There was also an argument concerning the weakly defended Old Smolensk Road, which was open to the classical Napoleonic flanking maneuver. Bennigsen and Kutusov were firm in their contention that the opolochenie was sufficient to hold this flank, and that Tuchkov's entire 3rd Infantry Corps was in a position to support them should they become too heavily involved with the French.
At dawn Napoleon began another review of the Russian positions, paying particular attention to their weak left and center. He advanced as far as the Russian outposts to insure that he had seen everything as clearly as possible. Poniatowski told him that he had not encountered heavy resistance, but Napoleon hesitated in deciding whether or not to attempt a grand tactical maneuver against the Russian left flank.
In the afternoon he again moved out to inspect the Russians, wishing to ascertain if there was any gap between the Bagration flèches and the right of the Russian 3rd Infantry Corps. As he stood on the heights opposite Borodino, Davout rode up and proposed taking the I and V Corps in a flanking maneuver around the Russian left flank. His proposal would bring him into the Russian flank and rear in the same manner as Junot should have done at Valoutino. The result would almost certainly have been the destruction of the Russians.
Such a maneuver was normally what Napoleon would have ordered, but in this instance he stated, “No! The movement is altogether too great! It would lead me away from my objective and make me lose too much time.* Many things no doubt passed through his mind. Foremost was the possibility that the Russians might once again refuse battle and disappear as they had at Smolensk. Or perhaps he feared that the Russians might go over to the offensive and strike him while a major portion of his army was maneuvering and unable to support him. He decided to commit the French to a bloody frontal assault. It is probable that he felt that he could have afforded the losses in men and material if he could have extracted an equal loss from the Russians and destroyed their only standing army. Having done so, he could have then brought up those forces he had left behind and have still had a substantial field force.
Above all Napoleon wanted a smashing victory which would force the Russians into political collapse. Another unsuccessful maneuver would merely waste time and leave him miles from his bases, far from the security of winter quarters in Smolensk and having obtained nothing for his gamble. No, he had committed too much and could not afford to let the Russians escape him again. He had no real choice but to pin them in place and pound them into submission.
As Napoleon returned to camp, Murat reported that the Russians appeared to be withdrawing. Napoleon moved back to the front quickly to see what was happening. What he saw was troops moving onto the field, not away from it.
The French Battle Plans
Napoleon's plans for the battle evolved during the remainder of the day. He decided to send Poniatowski's V Corps on a limited flanking maneuver along the Old Smolensk Road. He determined to make his main thrust against the Russian center, along a sector of about one and a half miles. Here he planned to mass 85,000 men of the three divisions of I Corps and the I, II, and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. He formed his forces into a deep columnar formation. Behind the I Corps he placed Ney's III Corps, Junot's Westphalians, the Guard Cavalry, the Young Guard, and finally the Old Guard. The Old Guard was designated as the last reserve. The assault formation was one-and-a-half miles long.
Napoleon posted Eugene north of the Kolocha with the IV Corps, Gerard's division of I Corps, and the III Reserve Cavalry Corps of General Grouchy. His task was to take the village of Borodino and the Raevsky Redoubt.
The Russian Positions
The Russians spent 6 September finishing off their entrenchments and positioning their forces. The 1st Army of the West was organized under the command of General of Infantry Miloradovitch. On its extreme right was the flank detachment of Colonel Vlasov III. His forces consisted of the Vlasov III Don Cossack Pulk and five sotnias of the Ataman Cossack Regiment.
Next came the Maslovo detachment of Generalmajor Passek who commanded the 4th, 30th, and 48th Jager Regiments. This force was positioned in the brush near Maslovo and the nearby woods. The Borodino detachment consisted of the Guard Jager Regiment, a section of the Guard Marine Equipage Battalion, and fourteen supporting guns.
In Gorki, Lieutenant Colonel Dieterichs III commanded the 11th and 36th Jager Regiments. They were positioned at the west entrance of Gorki and on both sides of the road.
The 2nd Infantry Corps, commanded by Generallieutenant Bag-govout, was positioned as follows: the 4th Division, Tobolsk, Volhynie, and Krementchug Infantry Regiments, 4th and 34th Jagers, and the Minsk Infantry Regiment. The 17th Division was positioned next and arranged left to right as follows: Riazan, Bieloserk, and Brest Infantry Regiments, 30th and 48th Jager Regiments, and Wilmanstrand Infantry Regiments. This force was supported by two battalions of Moscow opolochenie and seventy-two guns.
The 4th Infantry Coips, under Generallieutenant Ostermann-Tolstoy, was deployed as follows: 11th Division—Kixholm, Pernov, and Polotsk Infantry Regiments, 1st and 33rd Jager Regiments, and the Jeletz Infantry Regiment; 23rd Division—Rilsk, Ekaterinburg, and one battalion of the Seleguinsk Infantry Regiments and the 18th Jager Regiment. The corps was supported by forty-eight guns.
The 1st Cavalry Corps had the Niejine Dragoon Regiment and Polish Uhlan Regiment in the first rank, with the Guard Dragoon Regiment, Guard Hussar Regiment, Guard Uhlan Regiment, Guard Cossack Regiment, and twelve horse guns in the second rank. The 2nd Cavalry Corps had the Pskof and Moscow Dragoon Regiments in the front rank and the Elisabethgrad and Isoum Hussar Regiments in the second rank. The Kargopol and Ingremanland Dragoon Regiments had been detached, but ten horse guns remained with the 2nd Cavalry Corps.
General of Cavalry Platov was positioned with an independent force of cossacks consisting of the Don Cossacks of Ilowaiski #5, Grekov #18, Kharitonov #17, Jirov, five sotnias of the Ataman Regiment, Simpheropol Tartar Regiment, and twelve horse guns.
The center of the Russian position was commanded by General of Infantry Docturov. The first detachment from the center was under Colonel Voutich I and consisted of the 19th and 40th Jager Regiments. They were posted in the ravine to the right of the Raevsky Redoubt. The second detachment was under Generalmajor Alexapol. He commanded the 1st Jager Regiment, which was spread between the Raevsky Redoubt and Borodino. In the woods bordering the Kolocha, the 6th and 20th Jager Regiments were posted in a skirmish screen that reached to the Kamenka stream.
Docturov had deployed his 6th Infantry Corps with the 7th Division on his right. It was deployed, left to right, as follows: Moscow, Pskof, and Sofia Infantry Regiments, 36th Jager Regiment, and the Libau Infantry Regiment. To their left was the 24th Division under Generalmajor Lichat” cheff. They were, left to right, Oufa, Chirvan, and Bourtirki Infantry Regiments, 19th and 40th Jager Regiments, and the Tomsk Infantry Regiment.
Generalmajor Kreutz and his 3rd Cavalry Corps were posted in the center as well. The Kourland Dragoon Regiment and three squadrons of the Orenburg Dragoon Regiment were in the first line. The Soum and Marioupol Hussar Regiments were in the second line. The Siberian, Irkhoutsk, and one squadron of the Orenburg Dragoon Regiment and ten guns were detached to the road to the left as a rear guard.
The Russian main reserve consisted of the 5th Infantry Corps. The Guard Division was arranged with the Preobragenski, Semenovski, and Ismailov Guard Regiments in the first line. The Lithuanian and Finland Jager Guard Regiments were in the second line.
In addition to the Guard, the reserve contained the 1st Converged Grenadier Regiment which had three battalions drawn from the 4th and three battalions from the 17th Divisions, the 1st Cuirassier Division, and the main artillery reserve, 306 guns.
The left wing was commanded by General of Infantry Prince Bagration. The first detachment was under Colonel Goguel and consisted of the 5th, 41st, and 42nd Jager Regiments. This force was spread in a skirmish screen from west of the Kamenka to the detachment of General Alexapol. The s
econd detachment, under Generalmajor Prince Chakoff-ski, consisted of the 49th and 50th Jager Regiments, Tauride Grenadier Regiment, and the 21st Jager Regiment. This detachment was positioned from the leftmost flèche to the village of Utitza, where it occupied all the woods and brush in between.
The 7th Corps was posted with the 26th Division consisting of the Ladoga, Poltava, and Nivegorod Infantry Regiment, the 5th and 42nd Jager Regiments, and the Orel Infantry Regiment. To their left was the 12th Division with the Smolensk, Narva, and New Ingremannland Infantry Regiments, 6th and 41st Jager Regiments, and the Alexopol Infantry Regiment. This corps had two batteries, twenty-four guns, supporting it.
The 8th Infantry Corps was to the left of the 7th Infantry Corps. It was commanded by Generallieutenant Borozdin, The 2nd Grenadier Division was posted slightly behind and to the left of the 12th Division. It consisted of the Kiev, Astrakhan, Moscow, Siberia, Little Russia, and Fangoria Grenadier Regiments.
Behind the flèches was the 27th Division, consisting of the Vilna, Simbrisk, and Odessa Infantry Regiments, the 49th and 50th Jager Regiments, and the Tarnopol Infantry Regiment. This corps was supported by two batteries, twenty-four guns. It should be noted that portions of the 2nd Grenadier Division were occupying the three flèches.
The 4th Cavalry Corps was behind the 12th Division. It consisted of the Karkov, Tchernigov, Kiev Dragoon, and New Russia Dragoon Regiments. Behind them was the Akhtyrsk Hussar Regiment, the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment, and a horse battery of twelve guns.
The reserve of the right wing consisted of the 2nd Converged Grenadier Division and the 2nd Cuirassier Division. The 2nd Cuirassier Division was posted behind the 2nd Grenadier Division. It consisted of the Military Order, Ekaterinoslav, Gluchov, Novgorod, and Little Russia Cuirassier Regiments formed in two lines and a single horse battery.
A small detachment of eight cossack pulks was placed on the right flank of the 27th Division. This force was under the command of General-major Karpov and was in a picket screen that extended south towards Utitza.
The 3rd Infantry Corps was posted around Utitza. In the plain behind the village was Konovnitzin's 3rd Division. It consisted of the Mour-monsk, Revel, and Tchernigov Infantry Regiments, the 20th and 21st Jager Regiments, and the Seleguinsk Infantry Regiment. Behind them stood the 1st Grenadier Division consisting of the Leib, Count Arak-cheyev, Pavlov, Ekaterinoslav, Tauride, and St. Petersburg Grenadier Regiments. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Opolochenie Divisions, under the command of Generallieutenant Markov, and the Smolensk Opolochenie, commanded by Generallieutenant Lebedev, were posted behind the 1st Grenadier Division.
The Russians had divided their position by army corps. Each corps was supported by a small complement of artillery, while the bulk of the army's artillery was held in the general reserve. Two divisions occupied each sector. Initially all of the jagers were deployed as skirmishers before their respective divisions. Only the 33rd and 34th Jagers remained formed. The cavalry was formed in regimental lines, in two lines and behind the infantry, as a general rule.
In preparation for the coming battle, Kutusov toured the army, encouraging it. He was preceded by the Black Virgin of Smolensk icon. Kutusov read a proclamation to his soldiers saying, “Soldiers, fulfill your duties. Think of the sacrifices of your cities to the flames—of your children who implore you for protection. Think of your emperor, your lord, who regards you as the source of all his strength; and tomorrow, before the sun sets, you will have traced your faith and allegiance to your sovereign and country, in the blood of the aggressor and of his hosts.” Kutusov's passage through the ranks was preceded and followed by the incantations and prayers of the Russian Orthodox priests who sprinkled holy water, swung their censers, and blessed the troops and their colors. The Russian army was whipped up to a religious fervor with exhortations to drive the satanic invaders from the sacred soil of mother Russia.
As at Austerlitz, Kutusov issued only limited, last-minute orders. He left much of the execution of the pending battle to the local commanders. He did insist that they retain their reserves intact as long as possible, that they prevent the “troops from banging off with their muskets for no purpose, and to get the gunners to economize as far as possible their ammunition.” He fell back on the old Russian preference for the bayonet and stated that it would be the “fundamental tactic” of the day.
The commander of the 1st Army of the West's artillery, General Koutaissof, was an innovator and wished to stop a rather unfortunate habit of the Russian artillery. When threatened, the artillery would limber up and withdraw, fearing the loss of a gun more than being concerned for the infantry it left in the lurch. Koutaissof told his subordinates that they were
to remind the companies from me that they are not to make off before the enemy are actually sitting on the guns. Tell the commanders and all the officers that they must stand their ground until the enemy are within the closest possible cannister range, which is the only way that you will insure that we do not cede a yard of your position. The artillery must be prepared to sacrifice itself. Let the anger of your guns roar out! A battery which is captured after this will have inflicted casualties on the enemy which will more than compensate for the loss of the guns.
Although in this battle the Russian gunners obeyed these instructions, their habit of saving the guns at the expense of the infantry continued into the twentieth century and World War I.
French Battle Instructions
During the afternoon of 6 September, Napoleon received a courier from Paris who brought a new painting of his son, the king of Rome. He also brought news of Marmont's disastrous defeat at Salamanca at the hands of Wellington.
After that news, Napoleon set about preparing and dispatching his orders to the various corps. He ordered that the break of dawn should be marked by the fire of two new batteries organized during the night by Davout's corps against the flèches opposite them. Napoleon was still unaware that there was a third fiòche in this group.
At the moment General Pernety, commander of the I Corps artillery, with thirty guns from Compans' divisional artillery and all of the howitzers from Dessaix's and Friant's divisions shall commence to fire and crush with their shells the enemy battery, which shall have by this means, against it twenty four of the Guard's pieces, thirty from Compans' division and eight from the divisions of Dessaix and Friant; a total of sixty two guns.
General Foucher, commander of the artillery of III Corps, shall advance with all the howitzers of the III and VII Corps, which number sixteen, around the battery which forms the redoubt on the left. This will make forty guns against this battery.
General Sorbier shall be ready for the first command to detach himself with all the Guard howitzers and advance on one or the other redoubt.
During this cannonade Prince Poniatowski shall advance from the village towards the forest and turn the position of the enemy. General Compans shall skirt the forest to carry the first redoubt.
The cannonade on the right shall commence at the same moment as the cannonade on the right. A strong skirmish shall be started by Morand's division and by the divisions of the Viceroy (Eugene) as soon as they see the attack on the right begin. The Viceroy shall seize the village (Borodino), cross via the three bridges to the heights, as Generals Morand and Gerard advance under the Viceroy's orders to seize the (Raevsky) redoubt and form the line of the army.
All shall be done with order and method and having care to retain always a large quantity of reserves.
In addition to his orders to his generals, Napoleon had circulated to the lowest levels of his army his own proclamation, saying, “Soldiers, here is the battle that you have so desired. It will give us abundance, good winter quarters, and a prompt return to the fatherland. Conduct yourselves as at Austerlitz, Friedland, Vitebsk, Smolensk, and posterity will remember with pride your conduct on this day; that it shall be said of you: He was in the great battle under the walls of Moscow.”
Generally 6 September was spent by both sides in the pr
eparation of orders and less strenuous activities. Lieutenant Bogdanov, of the Russian engineers, was the one officer who was truly busy. He was charged with strengthening the Raevsky Redoubt. He spent the day digging a number of wolfpits about one hundred yards in front of the battery and extending the epaulments to a length of twenty-five yards. Taking timber from dismantled houses, he built a double palisade around the rear of the battery. The first stood upright and was about eight feet tall. The second was angled outwards and was about six feet in length. He left gaps on either end to permit troops and artillery limbers to enter or exit the redoubt.
After he inspected the work, General Raevsky said, “Now gentlemen, we may rest in security. When daylight comes Napoleon will espy what seems to be a single open battery, but his army will come up against a virtual fortress. The approaches are swept by more than 200 guns (he is counting those of the nearby field batteries), the ditch is deep and the glacis is solid.”
When night fell, no one in either camp slept soundly. The air was as full of tension as were the soldiers who looked forward to what might be the last day of their lives. The night echoed with the sounds of rumbling wheels as the armies made last-minute adjustments. The horizons were lit by a countless multitude of camp fires.
Napoleon slept less than all others. Still fearing that the Russians might decamp on him, he rose repeatedly to reassure himself that the Russians were still there. He rose at 3:00 A.M., spoke to his aides for a while, and finally joined Berthier and worked until 5:00 A.M. At dawn he rode out to the Shevardino Redoubt and remarked to his staff, “It is a trifle cold, but the sun is bright. It is the sun of Austerlitz!”
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 29