by Amarjit Kaur
The Akali-Janata government lasted barely two years. As the Janata government at the centre fell and Mrs Gandhi returned as prime minister, she dissolved the states’ legislatures including that of Punjab and called for new elections. The Congress party routed the Akali-Janata combine and Darbara Singh was elected chief minister.
The Congress party government under Darbara Singh proved disastrous for the state. For one, Darbara Singh and his predecessor Giani Zail Singh who had been inducted into the central cabinet as home minister, were forever throwing spanners in each other’s works. For another, Akalis, now out of power and with little prospect of regaining it through the electoral process, decided to destabilize the Congress government through agitation. They hauled the Anandpur Sahib Resolution out of the archives and proclaimed it as a charter of Sikh demands. To this they tagged another 45 ranging from the substantial ones like readjustment of the state’s boundaries and a fairer allocation of waters of Rivers Sutlej and Beas to which it was the only riparian state, to the utterly trivial ones like renaming a train as the Golden Temple Express and banning sale of cigarettes, liquor and meat in the vicinity of the Golden Temple. They followed it up with a series of agitations: nahar roko (blocking the canal meant to link Punjab’s river waters with the Yamuna), rasta roko (block road traffic), kam roko (stop work). And finally declared a dharamyudh (righteous war) from Amritsar against the government by sending over a thousand volunteers a day to court arrest.
Alongside this passive resistance movement a parallel Sikh fundamentalist movement began to build up under the leadership of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (1947-84). It had begun with the confrontation between orthodox Khalsa and Nirankaris in Amritsar on 13 April 1978 in which 13 lives were lost, mainly of Bhindranwale’s followers. The Nirankaris put on trial were acquitted by a judge who found that they had acted in self-defence. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale swore vengeance. The Akalis lent their support to him. From the Akal Takht the Nirankaris were proclaimed as enemies of the Khalsa Panth. On 24 April 1980, Baba Gurbachan Singh, the Nirankari guru, was assassinated in Delhi by Bhindranwale followers. This was followed by the killings of many Nirankaris in different parts of Punjab. Nevertheless, Bhindranwale was allowed to go about freely, toured Bombay and Delhi and when arrested was let off. He became a formidable force and gathered round him groups of terrorists mainly from unemployed youths belonging to the All India Sikh Students Federation. From slaying Nirankaris, terrorists expanded their ‘hit lists’ to include Nirankari sympathizers, dissident Akalis and Congress party members. Their chief target was the Hindu-owned Jullundur based chain of papers. On 9 September 1981, Lala Jagat Narain, chief editor of Punjab Kesari, was shot dead. A year later Jagat Narain’s son, Ramesh Chander, fell to their bullets. Amongst those killed were H.S. Manchanda, president of the Delhi Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, DIG of Police A.S. Atwal, Dr V.N. Tiwari, nominated member of parliament and Gyani Pratap Singh, a retired priest. Many Hindu temples were desecrated and innocent Hindu and Sikhs killed in cold blood. It was obvious that the terrorists’ ranks had been infiltrated by Pakistani agents, smugglers, Naxalites and common dacoits. The police were rarely able to identify or arrest the culprits. Its only method of dealing with the menace was to organize fake encounters and kill anyone they supported. And while the morcha continued, no Akali leader condemned these senseless killings in the language they deserved to be condemned nor had the courage to denounce Bhindranwale. The administration was totally paralysed. Meanwhile many meetings took place between Akali leaders and government representatives – issues were narrowed down and on at least two occasions agreement was within easy grasp when the talks had to be called off. It is difficult to say who was at fault, the Akalis or the government. Undoubtedly both.
When Bhindranwale sensed that the government had at long last decided to arrest him he first took shelter in the Golden Temple, then occupied and fortified portions of the Akal Takht. In full view of hundreds of armed constables, sophisticated arms including light machine guns and hand grenades were smuggled in. Killings which had so far been carried out beyond the precincts of the temple spread to the sacred precincts as rival gangs slew members of the other.
By the spring of 1984 it was clear that the day of reckoning between the authorities and Bhindranwale could not be put off for long. Akali leaders out of fear were unwilling or unable to order Bhindranwale out of the temple complex. The administration could not make up its mind about how and when to act. Mrs Gandhi’s advisers were unable to arrive at any settlement with Akalis and on a number of occasions when virtually all points of dispute had been resolved, they withdrew from their commitments, fearing that an agreement with the Akalis might be construed as yielding to pressure and might have adverse reaction on the numerically much larger Hindu vote in northern India. There were times when a force of commandos in plain clothes would have easily overpowered Bhindranwale and his men, who did not exceed a couple of hundred men spread out over the temple complex, and taken them alive or dead. Nor was it considered feasible to occupy the Guru ka Langar by force, or deprive Bhindranwale and his men of food and fuel and force them out of their entrenchment to come out and fight. On the contrary, the situation was allowed to develop to an explosive point and the worst possible time was chosen for action. On 3 June 1984 was the anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjun Dev. Thousands of pilgrims who had come from neighbouring villages were staying in the temple Sarai and the Parikrama. On 1 June, the army took over the state, cut off all communications with the outside world and imposed curfew in the city of Amritsar. Sporadic exchange of fire began on 1 June and continued for the next three days. On the evening of 5 June, the army entered the temple complex with tanks and armoured personnel carrier and blasted the Akal Takht. No one will ever know the final figure of casualties except that it was well over a thousand (three times more than Jallianwala Bagh in 1919) and hundreds of innocent men, women and children were killed. The Akal Takht including some priceless relics was in shambles. The temple archives which contained hundreds of handwritten copies of Granth Sahib and scores of Hukumnamas bearing signatures of the gurus went up in flames. Contrary to the government’s contention that the Harmandir had been untouched, scores of bullet marks were later found piercing its marble and wooden windows. The premises were subjected to extensive looting. Gurdwara golaks (money-pitchers) were emptied. Cash and office equipment in the SGPC and Akali Dal offices were taken. To destroy all evidences, entire buildings with all their records were set on fire.
The most damning judgement of Operation Bluestar is that the government did not foresee what the reaction of the Sikh community numbering 14 million would be to the storming of their holiest of holy shrines. The vast majority of Sikhs had no sympathy for Bhindranwale and were indeed nauseated by his venomous utterances and the senseless killings by his gun-men. Some who had submitted to Akali politics were disillusioned by their leaders lack of foresight. Most had no interest in politics of any sort. And it was they who felt that the government had used Bhindranwale as an excuse to give the entire Sikh community a bloody punch in their nose.
With the strict censorship imposed in Punjab, all we know of Operation Bluestar is the army-cum-government version of the action. It may be quite some time before we get to know the other side of the story. It is therefore only fair that readers should have some idea of what people who were present and witnessed the entire episode have to say. Of the hundreds of accounts received by me – with forgivable exaggerations by people who went through the ordeal – I have chosen one by Bhan Singh, secretary of the Akali Dal because it is a factual narration of incidents that took place. This is what he has to say:
‘On the morning of 1 June 1984, CRPF began to fire on the Golden Temple from different directions. The firing continued all day. As a result of this firing one Kulwant Singh was killed in Baba Atal Gurdwara and five men were killed in the Akal Takht. The firing was reckless and 32 bullet marks were seen on the walls of the Harman
dir.
‘On 3 June, curfew was imposed on the entire state; all manner of traffic was stopped and communication including telephones were cut off. Sunday, 3 June was the anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjun. Because of the relaxation in the curfew pilgrims had been able to enter the Parikrama. A large number of them slept the night in the Parikrama. So did many sevadars, paathis (scripture readers) and the devout who voluntarily clean temple premises at night. Volunteers numbering between 1800 to 1900 who had come to participate in the dharamyudh morcha to offer themselves for arrest were in Teja Singh Samundari Hall and Guru Ram Das Niwas. Amongst them were 1300 Akali workers under the leadership of Jathedar Nacchattar Singh including 200 women and 18 children.
‘On the morning of 4 June at 4.40 a.m. army cannons and machine-guns began to fire. There was no kind of notice or warning given. The firing went on all day into the night. I spent the night in my office in Teja Singh Samundari Hall. Most of the shells fell on the Akal Takht, Baba Atal, the Water Tower, Guru Nanak Niwas, Guru Ram Das Langar, and buildings behind the Akal Takht. Firing continued till five o’clock of the evening of 5 June. At 5.15 p.m. two Sikhs came from the Baghwali Gali which runs behind Guru Ram Das Niwas with the message that Sardar Abhashi Singh was wanted outside by Sardar Apar Singh Bajwa, DSP with the news that the army would stop firing from 4 to 5.30 p.m., so that anyone who wanted to come out could do so. I and Abhashi Singh conveyed the information to Sant Longowal and Sardar Gurucharan Singh Tohra. They asked me, S. Balwant Singh Ramoowalia and Abhashi Singh to go out and persuade the DSP to extend the time by an hour so that women, children and other helpless people could get out. However, while we were still at the gali, the firing was resumed with even greater intensity. During the interval about 40 to 50 armed Sikhs came from the Parikrama to Guru Ram Das Niwas, took positions on the rooftop and began to return the army’s fire. With this the army bombardment came to be directed towards Guru Ram Das Niwas, Teja Singh Samundari Hall and rooms of the Dharam Prachar Committee. We sat down in the middle room of Teja Singh Samundari Hall while Sant Longowal and Tohra along with ten Sikhs went into the president’s room. We spent the entire night awake because of the firing.
‘On the morning of 6 June, the army came inside Guru Ram Das Niwas and entered Teja Singh Samundari Hall. Sant Longowal, Tohra, Bibi Amarjit Kaur and other Sikhs with them were taken into custody by the jawans led by two officers and escorted away. We followed them from Teja Singh Samundari Hall towards Ram Das Niwas. In this time about 200 to 250 Sikhs collected, of which many sat down in the courtyard of the niwas. From the upper storey of the niwas a grenade fell on them. Jatheder Bagga Singh, a soldier and some Sikhs were killed. Nacchattar Singh’s leg was blown off. He did not receive medical attention and succumbed to his injuries after four hours. When the grenade fell it was still somewhat dark. Soldiers lost their temper and began to fire wildly killing between 30 to 35 people including women, children and aged people. Amongst the many who were injured were committee employees, Raj Singh, Dayal Singh and Gurubachan Singh. The injured men came to me and asked for medical help. I spoke to a subedar who sent a soldier to escort me to his major. When I got to the major I saw about 35 or 36 young Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads and the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help he got into a rage, tore my turban off my head and ordered his men to shoot me. I turned back and fled jumping over bodies of the dead and injured and saved my life by crawling along the walls. I got to the room where Tohra and Sant Longowal were sitting and told them of what I had seen. S. Karnail Singh Nag who had followed me also narrated what he had seen as well as the killing of 35 to 36 young Sikhs by cannon fire. All these youngmen were villagers of which about 20 to 21 wore long darhi and others were mona. All of them had been hauled out of the Guru Ram Das Sarai. This incident took place about 8.30 p.m.
‘We had nothing to eat or drink the day earlier. This day also we went hungry and thirsty. At about 4 o’clock, Tohra, Sant Longowal and their companions were taken out. People were crying for water. Some slaked their thirst with dirty water which had run down the damaged water tank and was mixed with blood and dirt of the courtyard. Of them nearly 120 were injured. There was no Red Cross or medical aid of any kind available for them. At 7 o’clock they began to remove the corpses and by 9 we were taken to military camps. I reached there at 9.30. I and my companions were released on 23 June 1984.’
Signed
BHAN SINGH
23 June 1984
Akali Dal: The Enemy Within
AMARJIT KAUR
The phenomenon of Khalistan has been there ever since the partition of this subcontinent into India and Pakistan. At the time of Independence, or just before, there was a significant number of people among the young Akali workers and junior leadership who actually thought that the time for a ‘Sikh state’ had come since the country was being divided. The British had, in fact, encouraged this line of thinking.
Fortunately, the older generation of Sikh leaders: the Akalis led by Master Tara Singh, the feudal elements led by the former rulers of the states of Patiala, Kapurthala, Jind, Faridkot and Nabha, and the old Sardari clique led by people like Sardar Baldev Singh, Raja Harinder Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh, in their wisdom, decided not to fall in with the designs of the British rulers and to cast their lot with India.
The younger elements within the Akali Dal who were for a separate Sikh state might have been defeated at that point in history; but, they were not deterred from working for this goal. Unfortunately, the older leadership within the Akali Dal inadvertently played into the hands of the fundamentalists and the separatists amongst the younger leadership when they began to proclaim that Sikh politics could not be separated from the Sikh religion since this was a fact of life proclaimed by the gurus.
There were two simple reasons why no Sikh challenged this concept created so conveniently by the Akali Dal. The common man amongst the Sikhs was not really bothered about such issues; he was too busy building a life for himself. Secondly, there was an acute lack of knowledge of Sikh history and scriptures amongst the Sikh masses. Consequently, the Akali Dal could feed their Sikh followers anything and they would accept it as the gospel truth.
Over the years as the younger generation began to replace the older, fundamentalism began to raise its ugly head and religion and politics began to be mixed even more, the distant glimmer of a Sikh-dominated state began to appear – and conflicts began between the moderate and those who imagined this distant glimmer – the first step towards a Sikh state, or as it is now called, Khalistan.
It is essential to understand the fact that the older generation of Akali leaders believed that the only way to create a mass base amongst the Sikh community was to appeal to the religious sentiments of the Sikhs. They wanted to appear as the only guardians of the Sikh faith. And as such, the bogey of Hindu communalism and domination became a convenient tool. Their eventual aim was to become the only spokesman of the Sikhs. The interpretation of religion became their prerogative and the existing administrative Sikh body of the SGPC became their lever, as well as their financier for all their future political activities.
The younger leadership which took over was more or less composed of uneducated jathedars such as Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Talwandi, etc. They began to use the SGPC as a treasury to render possible their dreams of an eventual Sikh majority state. This was how the Punjabi suba movement came into being. The issue of language – Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script – was only a pretext then, as is the Anandpur Sahib Resolution today, towards this end.
The educated Akali leadership such as Prakash Singh Badal, Justice Gurnam Singh and Lachman Singh Gill believed that they could politically outmanoeuvre their uneducated colleagues and take over the leadership of the Akalis.
Consequently, these educated leaders allowed communalism to cast a shadow over their party’s political concepts. Their reasoning: their exi
stence was dependent on Sikh votes and such votes could only come their way through religious exploitation.
These leaders felt that since the Akali Dal could never come to power in Punjab before 1966 and since the state was not Sikh-dominated, the Punjabi suba movement had to be started.
However, even after obtaining the Punjabi suba in 1966, their political fortunes did not improve significantly. The dominance of the Sikh community was confined to only two per cent, which they realized was insufficient to keep them in power because of the inherent conflicts within the party itself.
Whenever they did come to power, they ended up breaking into two or three factions; sometimes the divide occurred between the educated and the uneducated sections. Moreover, their government would always fall before the full five-year term only to be succeeded in a by-election by the Congress party.
Another cause for the growing frustration of the Akalis was the fact that the Sikh community at large did not fall for their ploy that they were the only spokesmen of their community, or for that matter that the Sikh panth was in danger.
Gradually, santdom began to dominate Punjabi politics. Fateh Singh then, Bhindranwale now. All these uneducated jathedars who took over the command of Akali leadership knew the words of the scriptures but not their spirit.
After the division of PEPSU into three States – which harmed the Punjabis because Punjab had shrunk – inter-party factions emerged, as mentioned earlier. Following this there was a rift between the Jats and the Khatris: Master Tara Singh was a Khatri. The Jat Akalis followed the others to a point when they were able to, and began to dominate Akali politics. This took place in 1962 with the emergence of Fateh Singh.
The Jats succeeded in ousting the Khatris; the conflict still exists, though with a kind of split between the urban and the rural Sikhs. Significantly, once the Jats took over the Akali leadership, conflicts within the Jats arose. Each group began to espouse demands which increased until they came to the point of Khalistan.