fortunately only do minor damage. In response, the Haguro is hit twice by 8" shells, knocking out one of her forward turrets.
At about 1250, the strike from HMS Colossus arrived. The light carrier only had eleven torpedo planes available and operational, covered by eight Sparrowhawks, but the Japanese cruiser force currently had no air cover at all (the Japanese fighters were at that moment over the invasion convoy which was closing the coast of Java). The AA fire from the warships was intense, and one Sea Lance was shot down and another forced to withdraw trailing smoke. The other nine targeted two of the Japanese cruisers, hitting the Haguro with one torpedo and the Jintsu with one. The other ships were strafed by the Sparrowhawks once they realised that there was no air cover, and the heavy cannon fire resulted in the loss of one of the destroyers, which blew up after being strafed, breaking in two and sinking fast (it was later ascertained that a cannon shell had set off one of her oxygen-powered torpedoes). With the damage caused to both sides, neither side was willing to carry on combat for the moment, and both the forces withdrew slightly. The Japanese intending to make a night attack once they had repaired their immediate damage, the Allies to allow their air force to continue to reduce the enemy strength. In any case, the original Allied task of finding and attacking the invasion fleet was now thought to be better served by air attack, using the cruiser force once sufficient damage had been done.
The invasion fleet itself had been the subject of two more heavy attacks during the day from RAF and RAAF Beaufighters and a squadron of Cormorant dive bombers operating from land bases. The convoy had been covered by Japanese fighters, and the Allies had lost seven Beaufighters and three Cormorants as well as five Sparrowhawk fighters to the fighters and the AA. The Japanese had lost twelve fighters, and the cruiser HIJMS Mogami was sinking, as were four transports, with another two transports burning. The Japanese commander pressed on despite these losses, and by the late afternoon was ready to make his landings on the island. The troops had now been reduced to some 9,000, and a considerable amount of equipment had been lost. The Japanese intention was to establish a foothold for additional troops to exploit; another division was available in the Celebes to reinforce the landings.
23rd-24th March
As night fell, the two cruiser forces were still manoeuvring for advantage. The Japanese were trying to get into a position for a night attack, while the Allied force was trying to slip along the coast to get at the invasion convoy. A strike was attempted on the Japanese at 1730 from HMS Colossus, but was unable to find the force; the ASV-equipped plane leading the strike had equipment failure, and the rest of the strike did not spot the Japanese beneath the cloud cover. With the Japanese force now lost, HMS Colossus was ordered to fall back on the main fleet. However, her earlier attacks on the Japanese cruiser force have given away her approximate position to the enemy. At 1715, (while her own strike was on the way to the estimated position of the Japanese cruisers) a large enemy raid was detected closing from the northeast. This is a surprise to the plotting crew, who had not been expecting a strike from that direction. It is in fact a strike from the three IJN light carriers comprising the cover force for the invasion fleet; this force had been detected by a USAAF aircraft yesterday, and Somerville is intending to attack it. At the moment, his priority is the destruction of the invasion force. Due to a mishap, the report of the force had been missed by Colossus and her destroyer escorts.
The incoming attack consisted of 24 torpedo planes and 20 dive bombers, escorted by 16 fighters. As the Colossus was also covering the Allied cruiser force, she only had 14 fighters available, although all of these were either airborne or launched before the enemy raid arrived. Ironically this raid had been spotted by a Catalina on its way west, but it had been assumed it was headed towards Somerville's main carrier force, currently preparing to launch a strike of their own against the covering force, having spent the day closing the range.
The FAA fighters tried to engage the raid, in particular the dive bombers (felt to pose the greatest risk to a light carrier), but the Japanese escort fighters closed to protect them. In the ensuing fight ten Sparrowhawks were shot down for the loss of four dive bombers and seven escorti
ng fighters. Another dive bomber and three torpedo planes were shot down by the AA fire of the carrier and her escorts. Despite radical manoeuvring, the Colossus was hit by four torpedoes, one of which failed to explode. The damage caused by those that hit was enough to force her to a halt as her both her engine rooms started to flood. This abrupt stop actually helped her evade the first of the dive bombers, who were unable to compensate for the sudden loss of speed, and six huge plumes of water rose into the air in front of the listing carrier. Despite all her AA could so, the remaining ten dive bombers dove down to deliver their 500lb bombs. The ship was hit three times, all three bombs penetrating her hanger. Two burst in the hanger itself (fortunately empty of planes), the third went deeper into the forward engine room (the light carriers had no hanger deck armour), where it exploded, wrecking the equipment. Colossus was left heavily on fire and listing from the water flooding in through the torpedo holes.
Even as the Colossus was being attacked, the main British strike was on its way. The force was centred around the fleet carriers HMS Illustrious and HMS Implacable, and the light carrier HMAS Melbourne. Their strike consisted of 24 SeaLance torpedo planes and 24 Cormorant dive bombers, escorted by 20 Sparrowhawks. Somerville intended to follow up this attack with a night strike, but this would not be prepared until after dark (he did not want armed and fuelled planes on deck or in the hanger with a possible inbound Japanese airstrike). The strike arrived at the Japanese carrier force just after sunset.
The Japanese force was centred on three light carriers (despite the reports, they were only escorted by heavy cruisers, not battleships). These were the carriers Takasaki and Tsurigisaki (converted into carriers as part of the response to the increased RN carrier program in the late 1930's), and the CLV Taiyo. Between them, they carried over 80 planes. The carriers were escorted by four cruisers and eight destroyers. The incoming strike was not spotted until it was ten miles away from the carriers, the fading light having made the raid commander decide to go straight in. Due to the fighters sent off to escort the raid on HMS Colossus, the force only had fourteen fighters available, and with the short warning time, only nine were in the air when the strike arrived. The defenders were immediately attacked by the Sparrowhawks, preventing them from closing with the attacking planes, and only one torpedo plane was lost to the defending fighters. All nine of the Japanese fighters were shot down for the loss of six Sparrowhawks.
The attacks were led by the torpedo planes. One was shot down on its attack run, and another forced to drop its torpedo and turn away by the AA fire, but 21 SeaLance remained. Without enemy fighters to worry about, the swept in on the first two carriers in a classic hammer and anvil attack, hitting the Takasaki with three torpedoes, and the Tsurigisaki with one. These were not the new Mk XV aerial torpedoes, but even so the hits crippled the two Japanese ships. Even as the torpedo planes swung away, the dive bombers were falling into their near-vertical dives. Most of the planes were attacking the two already-damaged carriers (the third carrier, Taiyo, was some distance away and had been missed in the hurry to get the attack in before dark). The Cormorants were carrying 500lb bombs due to the range (the strike had been launched at near to the maximum range, as the Japanese force was under observation by ASV-equipped RAF planes which had been able to guide it in), but these were more than adequate against the poorly-protected converted carriers. The Takasaki was already reeling and listing from the torpedo hits, and with no fighters to worry about the Cormorants could take their time. Three bombs hit the Takasaki, leaving her blazing in the falling night, and four exploded deep inside the Tsurigisaki. Ten minutes after the raid ended the Tsurigasaki exploded, sinking soon after. She would be joined in an hour by the Takasaki, her converted merchant hull unable to handle the structural damage from torpedoes and bombs.
The remaining six dive bombers headed for the Taiyo, which had been finally been spotted. The light was failing in the swift tropical twilight, and the dive bombers did not manage to get any hits, although they reported the carrier as 'damaged', having mistaken a couple of close misses as hits. The planes made it back to their carriers after dark without major incident as, despite the risk of submarine attack, the carriers used landing lights to help the planes land safely.
To the south, the invasion convoy had finally made landfall late in the afternoon. The Dutch commander of the defences had decided to let them land then counterattack, a decision later criticised by the Imperial commanders. As a result by sunset some 4,000 troops had got ashore (although with little equipment), only resisted by local light forces. The Dutch commander reported he would launch an attack on the beachhead at 0700 the following morning.
Unknown to the Japanese, Somerville had a second carrier force off Java - the two fleet carriers HMS Ark Royal and HMS Bulwark. This force was south of the island, and had been steaming east all day at 25 knots, putting it in range of the Japanese landing by 1800. The force had not been detected; the Japanese reconnaissance was concentrated north of Java, as they had indications of a carrier force there, and their intelligence led them to believe the RN only had the ships available to form one force. This would lead to one of the FAA's trademark night strikes. At 1900, the first strike set off, led by the ASV-equipped Spearfish, and followed an hour later by the rest of the planes. As the Japanese had no night fighter capability as far as the RN knew, the strikes were unescorted. The first that the Japanese knew was when their frantic unloading of their ships was suddenly illuminated by flares dropped by the raid leaders. The only defence of the ships was by wild and ineffective AA fire, as the torpedo planes bore in to attack the transport ships. The second strike, by the remaining torpedo planes and the dive bombers, was even easier - by now the Japanese defence was erratic and uncoordinated, the sea and the remaining ships lit by the burning hulks left by the first strike. Although the dive bombers were under orders to pull out higher than usual (to allow a safer attack at night), the sitting targets of unloading transports were hardly radically manoeuvring destroyers. By the time the last of the planes were recovered to the carriers only three transports were left, and the aircraft had also sunk two cruisers.
The Japanese now had only 6,000 men ashore on Java, with only limited equipment and ammunition.
March 23rd - 24th continued.
As night drew on the two cruiser forces were continuing to manoeuvre for position. The Japanese commander was trying to close on the Allied force for a night torpedo attack. The original orders to the Allies, to get behind the Japanese and shell the invasion convoy, had been rescinded when the Colossus was hit, and on the report that the southern air strike was in progress. So both forces were moving westward, the Allies trying to stay between any enemy force and the burning carrier.
The engineers' report on Colossus was not good; the combination of underwater damage, loss of power and the fires were overwhelming the light carrier, and now only damage control parties remained onboard. It was in this condition that the Japanese cruisers found her. As the enemy force closed, the Allied cruiser force moved to intercept. Not all the Allied cruisers were equipped with radar, or used to working together in night actions, and it had been hoped to draw the Japanese cruisers away so they would be vulnerable in the morning - Somerville had a surprise waiting for them come daybreak. However, the light from the fires burning in the carrier's hanger deck had been spotted, and to allow the remaining crew to be evacuated, the cruisers moved in to the attack.
The first hits were obtained by HMS Exeter at 0030 - her radar had allowed her to be targeting the Haguro for some time, and her third salvo scored on the heavy cruiser. Fires broke out on the Japanese ship, allowing the USS Houston to also target her. The Allied force was roughly equal in gun power, even without the Perth (ordered to Singapore with two destroyers as escort after the heavy torpedo damage she had taken), but the Allies were short of destroyers. Two had been ordered to help take off the Colossus's remaining crew, leaving only five destroyers to the Japanese thirteen. This allowed the Japanes
e destroyers to close in on the Allied cruiser line and make a torpedo attack (the Japanese ships carried reload torpedoes, allowing them to replace the ones used earlier). They also split off a force of five destroyers, which headed for the Colossus.
The night torpedo attack was from a closer range than the earlier daytime attack, and was more successful. One of the Japanese destroyers was sunk, intercepted by the defending ships, but the remainder managed a launch against the cruisers. The cruiser line was by now heavily engaged in a gun battle with the Japanese cruisers - the Haguro was burning heavily with three turrets out of action as a result of fire from HMS Exeter and USS Houston, and the light cruiser Naka was also in trouble, being targeted by HMS Danae, HMS Dragon and HMAS Hobart, although Danae had also taken a number of hits. HMS Exeter was hit by two of the Long Lance torpedoes, the cruiser hit aft and in her engine spaces. Without propulsion or power, she slowed to a stop, although the forward turrets were still firing manually. USS Houston was barely missed by another torpedo which passed forward of her by a matter of feet. But the small cruiser Danae, the fire from her shell hits making her an easier target, was hit by three of the large torpedoes. She rolled over and sank in less than two minutes, taking most of her crew with her.