On 27 November the bulk of the French army crossed over the bridges, and by the end of the day only the IX Corps and a horde of stragglers remained on the eastern bank.
The Battles of the Berezina Crossing
Tchichagov, realizing his error, moved rapidly northward, but was distracted by the mob of stragglers at Borisov. He stopped to oppose their passage. Not being certain of the French maneuvers, he detached his advanced guard northward to observe the northern fords.
Wittgenstein had reached Kostritsa on the night of 26 November and learned of the French bridges at Studianka. He departed from the better road to Veselovo and pushed across the poorer country paths to Stari-Borisov in the hope of intercepting Victor. Instead of Victor's entire force, he encountered Partoneaux's 12th Division, which had become lost on the backroads to the east of the Berezina River. Partoneaux and his staff had ridden forward and were captured before they could return to the cover of their troops. The main body did not know of the capture of their commander, but found themselves surrounded by the entire Russian 1st Infantry Corps. They held their ground until morning, but were forced to surrender. The Russians captured 4,000 fresh and well-disciplined infantry, 500 cavalry consisting of the Saxon Prince Johann Chevauxléger Regiment and the Berg Chevauxléger-lancier Regiment, and four guns. Only 160 men escaped the disaster to tell the story to Napoleon.
When he learned of this, Napoleon ordered Hochberg's brigade to recross the Berezina to rejoin the rest of the IX Corps. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the brigade was able to return to the other side, forcing its way through the stream of stragglers that flooded across the bridges. That stream of humanity was so heavy that the Baden artillery was unable to cross and was left on the western bank.
Tchichagov seized the east bank of the Berezina at Borisov and repaired the bridges on 28 November. He went on to establish communications with Wittgenstein, who was then in Stari-Borisov. The two Russian generals made plans for a morning attack. Tchichagov's cavalry was to move to seize the vital bridges at Zembik that were then in French hands. Yermolov joined Tchichagov, and Platov moved up in support. However, despite the excellence of their service up to this time, the cossacks failed miserably during the crossing operations.
Tchichagov advanced at dawn to find Ney had pushed Langeron and Tschlapitz back to Bolshoi-Starkov. Tchichagov counterattacked very poorly near Veselovo with 9,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.
Oudinot held the right and center, while Ney held the left. Oudinot had posted the 123rd (Dutch) Line Regiment and the four Swiss regiments in the front line. The Croatians were around the Zavniki redoubt. The extent of the French front was about a mile and a quarter. The ground was broken by open woods and only partially cultivated.
Seven Russian jager regiments (7th, 12th, 14th, 22nd, 27th, 28th, and 32nd), under the command of General Sabaniev, occupied the woods between Siakhov and Brill, supported by the Pavlograd Hussar Regiment. The hussars had been broken into independent squadrons and were spread behind the infantry in small meadows. A lively skirmish began, and Oudinot was wounded again. Ney assumed command. About 10:00 A.M. Ney counterattacked with the Vistula Legion, the 3rd Cuirassier Division, the four Swiss regiments, the 123rd Line Regiment, and the Croatians. The force of three to four thousand men struck the Russian left, in the middle of the woods, nearly a mile from the road. There were two small meadows, open patches of only a few hundred square yards each, in which the Russian 18th Division of Prince Tchervatov was posted. It was formed in deep columns and did not expect attack because of the heavy forest cover.
General Doumerc and his 3rd Cuirassier Division struck the 18th Division. The 4th, 7th, and 14th Cuirassier Regiments, totaling 400 men, struck them suddenly and successfully. They had passed through the brush and woods, quickly reformed, and fallen on the Russian columns. They sabered more than 600 men, by Russian reports, and took 2,000 prisoners as well as a few guns.
A flank attack by General Berthezène's brigade of the 1st Division of the Young Guard struck the Russian right where the brigade formed of the 12th and 22nd Jager Regiments was posted. General Gangeblov had been obliged to turn his command over to General Rudzevisch. Rudzevisch had deployed this force along the river. The attack of the Young Guard nearly destroyed them, reducing them from 4,000 men to 700 battered survivors in a matter of minutes.
The French cavalry continued their assault, taking advantage of their impetus, and bore down on the eight regiments of the 9th and 18th Divisions that General Savaneieff was bringing up to support Tschlapitz. Savaneieff had scattered much of his force into a skirmish screen that was very vulnerable to destruction at the hands of the formed French infantry. Opportunity had placed Tschlapitz at the head of two squadrons of the Pavlograd Hussar Regiment. He led them forward in a brilliantly executed charge that halted the French long enough for Savaneieff to rally and reform his infantry. The French II Corps advanced and established itself in the woods before Starkov and engaged Savaneieff's forces. Ney and Poniatowski responded by moving up their forces to support Oudinofs II Corps. Despite Russian reinforcements and counterattacks,the French successfully held their wooded positions until night fell and the battle ended.
On the east bank of the Berezina, Marshal Victor had established his corps on both sides of the village of Studianka. To the right of the village, towards Borisov, stretched a small, unobstructed plain. This plain was bordered on the east by a woods and stretched to the banks of the Berezina. The plain was split by the road that ran from Borisov to the site of the newly erected bridges. Though there were no major obstacles on the plain, it was cut by a valley that had a small stream in its bottom. The banks of this stream were steep. On the southern side of the valley was a ridge that overlooked the village of Studianka. Behind the southern ridge was a thick woods that obscured the view of the approaching roads.
It was on the plateau of Studianka that Victor placed his troops. Hochberg's Baden brigade, a battalion of the French 55th Line Regiment under Chef de bataillon Joyeaux, and four French 12pdrs formed the allied right. Its flank was secured on the Berezina and its left on Studianka. The center was held by the Berg brigade, and the allied left was held by Girard's 28th Division. The Poles (4th, 7th, and 9th Regiments) stood forward, supported by Kleingel's Saxon brigade (von Low and von Rechten Infantry Regiments), which were held in reserve.
Girard's left flank was unable to secure itself against the woods to the east of the plain and hung in the open as a result. The gap between the flank and the woods was filled by what little cavalry remained to the corps. This was the 350 cavalry of the Baden Hussar Regiment and the Hessian Chevauxléger Regiment under General Fournier. Behind the left, on a low ridge, was a reserve of fourteen French guns. Spread ahead of the main battle line was a thin skirmish line that acted as an advanced picket. On the far bank, Napoleon placed a battery of artillery from his reserve to support the Baden brigade with flanking fire.
In the beginning of the battle, the Russians quickly engaged the allied right. Vlastov, followed by Berg's corps, had taken position on the heights along the edge of the forest that overlooked the allied positions. As Vlastov established himself before the allied position, he sent Colonel Herngross to attack the French left with the converged hussars and the Rodinov #2 Don Cossack Regiment. The cossacks' attack was turned back by Fournier, who was in his turn driven back by the converged hussars. While this cavalry battle was going on, Vlastov established a twelve-gun battery to fire on the Baden brigade on the allied right.
This battery began to shell the bridges. The Russians also began a skirmish fire all along the entire length of the line. Timed with this was a major Russian assault against the Baden brigade. This assault attempted to push between the infantry and the Berezina in order to open a passage to the bridges. A hard-fought battle began, and the French battalion and the Lingg Jàgers were pushed back after they had exhausted their ammunition. General Lingg was wounded, but ordered the 2/3rd Baden Infantry Regiment forward to fill
the gap. As it approached the Russians it advanced with lowered bayonets, driving the Russians back into the woods. The Baden infantry attacked without any artillery support, yet despite this, it was successful.
While this was occurring, the Russians continued their heavy cannonade on the allied left. The Russian line extended itself towards the allied right and began redeploying their artillery to threaten the most exposed portion of the allied line. In response to this threat, Victor ordered General Damas to attack the Russian artillery on the heights with the Berg brigade.
The Berg brigade advanced in two columns, each with the approximate strength of a battalion, from the plateau, with the support of the Baden Hussar Regiment and the Guard battery on the far bank of the Berezina. As they reached the bottom of the valley, they paused and took shelter behind the bank of the small stream. This offered some cover from the plunging artillery fire. As they resumed their advance, the Russian skirmish line gave way. The Russians quickly reestablished their skirmishers several hundred paces behind their original line. The skirmishers stood before a defile through the woods. The 24th Jager Regiment stood in column in this defile. They engaged the assaulting Berg infantry with musketry.
Twice the Berg infantry attacked them and failed with great losses. They were faced by the Russian General Berg who commanded thirty-six guns, the Sievsk Infantry Regiment, the 1st Marine Regiment, and the 10th Cohort of St. Petersburg opolochenie. As this force was reinforced by the Perm Infantry Regiment, it went over to the attack.
As the first Bergish column fell back, the second column advanced in its turn. It had been deployed for such a contingency, but it too failed in its attack. Both columns fell back in disorder. Both columns fell back to their original positions near Studianka.
During this attack the Baden brigade underwent another heavy barrage of artillery and musketry fire on its extreme flank. Hochberg rotated his infantry battalions into the line, relieving each as it expended its ammunition. The Russian cannon fire was, by this time, reaching the masses of unformed stragglers that swarmed about the two brigades. The fire raised them to a panic, and they stampeded the bridges in terror. Others attempted to swim the freezing Berezina.
The withdrawal of the Berg brigade forced the Poles to fill in the gap. They did not recognize the Baden infantry and almost fired on it. As the fire of the Russian Horse Battery #23 intensified, the 34th Jager Regiment as well as the Nisov and Vorohenz Infantry Regiments advanced. They engaged the 7th and 9th Polish Infantry Regiments in a lively fusillade. The Hessian Chevauxlégers and Baden Hussars moved forward to attack. They totaled no more than 350 men. Foumier, their commander, was quickly wounded, and the command passed to Colonel de LaRoche. These brave men threw themselves against the flank of the advancing Russian column and, after a short fight, broke it. They captured 500 men of the 34th Jager Regiment and drove the other two regiments back.
Two squadrons of the Russian converged cuirassiers and the Pavlov Grenadier Depot Battalion advanced to counterattack LaRoche's forces with the supporting fire of Position Battery #11. The Hessian and Baden cavalry charged them. LaRoche, already wounded by a bayonet thrust in the first attack, was wounded a second time and taken prisoner. After that he was hit by another musket ball and received a saber cut to his shako. Wachtmeister Springer rushed to his commander's aide and freed him. The two German cavalry regiments were forced back. Once reformed and rallied it was found that there remained only 50 men. Though a costly attack, it had reestablished the center of the French lines. The Russian general Fock brought up his reserves and moved against the French left. The Saxons and 4th Polish Infantry Regiment fought off this last Russian attack.
As the IX Corps moved back, the Russians advanced their skirmishers against its right flank. The 2/2nd Baden Infantry Regiment was detached to hold them off. When it had expended its ammunition, the 1/lst Baden Infantry, under Captain Poln, advanced to fill its place.
The battle died down after this, and the Russians contented themselves with renewing their artillery and skirmish fire on the French lines. In the lull after the active attacks, the main French forces continued their retreat across the bridge. The press was so great, however, that it was still impossible to bring over the Baden artillery. The effort was eventually abandoned.
Losses were heavy on both sides. The Baden brigade lost 28 dead and wounded officers and 1,100 dead and wounded men. The Baden brigade had a total of 900 men remaining to arms. The Berg brigade was reduced to 60 men, and the Poles had 250 men.
At midnight the weakened forces from the IX Corps began withdrawing across the bridges. The grenadier company of the 1st Baden Infantry Regiment, commanded by Captain von Zech, formed their rear guard. Behind them, on the eastern bank of the Berezina, they left a mass of despondent and resigned stragglers. They were concerned with huddling around their meager fires and scavenging amongst the multitude of broken wagons and abandoned equipment that littered the bank. Escaping the Russians was not in their minds.
The French losses in the crossing operations were heavy. On 29 November the Old Guard had only 2,000 men and the Young Guard was reduced to 800. Hunger and cold had taken a heavy toll on the Russians as well.
The Retreat Resumes Again
On the 29th the French retreat began with the Guard leading the way. They moved from Zembik to Vilna. Had the Russians been able to seize these roads earlier, they would have totally destroyed the French. Fortunately for the French, these vital bridges were intact, and the security of Poland lay before them.
Napoleon Leaves the Grande Armée
At 10:00 P.M. that evening Napoleon quit the Grande Armée with an escort of 200 guardsmen. The 150 Guard horses that were still fit for duty were sent to Oshmiany, and a squadron of Guard Lancers formed relays between Smorgoni and Oshmiany. Murat was given command of the remains of the Grande Armée and ordered to bring it back to Poland.
At 9:00 A.M. on 29 November the Russian cossacks moved against the stragglers on the banks of the Berezina. Tchichagov did not stir to pursue the French. Ney once again assumed the rearguard duties and covered the French rear with the remains of the II, III, and V Corps. As they passed over the bridges through the marshes, General Elbe burned the major bridges between Brili and Zembik, blocking the Russian pursuit for twenty-four hours. Lanskoi's forces, consisting of twenty squadrons and a cossack regiment, moved to the vicinity of Pleshenitsy, sixteen miles from Zembik. He was stopped and held back by Oudinot and a collection of officers and batmen until Junot's Westphalians appeared and drove them off.
Wittgenstein was unable to cross the Berezina until Tchichagov provided the pontoons necessary to bridge it. The pursuit by the Russian armies finally got under way in a serious manner when Tschlapitz's light forces, composed of eight jagers, twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, eight cossack regiments, and three horse batteries, moved across the river. He quickly encountered the burnt-out bridges, which stopped his advance. Once it resumed, he stopped again when he encountered Platov's corps, which had been wandering about aimlessly, attempting to contact the French. Tschlapitz didn't contact Ney's rear guard until 2 December. Coming out the worse for that encounter, Tschlapitz assumed a respectful distance from Ney and contented himself with shadowing the retreat. The French still commanded respect.
On 2 December the main French army consisted of:
The weather began to deteriorate again, and the temperature dropped below zero. Both armies suffered cruelly from the ravages of the climate, lack of food, and typhus. Organization and discipline disintegrated as never before, and the cossacks took advantage of this, looting and killing with abandon.
On 9 December the French reached Vilna. Napoleon had sent word that it was to prepare to receive and provision the army, but the administration learned of the disaster and fled in terror of the cossacks. The city was filled with supplies that were looted and wasted by the undisciplined soldiers. The bountiful supplies so allured the stragglers that it was only with the greatest effort that Lefebvre an
d Ney were able to rally enough of them to chase off the cossacks. It was at this time that Berthier remembered that Schwarzenberg and Macdonald had not been given orders. Berthier took it upon himself to order Macdonald to withdraw through Tilsit and Schwarzenberg to withdraw to Bialystok. A new rear guard was formed from the remains of the VI Corps under Wrede and the 31st Division of Loison.
The French left Vilna on 10 December, and the cossacks instantly entered the city. As Ney retreated over the river he set fire to the remaining supplies. Murat reached Roumcziki on 11 December, and the army halted again. He advanced to Kowno with an escort, where he contacted the garrison of 1,500 German levies and forty-two guns. Twenty-five of the guns were well horsed. He also found large magazines and a well-stocked treasury with 2.5 million francs. As strong as this position might have been, the Niemen was frozen, and the position could not be held. Murat continued to retreat with the Guard on 13 December. He placed a nine-gun battery on a hill overlooking the approaches to Kowno to hold the way for Ney.
Ney made his entrance into Kowno with 1,000 combatants and found the city full of dead and drunk men. The magazines had been looted and little remained. Platov and his cossacks arrived around 2:00 P.M. and began to fire on the bridge. An error resulted in the spiking of the guns on the heights and the recruits manning them fled. Ney and Gerard moved to the threatened gate and stabilized the situation. General Mar-chand led a sortie that drove the cossacks back and recaptured the heights.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 40