Negotiating: Stages and Variables
Hostage takers who appropriate the lives of innocent people they do not know and representatives of legitimate organizations whose action is carried out according to the law do not have much in common. This characteristic has an obvious consequence for the negotiation process. The empathy phenomenon—one side stands in the shoes of the other and tries to understand (if not to share) its views—rarely operates. The moral gap created by the hostage-taking act is an element structuring the negotiation in terms of relational incompatibility and raises a major obstacle to the implementation of a mechanism of exchange and concessions. Thus, the negotiated package is at the same time a necessary tool but extremely difficult to set up. Because negotiation is the process of combining divergent positions into a joint decision, the first challenge when negotiating with terrorists is to establish common rules with people who reject all the rules by which the others act. Furthermore, this is a negotiation under conditions of high asymmetry because, for instance with fundamentalists, negotiators receive their instructions from their government, while jihadists consider that they receive their own orders directly from God.
Negotiating.
The negotiation process taken as a whole may be broken down into three stages: prenegotiation, the establishment of a formula for a possible agreement, and fine-tuning on each of the issues kept for discussion.
The prenegotiation stage requires the utmost diplomacy because it takes place during the first hours after hostage taking, and this is the time that most of the killings of hostages occur. The brutal change introduced by the hostage taking brings uncertainty to both sides even if the operation has been extremely well planned because no one knows for sure how the other and the hostages are going to react. The situation has to be stabilized, a channel of communication established, a crisis management group created, and a negotiation team selected. Then the legal authorities have to make sure that the hostages are alive. This is a phase of active listening with the purpose of gathering intelligence in order to prepare the coming negotiation.
The second stage consists of agreeing on a list of issues that can be accepted for negotiation—in other words, a formula. It is often a protracted phase because seldom does a ZOPA (zone of potential agreement) naturally come out from combining both ranges of demand and offer. Furthermore, terrorists often have demands that governments normally cannot meet, such as providing weapons and making public apologies.
Time plays an important role, working at the beginning against the terrorists and after a period of time turning to their advantage, especially because of public opinion and pressure from the families of the hostages who expect the government to solve the problem. Sometimes terrorists escalate their demands, which they link at each stage with a deadline to add pressure. As a rule, many obstacles stand in the way of the negotiation because terrorists tend to think that some governments are able to pay any amount of money to get their own nationals back.
The third stage deals with fine-tuning each of the issues that both parties have accepted. It is very much of a zero-sum game where all sorts of ploys may be used to cheat the other or reduce the cost of the concessions or the risk of being caught afterward. For instance, the authorities might pay with counterfeit money or hand over outdated medicine or equipment that does not work properly. Kidnappers might kill hostages to avoid releasing someone who can later help the authorities discover their hideout. A positive-sum game may thus be turned in a moment into a lose-lose outcome. Sometimes if no MHS (mutually hurting stalemate) takes place, the negotiation may be deadlocked for years. If a situation is painful for both sides and increasingly unbearable, the pain has a positive effect because it gives the sides an incentive to restore negotiation. Thus, what can be done is first to create the conditions for a MHS by increasing the shared pain (Zartman, 2000; Faure, 2012).
Each stage of the process has its own goals and rationale and has to be dealt with using its own specific tactics. For instance, the prenegotiation stage does not require any discussion on the substance of the negotiation; it is to establish the conditions for negotiating. The second phase enables building the structure of a possible deal. Creativity may be important at that level, and credibility and commitment are essential tools in this complex phase. The third phase is highly distributive. Bluffing, deadlocks, and unexpected events feed the process. Even if a minimum necessary level of trust has been achieved, anything may happen at this stage.
As it is with terrorist action, the threat organizes the interaction. On one side, the authorities are facing the risk of having the hostages killed. On the other side, the terrorists are often under the constant threat of an assault. Each side tries to modify the situation in a more favorable way in order to have a better bargaining position. Terrorists take measures to protect themselves against a possible storming and strengthen their commitment by sometimes killing one or several hostages. The authorities try to put all sorts of pressure on the perpetrators to lower their level of expectation and weaken them through harassment, exhausting them, and depriving them of sleep.
A traditional way to improve one’s bargaining position is to buy time to collect strategic information. On the authorities’ side, it means, for instance, using microphones and laser systems to listen to conversations or introducing hidden bugs in the place. This is what was done with the Lima hostage case: microphones were carefully hidden in chess wooden pieces. For terrorists, it means having accomplices among the onlookers, the media covering the event, or even among the hostages.
When the reputation of the counterparts make them untrustworthy or merciless, it may authorize behaviors that would otherwise not be present in a negotiation such as lying, playing tricks, manipulating, and using deception. “We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world,” stated Kenneth Adelman, former assistant to the US secretary of defense. Terrorist groups do not care about the requirements of the Geneva Convention. A number of people highly familiar with this type of negotiation, such as heads of police, believe that hostage takers should be promised everything and delivered nothing (Miller, 1980). Thus, not only the final purpose of the negotiation but the quality of the counterpart may morally justify lying and cheating. The role of a negotiator may be to distract the enemy while the legal authorities are preparing to attack them. However, if the police have to deal later with similar cases, the question of its credibility will be raised. If there is not a minimum amount of credibility among the parties, no serious and effective negotiation can be carried out.
Any hostage-taking negotiation develops under a high degree of uncertainty as the process may lead to an agreement but may also end up triggering an escalation in commitments, demands, level of threat, or violence (Zartman and Faure, 2005). On occasion, it may also lead to the surrender of the hostage takers or their escape. Predictability about terrorist behavior is extremely difficult, for one of the most important causal variables is the psychological-ideological profile of the terrorist group. How sensitive a fundamentalist group may be to arguments such as the reputation of Islam, the idea of fair justice, or the principle according to which Muslims should not take women as hostages is an important issue. Furthermore, terrorists, when captured, are cautious about releasing unnecessary information and may deliver misleading information to gain time and help their accomplices realize that they are no longer free to move on with their projects. When possible, terrorists avoid dealing with professional negotiators for fear of having them “read their minds.” Al Qaeda provides training on these issues so that its members can keep the upper hand even when they are in a difficult position. Nonetheless, some models have been developed to help predict the outcome in hostage-taking incidents, giving invaluable support to negotiators (Wilson, 2000).
Intervention Techniques.
SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams, tactical units trained to perform high-risk operations, are specialized in handling terrorist matters. They turn to elaborate metho
ds and techniques in order to intervene effectively, particularly with hostage takers (Davidson, 2002; Lanceley, 1999; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Thomson, 2001). Here is a seven-stage process developed by a French organization when dealing with a barricade-siege situation:
Gain time to better understand the situation and collect information. This is done through observation and the use of microphones, bugs, and minicameras.
Organize a negotiating group of two or three people and decide who will be “the voice”—the person who will talk to the terrorists. Sometimes when circumstances allow it, it will be a female negotiator to avoid getting into an escalation process.
When verbal exchanges have started, show respect to the counterparts; care about their face and reputation; do not criticize them. Offering status is the least costly concession to be made.
Let the terrorist express his anger, hate, fury, rage. He has to express that emotional part before getting into any rational discussion. He must overcome his own fear. Then, at some point, the negotiators have to cast doubt in the mind of the terrorists on the success of their action.
Make no concession without reciprocity. Always apply a tit-for-tat strategy. However, one has to remain balanced in any offers to keep enough credibility. The point is to start and then feed a negotiation process by creating some negotiable issues—for instance, turn off any spotlights, restore air-conditioning, or bring cigarettes, food, or water.
Set up some kind of personal relationship by, for instance, introducing oneself by first name.
Never invoke principles or values. Never introduce morals and judgments into the discussion.
These are the basic rules and techniques to enable the negotiators to create the process for the negotiation. Then the issue has to be dealt with according to the three-phase model: a prenegotiation, the establishment of a formula, and the fine-tuning on each of the issues.
ROGUE STATES
Negotiating with rogue states is a variation of negotiating with terrorists. It raises many questions starting with the definition of a rogue state. It is a controversial label because it sometimes includes dictatorships terrorizing only their own populations. A rogue state may be defined as a country that does not abide by international rules: it may disseminate weapons of mass destruction, export drugs, sponsor terrorist groups, or engage in organized crime. At least a dozen countries have been associated with this concept, sometimes briefly, including North Korea, Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar. Some governments have been so infiltrated by terrorists that there is de facto collusion between the country and the terrorist group. This is the case with Mali and AQIM, for instance, concerning Western hostages detained in the Sahara/Sahel.
The term rogue state was coined in the United States and has been much debated. It has at times been assumed that the United States uses it to refer to any country it has had serious troubles with. In the same wake, some countries such as Iran have labeled the United States and Israel as rogue states.
Rogue states develop two types of activities that qualify them for this designation:
Building up a nuclear arsenal in order to increase their international influence or using it to extract money, such as North Korea has been doing for over a decade. North Korea has managed to extract $1.3 billion from the United States in compensation for stopping its missile program, although it actually never stopped it (Congressional Research Service, 2013).
Supporting or even sponsoring terrorist groups such as Iran does with the Hamas and Hezbollah. In this role, rogue states may become a counterpart when one has to deal with terrorist actions.
Originally governments faced a dilemma: Should they engage rogue states through negotiations or apply the no negotiation doctrine and try to isolate them? They are now engaging more and more with these states under the formula of “talking” to them instead of “negotiating.” In reality, they discretely negotiate even with countries they have no diplomatic relations with. Demonization comes only when discussions lead nowhere and governments look for an excuse to resort to other means of action.
Probably the oldest negotiation with a rogue state recorded is between the United Nations represented by an American general and a North Korean general in Panmunjom for going beyond the armistice agreement. Here is a description of the process:
The American general and the North Korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut. . . . They sat there, arms folded for 4½ hours. Not a word. Finally Gen. Ri got up, walked out and drove away. It was the 289th meeting of the Korean Military Armistice Commission at the truce village of Panmunjom and set a record as the longest such meeting since the Korean War ended July 27, 1953. The generals had been there 11 hours and 35 minutes. Neither ate or went to the toilet in all the time. Delegates to such meetings may leave the room only with a formal adjournment proposal. (Rubin and Brown, 1975)
Several characteristics distinguish these negotiations from more usual ones: the question of accountability, the trust issue, and the seizure of the historical moment. Rogue states, like any other state, are supposed to be accountable to two types of audiences: their own people and the international community. Dictatorships do not mind fulfilling the first type of obligation. However, there is still the rest of the world to deal with. If they were totally isolated, they would be totally free but weak. Therefore, they need allies or close friends, but as soon as they have some, they are accountable to them. Thus, they cannot act beyond a certain limit if they do not want to harm the reputation of their ally. This is, for instance, the case for North Korea with China.
TRUST AND HISTORICAL GESTURES
The issue of trust is challenging. There should be some trust built, at least concerning the implementation of the agreement. On occasion, it may work, such as with the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Sinn Féin. This is not the case with counterparts such as North Korea or Iran, however. If the counterpart is not perceived as trustworthy, there is little chance of striking a deal, and the negotiation turns into a game of deception.
Sometimes history provides a chance for achieving something that otherwise would not be possible. Anwar El-Sadat, the Egyptian leader, made this historical gesture with his visit to Israel and speech before the Knesset in Jerusalem in 1977. Chancellor Helmut Kohl did something of similar importance when giving up the deutsche mark for the euro in order to strengthen European ties. In the area of terrorism, this sort of historical gesture was made when United Kingdom and the Sinn Féin achieved peace with the Good Friday Agreement on the Northern Ireland issue.
There are other options than engaging terrorists, such as appeasement, rollback, and containment. However, the two first are much riskier because they may be interpreted as signs of weakness and open the path to escalation. The containment strategy may be productive as a first step in a process that will be concluded by some kind of negotiation. Containment could be viewed as a condition to bring both sides to the negotiation table because of the incurred costs of the status quo. Containment may entail extremely high costs, and the consequences for the terrorist group may be harmful to its own purpose and members, which is a typical situation of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). This was, for instance, the case in Egypt with the Gamaa al Islamiyya, an Islamist movement responsible for killing hundreds of Egyptian police, soldiers, and civilians and dozens of foreign tourists. In this case, the negotiated outcome was that the terrorist organization renounced the ideology of violence so that the government would release most of its members who were held as prisoners (Goerzig, 2011).
THE VICTIMS
Victims of terrorists are most often killed not for what they have done but for who they are. Thus, they bear consequences of realities on which they have neither responsibility nor control. Psychologically this is one of the most difficult issues. Usually objects of negotiations do not speak, but in this very specific situation,
the people kept as hostages can tell something about the way they lived during their captivity.
Two periods can be distinguished: during the confinement and after liberation. The period of time they are secluded can last from a few days to a few years. For instance, the Israeli soldier referred to previously, Gilad Shalit, was kept hostage for over five years, and Terry Anderson, a kidnapped American journalist, was held for almost seven years in Lebanon. FARC hostages have been kept in the jungle of southern Colombia for over ten years—one of them for thirteen years. Some of the captives are decently treated; many others are treated inhumanely: solitary confinement, always attached and sometimes chained, blindfolded, underfed, with no elementary hygiene conditions, eaten by insects, with no light, beaten, tortured, victims of casual sadism and simulated executions. Some did not speak or know anything about the world outside their confinement for years. In quite a few situations, especially in the Middle East, hostages are sold from a first terrorist group to a second, then to a third, and sometimes to even more. This instability and uncertainty bring additional stress to captives, who realize that they are just bargaining chips. It contributes to a great extent to the dehumanization of the hostages.
In addition to the fact that years of their lives have been stolen, they will never return to a normal life and will have psychological sequelae. Constant fear, loss of the notion of time, sensory deprivation, and absence of intimacy have long-term consequences. Once freed, some hostages are unable to speak or sleep. In all cases, they went through one of the most traumatic experience humans can endure. Some find it extremely challenging to readjust to social life, even to family life. Some suffer from phobias, face recurrent nightmares, are subject to an extremely high level of irritability, cannot develop any trust, and may become paranoid.
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed) Page 114