The 30th and 31st Reserve Divisions formed the garrison of Riga. The 36th Reserve Division joined Generallieutenant Sacken and took part in operations against the Austro-Saxon forces, while the 37th Reserve Division was delayed in its formation because its parent unit, the 27th Division, was itself newly formed.
The 6th and 21st Divisions, stationed in Finland, were reinforced by the 38th Recruit Division, formed from the depots in Kargopol and Olonets. The 39th and 42nd Recruit Divisions were destined to reinforce Muller-Zakomelski's 1st Reserve Army. The 43rd through 47th Recruit Divisions were to reinforce Tormassov's 3rd Army of the West, but the beginning of the campaign slowed the completion of these divisions,resulting in their battalions being deployed piecemeal, rather than as major reinforcements.
There was yet one other formation in the Russian army during this period—the converged grenadier divisions—which provided a means of more effectively utilizing the manpower tied up in the depots. The converged grenadier battalions consisted of three elite companies stripped out of the depot battalions. These battalions were then grouped in accordance with a system that retained their parent division integrity. That is, battalions from one division had their companies joined into two converged battalions and no companies from any other divisions were ever mixed with them. These converged grenadier divisions were then distributed between the field armies where they acted as a reserve force.
An examination of the Russian 1st Corps will show some converged infantry and cavalry regiments. These converged regiments were, in fact, various reserve divisions that had been reorganized into the most functional formation for their limited manpower. Generalmajor Hamen's 32nd Reserve Division was so understrength that it could best be employed as the two converged infantry regiments it became. The converged cuirassier regiment and the converged Guard regiments had similar origins.
Russian Cavalry
In 1807 there were six cuirassier regiments in the Russian army. Prior to 1812 these cuirassier regiments had five squadrons each, but by the end of 1812 a sixth and seventh squadron had been raised. During the campaign, the Pskof and Starodoub Dragoon Regiments were converted to cuirassiers, raising the total of such regiments to eight.
In 1809 there were eleven hussar regiments, each with ten squadrons and a reserve squadron which acted as a depot. During 1812 the Irkhoutsk Hussar Regiment was formed from the combined remnants of the dragoon regiment of the same name and the “opolochenie,” or militia, horse regiment known as the Hussars of Count Slatikov.
In 1808 there were five uhlan regiments, organized the same as the hussar regiments. During the 1812 campaign the number of field squadrons was reduced to six. By the end of 1812 seven new uhlan regiments were organized by the result of the conversion of seven dragoon regiments to uhlan regiments.
There were thirty dragoon regiments in 1803. These had the same organization as the cuirassier regiments. During the 1812 campaign this number was reduced to twenty-one regiments as two were converted to cuirassiers and seven became uhlans. By the end of the 1812 campaign, the remaining dragoons raised a sixth field squadron.
The armament of the Russian cavalry regiments was not significantly different from that of their contemporaries, but a few differences evolved during the war with France. The most unusual difference was the equipping of the first rank of the first squadron of the hussar regiment with lances. The other change was necessitated by the heavy losses of material. The carbines were stripped from all of the cavalry regiments, and rifled carbines were issued to the sixteen men per squadron designated as flankers.
The cuirassier regiments had a total of 864 officers and men. Each squadron had 161 officers and men. The dragoon regiments had 897 officers and men. Each squadron had 166 officers and men. The hussar and uhlan regiments had 1,669 officers and men. Standards were carried only in the cuirassier, dragoon, and those light regiments which had distinguished themselves.
The structure of each regiment depended on its type, but was relatively consistent below the squadron level. Each squadron was organized into two half-squadrons. Each half-squadron had two platoons and each platoon had two half-platoons.
The Russian cavalry drill was primarily based on the Prussian drill of the period, but the Grand Duke Constantine made several changes which did not always have happy results. General Patapov produced a cavalry drill regulation based on Constantine's ideas, but it proved inexe-cutable on the battlefield.
The actual squadron school was decidedly different from that of the French army. Demiconversions were executed at the gallop, with an underofficer acting as a guide to control the movement in the same manner as in the British army. The Russians never deployed by platoons as did the French and Austrians, and the demiconversions were executed by threes because the number of files was evenly divisible by three. In a full conversion, the maneuver was executed in a different manner. A platoon of ten files was divided into three parts of four, three, and three files.
This conversion by threes forced the troopers to continually count their numbers and identify their position in the maneuvers. If there were casualties, the less-well-trained troopers often found it difficult to execute these maneuvers properly, and in consequence, the maneuvers would become sloppy. In contrast, under the French system, less-well-trained troops could be placed in the second rank and no problem would arise.
All Russian cavalry regiments, regardless of type, had a body of flankers whose function was skirmishing and scouting. In the dragoon and cuirassier regiments, where the entire regiments also received training in foot tactics like the French dragoons, these sixteen flankers were posted in the end files of each platoon. These were the men that were armed with rifled carbines.
A similar arrangement existed in the hussar and uhlan regiments, but this number was expanded considerably as the campaign went on. In the uhlan regiments, the extreme files of the first, second, and fourth platoons and the entire third platoon were designated as flankers. In the hussar regiments, all of the troopers were trained to function as skirmishers.
Russian Artillery
The artillery was probably the most important branch of the Russian army. The Russians were very partial to this arm, and as a result it was highly professional and very well trained, receiving special consideration and the finest horses available. Its weaponry included the licorne, a long-barreled howitzer designed and developed by Danilov and Martinov in 1757, that had a greater range and more accuracy than the howitzers used by the other European armies.
In 1805 the Russian artillery underwent a major material reorganization on a par with the introduction of the Gribeauval System in France. Count Alexei Arakcheyev standardized the calibers of the Russian guns to the 6pdr and 12pdr cannon and the 3pdr, lOpdr, and 20pdr licornes (the 3pdr was subsequently determined to be unsuitable and withdrawn from service in 1812). All of the Russian guns were made of highly polished brass, and after 1811 they were fitted with the “Karbanov System” of gunsights, which was among the best available at the time. Unlike the block system used by other European nations, this was an elevating wedge operated by screws. It gave the guns far greater accuracy.
In 1812 the Russian artillery consisted of position batteries, light batteries, and horse batteries. All three types of batteries had twelve guns each. Two guns were designated as a section, two sections formed a division, and three divisions formed a battery.
The position batteries consisted of four 20pdr licornes, four medium 12pdrs, and four short 12pdrs. The light and horse batteries had four lOpdr howitzers and eight 6pdr guns. The licomes were always posted in homogeneous divisions.
The Russian artillery was organized into twenty-seven brigades, each with one position and two light batteries. A brigade was assigned to each infantry division. There were also ten reserve brigades with four companies each and four depot brigades with eight companies each. In addition, the pontooniers and horse artillery were organized into independent formations that were distributed rather unequally througho
ut the army. There was also the garrison artillery and Guard Artillery Brigade. This gave the Russians a total of forty-five position batteries, fifty-eight light batteries, and twenty-two horse batteries.
In 1812 the “General Rules for Artillery in Field Action” was published by Generalmajor Kutisov, a student of Napoleon's concept of artillery. He advocated the use of massed artillery to knock holes in the enemy line or to stop attacks. In his work, Kutisov said that the main function of artillery was to engage in counterbattery fire and knock out the enemy's guns. He considered it worth checking the range at 1,000 yards because, though it would do little damage, it would discomfort the enemy's movements. At 450 yards, however, the fire would be murderous. He advocated that the artillery fire as rapidly as possible at the 450-yard range. He went on to advocate concealing as much of one's artillery as possible and slowly feeding it into the battle. This is what he intended to do at the Battle of Borodino, but he was killed before he had the opportunity to do so.
Other Line Units
In addition to the line infantry, there was also a small marine infantry organization. These four marine regiments had a three-battalion organization in 1803 and underwent the same reorganization as the rest of the line infantry in 1810. In 1811 they were incorporated into the army, and the first three were assigned to the 25th Division. The fourth went to the 28th Division. Only the Caspian Battalion was not changed by the 1810 reorganization. The marine regiments had a total of 1,968 officers and men. Each battalion had 633 officers and men, and each company had 158 officers and men.
The Russians had a long tradition of building field fortifications. In 1805 there were two regiments of pioneers, each with two battalions consisting of an elite company of sapper-miners and three companies of pioneers. In 1806 a third battalion was raised in both regiments. In 1812 two battalions of pioneers were organized from this force.
In 1812 the Sapper Regiment was formed by converging all of the existing engineering forces. It had a “Line Sapper Battalion” that had two companies of miners and two companies of sappers. The other battalion, the “Line Pioneer Battalion,” had one company of sappers and three of miners.
The Russian Guard
The Russian Guard was formed in 1683 when Peter the Great organized the first two Guard infantry regiments, Preobragenski and Semenov-ski. The Guard infantry added a third regiment in 1730 with the raising of the Ismailov Guard Infantry Regiment. Prior to 1805 all three regiments were redesignated as grenadier regiments. Preobragenski had four battalions, while the others had three. When the Guard Jagers were raised by Paul I, they had only a single four-company battalion.
In 1806, when a second battalion was added, the Guard Jagers became a regiment. In the same year the Imperial Militia Battalion was raised from peasants in the imperial domains. In 1807 a second battalion was raised and this became the Finland Guard Infantry Regiment. In addition, the half-company of artillery attached to the guard passed into the Guard Artillery Brigade.
In 1811 the Guard infantry took on the same external organization as the line infantry. Each battalion had an elite company divided into two platoons, one of grenadiers and one of tirailleurs. In the Guard Jager Regiment they were known as carabiniers. In 1811 the Finland Guard Regiment became a light regiment.
During the last months of 1811 the Lithuania Guard Infantry Regiment was formed with two newly raised battalions and the fourth battalion of the Preobragenski Regiment. With the reorganization of the Russian army into standing divisions, the guard division had three brigades.
In 1812 the Guard Sapper Battalion and Guard Equipage Battalion were raised, mimicking Napoleon's Guard Marines.
The Guard infantry regiments had 2054 officers and men each. A Guard battalion had 644 officers and men each. A company had 153 officers and men each. The Guard Jagers had a slightly smaller organization. Each battalion had 444 officers and men. Instead of fifers they had buglers.
In 1805 the Guard cavalry consisted of the Chevalier Guards, Horse Guards, Guard Hussars, and Guard Cossacks. The organization of the first three regiments was identical. Each had a total of 872 officers and men organized into five squadrons. Each squadron had 160 officers and men.
In 1809 the Grand Duke Constantine Uhlans passed into the Guards and its ten squadrons were used to form the Guard Uhlans and the Guard Dragoons. These regiments had five squadrons each, but their organization was slightly larger. They had 917 officers and men each. Their squadrons had 164 officers and men each.
In 1812 there were three Guard cuirassier regiments. The Chevalier Guards and Horse Guards raised a sixth squadron. The Emperor Cuirassiers, who joined the Guard in very late 1812, had only five. The Guard Hussars, Uhlans, and Dragoons also raised a sixth squadron each.
The Guard artillery had a total of four foot batteries, two position and two light, and two horse batteries. The foot batteries had a total of 1,005 officers, artillerists, train, and other staff personnel. Each foot battery had 206 officers and men manning twelve guns. The batteries had the same mix of licornes and cannon as the line batteries. The two horse batteries had 358 officers and men. Each battery had 198 officers and men.
The Guard Equipage Battalion was a single battalion and an artillery section. The battalion was organized with 435 men. Each of its four companies had 104 officers and men. The artillery section had fifty-one officers and artillerists. The Guard Sapper Battalion had four companies, two of sappers and two of miners.
Russian Irregular Forces
The Russian army had two irregular formations of note. The most famous and glamorous of these were the cossacks, the border guards of the Russian Empire. They were posted on the frontiers where Russia contacted the wild eastern tribes and the ever-threatening Turks. The hostile nature of their territories, or “vioskos,” resulted in their maintaining a continuous military organization always ready to engage the invader.
The size and composition of the cossack contingents from the various “vioskos” varied greatly. The famous Ataman Platov lead the Don Cossacks. This force consisted of many cossack “pulks,” or regiments, and two cossack artillery batteries. There were also ten pulks of Black Sea Cossacks, four Crimean Tartar pulks, a single Orenburg Cossack regiment, ten Ural Cossack pulks, ten Siberian Cossack pulks and two horse batteries, three Bug Cossack pulks, and in 1812 the Ukraine raised four regiments. In addition there were two regiments of Bashkirs and two of Kalmucks. The organization of these regiments was quite irregular. The number of “sotnias,” or squadrons, varied, as did the strength of those sotnias.
In 1811 the 1st and 2nd Ural Pulks were disbanded. On 5 June the Army of the Ukraine raised four new regiments. On 18 July 1812, fifteen Little Russia Cossack pulks were raised as a result of a draft, only to be disbanded in 1816. On 8 August 1812 the Orenburg Cossacks raised the Ataman Regiment, which had ten sotnias. In addition, twenty regiments of Bashkirs were raised, only to be disbanded in 1814 and 1815.
There were also two other regiments that had once been part of the cossack formations that were transferred to the regular army. These were the Tchougouiev Uhlan Regiment and the Tartar Horse Regiment. They had organizations that were roughly identical to those of the line uhlan regiments.
The other irregular force that existed was the “opolochenie,” or militia. This had been raised in previous years, but never stood to arms very long. In 1806-1807 a total of thirty-two battalions of skirmishers and an unknown number of mobile battalions were raised. However, a week later two-thirds of them were disbanded. The only formation raised during this period that was not disbanded was the Imperial Militia Battalion which became part of the Guard.
The opolochenie raised in 1812 was a reaction to the French invasion, but plans had been laid for its formation as early as 1810. Even so, when raised, it was poorly organized and inadequately armed. Though a standard organization was issued, it was seldom attained. In addition, the men were armed with anything available, including muskets, though seldom, pikes, and hatchets.
> The “druzhin” or cohorts (equivalent of a regiment) was the basic unit of the opolochenie. They were used as a source of replacements for the line units towards the end of the war. At Malo-Jaroslavets it was reported that pike-carrying opolochenie were used to fill out the third ranks of the companies. There are repeated references to the St. Petersburg opolochenie being absorbed into line units around the second battle of Polotsk. Other units, like the Count Saltiko Hussars of the Moscow contingent, did pass into the regular army.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the military had evolved a supply system based on the amassing of supplies in magazines and fortifications augmented by purchases from civilian contractors who followed in the wake of every army. These supply systems were rudimentary at best, and it was not possible for an army to sustain itself at any distance from its magazines. This restriction led to a system of military operations that were carefully planned, long in advance, and supported by the accumulation of military supplies for months prior to the actual inception of the campaign.
Once a war had begun, it was heavily influenced by supply considerations. There were no lightning maneuvers, troops marching hundreds of miles as was seen in the 1805 campaign. The wars of this period were like the jousting of turtles and seldom penetrated far into the country of either nation involved.
These wars were primarily wars of maneuver where one army attempted to establish itself in the enemy's territory in a strong position. It would then begin to ravage the enemy's territory until it forced the enemy to come to battle on as unfavorable terms as possible or was forced to move to fresh, unravaged country. These wars resulted in a continual squabbling over border provinces that exchanged hands every few years.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 11