Another possible answer is that bilateral escalation occurs when persistent structural changes take place in one or both parties or the community surrounding them. Pruitt and his colleagues (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994) have put together a theory about structural change based on an earlier speculative conflict literature and social psychological research about related issues. Some structural changes are in the psychological realm. Hostile attitudes and perceptions set in, trust takes a nosedive, and new, more competitive goals develop. Hostile attitudes, perceptions, and goals are accentuated by group discussion through the process of group polarization (see Isenberg, 1986), and these psychological states often become group norms, which are perpetuated by the processes of norm enforcement. Changes may also occur in normative and social structures within the groups. Once groups become mobilized, it is often hard to put the genie back into the bottle. Strong group identities tend to persist, crystalized grievances are easily remembered, activist subgroups often remain organized, and militant leaders seldom fade away gracefully. Structural changes may also occur in the community surrounding the parties. Community members are pulled into one or the other camp, leaving nobody in the middle to mediate—a phenomenon known as community polarization. Structural change theory is a synthesis of much prior thinking, but it is greatly in need of empirical test.
A remaining question is, What are the determinants of the rate of bilateral escalation, and how severe it becomes? Some testable answers to these questions can be derived from social psychological research on the antecedents of aggression (see Berkowitz, 1993). For example, people who have been annoyed become more aggressive when they are recently angered, autonomically aroused, or under the influence of alcohol and when time pressure is too great to allow careful thought. They become less aggressive when they are in a good mood or engaged in competing activities. Impulsive individuals and those with high, unstable self-esteem are easily provoked, while people with a strong need for social approval are not. All of these conditions are possible contributors to, or detractors from, escalation, especially if found on both sides of the conflict.
Relationships between individuals are also important. Several studies (e.g., Bradbury and Fincham, 1992) have shown that people in distressed marriages are prone to retaliate when annoyed. Since retaliation is at the base of many conflict spirals, this suggests that bilateral escalation should be greater in distressed marriages and other hostile relationships, a plausible and testable hypothesis. Positive relationships presumably have the opposite effect.
An old study by Back (1951) adds an intriguing twist to the latter speculation. He found that more cohesive groups engaged in more internal conflict but were less prone to internal escalation. This suggests that strong, positive interpersonal relationships provide enough security that people feel free to raise issues with one another but they inhibit the use of heavy contentious tactics. Back’s study needs to be replicated and extended with modern research methods.
Again, there is room for laboratory research on the conditions and processes underlying bilateral escalation. What is needed is a laboratory simulation that allows discovery of complex interactions between variables and careful measurement of escalation as it unfolds. Laboratory games like the prisoner’s dilemma were once thought to provide such a simulation, and some things were learned in these studies (Pruitt, 1998). But these games are so simple that they do not involve most of the complex processes described earlier. Clearly the field needs new laboratory paradigms.
Conflict Intractability
It is said that about 5 percent of conflicts become intractable—highly escalated, enduring, and destructive (Coleman, 2011). Due to the severe consequences of intractable conflicts, it is important to gain a better understanding of when and why some conflicts become intractable and how to transform and ultimately resolve them.
Drawing on dynamical systems theory, some recent authors have postulated that “intractable conflicts are formed when the cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns characterizing a party’s conflict-relevant dynamics lose their complexity” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1470; see also Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013). Complexity represents the degree to which people are multidimensional in their “perception of issues, judgment of out-group members, and action tendencies” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1471). Such oversimplification flies in the face of the enormous and increasing complexity of intractable conflicts. In addition to this basic postulate, dynamical systems theory helps understand intractable conflicts by focusing on concepts like feedback loops, tipping points, latent attractors, and others. The theory suggests research questions such as those outlined by Vallacher et al. (2010). Initial studies suggest that this approach is a fruitful basis for further research (Bui-Wrzosinska, 2005; Kugler, Coleman, and Fuchs, 2011; Kugler and Brodbeck, 2011; Kurt et al., in press). However, such studies are difficult to do because they require methods that incorporate complex dynamics.
READINESS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The basic question in this section is: Under what conditions does an intractable conflict become ready for deescalation and, hence. for negotiation or mediation? A subsidiary question is, What can third parties do to hasten this readiness?
A variety of answers have been given to these questions. Some authors advocate simple contact between the parties (Miller and Brewer, 1984). While this can be an effective remedy in mild conflicts, research suggests that it is counterproductive in highly escalated ones (Rubin, 1980). A second possibility is the development of superordinate (common) goals, which seem more important to both parties than the aims of the conflict. Case materials—for example, the turnaround of US-Soviet enmity when both countries began fighting the Nazis and Sherif’s boys’ camps (Sherif and Sherif, 1969)—suggest that this can be an effective solution. But compelling common goals are seldom available in intractable conflicts. A third approach involves ordinary mediation or various kinds of problem-solving workshops (for the latter topic, see Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 2002; Lederach, 1997). Research suggests that formal mediators have great difficulty solving heavily escalated conflicts (Kressel, 2000), and the problem would seem even larger for problem-solving workshops, which usually do not include the main decision makers of the groups involved in the conflict. More research is needed on the effectiveness of these methods, but as we suggest below, it seems likely that they are mainly effective in conjunction with other forces. A fourth approach involves having powerful third parties (e.g., UN peacekeepers) pressure the disputants to stop fighting and start talking (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). This makes sense if such third parties are available and ready to serve, though much more research is needed on the details of how this works.
Efforts to resolve conflicts often fail and sustainable constructive relations between parties cannot be established. This raises two questions: Under what conditions does a heavily escalated, intractable conflict become ready for de-escalation and, hence for negotiation or mediation? What can third parties do to hasten such readiness?
Ripeness theory (Zartman, 1989, 2000) is designed to answer these questions. Its author, an international relations specialist, characterizes a ripe moment as follows: “The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe. . . . The other element necessary for a ripe moment is . . . the perception of a way out . . . a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too” (Zartman, 2000, p. 228). Ripeness is a necessary but insufficient state for conflict resolution.
Ripeness theory concerns psychological processes but is not presented in the language of psychologists. Hence, the first author of this chapter (Pruitt, 1997, 2005c, 2007, 2012b) has developed a close cousin, readiness theory, which employs variables and looks separately at the motives and perceptions of decision makers on each side of the conflict. A party’s readin
ess to de-escalate and enter into negotiation or mediation is a joint function of its motivation to escape a conflict and its optimism about finding a mutually acceptable solution. Motivation to escape a conflict is a direct function of the costs and risks attributed to the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived likelihood of winning the conflict. Optimism is a direct function of trust that the adversary wants to resolve the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived distance between the two parties’ positions.
When the parties are groups of any size, optimism often grows as a result of secret, informal communication between them. Hostilities typically continue during periods of informal communication. Some readiness is required for such communication to take place, but much more is needed before formal negotiation or mediation will be initiated. Third parties can try to enhance motivation to escape the conflict, but their main role is to sponsor, and often to be the medium of, informal communication that contributes to optimism once motivation is established.
The following are some of the potentially testable hypotheses implied by readiness theory:
Receptivity to third-party intervention is a function of readiness, as defined above.
The more severe the escalation, the harder it will be to establish optimism, since optimism is a function of trust.
3. Greater motivation to escape the conflict can compensate for lesser optimism, and vice versa.
New leaders are more likely than old leaders to recognize that a conflict cannot be won or is producing unacceptable costs or risks. Hence, the likelihood of escaping an intractable conflict tends to be greater at times of leadership change.
Tests of such hypotheses need to combine laboratory experiments (e.g., Coleman, Kugler, and Vallacher, 2011) and field studies (for example Mooradian and Druckman, 1999).
NEGOTIATION
Research on negotiation has a long tradition and is quite extensive (see de Dreu, 2010; Pruitt, 2012a). Here we mention three recent trends in this research, each needing further development.
Negotiations are inherently relational, yet as Gelfand et al. (2006) noted, “There is still a dearth of theory and research on relational constructs in negotiation” (p. 428). These authors introduce a model that focuses on relational self-construal, a cognitive representation of the self as connected to others that includes relational cognitions, emotions, and motives. A research agenda introduced by the authors of this model (Gelfand et al., 2006), shows avenues for future empirical work, which is likely to enrich the existing, mostly arelational, research on negotiation.
Other research has explored the relationship between affect and negotiation. Some studies have looked at the impact of affect on negotiator behavior (Carnevale and Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998) and, more recently, the impact of knowledge about the other party’s affect (Van Kleef, de Dreu, and Manstead, 2004). A blind spot in this research has been the impact of displayed affect (Pruitt, 2012a). For example, the following questions need to be addressed empirically: Does displayed negative affect provide information that helps the other party find a mutually beneficial solution, or does it produce conflict spirals that fuel the conflict further? If it has both effects, what conditions encourage one over the other?
Another recent development is the study of stages in negotiation. For example, several authors have put forward psychological models concerning when and why people initiate negotiation or refrain from doing so (e.g., Reif and Brodbeck, 2011; Volkema and Fleck, 2012). These models open new avenues for research. The reasons for initiating a negotiation can strongly influence the subsequent processes during the negotiation, a phenomenon that also needs to be explored. Time series methods (e.g., Putnam, 1990) facilitate the study of later stages and the turning points between them. However, there is little convergence in the results of studies using these methods, with each investigator finding different stages and sequences of stages (see Pruitt, 2012a). Clearly these strands need to be untangled and a theory built that explains the various findings. Such an effort might begin with Druckman’s (2001) simple classification of negotiator strategy as cooperative versus competitive. In his study, 75 percent of the turning points in negotiation were positive (competitive followed by cooperative) and 25 percent were negative (cooperative followed by competitive). Follow-up research is needed to find the conditions and processes leading to one versus the other type of turning point.
MEDIATION
Mediation can be defined as third parties helping disputants overcome their differences. It can be formal, in the sense of involving specially trained third parties who offer their services to the public, or emergent, in the sense of involving third parties who are drawn from the same social milieu as the disputants. (For comprehensive summaries of the mediation research, see Pruitt, 2012a, and Wall and Dune, 2012.)
Rival Approaches to Mediation
Mediation has traditionally been viewed as assisted negotiation, the goal being to aid the disputants reach a viable agreement through problem solving (see Kressel, 2000; Herrman, 2006). The mediator helps the parties locate the interests (goals, values, needs) underlying their initial positions and their priorities among these interests. Then a search is made for options that satisfy these interests and priorities. If the parties are unable to devise their own options, the mediator throws out suggestions, but the final decision requires agreement between the parties.
This traditional approach has been challenged from a number of directions. A friendly amendment comes from writers who stress the importance of perceived justice in both negotiation and mediation (Conlon, 2005; Tyler and Blader, 2004; Zartman et al., 1996). The argument is that disputants are as concerned about justice as about satisfying their interests. Hence, if one or both parties feel that they are suffering an injustice, the traditional approach to mediation may produce no agreement or an agreement that is not followed. Injustice can be experienced in many ways (Deutsch, 2006): distributive injustice, procedural injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion, or cultural imperialism; hence, mediators must have a broad understanding of this phenomenon. Research has demonstrated the importance of perceived justice for success in mediation (e.g., Albrecht, 2010; Bollen, Ittner, and Euwema, 2012; Lind et al., 1993; Pruitt et al., 1993), but more empirical work is needed.
The traditional approach to mediation is more radically challenged by two new schools of practice. One is narrative mediation, which sees the job of the mediator as flushing out and restructuring the parties’ narratives—the stories they tell about the history of the conflict and how they think, feel, and speak about it (Cobb, 2003; Winslade and Monk, 2001). Narrative mediators have little use for the traditional effort to discover the parties’ interests because they view these interests as derived from the entering narratives and as likely to change when the narratives change. Agreements may be reached during narrative mediation, but that is not the basic goal, which is to improve the parties’ capacity to deal effectively with each other. The other dissenting voice comes from proponents of transformative mediation (Bush and Folger, 2005). Transformative mediators seek to improve the relationship between the parties and give the parties a sense of empowerment rather than to find a viable agreement. Their technique is very nondirective. They provide little structure and no advice, instead encouraging the parties to make their own decisions and helping them understand their own and the other party’s viewpoints.
There is considerable evidence favoring the claims of traditional mediation (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989), but narrative and transformative mediation have rarely been evaluated empirically (for an exception, see Nabatchi, Bingham, and Moon, 2010). Laboratory research does not seem appropriate for this evaluation unless one can bring experienced mediators and genuine disputes into the laboratory, which is likely to be very difficult. A more plausible setting would be a community mediation center that uses all three types of mediation, if such could be found. Otherwise, centers specializing in each kind of mediation would have to be used.
What is nee
ded first is a careful study of how traditional, narrative, and transformative mediators behave to pinpoint similarities and differences. Then a comparative study should be done in which several mediators of each type handle several cases. The ideal design would involve random assignment of the three types of mediators to cases. This is likely to be difficult in mediation centers, but a study by McGillicuddy, Welton, and Pruitt (1987) shows that it can be done. Finding common measures of success will be a challenge, since the proponents of these methods espouse different goals.
Contingent Mediation
Advocates of the three contrasting schools just described often assume that their method fits all cases. But this assumption is highly questionable, considering the variety of conflicts that undergo mediation. Instead, it makes sense to employ a contingent approach, using diagnosis followed by choice among a diverse set of strategies and tactics (Pruitt, 2013; Wall and Dunne, 2012). Empirical researchers need to come to terms with Wall and Dunne’s (2012) observation that “faced with such a complex set of categories, scholars have not been able to grapple with the two fundamental questions for mediation: (1) What are the major causes/antecedents of mediators’ strategies? That is, what causes mediators to use the strategies they do? (2) And what are the major impacts of the mediators’ use of particular strategies?” (p. 227). To these should be added a question about contingent mediation: (3) What strategies are appropriate under different conditions?
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed) Page 157