by Amarjit Kaur
The combination of these two factors – delayed information and an extensive army presence – is exemplified by what happened in a small village, six kilometres outside Moga town. On the morning of 7 June, as Operation Bluestar was in full swing inside the Golden Temple, the village of Talwandi Bagherian became tangled in an unexpected encounter with the army. The army version is that as some troops on a routine patrol approached the village, about 12 rounds were fired from within. A jawan was seriously injured and another wounded.
Two weeks after the incident, the village was still in a state of nervous shock, brought upon partly by shock and partly by mourning. The sarpanch, together with about a dozen others, was still under interrogation, but the village cooperative’s secretary, took us to meet members of the panchayat. These turned out to be two elderly men. They led us first to the house of Jagan Singh, a young inhabitant who had been killed as a result of the confrontation.
Then, in the courtyard of the village gurdwara – a ramshackle building in the shade of a neem tree – the villagers congregated to give their version of the incident. Amidst the rising cacophony of voices and arguments, they failed to answer the basic question: what led them to fire unprovoked upon the soldiers?
One of the panchayat members, Pooran Singh, silenced all the others to answer on behalf of the village. ‘I will tell you the truth,’ he said. ‘Yes, it is true that the villagers fired first, the sarpanch and Jagan Singh who the army took away and then later brought back dead. But the reality is that these men fired at the approaching soldiers out of confusion. We have no terrorists here, tell me do any of us look like terrorists? For a few days before 7 June we had been hearing stories of what happened in Amritsar. Then we heard that the Darbar Sahib was in shambles. And every main gurdwara in Punjab was under attack by the army. The local boys became very agitated. When we saw the army coming, we thought they had come to take our gurdwara. It was just that and nothing else. Sikhs will see their homes burn, but not their guru’s home.’
In the simple words of a peasant, Pooran Singh had truthfully summed up the feelings of his village. True, lack of information about the army action in the Golden Temple, was one reason for the inhabitants of a small village to mobilize themselves into unprovoked action. In a Punjab fallen silent under the rule of the army, it was understandable that a group of isolated villagers suddenly saw themselves as autonomous defenders of their faith. But the underlining emotion that led them into action was not their religious fervour; it was fear. Fear of one kind and another has become the keynote of the crisis in Punjab.
At first, it was fear of the terrorists. Then it was fear of the army. Now it is fear by one community facing reprisals from another if the army vacates the state. And the largest fear of all, bred by a mistrust of the government and its actions. It is these multiple and growing fears that have made the people of Punjab become partisan, in a defensive, demeaning way. It has transformed, in a matter of a couple of years, a dynamic, integrated, prosperous society into a fragmented, militant and embittered one. While the government jockeys for new stratagems to retain its position of strength, and prolongs its search for the healing touch to repair the communal chasm and defuse tensions, the future of Punjab defies political solution.
The model state, the flourishing frontier state, the great granary of India and the communally trouble-free state has now become a national problem. Repairing the Akal Takht under army control will not repair the greater divide created in Punjab. Allowing the army to linger will only breed a more invidious form of Sikh extremism in the future. The answer is to purge the state of fear. That can only be achieved not by demanding assurances from one community or one section of the people but by giving assurances. Or else Punjab’s continuing drift towards the dangerous extremities of social disintegration, economic despair and communal alienation will bring it back to the brink again.
White Paper on Punjab Agitation: A Summary
ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last three years Punjab has been the scene of a series of agitations. Four distinct factors were noticeably at work:
The agitations sponsored by the Shiromani Akali Dal;
A stridently communal and extremist movement which degenerated into open advocacy of violence and sanction for the most heinous crimes against innocent and helpless citizens and against the state;
Secessionist and anti-national activities; and
Involvement of criminals, smugglers, other anti-social elements and Naxalites who took advantage of the situation for their own ends.
The secessionist agitations and terrorist groups took advantage of the cover of agitations provided by the Akali Dal leadership to pursue a systematic plan of stockpiling of arms and ammunition in places of worship and of misusing the sacred precincts of the Golden Temple and other gurdwaras to direct and commit acts of murder, sabotage, arson and loot. Simultaneoulsy, a determined effort was made to drive a wedge between Hindus and Sikhs.
Gradually a secessionist and anti-national movement, with the active support of a small number of groups operating from abroad, dominated the scene. The Akali Dal leadership surrendered the initiative and control over the agitation to the terrorists and was unwilling to negotiate a settlement on the basis of any reasonable framework offered by the government.
The government made every possible effort to bring about a settlement. Till the very last moment discussions were held with the Akali Dal leaders who were found to be more rigid than before.
The subversive activities of terrorists had assumed menacing proportions in the context of India’s security environment. The influence of external forces, with deep-rooted interests in the disintegration of India, was becoming evident. In these circumstances the army was called in to meet the challenge to the security, unity and integrity of the country.
II
DEMANDS OF THE SHIROMANI AKALI DAL
AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
The Akali Dal sponsored an agitation in support of a set of demands submitted to the government in October 1981. Some of these demands had their origin in a resolution, generally known as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, adopted by the Akali Dal in October 1973. The resolution asked for the immediate merger with Punjab of Punjabi-speaking Sikh-populated areas in Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh besides Chandigarh. It also sought a fundamental change in the centre-state relations, restricting the role of the centre to defence, foreign affairs, post and telecommunications, currency and railways. The authenticated version of the resolution, issued in November 1982, emphasized the constitution of ‘a single administrative unit where the interests of Sikhs and Sikhism are specially protected.’
The prime minister met the representatives of the Akali Dal on 16 October 1981 and thereafter again on two occasions in November 1981 and April 1982. The process of consultation and discussion initiated thus has not been interrupted by the government since then. There have been several rounds of talks, both open and secret, as well as tripartite discussions in which leaders of opposition parties in parliament also participated. Annexure IV of the White Paper documents, the large number of meetings held with the representatives of the Akali Dal.
The main issues discussed with the Akali Dal representatives fall into three broad categories, viz.,
(i)
those which concern the Sikh community as a religious group;
(ii)
those which relate to other states besides Punjab; and
(iii)
general issues.
(i) DEMANDS WHICH CONCERN THE SIKH COMMUNITY AS A RELIGIOUS GROUP
The religious demands finally put forward by the Akali Dal were:
(a)
Grant of ‘holy city’ status to Amritsar on the pattern of Hardwar, Kashi and Kurukshetra;
(b)
Installation o
f ‘Harmandir Radio’ at the Golden Temple to relay kirtan;
(c)
Permission to Sikhs travelling by air to wear kirpans on domestic and international flights; and
(d)
Enactment of All India Gurdwara Act.
(a)
Grant of ‘Holy City’ Status to Amritsar
The government has not conferred ‘holy city’ status on the cities mentioned or any other city. Restrictions on the sale of meat or liquor in cities like Hardwar and Kurukshetra had been imposed by the local authorities or state governments. On 27 February 1983 the prime minister announced that the sale of tobacco, liquor and meat would be banned in a demarcated area around the Golden Temple as well as the Durgiana temple in Amritsar. Action has already been taken in pursuance of this announcement and shops selling tobacco, liquor and meat within a radius of 200 metres of Harmandir Sahib and Durgiana temple have already been shifted. The grant of ‘holy city’ status as such to any city is not in consonance with the secular nature of our Constitution.
(b)
Installation of Transmitter Station at the Golden Temple
While private radio broadcasting facilities cannot be allowed to any group, the government offered to arrange for direct relay of shabad kirtan from the Golden Temple through the Jalundur station of All India Radio. However, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee did not extend the requisite facilities to the All India Radio authorities.
(c)
Carrying Kirpans on Flights
nstructions were issued in February 1983 permitting Sikh passengers to carry kirpans which do not exceed 22.8 cm (9 inch) in length and whose blade length does not exceed 15.24 cm (6 inch) on domestic flights. International regulations do not permit carrying of weapons on international carriers.
(d)
All India Gurdwara Act
On 27 February 1983 the prime minister announced that governments of the states where the gurdwaras are located and the managements of the gurdwaras would be consulted to arrive at the consensus needed for enacting such a legislation.
(ii) DISPUTES WHICH RELATE TO OTHER STATES BESIDES PUNJAB
(a)
River Waters
The government was agreeable to rescinding the agreement of 31 December 1981 between the governments of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan and to refer the dispute regarding the surplus waters of Ravi-Beas to a tribunal presided over by a judge of the Supreme Court under the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956 to determine afresh the allocation between the two states. However, the Akali Dal wanted to reopen the 1955 agreement on the basis of which arid and dry lands of the Indus basin in Rajasthan are being irrigated. It also wanted the Yamuna waters to be taken into account. The widening of the scope of the dispute relating to the Ravi-Beas waters was obviously not acceptable to Haryana and Rajasthan as well as to the central government.
The prime minister had assured the Akali Dal that the interests of Punjab would not be affected. She suggested that a committee of experts should go into the whole question of augmenting the availability of water in the basin. Its recommendations would receive priority consideration by government. Even these assurances had no effect in changing the rigid position of the Akali Dal.
(b)
Territorial Issue
In 1966 the Shah Commission recommended that Chandigarh be given to Haryana. However, in 1970 Smt Indira Gandhi, as prime minister, announced that Chandigarh would go to Punjab. Under this decision:
(1)
The capital project area of Chandigarh would go to Punjab;
(2)
A part of Fazilka Tehsil (including Abohar) of Ferozepur district of Punjab would be transferred to Haryana; and
(3)
As regards other claims and counter-claims for the readjustment of inter-state boundaries, a commission would be appointed.
The above decision could not be implemented due to the change in the attitude of the state.
The government has indicated their willingness to abide by any one of the following alternatives:
(1)
Implementation of the 1970 decision;
(2)
Referring all disputes and claims including Chandigarh to a new commission;
(3)
Dividing Chandigarh between Punjab and Haryana, with Punjab getting the major share, and referring the remaining disputes to a commission; or
(4)
Adopting any other alternative acceptable to both states.
Within the above framework a large number of different formulations were proposed, none of which was acceptable to the Akali Dal leadership.
The prime minister has repeatedly declared that Chandigarh would go to Punjab provided Haryana were suitably compensated. As late as on 2 June 1984, the prime minister in her broadcast reiterated that Chandigarh would go to Punjab provided Haryana gets its share of some Hindi-speaking areas which are now in Punjab.
The Akali Dal is, however, adamant that Chandigarh should be transferred to Punjab immediately and other disputes referred to a Commission. Thus the stalemate continues.
(iii) GENERAL ISSUES
(a)
Centre-state Relations
Government set up in June 1983 a Commission under Chairman Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria to examine and review the existing arrangements between the union and the states in regard to powers, function and responsibilities in all spheres and recommended such changes or measures as may be appropriate. The commission was to keep in view the scheme and the framework of the constitution designed to ensure the unity and integrity of the country. The government invited the Akali Dal to make any submissions it wished before the Sarkaria Commission within its terms of reference. However, the Akali Dal insisted that the government make a specific mention of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which restricts the central role of foreign affairs, defence, currency and communications, while referring the matter to the Sarkaria Commission.
During the discussions, the Akali Dal had agreed not to press this. But subsequently Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, president of the Akali Dal, reiterated the demand.
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution is at total variance with the basic concept of the unity and integrity of the nation as expressed in our constitution. It cannot be accepted as a basis for discussion.
(b)
Other Demands
Among their other demands, the Akali Dal representatives emphasized the following two as issues of special concern to them:
(i)
Grant of second language status to Punjabi language in Haryana, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan.
(ii)
Stopping the uprooting of Punjabi farmers from Terai areas of Uttar Pradesh.
(i)
Second Language Status for Punjabi Language: The demand for the teaching of Punjabi as a second language in areas of Haryana and Rajasthan, where there is a sizable Punjabi-speaking population, can be met within the framework of the three language formula agreed at the chief ministers’ Conference in 1961. This was explained to the Akali Dal. Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh have taken action to provide facilities to teach Punjabi at the primary and the secondary stages.
(ii)
Punjabi Farmers in the Terai Region of U.P.: The state government of Uttar Pradesh have denied that Sikh farmers were being uprooted from the terai area. The state legislation is intended to prevent unauthorized occupation of tribal land. The Tharu and Buxar tribes have been dispossessed of substantial areas of land cultivated by them prior to 1947. Of the 7860 unauthorized occupants, more than 5000 were from Uttar Pradesh itself, and one common policy was being followed with regard to all such persons. Local authorities had been directed to take action only in accordance with the principles of natural justice and within the framework of the law.
(c)
Amendment of Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution
A completely new demand was raised by the Akali Dal in January 1984 asking for an amendment of Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Simultaneously, an agitation was announced for burning and mutilation of copies of the Constitution of India. Even though this demand was raised, the Akali Dal was not clear about the nature of the amendment. On 1 May 1984, it was reported that the SGPC president had constitued a 21-member committee of experts to suggest relevant amendments.
Even though the government maintains that Article 25(2)(b), far from weakening the distinct identity of the Sikh community, was in fact a recognition of that identity, it wanted to allay any misgiving on this point. Accordingly the home minister declared on 31 March 1984 that the government would be prepared to consult the SGPC and other representatives of the Sikh community as well as legal experts and undertake such legislation by way of amendment as may be necessary to remove such doubts.