We should note here that our working assumption is that the trustor’s strong IBD is healthy and appropriate—that is, grounded in accurate perceptions and judgments of the identity differences between the parties. Kramer (2001, 2002) has also written extensively about the conditions under which paranoid cognitions develop and the conditions under which this paranoia may be prudent or highly destructive to the actor and to relationships.
What Happens If Trust Is Violated?
Trust violations occur if we experience an outcome that does not conform to our expectations of behavior for the trustee, and this outcome is attributed to the trustee as opposed to the situation or some other person (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). Note that trust violations can occur in both directions—that is, we can expect trusting behavior and encounter distrust, or we can expect distrusting behavior and encounter trust.4 Our discussion here elaborates on the more commonly studied case of expecting trust and encountering distrust. If this disconfirming information is significant enough or if it begins to occur regularly in ongoing encounters, we are likely to reduce our perceptions of trust dramatically and possibly alter the type of relationship we have with the other (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996).5
Research on the consequences of trust violations consistently shows that violations lead to a reduction in subsequent trust and cooperation (Deutsch, 1958; 1973; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kramer, 1996). For example, employees’ trust in their employer declines when they perceive that their employer has violated the psychological contract—that is, the expectations held by both parties about the nature of the employment relationship (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). More specifically, trust violations stifle mutual support and information sharing in that relationship (Bies and Tripp, 1996), reduce the level of organizational citizenship behavior and job performance (Robinson, 1996), and may lead to low employee morale that adversely affects relationships with customers (Berry, 1999). There is also some indication that when managers are low in behavioral integrity (i.e., the perceived alignment between their words and actions), this characteristic can have a negative effect on the profitability of these organizations (Simons and McLean Parks, 2000; Simons, 2002).
For these reasons, the repair of damaged trust has emerged as a matter of tremendous practical significance. Trust repair can be regarded as a process that reverses the trustor’s confident negative expectations accruing from a violation to the point where he or she is once again willing to be vulnerable to the trustee (Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer, 2009; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010).6 Although this process is regarded as bilateral—involving decisions and actions from both the trustor (the person whose trust has been violated or victim) and trustee (the violator; see Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009)—the bulk of trust repair research has focused on the efficacy of the violator’s responses in the wake of a violation. In a review, Kramer and Lewicki (2010) presented a general typology of likely trustee responses to violations and subsequent efforts to repair trust: social accounts (including explanations and apologies), compensation (including reparations and penance), and structural solutions.
This categorization can be easily integrated with the stages of trust we described earlier. Specifically, CBT relationships are arm’s-length, market oriented, and transaction focused. Trust at this stage relies heavily on a cognitive assessment by the trustee that the benefits of honoring trust will outweigh the costs of damaging it; this type of trust sustains and enhances the trustor’s reliance on the trustee for some valued outcome (which is usually more economic or tangible in nature). Emotional concerns are not irrelevant here; they are merely less salient than cognitive concerns about the tangible costs and benefits of the transaction and loss. Therefore, while trust repair in CBT relationships might be facilitated to some degree by social accounts, greater efficacy in trust repair will result from actual compensation or structural changes that more directly facilitate the achievement of the trustor’s desired (economic) outcome. In short, dealing with the impact of a violation is paramount in violations of CBT.
Similarly, IBT relationships are close interpersonal relationships characterized by a strong emotional bond between the parties. These parties share the same goals and values and mutually demonstrate a strong commitment to continuing and nurturing the relationship to even higher levels. Trust at this stage relies heavily on an emotional assessment that the other party is equally motivated to invest in the relationship. Consequently, as opposed to CBT relationships, cognitive concerns are not irrelevant here, but they are merely less salient than emotional concerns. In this case, one might expect that trust repair is more effective to the extent that the trustee conveys social accounts that reaffirm commitment to the relationship. In short, dealing with the intent of the trustee in the wake of a violation is paramount in violations of IBT.
In the only study to directly test these predictions, Tomlinson, Lewicki, and Wang (2012) examined the independent and combined effects of impact (compensation) and intent (apology, explanation, and promise) tactics to repair both CBT and IBT relationships. They found no significant difference in the effectiveness of impact versus intent tactics for repairing violations in CBT relationships. However, intent tactics (accounts, apologies, verbalizations) were significantly better than impact strategies for repairing violations in IBT. Moreover, across both stages of trust, combining both strategies was found to be more effective than either type alone, suggesting these tactics combine in an additive manner.
We now inventory the remaining trust repair research, finding that the majority of this work has been done on CBT relationships and has examined the impact of all three categories in the Kramer and Lewicki (2010) typology (accounts, compensation, and structural change).
Trust Repair
Most trust repair studies have examined the use of verbal accounts (as opposed to compensation, for example) to repair CBT relationships. This is noteworthy insofar as talk is “cheap”—which is to say that mere words are unsubstantiated by the offender and unverified by the victim (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). According to this view, “a verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on”—a quote attributed to the famous New York Yankees catcher (and “philosopher”) Yogi Berra. An initial study by Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and Murnighan (2002) found that apologies and simple explanations led to restored cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Similarly, Tomlinson et al. (2004) found that apologies whereby the offender fully accepted culpability for the violation were significantly related to the victim’s willingness to reconcile after a violation; this beneficial effect was magnified when the receiver judged the apology as sincere and timely.
A subsequent stream of research by Kim and his colleagues (2004) examines the relative effects of apologies versus other types of social accounts. They found that when trust violations were regarded as matters of the violator’s low competence, apologies were more effective than when the offender denied the offense had happened; however, denial was more effective than an apology when the violation was ascribed to the violator’s low integrity. The authors explain this finding by suggesting that breakdowns in competence can often be readily explained (“I made a mistake”) and hence an apology can be effective, while breakdowns in integrity (“I lied” or “I broke my promise’) are less readily fixed by a simple apology, and hence denying the violation might indeed be more effective. They also established that apologies were more effective when there was subsequent evidence of actual guilt; denials were more effective when there was subsequent evidence of innocence.
A subsequent study by Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) examined two types of apologies. In one, the trustee made an internal attribution and admitted full responsibility for the violation, while in the other, the trustee made an external attribution and the “blame” for the violation was deflected away from the trustee. The results support the findings of the earlier study: trust repair was more effective when apologizing with an internal attribution on matters of a competence breakdown,
but when there was an integrity breakdown, an apology with an external attribution was more effective.
In a third study, these researchers also explored the viability of a third social accounting device: reticence (silence). They found that reticence (compared to apology and denial) is always a suboptimal response, which is striking given how apparently prevalent silence is in accounting for trust violations committed by highly visible politicians, sports figures, business leaders, and others (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and Dirks, 2007). To the extent that apologies influence trust repair, they appear to signal repentance (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, and Cooper, 2011). That is, they are construed by receivers as evidence that the offender is remorseful enough over the violation to the point that this person pledges to reform his or her behavior in subsequent interactions.
Interestingly, not all trust repair research has supported the efficacy of mere apologies (i.e., admission of responsibility and expression of regret) in CBT relationships. Because some researchers contend that apologies are distinct from other types of accounts (such as promises of future trustworthy behavior, hence manifesting a signal of repentance without actually apologizing for past behavior), their effects have been examined independently. Schweitzer et al. (2006) found that apologies did not influence trust repair, but promises of future trustworthy behavior significantly accelerated this process when the violator displayed a pattern of trustworthy behavior after the violation (as long as the victim did not perceive any deception). Similarly, Tomlinson (2012) separated the effects of apologies and promises and found that promises (but not apologies) were predictive of postviolation trust.
Despite the conceptual distinction between an apology and other verbal accounts, Polin, Lount, and Lewicki (2012) recognized six potential components of a fully effective apology: expression of regret for the violation, explanation of why the violation occurred, acknowledgment of responsibility for causing the violation, declaration of repentance (intent to not commit the violation in the future), offer of repair (for damage created by the violation), and request for forgiveness. They found that an apology that included more of these elements was more effective in stimulating trust repair than one including fewer components. They also replicated the findings of Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004) showing that apologies were more effective for competence violations compared to integrity violations; yet they also found that more complete apologies were more effective than less complete apologies for integrity violations as well.
Kramer and Lewicki (2010) also recognized that trustees might attempt to repair trust using strategies that rely more on actions than words. Bottom et al. (2002) found that penance (financial compensation for damage created by the violation) had an even greater effect on restored cooperation than apologies and explanations alone. Moreover, the actual size of the penance mattered less than whether the violator offered the penance voluntarily, combined with some degree of linguistic finesse in explaining it (i.e., “What can I do?” was superior to, “What will it take?”). Similarly, Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2011) found that financial overcompensation after a violation led to greater trust repair as long as the offense was not regarded as being due to the trustee’s malevolent intentions (e.g., deception). Much like apologies, substantive penance can signal repentance. Yet once again, repentance is more effective for violations of competence than integrity; that is, penance did not repair trust after intentional deception.
The final category to repair trust presented by Kramer and Lewicki (2010) is to change the structure of the situation so as to minimize trust violations in the future. As with accounts and reparations, the volitional nature of a structural change by the trustee is pivotal. One key study on this tactic did not focus on interpersonal trust per se but does empirically demonstrate the basic dynamic. Nakayachi and Watabe (2005) examined the effect of hostage posting on trust repair. Hostage posting refers to a self-sanctioning system whereby the trustee voluntarily accepts monitoring by the trustor and, if a violation occurs, penalties. These researchers found that hostage posting facilitates trust repair by removing the trustee’s incentive for untrustworthy behavior because he or she has agreed to be regularly monitored. Similarly, regulation is a tactic that focuses on altering the situation to make trust more likely to be honored in subsequent interactions because critical behaviors are monitored and punishable if they occur. Regulation can also signal the trustee’s repentance (Dirks et al., 2011).
Thus, violations of CBT can be repaired when the offender gives a timely, sincere, and complete apology (e.g., complete apologies include explicit promises of future trustworthiness). Trust repair can be further accelerated by other congruent tactics such as compensation or structural changes. As long as these tactics are seen as volitional and indicating repentance, they are likely to boost the likelihood of trust repair. However, boundary conditions do seem to exist. When there is reason to believe that deception or malevolent intent drives the violation, or when the violation is regarded as a matter of low integrity instead of low competence, such matters appear to be more resistant to repair. Similarly, violations that are more severe appear to be harder to repair (Tomlinson, 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2004).
If relationships are established that are high in IBT, there is also a higher level of emotional investment. In these relationships, trust violations contain both an affective and a practical component. Once a shared identity has been established, any disconfirming trust violation can be viewed as a direct challenge to the trustor’s (victim’s) most central and cherished values (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995), and it may also represent conflict with the trustor’s psychological orientation (Deutsch, 1985). The trustor is likely to feel upset, angry, violated, or even foolish if loss of face is a result of trusting the other when trusting turned out to be inappropriate. In cases where IBT is violated, we argue that reparative effort must at least be attempted for a high-IBT relationship to have even a chance of continuing. A number of studies have shown that when parties (particularly those in a close relationship) cannot or will not communicate about a major problem in their relationship, they are more likely to end the relationship than continue interacting (Courtright, Millar, Rogers, and Bagarozzi, 1990; Gottman, 1979; Putnam and Jones, 1982).
We envision three stages to the process of restoring IBT trust. First, the parties exchange information about the perceived trust violation (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). From the Tomlinson et al. (2012) study, we noted that strategies that attempted to address the intent of the violation were more effective for repairing IBT. Thus, parties should attempt to identify and understand the act that was perceived as violation. Miscommunication and misunderstandings are often cleared up at this stage. A husband might accuse his wife of admiring another man at a party, perceiving this to be an uncharacteristic violation of the IBT he has for her and the integrity of their marriage. When the wife explains that she was merely admiring the man’s sweater and thinking of purchasing a similar one for her husband, it might transform the husband’s perception of an IBT trust violation. An explanation that the act either was not what he perceived it to be or that the motivation for the act was consistent with his expectations of his wife’s commitment to their relationship may be adequate to restore the IBT relationship. (However, if this pattern persists whenever the couple is out together, the wife’s explanation will cease to be adequate over time.)
Second, the violated party must be willing to forgive rather than to engage in other forms of reaction to trust betrayal (see McCullough, Pargament, and Thoresen, 2000; Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon, 2002, for reviews). Research reveals that the victim’s commitment to the relationship plays an important role. Commitment occurs as a result of high satisfaction with the relationship, increasing investments in the relationship by the victim, and the declining availability or suitability of alternative relationships to meet important needs. When the victim is highly committed to the relationship (as measured by these indicators), he or she is far more willing to forgive than
to experience negative feelings, make negative attributions to the violator, or engage in behaviors such as revenge or retaliation toward the violator (Finkel et al., 2002; Tomlinson, 2011).
In the final communication stage, the parties reaffirm their commitment to a high-IBT relationship. They may affirm similar interests, goals, and actions (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998) and explicitly recommit to the relationship. They may also explicitly realign their psychological orientations to each other (Deutsch, 1985) and discuss strategies to avoid similar misunderstandings, miscommunications, or disconfirmations in the future.
However, when the parties either fail to reconcile the trust violation within their shared identity or are unable to do so, high-IBT relationships may be transformed to low IBT or even IBD. If the violation is largely inconsistent with the core beliefs and values of one of the partners and cannot be adequately explained within the context of the current relationship, then the parties must elect to either renegotiate their shared identity or terminate the high-IBT relationship (Larson, 1993).
Naturally not every IBT relationship is as all-encompassing as a marriage. But there are business and professional relationships where the same dynamics apply. One worker may take another into confidence and share strong dissatisfaction with the boss’s behavior, only to discover that the coworker has told the boss about the negative comments. A student may ask a favorite teacher to read some poetry that the student has written and later discover that the teacher published the poetry under his own name. Thus, no model of trust restoration can explain the idiosyncrasies of each individual relationship. Our intent is merely to explore the dynamics of trust restoration within the context of various kinds of relationship, to better understand the link between relationship and trust type.
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