Framed and portrayed their views, goals, and the invasion in a way that supported their position and overall preference, while discounting competing assessments and descriptions
Rejected the advice of those who did not share the same worldview as the majority of the group, for example Secretary of State Colin Powell, leading to a near unanimous group recommendation to attack Iraq
A review of these classic symptoms of groupthink that were present in the Iraq invasion decision makes it clear that the groupthink dynamic of the decision-making unit was a contributor to the faulty policy planning that characterized the invasion and early war years.
The Surge: The Con-Div Group Dynamic
Beginning in 2006, the administration began discussing a possible troop surge in Iraq to stem the rampant violence that was quickly leading Iraq down the path to civil war. During this period, the decision-making processes inside and outside Washington became much more balanced, careful, and comprehensive, perhaps due to the lessons learned from the calamitous first three years of the war.
The so-called surge in Iraq, often referred to as a New Way Forward in Iraq, was a reinforcement of U.S. forces by thirty thousand troops that began in spring 2007 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). President Bush announced the surge in January 2007 during a television speech in which he outlined the U.S. strategy in Iraq and articulated the goals of the surge and its key objectives:
America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them—five brigades—will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. . . . A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced. (“Transcript of President Bush’s Speech,” 2007)
Some saw the surge as a dramatic policy change from that of a small footprint to a more public embrace of the counterinsurgency strategy championed by General Petraeus. However, others claimed that it was simply a continuation of the path-dependent, U.S. strategy in Iraq. These opposing voices claimed that the administration had no clear exit strategy from the war. Whereas the military campaign at the beginning of the war was successful, once the United States actually invaded Iraq and became embroiled in the war, with all the sunk costs incurred in terms of casualties, money, and reputation, this led to a path-dependence process to stay the course in Iraq, a process that was extremely difficult to reverse. This often led to post hoc rationalization of the invasion, its causes and explanations. Not surprisingly, considerable debate preceded the surge decision in 2006–2007.
Unlike in the preinvasion period, however, the administration’s decision makers strongly benefited from the diverse and conflicting points of view regarding the best strategy for moving forward with the Iraq war. The administration took into account various viewpoints when considering the surge, such as the one presented by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which recommended a steady reduction in troop levels (Baker and Hamilton, 2006). Nancy Pelosi, Speaker-elect of the U.S. House, also very publicly opposed the surge proposal in an article entitled “Bringing the War to an End Is My Highest Priority as Speaker” (Pelosi, 2006). Following the 2006 U.S. midterm elections when the Republicans lost control of the House and Senate, a Heritage Foundation conference chaired by Republican whip Roy Blunt (R. Missouri) under the title “The New Way Forward: Refocusing the Conservative Agenda” (Blunt, 2006) supported a surge in U.S. forces in Iraq, albeit not exactly in the way in which it was ultimately carried out.
President Bush recognized these many conflicting viewpoints in his speech, claiming that “many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States and, therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq’s borders and hunting down Al Qaida. Their solution is to scale back America’s efforts in Baghdad or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. . . . We carefully considered these proposals. And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear that country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Speech,” 2007, emphasis added).
Thus, the decision on the surge exhibited strong characteristics of a quality (balanced) decision that took into account the views of many players: experts; think tanks; opposing groups (e.g., Democrats in Congress); policy groups such as the ten-person bipartisan Iraq Study Group; military leaders; Senator John McCain (R. Arizona), a strong advocate of the surge; the Iraqi government; and many others.
The surge decision was not rushed or conducted with shortcuts concerning information review and assessment of policy alternatives. In fact, President Bush waited for three other studies, conducted at the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council, before making the decision. The president echoed this idea, claiming, “My national security team, military commanders and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both parties, allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. . . . In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Speech,” 2007).
Overall, the surge has been largely credited as a success by many experts, as evidenced by a New York Times report that claims “the surge, clearly, has worked, at least for now . . . The result, now visible in the streets, is a calm unlike any the country has seen since the American invasion” (Filkins, 2008). Clearly, the balanced con-div group dynamic of President Bush and his national security team at the time benefited the decision-making process, leading to a carefully considered policy review process. Despite this, many have continued to criticize the surge for the damage it brought to Iraq and for not ending the war sooner and more decisively.
The Withdrawal from Iraq: A Polythink Process
The withdrawal from Iraq, unlike the early periods of the war and the surge, was characterized by polythink. There was a plurality of views and opinions on this critical decision. There was also divergence of policy opinions on the speed and character of the withdrawal process. However, the decision to withdraw from Iraq is also an example of a polythink dynamic that was, relatively speaking, effectively managed and controlled by the president, and it largely resulted in productive decision-making processes. In the following we will review the many symptoms of Polythink present in the Iraq troop withdrawal.
Group Conflict: Infighting, Turf Wars, and the Fear of Leaks.
Internal group conflict often results from polythink decisions. The many competing viewpoints, interpretations of the situation at hand, and potential courses of action available are all hotly debated among group members, which increase the likelihood of destructive group conflict and chronic disagreement, particularly if this process is not effectively managed by the leader. This divisive conflict in turn impedes optimal decision making. Group conflict retards the ability of group members to overcome personal animosity, concede refuted ideas, and successfully collaborate in developing optimal policies. In this way, group conflict both causes and is caused by the polythink syndrome.
During the Obama administration, group conflict remained an important problem to be overcome. This was not due to the ostracizing of one discordant group member or institution, as was done to Colin Powell in the Bush administra
tion, but rather to the large plurality of viewpoints throughout the decision-making group regarding the Iraq troop drawdown. One foreign policy analyst goes as far as to claim that “a man who advertised himself as ‘No Drama Obama’, in reality . . . presides over an administration pulsing with internecine conflict and policy disarray” (Karl, 2012). While Obama’s administration was not necessarily as fractious as this comment suggests, many battles did indeed take place between Obama’s inner circle of political staffers and his military advisors.3 For example, the deputy assistant to the president, Mark Lippert, was forced out of his position amid internal friction with the national security advisor, General James Jones. Jones had accused Lippert of “leaking negative stories about him” that were eventually reported in Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars (2010).
General Stanley McChrystal’s famed Rolling Stone interview demonstrates this troubled relationship among Obama’s various advisors, each representing different agencies and interests. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mike Mullen, was also concerned with the positions of many advisors who were not in favor of maintaining a residual force in Iraq after the end of combat operations (Hastings, 2010). He voiced his concerns in a confidential letter to Thomas Donilon, head of the National Security Administration that upset many of Obama’s political advisors who felt that the military was boxing in the White House and creating a potential political liability if it leaked (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). Thus, the polythink atmosphere of the Obama administration, composed of Obama’s inner circle of political advisors, who were very against the war; Democratic holdovers from the Clinton administration, who were moderate in their advocacy for a troop drawdown; and military leaders, who had previously served under George Bush’s Republican administration and supported continuing the war effort, created ample ground for intergroup conflict that at least partially impeded the close cooperation necessary to ensure not just a stable drawdown of troops but also a lasting plan for ensuring the survival of Iraq’s fledgling democracy.
Lack of Communication and Confusion.
A lack of communication and subsequent confusion within the decision-making apparatus often relates directly back to the polythink phenomenon; the large, heterogeneous group of policymakers and advisors who compose the federal security and defense apparatus can naturally lead to interagency competition and concerns regarding security leaks and subsequently heightened bureaucratic issues of access to information. This issue is particularly problematic in situations of group conflict within the decision unit.
In the Obama administration during the 2009–2011 withdrawal from Iraq, communication between agencies was much stronger than during the early Bush years, largely due to the bureaucratic changes implemented following the interagency communication failures of 9/11. However, communication between civilian advisors and the military remained problematic. This confusion and lack of communication between the channels was not due to simple bureaucratic challenges or a lack of technological ability. Rather, it was the result of completely conflicting worldviews that at times built a wall between the two groups of advisors. For example, Obama and his close political advisors generally saw America’s involvement in Iraq as a potential mine field rather than an opportunity and thus sought to chart a way out of Iraq as quickly as possible, a view that was at odds with many military commanders’ desire to preserve hard-fought gains in the field (Gordon and Trainor, 2012).
The reasons for these institutional battles may have their root in Graham Allison’s (1971) famed observation that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Thus, members of the military have their own institutional goals and agendas that may not meld well with the goals and agendas of political advisors or White House staff. Institutional considerations therefore often exacerbate polythink in the decision-making processes of the federal government. This problem is particularly pronounced when the decision group is made up of representatives of various agencies; each representative feels that he or she needs to staunchly defend the interests, perspectives, and worldview of his or her respective agency and therefore may make more extreme policy recommendations than if he or she were not acting as an official representative of his or her respective group.
In the withdrawal from Iraq, these institutional considerations clearly contributed to the communication barriers and growing sense of policy confusion regarding the plans for the troop withdrawal. What’s more, communication with the Iraqi government, a key player in the ultimate decision surrounding a U.S. troop presence in Iraq, still remained incredibly problematic. This symptom of interstate polythink was a critical factor in the Obama administration’s failure to secure a second Status of Forces Agreement that would have enabled a small contingent of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq following the 2011 withdrawal. For example, whereas President Bush held a weekly teleconference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, President Obama spoke to Maliki only a handful of times during his entire first term in office. This greatly hampered communication between the two sides at a very sensitive period.
Moreover, in their negotiations with the Iraqis, Kenneth Pollack (2011) explains, the Obama administration often “negotiated against themselves more than it negotiated with the Iraqis,” demonstrating the competing viewpoints and perspectives within the administration itself. This confusion and lack of communication within and between the American and Iraqi administrations severely hampered efforts to work out a long-term solution to the issue of U.S. troop levels in Iraq that would have enabled a sustained U.S. presence to support Iraq’s democracy and temper the influence of Iran over the long-term.
Limited Review of Alternatives, Objectives, Risks, and Contingencies.
As in groupthink, polythink can also contribute to a limited review of alternatives, as there is typically lack of consensus among group members concerning which options will enter the choice set. In order to reduce prolonged and potentially costly and divisive debate, decision makers may preemptively limit the choice sets under discussion. This effort to act quickly and decisively while still considering a diverse range of policy options is a central challenge of decision-making units characterized by polythink.
This dilemma is clearly demonstrated in the Obama administration’s decision-making processes surrounding the Iraq troop withdrawal. Almost immediately after President Obama was elected on a campaign promise to bring troops home from Iraq, a debate began between key decision makers within the national security apparatus regarding the alternatives, objectives, and risks moving forward in Iraq. However, this debate was mainly limited to the speed of the withdrawal, rather than the overall wisdom of the withdrawal. On the one hand, the Iraq Study Group advocated that U.S. troops be shifted from combat to training and that combat troops be withdrawn from Iraq over a relatively short period of time. Obama and his political advisors had also made a campaign promise that all troops would leave Iraq within sixteen months. In contrast, the military, including Iraq commander Ray Odierno, generally advocated a withdrawal plan of twenty-three months, stressing the importance of not withdrawing many troops in the early months, before the Iraqi elections scheduled for January 2010—much longer than Obama’s campaign promise.
To bridge this divide, Defense Secretary Robert Gates advocated a nineteen-month timetable that would enable the White House to say that the combat mission in Iraq had come to a close at the politically opportune moment—right before the midterm elections (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). What’s more, Obama would specify a date for ending the American “combat mission” in Iraq, but would not remove all of the brigades at that point; those that remained would simply be renamed “advise-and-assist units” (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). This plan enabled Obama to keep his campaign promise while also incorporating advice from the military and is also a key example of lowest-common-denominator decision making.
Failure to Reappraise Previously Rejected Alternatives.
Another important consequence of polythink in decision-making processes is the per
manent removal of key options from the table. Because arriving at consensus is so arduous when there is such a large plurality of conflicting perspectives and policy prescriptions, decision makers are often reluctant to reopen discussion on a previously rejected alternative, for fear of near endless debate on a potentially time-sensitive decision. Combined with the already limited review of alternatives caused by polythink, this means that alternatives that were not given a full airing at the outset will most likely not return to the table to be reconsidered later.
The Obama administration’s very public, steadfast commitment to the policy of speedily withdrawing from Iraq was never fully reconsidered: the administration maintained its pledge to draw down troop forces and shift resources to domestic concerns and the war in Afghanistan. Though this policy was perhaps warranted, the administration’s singular focus on withdrawal did hamper U.S. efforts to ensure political stability in addition to security in Iraq. By publicly signaling a pivot toward Afghanistan, domestic concerns, or even the Far East, many felt that the administration had taken irreversible steps that sent Iraq “beyond America’s influence” (Pollack, 2011). According to Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack in his testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “There is no turning back the clock, even if Washington suddenly had a change of heart. The decisions that have been made are now virtually set in stone. There will not be a significant American military presence in Iraq in the future. That train has left the station and it cannot be recalled or reboarded at some later stop” (Pollack, 2011).
Thus, the government’s public commitment to one course of action, troop drawdown, hindered U.S. goals of providing long-term political stability and security in Iraq, a major criticism levied by the president’s political opponents. However, in contrast to the Bush administration, the Obama administration did reconsider many of the specific details of its war plans, particularly its sixteen-month troop drawdown policy in Iraq, limiting this negative aspect of polythink to some extent.
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