An Italian fighter squadron, flying Hanriots (a French marque), was based at Istrana and some of these took off in pursuit of the raiders. Camels of 28 Squadron also intercepted some of these and brought one down.
At 12.3o p.m. a smaller raid struck Istrana. One flight attacked four Gotha bombers escorted by five Albatroses and shot down one of the former. From the accounts of captured pilots, it seemed that these raids were in reprisal for Barker’s and Hudson’s insult to the Austrian Flying Corps.
The daily task of the RE8s was to find and photograph enemy batteries; and, each aircraft escorted by six Camels, to make long reconnaissances to report enemy movements. Distant reconnaissance was more arduous and risky than an escorted bombing mission, because the RE8s had to fly a devious course and reconnoitre several objectives. The longer flight time, of course, increased the likelihood of interception.
The year ended with the RFC detachment well settled into the routine of their duties, despite the short time they had been in Italy, and the fighter squadrons among them with an appetite already whetted by several victories.
In the last two months of 1917, an Italian pilot, Giovanni Ancillotto, who shot down three enemy balloons in the course of a few days, was so impetuous in one attack that he flew over the balloon, which he had already set alight, and returned to base with his own machine badly damaged and the fabric burned. The official account declares that “This showed the purest spirit of heroism, well deserving of inclusion in the ranks of those selected for decoration with the Gold Medal.” Most operationally experienced British and German pilots would have described Ancillotto as careless.
On 8th December a genuinely heroic and accomplished fighter pilot scored three victories: Baracca had brought his total to thirty in seventy-three combats, which earned him the Gold Medal. Another Gold Medal went to Lieutenant Colonel Pier Ruggero Piccio, “of unflagging, cold, astute and serene bravery”, who attained his seventeenth victory on 30th November.
Of the attack on Istrana airfield, the Italian account claims that: “This fine victory raised even further the aggressive spirit of our fighters and reduced the enemy’s daylight activities to a minimum. The hard lesson, enemy prisoners confessed, deeply hurt their morale. With the 26th December the enemy’s short period of air supremacy attained since 1st October definitely ended.”
From 28th to 31st December, profiting from favourable weather conditions, the enemy resumed their nightly bombing missions. They dropped 18,500 kilogrammes of bombs on airfields and railway stations, causing large fires, other extensive damage, and many deaths and injuries among servicemen and the civilian population.
It would be fair to end this account of events on the Italian Front in 1917 with a story of Italian gallantry. Sotto Tenente Gino Lisa, a young bomber pilot, had been in many actions against fighters, had often had his aeroplane riddled by bullets, and twice returned from a sortie with it awash with blood. On 15th November he had completed an operation for which he had volunteered, when he saw another Caproni under fighter attack. He instantly went to its aid. In his turn, he was attacked by four fighters. After a long engagement, pitting his heavy and sluggish aircraft against the highly manoeuvrable Albatroses, his machine gunner was hurled out of the aircraft by violent evasive action. The enemy fighters shot the Caproni down and Gino Lisa was killed when it fell to the rocky ground. His Gold Medal was well deserved.
*
While the air forces were pitched against each other, plans for their future employment were being made, always keeping well in advance of the current situation. The two predominant concerns of the most senior RFC Staff officers were strategic bombing and the combination of the RNAS and RFC into one air Service with its own Air Ministry.
On 11th October 1917, Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as follows.
“The policy of bombing military objectives in Germany now having been approved, it is necessary to look forward to the operations in this respect next year. It is expected that a very considerable force of aeroplanes will be available, and it is probable that a large part of these will have to operate from centres far removed from the Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force in France. Preliminary arrangements for the accommodation and supply of the squadrons are already being made by the Commander-in-Chief through the General Officer Commanding RFC, but the full arrangements required for next year will entail a great deal of administrative work and probably a considerable amount of communication with the French authorities. I think the amount of work will be so great that it would probably interfere with the normal duties of the General Officer Commanding RFC in France if the whole burden were thrown on him.
“I consider that a special officer should be detailed to undertake the work of preparation. Whether or not the project for a combined Air Service should come into being, I consider that a force operating at a distance from HQ and detailed for a particular operation of war would carry on more efficiently if under a responsible Commander working directly under the C-in-C, so that the GOCRFC with the Expeditionary Force could concentrate on the particular duties of his Command, which are sufficiently serious to absorb his whole energies.”
The effect of this memorandum will be seen later.
Trenchard and others were opposed to a combined Air Service under a separate Air Ministry. Henderson was in favour of it. In retrospect, Trenchard admitted that Henderson had “twice the understanding and insight” that he had. The argument in favour of combining the RNAS and RFC and setting up an Air Ministry are well put in a document among the few surviving Henderson papers, dated 25th September 1917.
“The air services of all belligerents are growing so quickly that no Naval or Military Commander ever has sufficient aeroplanes or pilots. The more they get, the more they ask for and, by the time they have had their demands fulfilled, the enemy has produced more machines, and so they again make fresh requests, and so on.
“Consequently, the Officers Commanding the Grand Fleet, the Eastern Front, and other more detached places, cannot contemplate any air operations outside their immediate necessities until their own wants are satisfied. Consequently a great air offensive against the enemy’s supplies, depots and communications will never be proposed or worked out unless it is done by an Air Staff, distinct from the two great Services, which has the power to lay the matter before the War Cabinet, and afterwards plan the offensive and provide the means.
“There are indications that the enemy is at last waking up to the power of the Air and is constructing 4000 large bombing machines. It is vital that we should be before him and have our Bombing Squadrons destroying his aerodromes and machines, as well as his factories, before he annihilates ours. (Night operations are most essential for the destruction of machines, for they will be found in their hangars during the dark hours.) This is the truest method of defence in air warfare, as in all other kinds, and the only effective way of preventing attacks on this country.
“It is essential that a powerful bombing force should be prepared at once, so as to be in the field before that of the enemy. The carrying out of this scheme will necessitate some reduction in other military supplies, but the importance of the offensive to be taken justifies this when the present position of the war is taken into consideration. The Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet are in a state of stalemate. The armies are in almost an immobile condition. We can only get at the enemy’s supplies and communications by air. If we are to do this thoroughly we may cripple him and force him to give place to our armies. If we attack his submarines with aircraft in sufficient numbers we shall relieve the drain on our own resources. If we pulverise his factories and aerodromes we shall stop his raids on this country.
“Germany know this, and information shows that the enemy:—
(a) is reducing output of ammunition
(b) is reducing use of motor transport
(c) has stopped the building of large ships
in order to put all energy i
nto building of submarines and aircraft.
“All this in order to cut our communications and supplies, and to destroy aerodromes and machines and factories before we destroy theirs. It is a sort of ‘house that Jack built’. We must destroy the factories that produce the submarines and aircraft, that cut our supplies and bomb London. The enemy wishes to destroy our aerodromes and factories that supply the machines which destroy their factories and aerodromes and so prevent them cutting off our supplies and bombing London.
“The only cure is to put our hangars and shops at the aerodromes underground and bomb the enemy factories out of existence. When this is done the superiority of our forces on sea, land and in the air comes automatically.
“There is no time to be lost. It is a race between Germany and ourselves as to who begins first.”
CHAPTER 18 - 1918. Fury in the Firmament
The entry of the United States into the war had thrown the German press into a fervour of expected imminent subjugation by armed multitudes and, from the air, by immense air fleets. The Government and High Command, better informed, knew that many months must pass before America could assemble and train an effective army and air force. Spring 1918, when it was logical to expect the next Allied offensive, was the time for which Germany was preparing. The General Officer Commanding the Luftstreitkräfte knew that, with America’s great resources in manpower, materials and wealth, when she did go fully into battle, it would be in mighty strength. He accordingly, in mid-1917, drew up a plan to prepare the Air Service for the coming onslaught. This he called Das Amerika Programm.
On the British side, Henderson expressed his realistic appreciation of aerial warfare and his meticulous accuracy in a paper to the CIGS dated l0th January 1918. He comments, on the publicity automatically given to French pilots when they qualified as “Aces”.
“1. ‘Mastery of the Air’ is not a suitable expression to describe any degree of air superiority. No superiority can be sufficient to ensure that hostile aircraft will not break through on a limited offensive. It is hoped that, with the co-operation of America, our present superiority may be maintained and considerably increased.
“2. The British intend to continue the policy of an air offensive against military objectives in Germany. The name that is applied to these operations does not matter.
“3. The two policies are not quite accurately stated. The French announcements refer to the most successful fighting (i.e. fighter) pilots. ‘The best flying men’ may be employed on more important operations than fighting (i.e. flying fighters). The British system is not to conceal the names and records of flying men, but to publish them after they have been examined and approved by the Commander-in-Chief and the King. My own opinion is that the British policy is the better, both as a matter of justice and as tending to keep up the level of efficiency throughout the Force whatever work the pilot may be engaged on.
“4. No amount of superiority, in number or in quality of machines and pilots, can hope to secure absolute mastery of the air, nor can even a dominant position be assured unless the organisation of the Force and the spirit and skill of the pilots keep pace with the provision of mechanical appliances.”
The sentiment about justice in his third paragraph is admirable, but he overlooks the equal merit and claim to recognition of observers and aerial gunners.
There are two points to make about Henderson and Trenchard in which the attitudes they took differed from those customarily attributed to them. The DH4’s successor, the DH9, also a two-seater bomber, was intended for long-range bombing. Geoffrey de Havilland was uneasy about this: its performance was not adequate and would put the crews’ lives in jeopardy. He said it should not be put to this task.
Henderson demurred. “It may be inadvisable to attempt any bombing until a better machine is produced, by which time again the German machines may also have improved. If the DH9 is fit for day bombing, then the more of them we use the better.”
Trenchard totally disagreed and put his point with witty sarcasm. “I want to bomb Germany, but please remember that if we lose half our machines doing so, the good morale effect which is three-quarters of the work will be on the German side and not ours.”
Trenchard had been knighted in the New Year Honours List. Henderson was no longer at the War Office. He had moved to the newly formed Air Ministry as Deputy Chairman of the Air Council, and 1st April 1918 had been set as the date for the amalgamation of the RNAS and RFC into the Royal Air Force.
Political pressure of the shabbiest sort had been exerted on Trenchard to induce him to return to England and become Chief of Air Staff. Like Henderson, three years earlier, he put the good of the Service before his own advancement and would have preferred to remain in France. Insistence by Lord Northcliffe and his brother, Lord Rothermere, both newspaper-owners with huge political power, proved too high and he had to accept the promotion. As Henderson had done, he left the field for an office desk. His place was taken by Sir John Salmond.
By March, Trenchard, sickened by further political intrigue, resigned. He was astonished when the man chosen to replace him proved to be Sykes. He was offered the choice of three new appointments, but elected a fourth: command of an enlarged bomber force to be stationed in France.
None of these basic changes made any noticeable practical difference to the lives of the aircrews at the Western or Italian Fronts.
*
The annual winter reduction in air activity ended with the great German offensive that began on 21st March. By then the Luftstreitkräfte had grown to 153 Fliegerabteilungen, 80 Jastas, 38 Schlastas, and 24 Bombengeschwader that comprised 24 Staffeln.
Of these, pitted against the RFC were 49 Fliegerabteilungen, 35 Jastas, 27 Schlastas and 4 Bombengeschwader: 730 aircraft, of which 326 were single-seater fighters.
Ranged against these the RFC had 579 aircraft serviceable, 261 of them single-seater fighters. The fighters were mostly SE5as and Camels. There were five Bristol Fighter squadrons and one flying the Sopwith Dolphin.
The RFC’s air activity preliminary to the offensive consisted of bombing enemy airfields, and targets that would impede troop movements: railways, bridges, roads. Many fighters were sent on low-level bombing raids.[18] The RFC C-in-C, as always, took it for granted that aggression would overcome the defence. The Luftstreitkräfte, also as usual, relied on well-planned defensive tactics. The British casualties, although the Staff appeared not to recognise the fact, proved heavier than the enemy’s.
March 18th saw a battle between five DH4s escorted by twenty-four Camels and SE5As, against thirty Albatroses, Pfalzes and Fokker Triplanes led by Richtfhofen, plus eight Staffeln flying the same variety of fighters. Badly outnumbered, the British did well to lose no more than two DH4s, two SE5As and five Camels. But it was a heavy defeat nevertheless: the Germans lost one Albatros.
The offensive began in poor weather, with fog that hampered flying. The Germans’ initial advance drove many squadrons to retreat on the second and third days to aerodromes further behind the line. Naval 5’s base was shelled and some of the squadrons, including Sholto Douglas’s 84, moved with only an hour or two to spare before the enemy overran them.
Eighty-four Squadron had been strafing day after day. It was a rich time for Beauchamp-Proctor. He had shot down his first enemy aircraft, a reconnaissance type, on 3rd January. He got his first fighter, a Fokker Triplane, on 17th February and soon shot down four more fighters and was given an MC. On 1st April 1918, the day on which the RAF came into being, he was promoted to captain and given command of a flight.
Sholto Douglas insisted on his squadron operating in three flights of five aeroplanes and staying in formation. The individualists objected to this, and he issued an order that no one was to break formation to snatch an easy chance to shoot down an enemy. The initiative for any attack must come from the leader. As this would be the most experienced pilot, he had the best prospect of shooting down the chosen victim. McCudden followed the same system. This style of figh
ting aroused resentment and jealousy. Some of the other pilots objected that the leader scored most of the kills while they guarded him. The leaders pointed out that most new pilots were shot down when a formation broke up. The way to give them experience was for all to hold formation, with the raw men guarded by the experienced, who also protected the leader.
McCudden had ended 1917 with two dazzling displays of marksmanship and the style of flying that combat demanded. On 23rd December he shot down four hostiles, and on the 28th he shot down three LVGs in twenty minutes. The first of these he took by surprise from astern and below; and afterwards wrote: “I hate to shoot a Hun down without his seeing me, for although this method is in accordance with my doctrine, it is against what little sporting instincts I have left.” The second one, he destroyed at a range of 400 yards. He said he knew this estimate would be disputed, but was adamant about his accuracy in judging range. Most pilots, he said, underestimated the range at which they opened fire, and novices usually fired their first bursts from twice the distance they thought they were from their target. This was often said in the 1939-45 war, with equal truth, and was a frequent topic of squadron and flight commanders’ observations on newcomers in action.
Being an ex-mechanic, McCudden was very conscious of the disparity between the performance of aircraft of similar type. He had lately been irritated to see Rumplers passing him when above 15,000 feet, and found out that their original engine had been replaced by a more powerful one. A new engine was being put into the SE5A, and he obtained a set of high-compression pistons for it. “I was very keen to see the Rumpler pilots’ hair stand on end as I climbed past them like a helicopter.” What is as interesting as his attention to mechanical detail is the fact that he knew the word “helicopter”. None had yet been built and he did not live to see their advent.
The First Great Air War Page 32