Conflict Needs Creativity, and Creativity Needs Conflict
The potential of constructive conflict is to produce positive personal and social change (Deutsch, chapter 1 of this Handbook). To do so, conflict must be handled in a way that stimulates creative solutions and avoids the negatives of destructive conflict. A main advantage of creative, integrative agreements over compromises is that they foster stability of relationships (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Thomas, 1976). There are other advantages as well: the larger organization or society will benefit if the constituent groups and individuals reach high-value agreements (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993); also, unless the agreement is integrative, designed to satisfy the parties’ major interests, there might be no agreement at all.
Conflict is an important element of creativity. Sometimes productive change would not occur without it. Follett (1940) told the story of an improvement in a work environment that occurred as a direct result of a conflict, and the improvement would not have occurred had the conflict not occurred. Two groups of workers, dairymen, fought over who would have access to a loading and unloading dock: “If the Dairymen’s League had not fought over the question of precedence, the improved method of unloading would not have been thought of. The conflict in this case was constructive. And this was because, instead of compromising, they sought a way of integrating” (p. 34). Coleman and Deutsch (this volume) make the important point that the status quo might favor an unjust system, and conflict provides the impetus for powerful parties, who favor the status quo, to make change.
The idea that conflict—or tolerance of conflict—is a precursor to creativity is well known and part of several broad theoretical statements in social conflict. The dual-concern model, for example, holds that “concern of own aspirations”—which specifies the degree of personal importance of the issues in conflict—is an important determinant of problem solving and integrative outcomes; it provides the impetus for people to stick it out in conflict and explore various options that will satisfy their own aspirations (Pruitt, 1981). In her concept of integrate, Follett (1940) put it this way: “A friend of mine said to me, ‘Open-mindedness is the whole thing, isn’t it?’ No it isn’t; it needs just as great a respect for your own view as for that of others, and a firm upholding of it until you are convinced. Mushy people are no more good at this than stubborn people” (p. 48).
John Dewey (1922) tells us that “conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity” (p. 300). Indeed, there is supporting evidence: conflict can enhance creativity (Nemeth, Personnaz, Personnaz, and Goncalo, 2004) and innovation (Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir, 2001). Beersma and de Dreu (2005) report that the positive effects of conflict on creativity depend on the nature of the task, and de Dreu and Nijstad (2008) suggest that it depends on whether the domain of judgment is in or outside the realm of conflict.
CREATIVE PRODUCTS: THE STRUCTURE OF INTEGRATIVE AGREEMENTS
The products, or outcomes, of negotiation and social conflict can be creative, meaning that they are—to paraphrase Simon—novel, interesting, valuable, and appropriate in having a bearing on settlement or resolution. Dean Pruitt identified five basic types of integrative agreements: expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting, and bridging (see Pruitt, 1981, see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, p. 198; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). These five can be augmented; indeed, there are three additional types (including compromise) that derive from a close look at the underlying dynamics of integrative agreements.
The nature of integrative, creative conflict outcomes is greatly affected by the type and difficulty of the problem faced by the parties in conflict. Figure 21.1 presents a classification schema called the Agreement Circumplex (Carnevale, 2013).4
Figure 21.1 The Agreement Circumplex
The classification schema provides a starting place for understanding the structure and dynamics of integrative agreements. It has value regarding theory—the underlying dynamics of each type of integrative agreement is distinct—and it has practical value in that it can serve as a checklist for negotiators and mediators interested in reaching creative, integrative, high-value agreements.
The schema proposes that agreements can be categorized as one or another of four main types (each with two subtypes). The key distinction in the schema is that between the parties’ positions and the parties’ underlying interests.
Main Agreement Types
The four main agreement types, related to each other as the four quadrants of a circumplex structure, are identified by the main goal that each entails. The goals pertain to what the parties hope to achieve with regard to the positions taken and their underlying interests. Each main agreement type has two subtypes, detailed in the following.
Quadrant I: Accommodate the Parties’ Positions.
There are two forms of position accommodation wherein the parties’ initial demands on the issues are accommodated: simple compromise and logrolling. Compromise is meeting halfway on the issues, and logrolling is giving up one issue in exchange for getting what one wants on a more important issue.
Quadrant II: Achieve the Parties’ Positions.
In position achievement, each party gets exactly what it stated in its initial demand. For example, in a dispute over a resource, if the resource is doubled, the parties each get exactly what they want, that is, their initial demands are met. There are two forms: one driven by an increase in the resource and the other driven by modifying the resource so that it now fits what the parties want.
Quadrant III: Achieve the Parties’ Underlying Interests.
Interest achievement has two forms, bridging and cost cutting. In both cases, the parties’ underlying interests are met. In the former, a novel alternative arises, whereas in the latter, one (or both) parties’ reasons for resistance are met and overcome. Often some exploration of underlying interests is required; indeed, an analysis of interests that underlie interests may not be sufficient (Pruitt and Kim, 2004): “It will often be necessary to seek the interests underlying these interests, or the interests underlying the interests underlying these interests, and so on” (p. 199). Often there is a hierarchy of interests. For example, in a dispute between a father and son over whether the son can buy a motorcycle, the son wants the motorcycle because he has an underlying interest of wanting to impress the girl next door. The father’s interest in not wanting his son to have a motorcycle is that he does not want to hear the noise. It may be that at a deeper level, the boy’s interest is self-esteem or other identity-related concern (compare Rothman, 1997); certainly the father has no problem with his son having high self-esteem. Perhaps this self-esteem can be achieved by another means, for example, golf lessons for the son so that winning a golf trophy can impress the neighbor. The point is that differences often take on a new character, and the appearance of opposition can diminish at a deeper level of interest. (See Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991.)
Quadrant IV: Substitute the Parties’ Underlying Interests.
There are two forms of interest substitution, often bilateral as in superordination, or unilateral as in compensation. In the case of compensation, the one party who is indemnified for acceding to the other’s demand has his or her interest replaced by the interest manifest in the compensation. In the case of superordination, this happens with both sides—both give up their initial interests in favor of that which is gained in the superordination, and the form of the superordination does not need to be the same for each side. However, disputants often make vicarious comparisons of what is gained by compensation, especially if it comes from a mediator. (See Carnevale, 1986, 2002.)
The Dimensions of the Subtypes
Person-Based versus Issue-Based.
At the left side of the circumplex, logrolling and compromise entail fitting the partie
s to the issues under discussion; that is, they involve an element of one side moving toward the other side, simply giving in, either on each issue or with some sense of the priorities among the issues. The term person-based refers to the focus on fitting the persons to the issues and this is done by concessions or issue trades. The change that leads to agreement stems from the person modifying her position on the issues in the conflict.
At the right side of the circumplex, modify and expand entail fitting the issues under discussion, or the resources, to the parties; that is, an element of search for additional resources or investigation into the nature of the issue is required. The term issue-based refers to the focus on fitting the resources or issues to the persons. The change that leads to agreement stems from a change in the issue or resource under discussion. Bridging, cost cutting, superordination, and compensation have elements of both person and issue bases.
Simple versus Complex.
What are the information requirements for that particular type of agreement to occur? Either they are simple, meaning not much, or complex, meaning that the information requirements are extensive. Simple agreements do not require a close look at the concerns that underlie the parties’ positions—concerns that may involve goals, values, principles, or needs. Complex agreements do. Bridging, cost cutting, logrolling, and modifying the resource, in particular, may require extensive conceptual work, skill, expertise, learning about what the parties want or do not want, and bringing this information into the set of agreement alternatives. The parties may be able to do this on their own, but often they need the help of a third party. For a logrolling solution, information about the parties’ priorities is useful so that one can trade a concession on one issue for concession on a lower-priority issue. Often it is difficult to get such information, particularly when trust is low. In a solution through cost cutting, information about the costs or reservations felt is useful, and it may take some doing to uncover this. Bridging often needs a deep understanding of both parties’ underlying interests.
This is not to imply that compromise, or searching for more of a resource, or compensation, or superordination can occur without some thought. To the contrary, knowing when to compromise is often a delicate skill that if not handled well may cause the other to expect even more (compare Hilty and Carnevale, 1993). Knowing what a person values is key for any compensation scheme. And superordination requires an understanding of the parties’ values and interests apart from the set of differences defined in the issues. The information requirements for expanding the pie are small in the sense that all one needs to know is what the other demands. Of course, even here, some information is needed; certainly one needs to know what is available in the environment. But the point is that these outcomes, which reside more at the surface of interests and positions, are shallow and are more simply achieved than outcomes that reflect hidden interests, needs, values, and desires, which lurk at depths often hidden well below the extant positions.
Complexity in negotiation can be managed via a mental operation called unlinking (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Sometimes differences of interest are a bundle of connected demands, goals, aspirations, and values that are seen as inseparable from other demands, goals, aspirations, and values; it looks as if there is just one issue. Unlinking entails breaking the bundle into smaller parts. Hopmann (1996) calls this process “disaggregation” and Fisher (1964) calls it “fractionation.” Lax and Sebenius (1986, p. 108) refer to it as a process of converting “one issue into more than one.” Through unlinking, the smaller parts might then be realigned, or prioritized, and form the basis of trade-offs, or a new alternative might emerge, as seen in the following examples.
Types of Products in the Agreement Circumplex: Eight Basic Types
Type 1: Compromise.
A compromise is defined as a middle ground on an obvious dimension connecting the parties’ initial offers (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). A compromise is largely viewed as a nonintegrative, noncreative form of agreement, not novel, not interesting, and not all that valuable (but likely valuable as an agreement when no other is available and when agreement is better than no agreement). Compromise serves as a useful baseline to which to judge more integrative options; thus, it will be useful to include compromise in an organizing framework.
Type 2: Logrolling: Trading High- and Low-Value Issues.
When a conflict involves differences across a set of issues and the issues differ in their relative importance to the parties, the difference can be traded for one another. This is possible especially if one of the issues is more important than another issue for one party, and the other side has the opposite preference ordering on the issues. Thus, as a set, the differences on the issues are complementary. In the trade, each side gets what it wants on its high-priority issue and gives in to the other on its low-priority issue; this gives greater value in the agreement to each side individually—and to them collectively—than each getting something in the middle on the issues or making no deal at all. Lax and Sebenius (1986) describe this as “the trading of differences.” Suppose Carsten has an apple and a pear and really loves pears but is just okay on apples. And Esther also has an apple and a pear and really loves apples but is just okay on pears. Each is better off, and they are better off together, if they exchange a whole apple for a whole pear. The compromise solution, fifty-fifty, that is, the middle ground would be an exchange of half an apple for half a pear.
Type 3: Modify the Resource Pie.
When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, one solution is to figure out a way to modify the resource so that both parties can achieve their objectives. There is a reconfiguration of the existing resource. Follett (1940) gives an example:
A Dairyman’s Co-operative League almost went to pieces last year on the question of precedence in unloading cans at a creamery platform. The men who came down the hill (the creamery was on a down grade) thought they should have precedence; the men who came up the hill thought they should unload first. The thinking of both sides in the controversy was thus confined within the walls of these two possibilities, and this prevented their even trying to find a way of settling the dispute which would avoid these two alternatives. The solution was obviously to change the position of the platform so that both up-hillers and down-hillers could unload at the same time. (pp. 32–33)
In this case, it took an element of ingenuity to figure out how the resource, the platform, could be modified so that both sides could have what they wanted.
Type 4: Expand the Resource Pie.
When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, a simple but powerful solution is to simply increase the amount of the resource. The resource may be about money, space, time, an object, or any other resource. Two units of an organization vie over a limited budget; or two managers both want the nicer corner office; or a husband and wife have a week of vacation but one prefers going to the beach and the other to the mountains; or siblings quarrel over who will inherit the nice antique chair. It is essentially a supply problem, with the supply exceeding the demand. An integrative solution is achieved by increasing the resource: get a larger budget, find a second nice office, take two weeks of vacation, find a second chair. Each side achieves exactly what it wants.
Sometimes the increase in the resource or the idea for modifying the resource comes from a third party (the “integrator consultant” from Follett, 1940; or the “3-D move” from Lax and Sebenius, 2002). Imagine if the Dairyman’s Co-operative League decided to double the size of the unloading platform. In this case, the supply of the resource (the platform) expands to provide enough for both parties to be satisfied. Each gets what it wants from an influx of resources. Consider the story told by a student: “My sister bought this adorable shirt that I always borrowed without asking; we often get into conflict over ‘sharing’ clothes (I usually just take hers). To solve this situation, my mother intervened and bought me the exact same shirt that my sister had, so that
instead of us arguing over the single shirt, we each had our own.”
Modifying the resource pie—or expanding it—can succeed when the difference of interest is about an opportunity cost—the uphillers were not able to unload when the downhillers unloaded and vice versa. Increasing the resource or modifying it is not workable if what one side wants will make the other suffer; for example, if one sister could not stand seeing the other sister wear that style shirt, getting another shirt is pointless. In this case, the problem is not a shortage of shirts.
Type 5: Bridge the Interests.
Perhaps the most creative form of integrative agreement is bridging. In bridging, a new alternative is devised that gives the parties what they want in terms of the interests that underlie their positions. A husband and wife had a one-week vacation, but one wanted to go to the mountains and the other wanted to go to the beach. They talked about the reasons for their preferences, and they learned that one wanted to do freshwater fishing and the other wanted to play volleyball in the sand. With a search for new alternatives, they discovered a resort that had both freshwater fishing and sand volleyball. Each gave up their initial demand and became enthusiastic about the new option that gave them both what they wanted. The interesting feature of the agreement was not that each side gave in, or that they made a trade on low- and high-priority issues, or one side was compensated or had its costs cut, but rather a new alternative emerged through discussion and exchange of information about underlying interests, and these interests were completely met.
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed) Page 74