Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  Knowing this, the Russians attempted to provide a flexible magazine system which operated in a specific area, gathering in supplies from the peasants to support the army. However, there was never sufficient time to establish these magazines and the carts employed to transport the provisions had a bad habit of being captured by the advancing French. In addition, because of the personal danger to the wagoners, they reacted in ways that protected themselves, but that acted to the detriment of the army they were to feed. They tended to take the long, safe route, and if it took two weeks, well that was too bad.

  There was a further failure that resulted from the lack of proper preparation on the upper Dvina, the upper Dnieper, in Smolensk, and along the roads to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The initial Russian plan was to withdraw only as far as the Dvina, but the unexpected changing of plans totally upset the Russian supply plans. They were, as a result, obliged to supply their armies on an ad hoc basis during the middle phases of the campaign.

  During the French withdrawal, the Russians provided their armies with supplies drawn by requisitions from the outlying cities and farming regions along the side of the French line of advance that had not been ravaged by the French. This material was passed through the flexible magazines described earlier. The supplies so gathered were transported in any and all available transportation, civilian and military. This system was one that sprang up to meet the needs of the army rather than a formally organized and planned military system. It did succeed in feeding the Russian army. Its vehicles were adapted to use on the notoriously bad Russian roads, and it was not subject to the ravagings of the cossacks or pillaging by its own troops who had lost all discipline. This does not mean that it functioned perfectly. It did not. It had its failures and, though the lot of the Russian soldiers was better, they weren't immune from the pain and hardships of hunger. They also died by the thousands from cold and hunger.

  As Napoleon began reorganizing his army for the campaign, he quickly encountered manpower problems. His first step was to bring the fourth and sixth battalions of his infantry regiments up to strength by stripping the regimental depots of men and sending them forward in July 1811. On 1 July the conscripts forming the Class of 1811 were called to active duty. During August they departed for their depots.

  The Expansion for War Begins

  In December a new decree ordered a levy from the Class of 1812 as well as 7,920 new drafts from the Classes of 1810 and 1811 in the seven departments of Holland, the Rhine Estuary, Breda, and the Scheldt Estuary. A major recruiting campaign began on 10 February 1812 in an effort to raise still more manpower.

  The increased recruiting and conscription could solve the numerical aspect of the manpower problem, but problems arose with the quality of the noncommissioned officers necessary to supervise and train the new recruits. Indeed, there were insufficient men available to be raised to noncommissioned officer status. On 1 July 1811 it was reported that many of the newly promoted noncommissioned officers in several of the newly formed sixth battalions did not have the prerequisite two years of service for the Fontainbleau noncommissioned officer school. Napoleon insisted that these unqualified men be returned to the ranks and that only qualified individuals, those with two years of service and attendance at the Fontainbleau school, be appointed to the ranks of noncommissioned officers.

  Napoleon justified this by stating that he felt that a noncommissioned officer must have practical experience in war in order to be able to attend to the special needs of soldiers in the field. Anyone lacking this experience could not possibly function properly. To underscore this point, Napoleon issued the Decree of 2 August 1811, which stated that no conscript could become a corporal or brigadier until he had two years of service. This decree also set very specific periods of time before a soldier could be promoted to any of the other noncommissioned ranks. To become a corporal fourier or brigadier fourier required two and a half years of service. To become a sergeant or quartermaster sergeant required four years of service, and to rise from sergeant-major, quartermaster sergeant, or adjudant to lieutenant required eight years of service.

  There was a great deal of concern regarding the quality of the soldiers being used to form the sixth battalions. On 25 August Davout reported to Napoleon that he had taken conscripts from the sixth battalions and spread them amongst the first four field battalions in an effort to even out the distribution of new drafts into his regiments. Concurrent with this he withdrew veterans from the first four battalions and placed them into the new sixth battalions to provide those battalions with a solid cadre of veteran soldiers.

  Davout spoke of his shortage of noncommissioned officers or men who could qualify to become noncommissioned officers. Principally he spoke of the requirement that they be able to read and write. As a stopgap measure, Davout informed Napoleon that he was promoting individuals to the ranks of noncommissioned officers if they seemed capable, but did not fully meet the requirements.

  In addition to the newly raised sixth battalions, Napoleon was giving serious consideration to raising a seventh battalion in each regiment or increasing the number of men assigned to each battalion. It had become apparent that the recruiting campaign and the drafts were producing more men than had been anticipated. Napoleon sought an efficient use of these men and consulted Davout. Davout's opinion, in a letter dated 10 September 1811, was that a battalion of 960 men was too large to be managed properly. He supported the idea of a seventh battalion.

  Davout went on to say that if Napoleon's decision was to raise a seventh battalion, he would require six to eight weeks to pull sufficient cadres from his corps for this project. He also felt that despite the earlier discussions of a shortage of qualified noncommissioned officers, he could find enough of them for the seventh battalions.

  Though there was frantic activity in 1811, the actual military preparations for the 1812 campaign began shortly after the 1809 campaign. Napoleon had no idea that by 1812 he would be at war with Russia, his nominal ally. The ground work for the Grande Armée of 1812 was being laid in the demobilization of the Grande Armée of 1809.

  Changes After the 1809 Campaign

  The French armies began withdrawing from Austria after the Peace of Schònbrunn. Many units returned to their garrisons in France, while others took up positions in Germany. Major formations occupied Dusseldorf, Hanau, Fulda, the Hanseatic cities, Hanover, Magdeburg, Bayreuth, Salzburg, and Rastibon. These cities were all occupied by late February 1810, but the demobilization of the French armies was to continue.

  On 15 May Napoleon ordered the disbanding of the Armée d'Alle-magne. In its place Napoleon ordered Davout to organize a new army. Davout did this and repositioned some of these forces. He moved forces into Passau, Danzig, Stettin, Kustrin, and Glogau, while maintaining garrisons in the cities mentioned earlier.

  During 1812 the Armée de Barbant, which consisted of the French forces occupying Holland as well as the Dutch army, was disbanded. It had consisted of two divisions of infantry, a National Guard division, a light cavalry division, and a Dutch infantry division. All told it had 38,791 French infantry, 4,392 French cavalry, 9,369 Dutch infantry, and 1,007 Dutch cavalry. It was dissolved in April. The National Guard was demobilized and some of the French troops returned to garrisons in France.

  On 1 May 1810 the Corps d' Observation de la Hollande was organized to replace the Armée de Barbant. Pursuant to the treaty of 16 March 1810, it consisted of 12,000 Dutch troops and those French troops remaining in Holland. This corps lasted only until 9 July 1810, when Holland was formally incorporated into metropolitan France. The Dutch army ceased to exist, and the Decree of 18 August 1810 incorporated it into the French army.

  On 19 September 1810 Napoleon directed Prince Eugene, viceroy of Italy, to reorganize the Armée d'Italie. It had 27,000 men and a guard of 3,000. After the 1809 campaign it had stood down and been renamed the “Corps d'Observation d'Italie.” The corps consisted of three infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and the Italian Royal
Guard.

  On 4 October 1810 Napoleon set about reorganizing the Armée d'Allemagne. It was to have three infantry divisions, a light cavalry division, and a heavy cavalry division. It was to be equipped with 110 guns and a double provision of ammunition. Its engineering corps was to consist of six sapper companies, one miner company, and two pon-toonier companies. It was also to have a gendarme force of 100 men. It was renamed the Corps d'Observation de l'Elbe. Prior to completion of the reorganization, the three infantry divisions were increased to four divisions. This growth continued, and by August 1811 a fifth division was organized.

  A sixth division was raised from the various allied contingents under the command of General Grandjean and became the garrison of Danzig. The eighth and ninth divisions were also raised in August. The eighth was formed in Minister and the ninth was raised in Nijmegen.

  The Corps d'Observation du Rhin was renamed the Corps d'Observation des Còtes de 1'Ocean, but it underwent no changes until 1 January 1811. At that time its first two divisions were formed and held in Boulogne, the third was raised in Utrecht, and the fourth in Emden.

  The Corps d'Observation de l'Elbe, Corps d'Observation des Còtes de l'Océan, and the Corps d'Observation d'Italie constituted the standing French army in early 1811. These three corps were to form the nucleus of the Grande Armée of 1812.

  On 17 April 1811 Napoleon ordered the formation of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cuirassier Divisions. The regiments that were to form these divisions were moved into Germany in September and began organizing in October in Bonn, Erfurt, and Cologne. The cuirassier division with Davout's corps was designated as the 1st Cuirassier Division.

  Napoleon began gathering his artillery together in the forward magazines at Metz, Wesel, la Fere, and Strasbourg, where it would be ready to move into Germany quickly. At the same time Napoleon ordered the organization of a major bridging train in Danzig. The task of this train was to throw two bridges over the Vistula when Napoleon decided it was time to advance.

  Napoleon also ordered the formation of two siege trains. One was formed in Danzig and the other in Magdeburg. He also began a selective recall of troops fighting in Spain. Efforts to accumulate provisions in Magdeburg, Stettin, Kustrin, and Glogau were accelerated, while Danzig was to become the principal depot, repair facility, and construction center of the French forces deployed in eastern Germany.

  Napoleon's Allies Prepare for War

  During early 1811 Napoleon began urging the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Westphalia to expedite the mobilization of their armies. He was greatly concerned about the possibility of a preemptive Russian attack and wanted both armies ready to defend their borders. He also pushed the various other princes in the Confederation of the Rhine to do the same. Similar urgings were sent to Davout, Eugene, and Ney.

  On 9 August 1811 Napoleon signed a conscription decree for the Army of Cleve-Berg. The decree called up a total of 1,850 men. With the addition of further drafts to replace desertions from the ranks, the actual total called up came to 2,150 men. Six hundred of these men were used to rebuild the 1/lst Regiment in Dusseldorf, 1,200 were to form the 4th Regiment, and the remainder went to the cavalry regiment and train units.

  Napoleon hoped to rebuild the Berg army with this draft until the 1st Regiment had one 600-man battalion and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Regiments had two full 600-man battalions each. The cavalry was to have a total of 1,000 men and the artillery, train, and engineers were to have 1,500 men. However, the 1811 draft proved insufficient and a further draft was called in 1812.

  Pressures were applied to the other German states, reaching a peak in December 1811. In February 1812 the first German division was organized with the contingents of Berg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt. This division was assigned to General Daendels and sent north, where it occupied Swedish Pommerania, Stettin, and Kustrin in early March 1812. In addition, the forces of Frankfurt and Wurzburg were joined to form the nucleus of the “division princiére” and stationed in Hamburg.

  The two Mecklenburg contingents were formed into a brigade and assigned to the Corps d'Observation de l'Elbe, now known as I Corps. However, the armies of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wiirttemberg were not expected to be mobilized until March 1812.

  During the month of February the strength and positions of the allied contingents of the Grande Armée were as follows:

  The Wùrttembergers under the command of the Prince of Wurttemberg totaled 10,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 1,000 artillery, and 30 guns. With the exception of the 7th Regiment, which was assigned to garrison Danzig, the entire Wurttemberg army was awaiting orders at Heilbronn on 26 February. It was assigned to the HI Corps under the command of Marshal Ney.

  The Bavarian army consisted of 14,000 infantry, 3,174 cavalry, and 1,016 artillerists and train. Between 10 and 15 February they left their garrisons and moved to the Saxon border. They were assigned to the VI Corps under the command of General St. Cyr.

  Saxony provided two mixed divisions, each with about 9,000 men. Additional Saxon forces were serving as garrisons in Danzig and Glogau. Saxony provided a total of 624 officers, 19,013 men, 6,160 horses, and 59 guns. However, Saxony did not mobilize its forces until later in 1812, choosing to keep their forces in garrisons in Dresden, Torgau, Buben, Lubeck, and Kottbus.

  The Westphalian army consisted of 20,000 men, 4,416 horses, and 40 guns, not including the 1st and 8th Infantry Regiments stationed in Danzig, the Chevauléger Regiment serving in Spain, and an infantry battalion also serving in Spain. The main Westphalian army was scattered through Westphalia in garrisons in Kassel, Halberstadt, Ascherlebe, Hil-desheim, Brunswick, Muhlhausen, Nordhausen, and other cities.

  The Westphalian corps was initially organized into three groups: a mixed brigade forming the advanced guard, a division of ten infantry battalions and a reserve formed of an infantry brigade, a cuirassier brigade, and the park. Napoleon found this arrangement awkward and in February directed Jerome to reorganize this force into two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. The Westphalian corps assembled between 10 and 15 March near Halle and Dessau with orders to cross the Elbe if called. Though Jerome was in command, all military considerations were left to General de division Vandamme.

  The Polish forces were fully organized and standing to arms in March. Napoleon made no further dispositions of their forces, but ordered the raising of a fourth battalion for every infantry regiment. He also directed that the cavalry regiments be raised from 850 to 1,050 men.

  During January 1812 the Corps d'Observation de l'Elbe was divided into the I and II Corps. The I Corps had five divisions and the II Corps had three. Oudinot, who commanded the II Corps, moved his forces to Minister and Osnabruck.

  The Corps d'Observation des Cótes de I Ocean was reorganized into the 7th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions on 15 February. They then assembled in Mainz under the command of Marshal Ney as the II Corps. The Corps d'Observation d'Italie became the IV Corps and its divisions were numbered as the 13th, 14th, and 15th Divisions. On 15 February these divisions occupied Botzen, Tremot, Verona, and Bresica.

  The cavalry reserve was divided into three corps, each having a light cavalry division and two divisions of either cuirassiers or dragoons. A remount depot was established in Hanover under the command of General Broucier. He was charged with securing sufficient horses from German sources to fully mount all three cavalry corps.

  General Daendels' 26th Division was organized by Napoleon on 22 January 1812. It consisted of forces from Frankfurt, Wurzburg, Meck-lenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Rhin-bund Regiments.

  As the invasion drew closer, Napoleon began to look to the requirements of the first days of the campaign. He paid particular attention to the bridging requirements of the Niemen. To cross it he needed a bridging train capable of crossing a 600-foot-wide river. To solve this he had three bridging trains organized in Danzig. The first two had 100 pontoons each, while the third had none. It was equipped solely with cordage and other necessary equi
pment. The other pontoonier companies were in Danzig, and five fully equipped companies were with the advanced guard. Napoleon also ordered the outfitting of two battalions of “mate-lots” (sailors) to assist in the crossing. These men were to man the boats that were to transport the first assault waves of infantry across the Niemen.

  Napoleon also organized his grand park. It was to have an additional 50 percent over the normal provision for the army's artillery and a 25 percent overprovision of infantry ammunition. However, this formation was not loaded until the invasion was imminent.

  The French park had eight artillery train companies attached to it. Six were French, one was Guard, and one was Italian. A total of 2,016 wagons were attached to those units. In addition, there were four newly raised battalions “à la comtoise” with 2,424 wagons, and four ox-drawn battalions with a further 1,224 wagons.

  Each regular wagon was capable of carrying an average of 30 metric hundredweights, the “comtoise” wagons would carry 12 metric hundredweights, and the ox wagons would carry 20 hundred-weights. This meant that the train could carry between 110,000 and 120,000 metric hundredweight of supplies.

  The effect of the call-up of the Class of 1812 on 24 December was substantial. By the end of January, half of the conscription was complete and approximately 120,000 draftees were called. Of that number, 112,249 were already in the depots being trained. The remaining 7,751 were retained in a reserve to be trained later.