That the Californian, controlled by the same company as the Titanic, was nearer the sinking steamer than the 19 miles reported by her captain, and that her officers and crew ‘saw the distress signals of the Titanic and failed to respond to them in accordance with the dictates of humanity, international usage and the requirements of law.’ The committee concludes that the Californian might have saved all the lost passengers and crew of the ship that went down.
That the full capacity of the Titanic’s lifeboats was not utilized, because, while only 706 persons were saved, the ship’s boats could have carried 1,176.
That no general alarm was sounded, no whistle blown and no systematic warning given to the endangered passengers, and it was fifteen or twenty minutes after the collision before Capt. Smith ordered the Titanic’s wireless operator to send out a distress message.
That the Titanic’s crew was only meagrely acquainted with its positions and duties in an accident and that only one drill was held before the maiden trip and none after the vessel left Southampton though many of the crew joined the ship but a few hours before she sailed.
Warnings Disregarded
That the warnings received on every side by the Titanic that ice was in her path, warnings which her captain forwarded to the Hydrographic Bureau in Washington, were disregarded so far as the navigation of the vessel was concerned, and that her speed was not relaxed but increased and her lookout watch not doubled.
That the wireless operator of the Carpathia was not ‘duly vigilant’ in handling messages concerning the Titanic disaster, either official or from passengers, and that the practice of allowing wireless operators to send newspaper accounts of their experience in the line of duty should be stopped.
That all ships carrying 100 passengers or more should be equipped with double searchlights; that all ships should carry lifeboats sufficient to hold every soul aboard; that wireless telegraphy should be regulated by law so as to prevent amateur interference and also compel ships to maintain a day and night watch of operators.
Senator Smith’s speech began with an explanation of the course of his committee in taking prompt steps to gather at first hand the evidence of the rescued sailors of the Titanic before they should sail for England.
‘Questions of diverse citizenship,’ he said, ‘gave way to the universal desire for the simple truth. It was of paramount importance that we should act quickly to avoid jurisdictional confusion and organized opposition at home and abroad.
‘Absolute Unpreparedness’
‘Though without any pretension to experience or special knowledge in nautical affairs,’ continued the Senator, ‘nevertheless, I am of the opinion that very few important facts escaped our scrutiny.’
Continuing, the Michigan Senator said in part:
‘In the construction of the Titanic no limit of cost circumscribed their endeavour, and when this vessel took its place at the head of the line every modern improvement in shipbuilding was supposed to have been realized; so confident were they that both owner and builder were eager to go upon the trial trip; no sufficient tests were made of boilers or bulkheads or gearing or equipment, and no life-saving or signal devices were reviewed; officers and crew were strangers to one another and passengers to both; neither was familiar with the vessel or its implements or tools; no drill or station practice or helpful discipline disturbed the tranquillity of that voyage, and when the crisis came a state of absolute unpreparedness stupefied both passengers and crew and, in their despair, the ship went down, carrying as needless a sacrifice of noble women and brave men as ever clustered about the Judgement Boat in any single moment of passing time.
‘Captain’s Recklessness’
‘We shall leave to the honest judgement of England its painstaking chastisement of the British Board of Trade, to whose laxity of regulation and hasty inspection the world is largely indebted for this awful fatality. Of contributing causes there were very many. In the face of warning signals, speed was increased and messages of danger seemed to stimulate her to action rather than to persuade her to fear.’
Of Capt. Smith, Senator Smith said that ‘his indifference to the danger was one of the direct and contributing causes of this unnecessary tragedy, while his own willingness to die was the expiating evidence of his fitness to live.’
The Senator pointed to the reckless disregard even of the falling, chilling temperature that was a matter of comment among all the passengers as they got into the icefield. The blow which the Titanic struck the iceberg was severe, yet many of the passengers and crew ‘did not even know of the collision until tardily advised of the danger by anxious friends, and even then official statements were clothed in such confident assurances of safety as to arouse no fear.
‘No Orderly Routine’
‘The awful force of the impact was well known to the master and builder, who, from the first, must have known the ship was doomed and never uttered an encouraging sign to one another, while to the inquiry of President Ismay as to whether it was serious, the captain only replied, “I think it is.” ‘ There is evidence tending to show that even the watertight compartments were not successfully closed either above or below. No general alarm was given, no ship’s officers formally assembled, no orderly routine was attempted or organized system of safety begun. Haphazard, they rushed by one another, on staircase and in hallway, while men of self-control gathered here and there about the decks, helplessly staring at one another or giving encouragement to those less courageous than themselves.
‘And yet,’ exclaimed the Senator, ‘it is said by some well-meaning persons that the best of discipline prevailed. If this is discipline, what would have been disorder?’
The ‘recklessness and indifference’ of many of the crew, the haste of some of the junior officers to ensure their own safety while passengers were still trying to get into the boats, the woeful ignorance of the stewards and others manning the boats of even the rudiments of seafaring knowledge, were all touched upon by Senator Smith.
He paid a tribute to Phillips and Bride, the wireless operators of the Titanic, who stayed till the very end was at hand before seeking to rescue themselves, and commented on the lucky fact that the Carpathia’s operator, listening for a Cape Race message, kept his telephone over his head while undressing and so was able to receive, just as he was turning in for the night, the distress call of the Titanic.
‘The spirit of venality’ that brought about the ‘systematic reign of silence’ in the wireless operation of the Carpathia was strongly condemned by Senator Smith, and he declared also that the White Star Line officials in New York received information ‘containing absolutely the entire story’ about 8.30 Monday morning, yet ‘battled against the truth all day’, and after seven o’clock that night sent a message to Representative Hughes assuring him that the Titanic was safe and being towed to Halifax.
‘It is little wonder,’ said the Senator, ‘that we have not been able to fix with definiteness the author of this falsehood.’
Of Capt. Lord’s conduct in failing to proceed to the Titanic’s rescue when her distress signals had been seen from the Californian Senator Smith spoke in scathing terms. He read the English law which makes it a misdemeanour for the master of a vessel to fail to proceed forthwith to the assistance of any person or vessel in danger of being lost at sea.
Senator Smith compared with Lord’s the conduct of Capt. Rostron, and concluded with a declaration that ‘obsolete and antiquated shipping laws should no longer encumber the parliamentary records of any government,’ and that the best way to honour the dead of the Titanic was to pass such laws as would serve to prevent the recurrence of such disasters.
(New York World, 29 May 1912)
LONDON PAPERS DENOUNCE SMITH
The London morning papers print lengthy extracts from the Senate Committee’s report on the Titanic disaster and from Senator Smith’s speech, but only a few comment upon the matter editorially. The Daily Mail says the report is not likely to provoke serious crit
icism, but thinks it regrettable that Senator Smith was not content to allow it to speak for itself, as it regards his speech as ‘a violent, unreasonable diatribe, in which the Senator betrays once more the amazing ignorance that prompted some of his questions during the inquiry.’
The Daily Express says: ‘Although much of the report sounds sensible, the grotesque oration of Senator Smith deprives it of much value. That extraordinary mass of grandiloquent bosh is probably without a parallel in the history of parliaments. Its mock heroics and ludicrous verbosity relieve it of any taint of sincerity or sense.’
The Express thinks that in view of Senator Smith’s behaviour at the inquiry the report will not benefit from his association with it, but admits there is some justification for the charge of lack of discipline in loading the boats after the collision. As regards the censure of the Californian’s captain, it believes the British people will reserve judgement until after the report of the Mersey Commission.
The Daily News, on the contrary, believes Senator Smith has no need to apologize for his committee, which got its witnesses when the facts were too fresh in their memories for art or delusion to colour them and whose questions were a model of rigorous investigation.
‘Some, at least, of its conclusions,’ it declares, ‘are irresistible, and they are very disturbing. We cannot believe the Titanic alone of British ships had these defects.’
(New York World, 29 May 1912)
The British Board of Trade Inquiry convened for the first time on 2 May under the auspices of Wreck Commissioner Lord Mersey. The Board of Trade, represented by the Attorney General, Sir Rufus Isaacs, drew up a list of 26 questions to be answered by the court relating to the construction of the Titanic, navigation, ice warnings, and the proximity of the Californian. To clarify the events on the night of the sinking, Lord Mersey and his team of five assessors were able to refer to a large model of the Titanic, specially built for the hearings. By the time the jury retired on 21 June, the testimony of the various witnesses had amounted to 25,622 questions and answers.
Able Seaman Joseph Scarrott was the second witness to testify at the Board of Trade Inquiry.
I myself took charge of No. 14 as the only sailorman there. The Chief Officer ordered women and children to be taken in. Some men came and tried to rush the boat. They were foreigners and could not understand the orders I gave them, but I managed to keep them away. I had to use some persuasion with a boat tiller. One man jumped in twice and I had to throw him out the third time. I got all the women and children into the boat. There were fifty-four women and four children – one of them a baby in arms. There were myself, two firemen, three or four stewards and Mr Lowe, who got into the boat. I told him the trouble I had with the men and he brought out his revolver and fired two shots between the boat and the ship’s side. He said: ‘If there is any more trouble I will fire at them.’
The after fall got twisted and we dropped the boat by the releasing gear and got clear of the ship. There were four men rowing. There was a man in the boat who we thought was a sailor, but he was not. He was a window cleaner. The Titanic was then about 50 yards off, and we lay there with the other boats. Mr Lowe was at the helm.
After the ship sank, we heard cries coming from another direction. Mr Lowe decided to transfer our passengers among the other boats, and then make up the full crew of men to go in the direction of the cries. Then we went among the wreckage. When we got where these cries were, we were among hundreds of dead bodies floating in lifebelts. The wreckage and the bodies seemed to be hanging in one cluster. We pushed our way among the wreckage, and as we got towards the centre we saw a man – I have since found out he was a storekeeper – on the top of a staircase or a large piece of wreckage as if he was praying and at the same time calling for help.
When we saw him we were about 15 yards from him, and the wreckage was so thick – I am sorry to say that there were more bodies than there was wreckage – that it took us quite half an hour to get that distance to that man. We could not row the boat through the bodies. We had to push them out the way, to force our way to the man. We could not get close enough to get him right off, only within reach of an oar. We pulled him off with that and he managed to hang on and get into the boat.
(British Inquiry, 3 May 1912)
AWAY JUST IN TIME
Able Seaman William Lucas, an ex-Navy man, another witness at the Titanic inquiry, said he was playing ‘nap’ when the ship struck.
He got into a collapsible boat and they had only just got clear when the Titanic went down.
Lucas said he knew there was some ice ‘knocking about’. The shock of the collision nearly knocked him off his feet.
‘After the collision what did you do?’ – ‘I went down and put on an extra jersey.’ (Laughter)
Lucas said that as far as he knew the passengers on the boat deck were all of the first class. The boats lowered from that deck were not full by a long way. That was ‘because there were no women knocking about’.
He got into the last boat to get away on the port side – a collapsible boat – but Mr Lightoller ordered him out.
He then went to the starboard side to see if there were any boats left there, but there were not, so he went back to the collapsible boat. A lady called out that there were ‘no sailors or plugs’ in the boat, so he got in. The water was then up to the ship’s bridge. With the rising of the water and the tilting of the Titanic the boat ‘floated off’.
Lucas said the women were afraid of the collapsible boat when it had been lowered, and he transferred them to another boat. Afterwards his boat rescued thirty-six people clinging to an overturned collapsible boat. Two boats rowed back to the scene of the wreck, but they found nobody alive.
He said that after the boat drill at Southampton he went ashore. ‘It is a regular thing for the sailors to go ashore and have a final drink.’
‘In the lowering of the boats was there sufficient interval to enable the female passengers from the steerage to get on to the boat deck?’ – ‘They would have been able to if there had been anyone there to direct them to the boat deck.’ Lucas did not think there was anyone directing them.
There were two girls on deck when he left with the collapsible boat. ‘I said to them, “Wait a minute, there is another collapsible boat being put down from the funnel. You had better get into that.” I could not take them because my boat was full.’
Lucas said that he and Mr Lightoller helped one elderly lady into the collapsible boat and then had to help her out again as she would not go without her husband. ‘There were several cases like that,’ he said.
The inquiry was adjourned.
(Daily Sketch, 8 May 1912)
Reginald Lee, forty-two, from Oxfordshire, was on lookout duty with Frederick Fleet in the crow’s nest when the iceberg suddenly loomed into view. The Attorney General was greatly concerned by the absence of binoculars on the Titanic.
‘You have had about 15 or 16 years’ experience at sea altogether?’ – ‘Yes.’
‘Have you had experience in mail steamers?’ – ‘Yes.’
‘Are glasses usually supplied to the lookout man in mail steamers?’ – ‘Not that I know.’
‘Have you acted as lookout man in other ships before the Titanic?’ – ‘Yes.’
‘On mail steamers?’ – ‘Yes.’
‘Have you ever had glasses for use as a lookout man?’ – ‘Yes, but I do not know whether they were private or supplied by the company.’
‘Have you found them of use?’ – ‘They are better than ordinary eyesight.’
‘Are they of use at night at all?’ – ‘Certainly: night glasses.’
‘Do you know whether they are supplied in any other vessels of the White Star Line?’ – ‘I cannot say they are for certain, but my mate in the crow’s nest, Fleet, who was four years in the Oceanic as lookout man, told me they had them there.’
‘Were there any on the Titanic?’ – ‘No, not for our use anyway.’
‘Was
there any place in the crow’s nest for glasses?’ – ‘Yes, there was a small box.’
‘Did you look for glasses at all in the crow’s nest?’ – ‘We asked for them. I did not personally ask for them, but one of the other fellows did, and they said there were none for us.’
‘Did you come on the lookout at 10 o’clock on Sunday night the fourteenth of April?’ – ‘Yes. We relieved Symons and Jewell.’
‘Did one of you take the starboard side and one the port side of the crow’s nest on the lookout?’ – ‘I generally took the starboard side and Fleet took the port side.’
‘When you relieved Jewell and Symons, did they pass any word to you?’ – ‘Yes, they told us to keep a careful lookout for ice – and growlers in particular.’
‘What sort of a night was it?’ – ‘A clear, starry night overhead, but at the time of the accident there was a haze right ahead. In fact it was tending more or less round the horizon. There was no moon. And no wind whatever, barring what the ship made herself. The sea was quite calm, but it was very cold, freezing – the coldest we had had that voyage.’
‘Did you notice this haze, which you said extended on the horizon, when you first came on the lookout, or did it come late?’ – ‘It was not as distinct then, not to be noticed, but we had all our work cut out to pierce through it just after we started. My mate happened to pass the remark to me. He said: “Well, if we can see through that we will be lucky.” That was when we began to notice there was a haze on the water.’
‘At the time you came on watch, up to the moment just before the collision, can you tell us whether there was any difference in the speed at which the vessel was travelling compared with the rest of the voyage?’ – ‘She seemed to be going at the same rate all the way.’
‘Did you receive any orders from the bridge at all during this watch?’ – ‘No. The orders were turned over by the people we relieved.’
Voices from the Titanic Page 49