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CHAPTER FIVE
TRUST, TRUST DEVELOPMENT, AND TRUST REPAIRa
Roy J. Lewicki
Edward C. Tomlinson
The relationship between conflict and trust is an obvious one. Most people think of trust as the glue that holds a relationship together. If individuals or groups trust each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they do not trust each other, conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult. Bitter conflict itself generates animosity and pain that is not easily forgotten; moreover, the parties no longer believe what the other says or believe that the other will follow through on commitments and proposed actions. Therefore, acrimonious conflict often serves to destroy trust and increase distrust, which makes conflict resolution ever more difficult and problematic.
In this chapter, we review some of the work on trust and show its relevance to effective conflict management. We also extend some of this work to a broader understanding of the key role of trust in relationships and how different types of relationships can be characterized according to the levels of trust and distrust that are present. Finally, we describe procedures for repairing trust that has been broken and for managing distrust in ways that can enhance short-term conflict containment while rebuilding trust over the long run.
WHAT IS TRUST?
Trust is a concept that has received attention in several social science literatures: psychology, sociology, political science, economics, anthropology, history, and sociobiology (for reviews, see Worchel, 1979; Gambetta, 1988; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995; Bachmann and Zaheer, 2006, 2008). As can be expected, each literature approaches the problem with its own disciplinary lens and filters. Until recently, there has been remarkably little effort to integrate these perspectives or articulate the key role that trust plays in critical social processes, such as cooperation, coordination, and performance (for notable exceptions, see Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Sitkin, Rousseau, Burt, and Camerer, 1998).
Worchel (1979) proposes that these differing perspectives on trust can be aggregated into at least three groups (see also Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996, for detailed exploration of theories within each category):
The views of personality theorists, who focus on individual personality differences in the readiness to trust and on the specific developmental and social contextual factors that shape this readiness. At this level, trust is conceptualized as a belief, expectancy, or feeling deeply rooted in the personality, with origins in the individual’s early psychosocial development (see Worchel, 1979; Rotter, 1971; Kramer, 2006).
The views of sociologists and economists, who focus on trust as an institutional phenomenon. Institutional trust can be defined as the belief that future interactions will continue, based on explicit or implicit rules and norms (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998; Currall and Inkpen, 2006). At this level, trust can be conceptualized as a phenomenon within and among institutions and as the trust individuals put in those institutions. For example, one group of researchers explored the role of trust in interfirm relationships at both the interpersonal and organizational levels. They showed that high levels of interorganizational trust enhanced supplier performance, lowered costs of negotiation, and reduced conflict between firms (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Others argue that organizations must significantly redesign their governance mechanisms in order to address the considerable loss of public trust in American corporations in the past decade (Caldwell and Karri, 2005).
The views of social psychologists, who focus on the interpersonal transactions between individuals that create or destroy trust at the interpersonal and group levels. At this level, trust can be defined as expectations of the other party in a transaction, considering the risks associated with assuming and acting on such expectations and contextual factors that either contribute to or inhibit development and maintenance of the relationship. The earliest examples of this perspective can be found in the pioneering studies of Deutsch (1958, 1960, 1962) and his exploration of the dynamics of trust among experimental subjects playing a prisoner’s dilemma game. Examples of elaborated models of trust, particularly in organizations, can be found in Jones and George, (1998), Dirks and Ferrin (2001), and Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007).
A DEFINITION OF TRUST
The literature on trust is rich with definitions and conceptualizations (see Bigley and Pearce, 1998). In this chapter, we adopt as the definition of trust “an individual’s belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” (McAllister, 1995, p. 25; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998). Implicit in this definition, as in other comparable ones (Boon and Holmes, 1991), are three elements that contribute to the level of trust one has for another: the individual’s chronic disposition toward trust (see our earlier discussion of personality), situational parameters (some are suggested above, others below), and the history of their relationship. Our current focus is on the relationship dimension of trust, which we address throughout this chapter.
WHY TRUST IS CRITICAL TO RELATIONSHIPS
There are many types of relationship, and it can be assumed that the nature of trust and its development are not the same in all the types. In this chapter, we discuss two basic types: professional and personal relationships. The former is considered to be a task-oriented relationship in which the parties’ attention and activities are primarily directed toward achievement of goals external to their relationship. The latter is considered to be a social-emotional relationship whose primary focus is the relationship itself and the persons in the relationship (see Deutsch, 1985, for a complex treatment of types of interdependence in relationships; see also Sheppard and Sherman, 1998; and chapters 1 and 37 in this handbook).
An effort to describe professional relationship development in a business context was proposed by Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992). They suggest that three types of trust operate in developing a business relationship: deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Expanding on this work, Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) adopted these three types of trust and made several major additions and modifications. We briefly present these ideas (Lewicki and Bunker’s articles provide a richer and fuller description of each type of trust and how it is proposed that the types are linked together in a developmental sequence).
Calculus-Based Trust
Shapiro et al. (1992) identified the first type as deterrence-based trust. They argued that this form of trust is based in ensuring consistency of behavior; simply put, individuals do what they promise because they fear the consequences of not doing what they say. Like any other behavior based on a theory of deterrence, trust is sustained to the degree that the deterrent (punishment) is clear, possible, and likely to occur if the trust is violated. Thus, the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant motivator than the promise of reward.
Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) called this form calculus-based trust (CBT). We argue that trust at this stage is grounded not only in t
he fear of punishment for violating the trust but also in the rewards to be derived from preserving it. This kind of trust is an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose value is determined by the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. Compliance with calculus-based trust is often ensured by both the rewards of being trusting (and trustworthy) and the threat that if trust is violated, one’s reputation can be hurt through the other person’s network of friends and associates. Even if you are not an honest person, having a reputation for honesty (or trustworthiness) is a valuable asset that most people want to maintain. So even if there are opportunities to be untrustworthy, any short-term gains from untrustworthy acts must be balanced, in a calculus-based way, against the long-term benefits from maintaining a good reputation.
The most appropriate metaphor for the growth of CBT is the children’s game Chutes and Ladders. Progress is made on the game board by throwing the dice and moving ahead (“up the ladder”) in a stepwise fashion. However, a player landing on a “chute” is quickly dropped back a large number of steps. Similarly, in calculus-based trust, forward progress is made by climbing the ladder, or building trust, slowly, step by step. People prove through simple actions that they are trustworthy, and, similarly, they are regularly testing others’ trust. Results of such incremental trust development are being reported in the neuroscience literature. In one study, researchers found that as parties played a game of economic reciprocity and one party gained a reputation for trustworthy choices, the other’s intention to make a reciprocal trusting choice and actual trust decision could be tracked through changes in brainwaves in the dorsal striatum (King-Casas et al., 2005). Balancing this trust-building development, trust declines can also occur frequently; a single event of inconsistency or unreliability may “chute” the relationship back several steps—or, in the worst case, back to square one. Thus, CBT is often quite partial and fragile.
The dynamics of this trust development may not always be as rational as this description suggests. In fact, trustors and those who are trusted may be motivated by different things.1 Trustors are more likely to focus on the risk associated with taking the trusting action. Thus, trust-building activities such as placing trust in the other in spite of the possible associated risks may be both irrational and necessary to develop that trust. At the same time, the trusted are more likely to focus on the level of benefits they are receiving. Thus, trustors will be cautious; they focus on risk of trust and may be more likely to initiate trusting actions that do not risk extending high (but potentially unreciprocated) rewards to the other. In contrast, the trusted are more likely to focus on the benefits and may be more likely to reciprocate (and create joint gain for the parties) when the reward level is high (Malhotra, 2004; Weber, Malhotra, and Murnighan, 2005). Paradoxically, from the trustee’s point of view, trust cannot be asked for, but is more likely to be accepted if it is offered.
Identification-Based Trust
While CBT is usually the first stage in developing more intimate personal relationships, it often leads to a second type of trust, based on identification with the other’s desires and intentions. This type of trust exists because the parties can effectively understand and appreciate one another’s wants (Rousseau et al., 1998, have called this relationship-based trust). This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each person can effectively act for the other. Identification-based trust (IBT) thus permits a party to serve as the other’s agent and substitute for the other in interpersonal transactions (Deutsch, 1949). Both parties can be confident that their interests are fully protected and that no ongoing surveillance or monitoring of one another is necessary. A true affirmation of the strength of IBT between parties can be found when one party acts for the other even more zealously than the other might demonstrate, such as when a good friend dramatically defends you against a minor insult.
A corollary of this “acting for each other” in IBT is that as the parties come to know each other better and identify with the other, they also understand more clearly what they must do to sustain the other’s trust.2 This process might be described as second-order learning. One comes to learn what really matters to the other and comes to place the same importance on those behaviors as the other does. Certain types of activities strengthen IBT (Shapiro et al., 1992; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996; Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998), such as developing a collective identity (a joint name, title, or logo), co-location in the same building or neighborhood, creating joint products or goals (a new product line or a new set of objectives), or committing to commonly shared values (such that the parties are committed to the same objectives and so can substitute for each other in external transactions). For example, at the leadership level, De Cremer and van Knippenberg (2005) have shown that leader self-sacrifice enhanced follower trust, cooperation, and collective identification with the leader. At the team level, Han and Harms (2010) have shown that identification with the team strengthened trust and decreased both task and relationship conflict. Finally, at the organization level, Kramer (2001) has argued that identification with the organization’s goals leads individuals to trust the organization and share a presumptive trust of others within it.
Thus IBT develops as one both knows and predicts the other’s needs, choices, and preferences and as one also shares some of those same needs, choices, and preferences as one’s own. Increased identification enables us to think like the other, feel like the other, and respond like the other. A collective identity develops; we empathize strongly with the other and incorporate parts of their psyche into our own identity (needs, preferences, thoughts, and behavior patterns). This form of trust can develop in working relationships if the parties come to know each other very well, but it is most likely to occur in intimate, personal relationships. Moreover, this form of trust stabilizes relationships during periods of conflict and negativity. Thus, when high-trusting parties engage in conflict, they tend to see the best in their partner’s motives because they make different attributions about the conflict compared to low-trusting parties. Thus, the determinant of whether relationships maintain or dissolve in a conflict may be due to the attributions parties make about the other’s motives, determined by the existing level of trust (Miller and Rempel, 2004).
Music suggests a suitable metaphor for IBT: the harmonizing of a barbershop quartet. The parties learn to sing in a harmony that is integrated and complex. Each knows the others’ vocal range and pitch; each singer knows when to lead and follow; and each knows how to work with the others to maximize their strengths, compensate for their weaknesses, and create a joint product that is much greater than the sum of its parts. The unverbalized, synchronous chemistry of a cappella choirs, string quartets, cohesive work groups, emergency medical delivery teams, and championship basketball teams are excellent examples of this kind of trust in action.
Trust and Relationships: An Elaboration of Our Views
In addition to our views of these two forms of trust, we need to introduce two ideas about trust and relationships. The first is that trust and distrust are not simply opposite ends of the same dimension but conceptually different and separate. Second, relationships develop over time, and the nature of trust changes as they develop.
Trust and Distrust Are Fundamentally Different.
In addition to identifying types of trust, Lewicki et al. (1998) have argued that trust and distrust are fundamentally different from each other rather than merely more or less of the same thing (see also Ullman-Margalit, 2004; Kramer and Cook, 2004). Although trust can be defined as “confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct,” distrust can indeed be “confident negative expectations” regarding another’s conduct (Lewicki et al., 1998). Thus, just as trust implies belief in the other, a tendency to attribute virtuous intentions to the other and willingness to act on the basis of the other’s conduct, distrust implies fear of the other, a tendency to attribute sinister intentions
to the other, and a desire to protect oneself from the effects of another’s conduct.
Relationships Are Developmental and Multifaceted.
In discussing our views of the types of trust, we also pointed out that these forms of trust develop in different types of relationships. Work (task) relationships tend to be characterized by CBT but may develop some IBT. Intimate (personal) relationships tend to be characterized by IBT but may require a modicum of CBT for the parties to work together effectively or coordinate their lives together (e.g., share property, meet obligations and commitments).
All relationships develop as parties share experiences with each other and gain knowledge about the other. Every time we encounter another person, we gain a new experience that strengthens or weakens the relationship. If our experiences with another person are all within the same limited context (I know the server at the bakery because I buy my bagel and juice there every morning), then we gain little additional knowledge about the other (over time, I have a rich but very narrow range of experience with that server). However, if we encounter the other in different contexts (if I join a colleague to talk research, coteach classes, and play tennis), then this variety of shared experience is likely to develop into broader, deeper knowledge of the other.
People come to know each other in many contexts and situations. Conversely, they may trust others in some contexts and distrust in others. You may have friends you would trust to take care of your child but not to pay back money that you loan them. A relationship is made up of components of experience that one individual has with another. Within these relationships, some elements hold varying degrees of trust, while others hold varying degrees of distrust. Our overall evaluation of the other person involves some complex judgment that weighs the scope of the relationship and elements of trust and distrust. Most people are able to be quite specific in describing both the trust and distrust elements in their relationship. If the parties teach a class together, work together on a committee, play tennis together, and belong to the same church, the scope of their experience is much broader than for parties who simply work together on a committee.
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