Banzai! by Parabellum

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by Ferdinand Heinrich Grautoff


  _Chapter IX_

  A FORTY-EIGHT-HOUR BALANCE

  A steamer is lying at the pier taking in cargo. Long-legged cranes aretaking hold of bales and barrels and boxes and lowering them through theship's hatches with a rattle of chains. Wooden cases bound with steelropes and containing heavy machinery are being hoisted slowly from thelorries on the railway tracks; the swaying burden is turning round andround in the air, knocking against the railing with a groaning noise,and tearing off large splinters of wood. The overseer is swearing at themen at the windlass and comparing his papers with the slips of thecustoms officer, the one making a blue check on the bill of lading andthe other taking note of each article on his long list. Suddenly a smallbox comes to light, which has been waiting patiently since yesterdayunder the sheltering tarpaulin. "A box of optical instruments," says thecustoms officer, making a blue check. "A box of optical instruments,"repeats the overseer, making a mark with his moistened pencil-stump:"Careful!" he adds, as a workman is on the point of tipping the heavybox over. Then the hook of the crane seizes the loop in the steel ropeand with a stuttering rattling sound the wheels of the windlass set towork, the steel wire grips the side of the box tightly, the barrelbeside it is pushed aside, and a wooden case enclosing a piece ofcast-iron machinery is scraped angrily over the slippery cobble-stones.Heave ho, heave ho, chant the men, pushing with all their might. To theaccompaniment of splashing drops of oily water, puffs of steam, groansof the windlass and the yells and curses of the stevedores, the wholeload, including the box of optical instruments, at last disappears inthe hold of the ship. It is placed securely between rolls of cardboardnext to some nice white boxes filled with shining steel goods. But whenthe noise up above has died down, when with the approach of darkness therattling of the chains and the groaning of the windlasses has ceased,when only the slow step of the deck-watch finds an echo--then it can beheard. Inside the box you can hear a gentle but steady tick, tick, tick.The clock-work is wound up and set to the exact second. Tick, tick, tickit goes. When the ship is far out at sea and the passengers are asleepand the watch calls out: "Lights are burning. All's well!" then theworks will have run down, the spring will stop and loosen a littlehammer. Ten kilograms of dynamite suffice. A quarter of an hour laterthere'll be nothing left of the proud steamer but a few boats loadeddown with people and threatening every moment to be engulfed in thewaves.

  Tick, tick, tick, it goes down in the hold; the clock is set. Tick,tick, tick, it goes on unceasingly, till the unknown hour arrives. Noone suspects the true nature of a piece of the cargo which certainlylooked innocent enough. Yet the hour is bound to come sooner or later,but no one knows just when.

  * * * * *

  Nor had the country at large recognized that the hour was at hand. Inthe time that it took the short hand of the clock to complete its roundfour times, our country had completely changed its complexion, and thebalance drawn by the press on Tuesday morning after an interval offorty-eight hours, had a perfectly crushing effect. Of course theappearance of the enemy in the West at once produced a financial panicin New York. On Monday morning the Wall Street stock-quotations of thetrans-continental railroads fell to the lowest possible figure,rendering the shares about as valuable as the paper upon which they wereprinted. Apparently enormous numbers of shares had been thrown on themarket in the first wild panic, but an hour after the opening of theStock Exchange, after billions had changed hands in mad haste, a slightrise set in as a result of wholesale purchases by a single individual.Yet even before this fact had been clearly recognized, the railwaymagnates of the West had bought up all the floating stock withoutexception. They could afford to wait for the millions they would pocketuntil the American army had driven the enemy from the country.

  At the same time selling orders came pouring in from the other side byway of London. The Old World lost no time in trying to get rid of itsAmerican stocks, and the United States were made to realize that in thehour of a political catastrophe every nation has to stand on its ownfeet, and that all the diplomatic notes and the harmlesssentimentalities of foreign states will avail nothing. So it was afterthe terrible night of Port Arthur and so it was now.

  It was of course as yet impossible to figure out in detail how theJapanese had managed to take possession of the Pacific States withintwenty-four hours. But from the dispatches received from all parts ofthe country during the next few days and weeks the following picturecould be drawn. The number of Japanese on American soil was in roundnumbers one hundred thousand. The Japanese had not only establishedthemselves as small tradesmen and shopkeepers in the towns, but had alsosettled everywhere as farmers and fruit-growers; Japanese coolies andMongolian workmen were to be found wherever new buildings were going upas well as on all the railways. The yellow flood was threatening todestroy the very foundations of our domestic economy by forcing down allwage-values. The yellow immigrant who wrested spade and shovel, ax andsaw, from the American workman, who pushed his way into the factory andthe workshop and acted as a heartless strike breaker, was not only foundin the Pacific States but had pushed his way across the Rockies into thevery heart of the eastern section. And scarcely had he settled anywhere,before, with the typical Tsushima grin, he demanded his politicalrights. The individual Jap excited no suspicion and did not becometroublesome, but the Mongolians always managed to distribute theiroutposts on American soil in such a way that the Japanese element neverattracted undue attention in any one particular spot. Nevertheless theywere to be found everywhere.

  We had often been told that every Japanese who landed on the PacificCoast or crossed the Mexican or Canadian borders was a trained soldier.But we had always regarded this fact more as a political curiosity or aJapanese peculiarity than as a warning. We never for a moment realizedthat this whole immigration scheme was regulated by a perfect system,and that every Japanese immigrant had received his military orders andwas in constant touch with the secret military centers at San Francisco,who at stated periods sent out Japanese traders and agents--in realitythey were officers of the general staff, who at the same time madeimportant topographical notes for use in case of war--to control theirmovements. Both the lumber companies in the State of Washington, whichbrought hundreds of Japanese over from Canada, and the railways whichemployed Japanese workmen were equally ignorant of the fact that theyhad taken a Japanese regiment into their employ.

  Thus preparations for the coming war were conducted on a large scaleduring the year 1907, until the ever-increasing flow of Japaneseimmigrants finally led to those conflicts with which we are familiar. Atthe time we regarded it as a triumph of American diplomacy when Japan,in the face of California's threatening attitude, apparently gave inafter a little diplomatic bickering and issued the well-knownproclamation concerning emigration to Hawaii and the Pacific States, atthe same time dissolving several emigration companies at home.

  As a matter of fact Japan had already completed her militarypreparations in our country in times of absolute peace, the soledifficulty experienced being in connection with the concentration of theremaining coolie importations. The Japanese invasion, which ourpoliticians dismissed as possible only in the dim and distant future,was actually completed at the beginning of the year 1908. A Japanesearmy stood prepared and fully armed right in our midst, merely waitinguntil the military and financial conditions at home rendered the attackfeasible.

  When we glance to-day through the newspapers of that period, we cannothelp but smile at allowing ourselves to be persuaded that the Japanesedanger had been removed by the diplomatic retreat in Tokio and theprohibition of emigration to North America. Our papers stated at thetime that Japan had recognized that she had drawn the bow too tight andthat she had yielded because Admiral Evans's fleet had demonstratedconclusively that we were prepared. That only goes to show how little weknew of the Mongolian character!

  We had become so accustomed to the large Japanese element in thepopulation of our Western States, that we entirely neglected to controlthe
harmless looking individuals. To be sure there wasn't a great dealto be seen on the surface, but it would have been interesting to examinesome of the goods smuggled so regularly across the Mexican and Canadianborders. Why were we content to allow the smuggling to continue withoutinterference, simply because we felt it couldn't be stamped out anyhow?The Japanese did not resort to the hackneyed piano-cases and farmingmachinery; they knew better than to employ such clumsy methods. Thegoods they sent over the line consisted of neat little boxes full ofguns and other weapons which had been taken apart. And when a Japanesefarmer ordered a hay-cart from Canada, it was no pure chance that theremarkably strong wheels of this cart exactly fitted a field-gun. Thebarrel was brought over by a neighbor, who ordered iron columns for hisnew house, inside of which the separate parts of the barrel weresoldered. It was in this way that, in the course of several years, theentire equipment for the Japanese army came quietly and inconspicuouslyacross our borders.

  And then the Japanese are so clever, clever in putting together andmounting their guns, clever in disguising them. Did it ever enteranyone's head that the amiable landlord who cracked so many jokes at theJapanese inn not far from the railroad station at Reno commanded abattalion? Did anyone suppose that the casks of California wine in hiscellar in reality enclosed six machine-guns, and that in the yard behindthe house there was sufficient material to equip an entire company ofartillery inside of two hours, and that plenty of ammunition was storedaway in the attic in boxes and trunks ostensibly left by travelers to beheld until called for? As long as there's sufficient time at disposal,all these things can be imported into the country bit by bit, andwithout ever coming into conflict with the government.

  Things began to stir about the end of April. A great many Japs weretraveling about the country, but there was no reason why thiscircumstance should have attracted special notice in a country like ourswhere so much traveling is constantly done. The enemy were assembling.The people arrived at the various stations and at once disappeared inthe country, bound for the different headquarters in the solitudes ofthe mountains. There each one found his ammunition, his gun and hisuniform exactly as it was described in Japanese characters on the paperwhich he had received on landing, and which had more than once beenofficially revised or supplemented as the result of information receivedfrom chance acquaintances who had paid him a visit.

  Everything worked like a charm; there wasn't a hitch anywhere. No onehad paid any particular attention to the fact, for example, inconnection with the fair to be held in the small town of Irvington onMay eighth, that numerous carts with Japanese farmers had arrived on theSaturday before and that they had brought several dozen horses withthem. And who could object to their putting up at the Japanese innwhich, with its big stables, was specially suited to their purpose. Atfirst the Japanese owner had been laughed at, but later on he wasadmired for his business ability in keeping the horse trade of Irvingtonentirely in his own hands.

  When on the following day during church hours--the Japanese beingheathens--the streets lay deserted in their Sunday calm, the few peoplewho happened to be on Main Street and saw a field battery consisting ofsix guns and six ammunition wagons turn out of the gate next to theJapanese inn thought they had seen an apparition. The battery startedoff at once at a sharp trot and left the town to take up a position outin a field in the suburbs, where a dozen men were already busily at workwith spades and pick-axes digging a trench.

  The police of Irvington were at once notified, a sleepy official at thePost Office was roused out of his slumbers, and a telegram was directedto the nearest military post, but the latter proceeding was useless andno answer was received, since the copper wires were long ago in thecontrol of the enemy. Even if it had got through, the telegraphicwarning would have come too late, for the military post in question, ofwhich half of the troops were, as usual, on leave, had been attacked andcaptured by the Japanese at nine o'clock in the morning.

  A hundred thousand Japanese had established the line of an easternadvance-guard long before the Pacific States had any idea of what wasup. During Sunday, after the capture of San Francisco, the occupation ofSeattle, San Diego and the other fortified towns on the coast, thelanding of the second detachment of the Japanese army began, and byMonday evening the Pacific States were in the grip of no less than onehundred and seventy thousand men.

  * * * * *

  When, on Sunday morning, the Japanese had cut off the railwayconnections, they adopted the plan of allowing all trains going fromeast to west to pass unmolested, so that there was soon quite acollection of engines and cars to be found within the zone bounded bythe Japanese outposts. On the other hand, all the trains runningeastward were held up, some being sent back and others being used forconveying the Japanese troops to advance posts or for bringing thevarious lines of communication into touch with one another. In somecases these trains were also used for pushing boldly much farther east,the enemy thus surprising and overpowering a number of military postsand arsenals in which the guns and ammunition for the militia werestored.

  Only in a very few instances did this gigantic mechanism fail. One ofthese accidents occurred at Swallowtown, where the mistake was made ofattacking the express-train to Umatilla instead of the local train toPendleton. The lateness of the former and the occupation of the stationtoo long before the expected arrival of the latter, and coupled to thisthe heroic deed of the station-master, interfered unexpectedly with theexecution of the plan. The reader will remember that when the expressreturned to Swallowtown, Tom's shanty was empty. The enemy haddisappeared and had taken the two captive farmers with them. The mountedpolice, who had been summoned immediately from Walla Walla, found thetwo men during the afternoon in their wagon, bound hand and foot, in ahollow a few miles to the west of the station. They also discovered atime-table of the Oregon Railway in the wagon, with a note in Japanesecharacters beside the time for the arrival of the local train fromUmatilla. This time-table had evidently been lost by the leader of theparty on his flight. Soon after the police had returned to theSwallowtown station that same evening, a Japanese military train passedthrough, going in the direction of Pendleton. The train was movingslowly and those within opened fire on the policeman, who lost no timein replying. But the odds were too great, and it was all over in a fewminutes.

  By Monday evening the enemy had secured an immense quantity of railwaymaterial, which had simply poured into their arms automatically, andwhich was more than sufficient for their needs.

  The information received from Victoria (British Columbia) that a fleethad been sighted in the Straits of San Juan de Fuca, whence it was saidto have proceeded to Port Townsend and Puget Sound, was quite correct. Acruiser squadron had indeed passed Esquimault and Victoria at dawn onSunday, and a few hours later firing had been heard coming from thedirection of Port Townsend. The British harbor officials had suddenlybecome extremely timid and had not allowed the regular steamer to leavefor Seattle. When, therefore, on Monday morning telegraphic inquiriescame from the American side concerning the foreign warships, which, bythe way, had carried no flag, ambiguous answers could be made withoutarousing suspicion. Considerable excitement prevailed in Victoria onaccount of the innumerable vague rumors of the outbreak of war; thenaval station, however, remained perfectly quiet. On Monday morning acruiser started out in the direction of Port Townsend, and afterexchanging numerous signals with Esquimault, continued on her coursetowards Cape Flattery and the open sea. It will be seen, therefore, thatno particular zeal was shown in endeavoring to get at the bottom of thematter.

  A battle between the Japanese ships and the forts of Port Townsend hadactually taken place. Part of the hostile fleet had escorted thetransport steamers to Puget Sound and had there found the naval depotsand the fortifications, the arsenal and the docks in the hands of theircountrymen, who had also destroyed the second-class battleship _Texas_lying off Port Orchard by firing at her from the coast forts previouslystormed and captured by them. They had surprised S
eattle at dawn much inthe same way as San Francisco had been surprised, and they at oncebegan to land troops and unload their war materials. On the other hand,an attempt to surprise Port Townsend with an insufficient force hadfailed. The Americans had had enough sense to prohibit the Japanese fromcoming too near to the newly armed coast defenses, and the better watchwhich the little town had been able to keep over the Asiatics had madeit difficult for them to assemble a sufficiently large fightingcontingent. The work here had to be attended to by the guns, and theenemy had included this factor in their calculations from the beginning.

  How thoroughly informed the Japanese were as to every detail of ourcoast defenses and how well acquainted they were with each separatebattery, with its guns as well as with its ammunition, was clearlydemonstrated by the new weapon brought into the field in connection withthe real attack on the fortifications. Of course Japanese laborers hadbeen employed in erecting the works--they worked for such ridiculouslylow wages, those Japanese engineers disguised as coolies. With the eightmillion two hundred thousand dollars squeezed out of Congress in thespring of 1908--in face of the unholy fear on the part of the nation'srepresentatives of a deficit, it had been impossible to get more--twonew mortar batteries had been built on the rocky heights of PortTownsend. These batteries, themselves inaccessible to all ships' guns,were in a position to pour down a perpendicular fire on hostile decksand could thus make short work of every armored vessel.

  Now the Japanese had already had a very unpleasant experience with thestrong coast fortifications of Port Arthur. In the first place,bombarding of this nature was very injurious to the bores of the ships'guns, and secondly, the results on land were for the most part nominal.Not without reason had Togo tried to get at the shore batteries of PortArthur by indirect fire from Pigeon Bay. But even that, in spite ofcareful observations taken from the water, had little effect. And eventhe strongest man-of-war was helpless against the perpendicular fire ofthe Port Townsend mortar batteries, because it was simply impossible forits guns, with their slight angle of elevation, to reach the fortssituated so high above them. And if the road to Seattle, that importantbase of operations in the North, was not to be perpetually menaced, thenPort Townsend must be put out of commission.

  But for every weapon a counter-weapon is usually invented, and every newdiscovery is apt to be counterbalanced by another. The world has neveryet been overturned by a new triumph of skill in military technics,because it is at once paralyzed by another equally ingenious. And now,at Port Townsend, very much the same thing happened as on March ninth,1862. In much the same way that the appearance of the _Merrimac_ hadbrought destruction to the wooden fleet until she was herself forced toflee before Ericsson's _Monitor_ at Hampton Roads, so now at PortTownsend on May seventh a new weapon was made to stand the crucial test.Only this time we were not the pathfinders of the new era.

  While the Japanese cruisers, keeping carefully beyond the line of firefrom the forts, sailed on to Seattle, four ships were brought intoaction against the mortar batteries of Port Townsend which appeared toset at defiance all known rules of ship-building, and which,indestructible as they were, threatened to annihilate all existingsystems. They were low vessels which floated on the water like hugetortoises. These mortar-boats, which were destined to astound not onlythe Americans but the whole world, had been constructed in Japaneseshipyards, to which no stranger had ever been admitted. In place of theordinary level-firing guns found on a modern warship, these uncanny graythings carried 17.7-inch howitzers, a kind of mortar of Japaneseconstruction. There was nothing to be seen above the low deck but ashort heavily protected funnel and four little armored domes whichcontained the sighting telescopes for the guns, the mouths of which layin the arch of the whaleback deck. Four such vessels had also beenconstructed for use at San Francisco, but the quick capture of the fortshad rendered the mortar-boats unnecessary.

  We were constantly being attacked in places where no thought had beengiven to the defense, and the fortifications we did possess were nevershot at from the direction they faced. Our coast defenses wereeverywhere splendidly protected against level-firing guns, which theJapanese, however, unfortunately refrained from using. With theirmortar-boats they attacked our forts in their most vulnerable spot, thatis, from above. With the exception of Winfield Scott, the batteries atPort Townsend were the only ones on our western coast which at onceconstrued the appearance of suspicious-looking ships on May seventh assigns of a Japanese attack, and they immediately opened fire on the fourJapanese cruisers and on the transport steamers. But before this firehad any effect, the hostile fleet changed its course to the North andthe four mortar-boats began their attack. They approached to within twonautical miles and opened fire at once.

  What was the use of our gunners aiming at the flat, gray arches of theseuncanny ocean-tortoises? The heavy shells splashed into the water allaround them, and when one did succeed in hitting one of the boats, itwas simply dashed to pieces against the armor-plate, which was severalfeet thick, or else it glanced off harmlessly like hail dancing off thedomed roof of a pavilion. The only targets were the flames which shotincessantly out of the mouths of the hostile guns like out of afunnel-shaped crater.

  By noon all the armored domes of the Port Townsend batteries had beendestroyed and one gun after another had ceased firing. The horizontalarmor-plates, too, which protected the disappearing gun-carriagesbelonging to the huge guns of the other forts, had not been able towithstand the masses of steel which came down almost perpendicularlyfrom above them. One single well-aimed shot had usually sufficed tocripple the complicated mechanism and once that was injured, it wasimpossible to bring the gun back into position for firing. The concreteroofs of the ammunition rooms and barracks were shot to pieces and thetraverses were reduced to rubbish heaps by the bursting of the numerousshells of the enemy. And all that was finally left round the tatteredStars and Stripes was a little group of heavily wounded gunners,performing their duty to the bitter end, and these heroes were honoredby the enemy by being permitted to keep their arms. They were sent bysteamer from Seattle to the Canadian Naval Station at Esquimault on theseventh of May, and their arrival inspired the populace to stormydemonstrations against the Japanese, this being the first outwardexpression of Canadian sympathy for the United States. The Canadiansfelt that the time had come for all white men to join hands against thecommon danger, and the policy of the Court of St. James soon becameintensely unpopular throughout Canada. What did Canada care about whatwas considered the proper policy in London, when here at their very doornecessity pressed hard on their heels, and the noise of war from acrossthe border sounded a shrill Mene Tekel in the white man's ear?

  * * * * *

  There were therefore no less than one hundred and seventy thousandJapanese soldiers on American soil on Tuesday morning, May ninth. In thenorth, the line of outposts ran along the eastern border of the Statesof Washington and Oregon and continued through the southern portion ofIdaho, always keeping several miles to the east of the tracks of theOregon Short Line, which thus formed an excellent line of communicationbehind the enemy's front. At Granger, the junction of the Oregon ShortLine and the Union Pacific, the Japanese reached their easternmostbastion, and here they dug trenches, which were soon fortified by meansof heavy artillery. From here their line ran southward along the WasatchMountains, crossed the great Colorado plateau and then continued alongthe high section of Arizona, reaching the Mexican boundary by way ofFort Bowie.

  Only in the south and in the extreme north did railroads in anyrespectable number lead up to the Japanese front. In the center,however, the roads by way of which an American assault could be made,namely the Union Pacific at Granger, the Denver and Rio Grande at GrandJunction, and further south the Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe, approachedthe Japanese positions at right angles, and at these points captiveballoons and several air-ships kept constant watch toward the east, sothat there was no possibility of an American surprise. In the northstrong field forti
fications along the border-line of Washington andIdaho furnished sufficient protection, and in the south the sunbakedsandy deserts of New Mexico served the same purpose. Then, too, thealmost unbroken railway connection between the north and the southallowed the enemy to transport his reserves at a moment's notice to anypoint of danger, and the Japs were clever enough not to leave theirunique position to push further eastward. Any advance of large bodiesof troops would have weakened all the manifold advantages of thisposition, and besides the Japanese numbers were not considerable enoughto warrant an unnecessary division of forces.

  And what had we in the way of troops to oppose this hostile invasion?Our regular army consisted, on paper, of sixty thousand men. Fifteenthousand of these had been stationed in the Pacific States, composedprincipally of the garrisons of the coast forts; all of these withoutexception were, by Monday morning, in the hands of the Japanese. This atonce reduced the strength of our regular army to forty-five thousandmen. Of this number eighteen thousand were in the Philippines and,although they were not aware of it, they had to all intents and purposesbeen placed _hors de combat_, both at Mindanao and in the fortificationsof Manila. Besides these the two regiments on the way from San Franciscoto Manila and the garrison of Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands,could be similarly deducted. It will be seen, therefore, that, onlytwenty-five thousand men of our regular army were available, and thesewere scattered over the entire country: some were in the numerousprairie-forts, others on the Atlantic coast, still others in Cuba and inPorto Rico. Thus twenty-five thousand men were pitted against a forcenot only seven times as large, but one that was augmented hourly byhundreds of newcomers. On Monday the President had called out theorganized militia and on the following day he sent a special message toCongress recommending the formation of a volunteer army. The calls toarms were posted in the form of huge placards at all the street-cornersand at the entrances to the speedily organized recruiting-offices. Inthis way it was possible, to be sure, within a few months to raise anarmy equal to that of the enemy so far as mere numbers were concerned,and the American citizen could be relied upon. But where were theleaders, where was the entire organization of the transport, of thecommissariat, of the ambulance corps--we possessed no militarytrain-corps at all--and most important of all, where were the arms tocome from?

  The arsenals and ammunition-depots in the Pacific States were in thehands of the enemy, the cannon of our far western field-artillery depotshad aided in forming Japanese batteries, and the Japanese flag waswaving above our heavy coast guns. The terrible truth that we were forthe present absolutely helpless before the enemy had a thoroughlydisheartening effect on all classes of the population as soon as it wasclearly recognized. In impotent rage at this condition of utterhelplessness and in their eagerness to be revenged on the all-powerfulenemy, men hurried to the recruiting-offices in large numbers, and thelists for the volunteer regiments were soon covered with signatures. Thecitizens of the country dropped the plow, stood their tools in thecorner and laid their pens away; the clattering typewriters becamesilent, and in the offices of the sky-scrapers business came to astand-still. Only in the factories where war materials were manufactureddid great activity reign.

  For the present there was at least one dim hope left, namely the fleet.But where was the fleet? After our battle-fleet had crossed the Pacificto Australia and Eastern Asia, it returned to the Atlantic, while asquadron of twelve battleships and four armored cruisers was sent underAdmiral Perry to the west coast and stationed there, with headquartersat San Francisco. To these ships must be added the regular Pacificsquadron and Philippine squadron. The remaining ships of our fleet werein Atlantic waters.

  That was the fatal mistake committed in the year of our Lord 1909. Invain, all in vain, had been the oft-repeated warning that in face of themenacing Japanese danger the United States navy should be kept together,either in the west or in the east. Only when concentrated, only in thecondition in which it was taken through the Straits of Magellan byAdmiral Evans, was our fleet absolutely superior to the Japanese. Everydispersal, every separation of single divisions was bound to provefatal. Article upon article and pamphlet upon pamphlet were writtenanent the splitting-up of our navy! And yet what a multitude of entirelydifferent and mutually exclusive tasks were set her at one and the sametime! Manila was to be protected, Pearl Harbor was to have a navalstation, the Pacific coast was to be protected, and there was to be areserve fleet off the eastern coast.

  And yet it was perfectly clear that any part of the fleet which happenedto be stationed at Manila or Hawaii would be lost to the Americansimmediately on the outbreak of hostilities. But we deluded ourselveswith the idea that Japan would not dare send her ships across thePacific in the face of our little Philippine squadron, whereas not evena large squadron stationed at Manila would have hindered the Japanesefrom attacking us. Even such a squadron they could easily have destroyedwith a detachment of equal strength, without in any way hindering theiradvance against our western shores, while the idea of attempting toprotect an isolated colony with a few ships against a great sea-powerwas perfectly ridiculous. The strong coast fortifications and a divisionof submarines--the two stationed there at the time, however, were reallynot fit for use--would have sufficed for the defense of Manila, andanything beyond that simply meant an unnecessary sacrifice of forceswhich might be far more useful elsewhere.

  After our fleet had been divided between the east and the west, both thePacific fleet and the reserve Atlantic fleet were individually farinferior to the Japanese fleet. The maintenance of a fleet in thePacific as well as of one in the Atlantic was a fatal luxury. It wassuperfluous to keep on tap a whole division of ships in our Atlanticharbors merely posing as maritime ornaments before the eyes of Europe orat the most coming in handy for an imposing demonstration against arefractory South-American Republic. All this could have been done justas well with a few cruisers. English money and Japanese intrigues, it istrue, succeeded in always keeping the Venezuelan wound open, so that wewere constantly obliged to steal furtive glances at that corner of theworld, one that had caused us so much political vexation. Matters hadindeed reached a sorry pass if our political prestige was so shaky, thatit was made to depend on Mr. Castro's valuation of the forces at thedisposal of the United States!

  In consideration of the many unforeseen delays that had occurred in thework of digging the Panama Canal, there was only one policy for us toadopt until its completion, and that was to keep our fleet together andeither to concentrate it in the Pacific and thus deter the enemy fromattacking our coasts, regardless of what might be thought of our actionin Tokio, or to keep only a few cruisers in the Pacific, as formerly,and to concentrate the fleet in the Atlantic, so as to be able to attackthe enemy from the rear with the full force of our naval power. Butthese amateur commissioners of the public safety who wished to have animposing squadron on view wherever our flag floated--as if the Stars andStripes were a signal of distress instead of a token ofstrength--condemned our fleet to utter helplessness. In 1908, whenthere was no mistaking the danger, we, the American people, one of therichest and most energetic nations of the world, nevertheless allowedourselves in the course of the debate on the naval appropriations to befrightened by Senator Maine's threat of a deficit of a few dollars inour budget, should the sums that were absolutely needed in case ourfleet was to fulfill the most immediate national tasks be voted. Thiswas the short-sighted policy of a narrow-minded politician who, when acountry's fate is hanging in the balance, complains only of the costs.It was most assuredly a short-sighted policy, and we were compelled topay dearly for it.

  The voyage of our fleet around South America had shown the world thatthe value of a navy is not impaired because a few drunken sailorsoccasionally forget to return to their ship when in port: on thecontrary, foreign critics had been obliged to admit that our navy inpoint of equipment and of crews was second to none. And lo and behold,this remarkable exhibition of power--the only sensible idea evolved byour navy department in years--is foll
owed by the insane dispersal of ourships to so many different stations.

  How foolish had it been, furthermore, to boast as we did about havingkept up communication with Washington by wireless during the whole ofour journey around South America. Had not the experience at Trinidad,where a wireless message intercepted by an English steamer had warnedthe coal-boats that our fleet would arrive a day sooner, taught us alesson? And had not the way in which the Japanese steamer, also providedwith a wireless apparatus, stuck to us so persistently betweenValparaiso and Callao shown us plainly that every new technicaldiscovery has its shady side?

  No, we had learned nothing. In Washington they insisted on sending allorders from the Navy Department to the different harbors and navalstations by wireless, yet each of the stations along the whole distancefrom east to west provided possibilities of indiscretion and treacheryand of unofficial interception. Why had we not made wireless telegraphya government monopoly, instead of giving each inhabitant of the UnitedStates the right to erect an apparatus of his own if he so wished? Didit never occur to anybody in Washington that long before the orders ofthe Navy Department had reached Mare Island, Puget Sound and San Diegothey had been read with the greatest ease by hundreds of strangers? Itrequired the success of the enemy to make all this clear to us, when wemight just as well have listened to those who drew conclusions fromobvious facts and recommended caution.

  In spite of all this, the press on Tuesday morning still adhered to thehope that Admiral Perry would attack the enemy from the rear with histwelve battleships of the Pacific squadron, and that, meeting theJapanese at their base of operations, he would cut off all threads ofcommunication between San Francisco and Tokio. It was no longer possibleto warn Perry of his danger, since the wireless stations beyond theRockies were already in the enemy's hands. The American people couldtherefore only trust to luck; but blind chance has never yet saved acountry in its hour of direst need. It can only be saved by the energy,the steady eye and the strong hand of men. All hope centered in AdmiralPerry, in his energy and his courage, but the people became uneasy whenno answer was received to the oft-repeated question: "Where is thePacific fleet?" Yes, where was Admiral Perry?

 

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