Mahony’s manuscript began with the exercise or drill for handling a musket and bayonet, or the manual exercise as it was known, listing each drill movement and how many individual movements each was comprised of. These movements were the same, with minor variations in wording, as those given in Foster’s manuscript and in a publication titled: The New Exercise of Firelocks & Bayonets; Appointed by his Grace the Duke of Marlborough to be used by all the British Forces. This was not an official publication, but was stated to be ‘By an Officer in Her Majesties Foot Guards’ and was published in London in 1708.48 It was also limited to the manual exercise and did not deal with the firings.
Figure 5.1: A Battalion of infantry according to Mahoney’s Manuscript
Source: Cornwall Record Office, DD.R.H.839.
The key sections in both Mahony’s and Foster’s manuscripts were their descriptions of the organisation of a battalion into platoons and firings and how firing was to be carried out. Mahony provided a diagram that clearly shows a central or colour platoon, see figure 5.1.
Each box represents one of the fifteen platoons that a battalion was now to be divided into. The grenadier company was still divided into two platoons that took their places on the flanks of the battalion, indicated in the diagram above by (G). The hat companies were divided into thirteen platoons. The fifteen platoons were then divided into three firings, the first and second of six platoons each and the third of just three. The upper number in each box indicates the firing that a platoon was in. The lower number in each box indicated the order of firing of the platoons within each firing. Thus when the first firing fired the platoon marked 1 over 1 fired first, followed by the platoon marked 1 over 2 from the other flank of the battalion. Next came 1 over 3, then 1 over 4, 1 over 5 and finally 1 over 6. The second and third firings followed in the same manner. There was a slight difference in the way the grenadier platoons fired as they were to wheel 45° towards the centre so that their fire was directed more towards the centre of the enemy line. If firing on the march or advancing, the whole battalion was to halt when the platoons fired. If the battalion was retreating then the whole battalion halted and faced about while the platoons of a firing delivered their fire. The effect of this new method was that the firing of the platoons was more evenly distributed across the front of a battalion, as the first two firings consisted of almost every other platoon. In addition there were always at least three platoons loaded at any time, those of the smallest, third firing and because those were on the flanks and in the centre it maximised the protection they could give to the other platoons.
The most significant aspect of the new firings, however, was that rather than only firing in turn all the platoons in a firing could fire together in a single volley. Six platoons together represented in excess of 40 per cent of the firepower of a battalion. This could be followed very quickly by a second firing of the same size and even the smaller third firing, 20 per cent, was on a par with a rank of a French infantry battalion. Furthermore, due to the sustainability of platoon firing, this small third firing could be followed by the first firing again with another 40 per cent of the available firepower and so on. This sustainability was in part a product of the changes that had taken place over the preceding fifteen years or so as flintlock replaced matchlock and cartridge replaced bandoleer, leading to much quicker reloading.
As a variation on the above the commander of a battalion could choose to keep in the reserve the front ranks of the first and second firings. The reserved front ranks were then fired after the second firing. This would give four firings of approximately 27 per cent, 27 per cent, 26 per cent and 20 per cent. The orders for loading and firing continued to be ‘make ready’, ‘present’ and ‘fire’ but the distance between ranks for loading was reduced to a single pace from two. This reduction in space was probably the result of the abandonment of the matchlock and bandoleer making the loading process less risky. The benefit of it was that it further reduced, albeit slightly, the time taken to load, as the third rank now only needed to take two paces back instead of four.
A reduction in the reloading time of the few seconds it took to take two steps backwards may not seem very significant. However, when combined with the benefits of the changes in weapons and equipment it is what allowed a battalion to keep up a continuous fire based on three firings rather than the four platoons required by Mackay. This increase in the rate of fire increased a battalion’s firepower by a third.
The effectiveness of the new firings was demonstrated at Oudenarde, while at the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, the fourth of Marlborough’s great victories against the French, the British infantry demonstrated that they had not lost any ability when hand-to-hand combat rather than shattering volleys was required.49 The fighting in the wood of Taisnières was described by Sergeant John Wilson:
[We] attacked the Enemy in the wood afores’d with a great deal of courage and resolution but were received by the Enemy with as great bravery. Wee beat them from that post and they beat us back again with as great courage and resolution as wee had them. Whereupon ensued an obstinate engagem’t for the space of two hors in which there was a great effusion of blood on both sides; the Armys fireing at each other bayonet to bayonet. And after came to stab each other with their bayonets and several came so close that they knocked one another’s brains out w’th the butt end of their firelocks.50
It was, however, at Malplaquet that a most remarkable event occurred, which gives perhaps the clearest evidence of the superiority of British platoon firing over French fire by ranks. Robert Parker of the Royal Irish Regiment was not a participant in the battle of Malplaquet, being at the time in Ireland, but he has left a most vivid account, presumably garnered from fellow officers. The regiment was the last British regiment to arrive on the battlefield and found itself in a relatively isolated position of the extreme flank of the army, opposite the wood of Sart. As the army advanced and the Royal Irish marched through the wood they found themselves in a clearing and confronted by a single French battalion. No other troops were involved in what followed.
Upon this Colonel Kane, who was then at the head of the Regiment, having drawn us up, and formed our Plattoons, advanced gently toward them, with the six Plattoons of our first fire made ready. When we had advanced within a hundred paces of them, they gave us a fire of one of their ranks: Whereupon we halted, and returned them the fire of our six Platoons at once; and immediately made ready the six Plattoons of our second fire, and advanced upon them again. They then gave us the fire of another rank, and we returned them a second fire, which made them shrink; however they gave us the fire of a third rank after a scattering manner, and then retired into the wood in great disorder: On which we sent our third fire after them, and saw them no more.51
This was a textbook action on the part of the Royal Irish. They closed with the French and did not fire until the French had. The French were clearly adhering to their usual practice of firing by ranks and the Royal Irish replied with whole firings. When Parker’s regiment advanced they discovered that the enemy battalion had been the French Royal Regiment of Ireland. The British battalion had suffered four killed and six wounded while the French battalion lost ‘near forty’ killed and wounded. Parker gave an explanation for this victory and the disparity in casualties:
The advantage on our side will be easily accounted for, first from the weight of our ball; for the French Arms carry bullets of 24 to the pound: Whereas our British Firelocks carry ball of 16 only to the pound, which will make a considerable difference in the execution. Again, the manner of our firing was different from theirs; the French at that time fired all by ranks, which can never do equal execution with our Plattoon-firing, especially when six Plattoons are fired together. This is undoubtedly the best method that has yet been discovered for fighting a Battalion; especially when two Battalions only engage each other.52
This extensive and detailed account contained a wealth of information, but has also been subject to some misunderstandin
g. Parker stated that the first and second firings of the Royal Irish consisted of six platoons. It has been assumed by Chandler, Nosworthy and others that the third firing also consisted of six platoons and that this event represented a clear example of platoon firing as described by Kane.53 It is clear from the manuscripts of Mahony and Foster that the third firing would have been only three platoons. Three firings of six platoons each was a much later development, before which, as will be shown, there was a reduction to only fourteen platoons. Finally, in an echo of Mackay, the third firing was fired as the enemy broke and ran.54
Parker describes the battalion advancing on the enemy and not firing until fired upon, each rank fired by the French Irish being replied to with all the platoons of a firing giving fire together. He is clear in his view of the superiority of platoon firing over firing by ranks, which is perhaps not surprising as each French rank that fired, representing 20 per cent of the battalion, was replied to by a firing of 40 per cent of the Royal Irish. He also makes a very interesting comment about the relative effectiveness of British and French muskets. Edward D’Auvergene made a similar comment in his account of the campaign of 1692: ‘Of the wounded a vast many dy’d afterwards, because our arms are stronger, and carry better balls than theirs.’55 Undoubtedly a heavier musket ball travelling at the same velocity as a lighter one will inflict the greater damage. However, there are a number of other factors at play that determine the ballistic characteristics of a musket shot, such as the size of the charge of powder, the strength of the powder and the quality of the musket barrels, which would need to be considered in evaluating Parker’s claim and which fall outside this work. But whatever the reason, there would appear to have been a belief that individual British musket shots caused more damage than French ones. If this belief was shared by the French it could have had a serious, deleterious effect on their morale. A hint that this might have been the case is found in Chandler, who cites a French dispatch after the battle of Steenkirk that reported French soldiers throwing away their matchlocks and taking up captured flintlocks.56 That, however, could be because of the superiority of the flintlock to the matchlock firing mechanism rather than a superior ballistic performance.
The new system of firings was not without its problems. These arose when a battalion had to form a hollow square as a defence against cavalry. This required the grenadiers to be divided into four platoons and the rest of the battalion to be divided into four grand divisions of equal size that were divided in turn into four platoons each. This was relatively straightforward for the grenadiers, but the hat companies had to be reorganised from thirteen platoons into sixteen. This problem was touched upon in Parker’s letter of 13 September 1708; however it is not clear if he is writing about four grand divisions being made the norm or just used on the march.57 Each grand division formed a side of the square and became a firing of four platoons. The grenadier platoons either stayed outside the square and covered the corners or marched in and out of the square to fire, the right-hand platoon of each face, called the angle platoon, acting as a sort of gate for them. A square could be formed either from the battalion in line or on the march with the four grand divisions marching in column, one behind the other. This last manoeuvre as described in Mahony’s manuscript is the same as that apparently devised by Parker. Once the square was formed the battalion commander had a number of options when it came to firing. First the angle platoons marched forwards while the grenadiers outside the square fired. They then marched into the square behind the angle platoon while it fired, before returning to its place. After that the other three platoons in each firing fired, the right-hand one first, then the left and lastly the centre one. As a variation on this the fire of the front ranks could be reserved. Alternatively, the three platoons of each firing could fire together by ranks, starting with the rear rank, followed in turn by the angle and grenadier platoons firing their three ranks together.
Given the complexity of two different arrangements of a battalion into platoons it is perhaps no surprise that British infantry battalions appear to have preferred to face French cavalry head on. At Malplaquet Matthew Bishop described what happened when his battalion was threatened by French cavalry; ‘Then we had orders to wheel to the right. Had we not the French Horse would certainly have fallen upon our Rear. This happened at the Ground where we first made our Attack. But when we faced them, they backed their Horses as fast as they could.’58
Foster’s manuscript book also contained a revision of drill issued by Lord Orkney on 23 October 1711 because ‘For the better Regulating of her Majties Foot his Grace the Duke of Marlborough has thought fit I should give out the following orders.’ Orkney’s orders included the manual exercise, which contained minor changes, mostly in the wording of commands, the ‘Evolutions’, described as being ‘according to the Explainatn in K Wms Book of Exercise’, various regulations for garrison duty and the like and a new method of organising the firings.59 A diagram showed twelve hat platoons and two of grenadiers: see figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: A battalion of infantry after 1711, according to Foster
Source: BL Add Mss 29477, f. 117v – 107r.
The first firing was composed of the platoons numbered 1 to 6, using the upper number, the lower number indicating the first firing. The second firing was platoons 7 to 10 and the third firing was the grenadier platoons, 11 and 12, and platoons 13 and 14 in the centre. The orders stated ‘You fire your Platoons Right and Left as usual’, referring to the order of firing within each firing.60 The orders do not go into any detail about the different ways of managing the fire of the firings and the platoons, so it would seem that these remained unchanged.
This method represents an improvement on the previous method for a number of reasons. Firstly, this organisation meant a return to each company also forming a platoon, except for the grenadiers, which can only have simplified matters and made command and control easier. Secondly and most obviously, it is a lot easier to form a square as the twelve line platoons are simply divided into four grand divisions without the need to reorganise the platoons. Once the square was formed the grenadiers still marched in and out to fire, the three platoons on each face of the square formed a firing and fired in the order of the right-hand platoon first, then the left-hand one and finally the centre one. The third improvement was that fewer platoons meant bigger platoons. The first firing of six platoons represented almost half the battalion while the other two firings were roughly a quarter each. This meant that the all-important first firing was slightly bigger than before while the second firing was about a third smaller. The third firing was also larger than before, but two of its four platoons were the grenadier company divided in two, so it was still smaller than the second firing. In percentage terms the strengths of the firings were approximately 46 per cent, 31 per cent and 23 per cent.
The orders for the garrison of Ghent issued by Major General Cobham in 1712 contain no changes to the organisation and execution of firing; he did, however, include in the orders some illuminating observations about firefights:
All Commanding Officers must take great care when they march a Battn to attack an Enemy, to be moving so slow that their men may be in good ordr & not out of breath when they come to Engage, they must always manage their fire well, & never begin to fire till they are very near it being very certain it is better to receive an Enemy’s fire than fire at two [sic] great distance.61
Cobham emphasised the importance of a steady advance and of getting close to the enemy before firing, even if it meant receiving the enemy’s fire. On the subject of dealing with cavalry attacks he advised that whether in square or line it was best to reserve the fire of the front rank while the second and rear ranks fired by platoon. The fire of the front rank was to be delivered at close range, ‘a well managed fire at 30 or 40 paces distance will make their front rank not only stop short, but fall into confusion upon those which follows.’62
Cobham also gave details of a rather fanciful way of forming a batta
lion six deep into a total of twenty-eight platoons. His comment on this was telling. ‘These sorts of figures are very handsome in exercise & very useful for ye instruction of soldiers, & it may happen may be of great use sometimes.’ He followed this with his observations on what he considered practical on the battlefield.
I have seen much pains & trouble in firing Platoons advancing, & retreating but such will never happen, but at Exercise for it was never Done on real service but a Battn formed this way is ready to march either backwards or forwards together, if you beat ye enemy you can’t overtake them in good order without ye fear of being flank’t, & if they will beat you all the Precaution imagineable will not hinder some Confusion so as to put you by order so that fireing as it’s call’d maintaining ground, & very quick is ye real service done by Platoons, & let ye maner & form of making Plattoons be never so convenient & handsome, quick firing & maintaining ground is ye real service of it, & indeed on all occasions to teach men to fire quick & sure is the best Exercise, not but all figures composed Handsomely shows a genious fill for great matters, it is very commendable in every officr & will meet with the applause of all men, & will enable those men to make enquiry into further matters that will at least make them great.63
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 11