Mortar sergeant Richard Klein remembered the withdrawal and subsequent positioning on a hillside. It would turn out to be a miserable night for him, weatherwise. Fog continued to be a problem the next morning.
We proceeded to pull back toward Mont, crossing several barbed wire fences along the way. For reasons I never understood, we dug in on the reverse slope of a hill, about halfway between Mont and Neffe. We stayed there the rest of the night.
By late afternoon of the 19th, Colonel Ewell had committed all three of his battalions and each had been stopped by tank and small arms fire. The companies had moved into favorable defensive positions and dug in. Ewell felt he needed reinforcements on his right flank and had asked for Division troops to help secure the area through which enemy troops might turn his right flank.
Colonel Hartford F. Salee’s 1st Battalion
Once the three parachute infantry regiments had departed for their assigned perimeter lines of defense, Colonel Joseph N. Harper and his staff of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, took over the temporary command post which Division Headquarters had set up in the school house at Mande St. Etienne. At 1600 hours, the 1st Battalion, less “B” Company, was sent through Bastogne and was attached to Colonel Julian Ewell’s 501st Regiment in support of his right flank.
Captain Walter L. Miller, leading his “C” Company of the 1st Battalion, then reported in at headquarters in Bastogne where he was directed to a commanding height near Neffe. Miller relates:
I had reported to Colonel Ewell in Bastogne and he assigned us a hill to his right. We moved up and dug in and I remember it well because I chided my first sergeant about digging such a deep foxhole. When the shells started falling, I jumped in right beside him and was glad he had dug so deep.
During the night, we could hear the sounds of mechanized forces to our front and an occasional burst of a Schmeizzer. The next morning we overlooked a small village and I could see there was fighting as two vehicles had been hit and were in flames.
The stay on the southeast side for the 1st Battalion of the 327th Glider Regiment would be of short duration. After a brief skirmish on the 20th, 1st Battalion and its Headquarters Company would be called back to the west side of Bastogne. “B” Company would move east on the 20th to serve as flank protection.
The Enemy Makes its Deepest Penetration
On the evening of the 19th, the enemy would make its deepest penetration into the perimeter defense of the 101st Division at Bastogne. The action is described by a 1st Battalion machine gunner and by 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion historian Robert Minick.
In a patrol action that enabled the enemy to reach its closest point to the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters, PFC. John C. Trowbridge relates an action that ties in with an event that took place in the “B” Battery (907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion) area during the first night.
I don’t know who took over that grove after that, but that night an enemy patrol came within 50 yards of our position when Rasmussen challenged, then fired, along with a .50 caliber from artillery, which was to our left rear. The next morning we found one dead enemy and heard that one was captured.
In a wartime history of the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, which he wrote, Robert Minick provides a more detailed account of the above situation which occurred in the “B” Battery area.26
Late on the evening of the 19th, a German patrol of between 20 and 40 men accidentally infiltrated the B Battery position. Having apparently lost their way in the dense fog, the patrol wandered down the slope of a small hill and headed straight for Sergeant McGinnis’ gun position. Hushed whispers silently passed the alert down along the line of waiting artillerymen. After a very subdued telephone conversation with Captain McGlone, who was also trying to warn the gun crews of the developing situation, Sergeant McGinnis and PFC. Narcisso Jaso went to work. They acted as decoys while PFC. Stanley J. Vincent and others drove the patrol back up the slope toward one of the .50 caliber crews on outpost guard. With their vision hampered by the fog, the men in pursuit could only listen to the enemy patrol as it scampered back in the opposite direction. In their haste to clear the area and right their course, the Krauts were dropping parts of their equipment as they moved along. When they reached the top of the hill, they received a challenge from PFC. Agapieto Hernandez who was operating the machine gun. When the Germans failed to respond with a countersign, ‘Mexican Pete’ opened up on them, killing their leader, a young lieutenant. The following morning the already frozen body of the German officer was viewed by all who cared to look as he lay there on the frozen ground with a large gaping hole in the middle of his chest. The remaining members of the patrol were driven into the lines of the 327th and captured by the glider infantrymen.
Noville and Foy
It had been a long, hard ride for the men of the 10th Armored Division as they moved from their rest area in France to an assembly area near Luxembourg City. At that juncture, Combat Command B, under Colonel William C. Roberts, had been ordered to continue on to Bastogne to be placed under the command of General Troy Middleton and his VIII Army Corps.
Upon arrival in Bastogne on the afternoon of December 18, and after learning where General Middleton wanted hasty defensive positions set up, Colonel Roberts divided his forces into three combat teams. The one of concern here for the Noville operation became known as Team Desobry. It was led by Major William R. Desobry, a tall, six foot four inch, one hundred and sixty pounder who commanded the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion.
Team Desobry was the last of the three combat teams which Colonel Roberts had formed to be positioned at locations to which General Middleton had assigned them to stop advancing enemy forces. Team Desobry made its move after darkness had set in on the night of the 18th.
One of the company commanders in Team Desobry was Captain Gordon Geiger. He was ordered to Noville to set up a blocking force. Geiger began placing his troops and vehicles in positions in and around Noville to stop the Germans from breaking through. He describes the problem he had separating the retreating American forces from the enemy which were reported in the vicinity.27 All through the night (18-19), American vehicles, with their lights on, moved through Noville heading for Bastogne. Everybody said that more Germans were coming. We knew it and my men were scared. As the Americans came through, they said, ‘There are more Germans coming than you have ever seen before. There’s no use staying here. They’ll run over you in no time!’ But my orders were to hold, so that’s what we had to do.
Finally, my commander ordered me to stop all vehicles going toward Bastogne and take the soldiers off to fill our ranks. They were scared and didn’t know me. Some said, “We were given orders to withdraw.” But I said, “I’m the one giving orders now. Hold your ground and fight.”
The three hundred man force of Team Desobry consisted mainly of the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion and a tank destroyer unit consisting of five TD vehicles. These were augmented by men of the 28th Infantry Division and a few men and officers of the 9th Armored Division who were convinced they could help in stopping the enemy advance.
Shortly before daybreak, the enemy forces were nearing the outskirts of Noville. The men of Team Desobry continued to hold off on their firing as retreating American soldiers sought refuge as they fled into Noville from the north.
Captain Geiger continued his story of how they tried to separate the retreating Americans from enemy forces.28
Our men on the outposts didn’t want to fire on Americans. The only way they could tell who was there was to holler out and ask if approaching soldiers spoke German. If they did, then they were the enemy.
Captain John T. Prior was a member of the Medical Battalion of the 10th Armored Division and on December 14th had been detached to the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion to replace their surgeon who had been evacuated with pneumonia. Captain Prior was involved with Team Desobry at Noville on December 19, 1944. Part of his story follows:29
Arriving in Noville at 0600, Dec
ember 19th, we found a sleepy little crossroads town. My aid station was located in the pub. I found this type of building always best for our purposes since the large drinking area accommodated many litter patients. Within two hours of our arrival the little town had turned into a shooting gallery featuring small arms, machine gun and tank fire on the main thoroughfare. The large front window of the pub was an early casualty and it was necessary to crawl on the floor to avoid being hit as we treated our increasing number of casualties. Someone had selected our backyard as the ‘ammo’ dump and this did not boost our equanimity. Team Desobry was ordered to hold Noville at all costs.
The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, led by Colonel Robert F. Sink, had arrived in the assembly area near Mande St. Etienne at 0400 on the morning of December 19. The men had a few hours to stretch to get rid of the kinks that developed during the long ride from Mourmelon.
Having accompanied the 506th Regiment to Bastogne to assume its responsibility as the forward observer team of the 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion, one of the team members, PFC. William J. Stone, remembered that his team leader, 1Lt. Francis Canham, came back from a meeting in the assembly area with the news of the terrible shortage of ammunition in the rifle company to which they were attached for the mission. Stone describes how his team leader tried to alleviate the situation:
While talking with the officers of the company with which we were working, Canham learned that they had no ammunition for their carbines. As artillerymen, we were armed with carbines and had enough ammunition to share with them, which we did. In addition, the riflemen did not have sufficient ammunition for their rifles and there was a shortage of hand grenades and rocket launcher projectiles. This was remedied, somewhat, just as we were entering Noville.
Shortly after daylight on the 19th, and when Division had decided where each of the fighting units was to take its place in defensive positions, the men began their marches east through Bastogne.
With the arrival of daylight, Major William Desobry, in Noville, was able to see periodically into the distance when the fog lifted. He noted that the town was in a pocket with high ground on three sides which made it difficult to defend when the enemy could look down into Team Desobry’s defensive positions.
With this observation, Desobry called Colonel William Roberts, commander of Combat Command “B” of the 10th Armored Division at his command post in Bastogne requesting permission to withdraw to more defensible positions. After Colonel Roberts consulted with VIII Corps and 101st Division Headquarters, he was told to keep his forces in Noville and that a battalion of 101st paratroopers was on its way to reinforce his troops.
When Major Desobry learned that 1st Battalion of the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment was on its way to Noville, he sent a jeep down the road to pick up LTC. James LaPrade, its commander, so the two officers could do a reconnaissance of the area. In this way, LaPrade would know in advance, without an assembly, where to position his men. LaPrade also alerted Desobry to the fact that his men were without adequate weaponry, rifle and machine gun ammunition, mortar shells and hand grenades. Desobry ordered men of his Service Company to rush the necessary armament to the advancing troops. The truck loads of equipment were waiting at the roadside near Foy as the troops came by.
That was the way LTC. Jim LaPrade’s troops arrived on the combat scene, ill-equipped to fight a war on the morning of December 19, 1944. They were less than two miles from the enemy forces attacking Noville.
After disembarking west of Bastogne, T/5 Owen E. Miller remembers walking to the east and coming upon a road sign that read BASTOGNE. He remembers Captain Joseph Warren coming by to pick him up in a jeep.
As I was walking through the square in Bastogne in the line of march, here comes Captain Warren in a jeep. He picked me up and had me drive. I asked him where to go and he said just stay on this road. We passed two trucks that had stopped and were dumping equipment along the road. We kept going and came to a small town.
When the assignments were issued in the assembly area, “C” Company was to lead out for 1st Battalion of the 506th Regiment. 1Lt. Joe Reed was in on the action and the first platoon was fortunate to pick up weapons and ammo from retreating troops. Reed wrote:
Company ‘C’ was the advance party and my platoon was given the point. We were on both sides of the road in the Foy area when we came upon a bunch of friendly armored vehicles withdrawing through us. We were ill-equipped and short of ammo so we asked them for weapons and ammo, which they gladly gave us. We proceeded on up to the Noville area without enemy contact.
For PFC. Robert M. Wiatt, the fighting around Bastogne would be his second combat mission with “C” Company. Near the small village of Foy, his group got some much needed ammunition. He relates:
At this point, we picked up some ammunition. We had no .45 caliber ammo, no machine gun or mortar ammo, but did have some .30 cal. rounds in clips made for the .03 rifle. It was nice to feel, again, that at least we had something to fight with.
PFC. Donald B. Straith of “A” Company was moving into his first combat action and remembered:
A jeep raced up and a crate of hand grenades was unloaded. These were distributed, one to each man, until the small supply was exhausted. Hooking mine to my belt, I listened as we were told that we would move through the town and seize the distant ridge. With that, we were up and moving again.
Though the men in his unit had weapons, there was little ammunition for them so PFC. Robert A. Flory of “B” Company was relieved when ammunition arrived in the nick of time. He relates:
We were pretty well equipped with weapons but had little or no ammo. The closer we got to Noville, the more we could hear the sounds of battle and we were wondering what we were supposed to fight with. Just short of Noville, a convoy of jeeps and 6 x 6’s showed up carrying ammo, grenades and mortar shells. We halted and rested. Colonel LaPrade, our battalion commander, had gone ahead to confer with Major Desobry, one of three team leaders from Combat Command ‘B’ of the 10th Armored Division. We drew our ammo and waited for orders. At about 1300 hours, the 3rd Platoon was ordered to advance up a hill to the west of Noville.
Medical technician Owen E. Miller had been picked up by Captain Joseph Warren, 1st Battalion surgeon and now drove Warren’s jeep. They had passed the supply trucks unloading ammunition and were now entering Noville from the south. Miller wrote:
We kept going and came to a small town. I heard loud motors. I told Captain Warren that we had better stop. He asked what for, so I kept going. Then I heard a motor in high rev behind us. It was a tank destroyer and he was really coming up quick. I had to pull over to the side of the road as he went by us. He locked his brakes and kept sliding up the road. He was just past the second house and he backed up between two houses, just as a shell hit the corner of the house where he had secreted himself. I got the jeep turned around pretty quick and came back about a hundred yards to the first house on the right side of the road. We got out and cleared the house to have it set up as an aid station.
With his company at the point of the 1st Battalion move to Noville, 1Lt. Edward Mehosky describes the arrival in the town and the positioning of the line companies:
It was still cold and gray when we arrived in Noville. No Germans were in the village. The place looked battered. The battalion commander had finished his reconnaissance and issued his orders: to effectively defend Noville, the Battalion would have to secure the high ground. ‘C’ Company was given the assignment to take a wooded ridgeline to the east of Noville. ‘B’ Company had the other side of the road and were to take the high ground to the northeast. ‘A’ Company would be in reserve. We moved out by platoons astride the Noville-Bourcy road.
As the morning fog swirled about the Noville area, lifting and again settling to the ground, the two commanders asked for artillery and smoke to conceal the moves of the paratroopers as they advanced toward the high ground which dominated the landscape north and east of town.
As the two comman
ders watched the movement of the paratroopers, the fog lifted and fell periodically. Major Desobry observed the tactics of these troops. He related:30
The paratroopers came on and, instead of going into an assembly area, went on the attack right off the approach march. They hit it just about on the nose in conjunction with the artillery preparation.
They spread out across the fields and those guys, when they attacked, did it on the dead run. None of this fooling around like you see on television—walking and so on. These guys went on the dead run. They would sprint for fifty yards, hit the ground, get up and run, on and on. Our tanks moved out with them.
It wasn’t long after replenishing their ammunition supply that the men of 1st Battalion were in combat with the enemy at Noville. 1Lt. Joe Reed was to take his platoon to high ground where he caught some careless enemy soldiers. He wrote:
As we went through Noville, I was directed to take the high ground to the right side of town. As we proceeded to do this, we came up on a bunch of Krauts sleeping in their holes. We started to pop them as we ran along the ridge. Immediately, we heard a bunch of tank motors start up just over the hill in the wooded area. From my observation, there were many, many tanks. I yelled to the guys to get off the hill and fall back to the town, which we did.
Company “B” was moving into position on the hills to the west and north on Noville. PFC. Robert Flory describes that move and subsequent action:
There was a much used cow path going up to the top of the hill. The hill top was pretty much wooded but the path we had to take was out in the open. Half way up the hill, we came under machine gun and small arms fire, but we made it to the top with very few casualties. I remember one incident that happened. We had a platoon leader, new to combat, who was not very popular with the men. 2Lt. C. A. Mitchell, who had won his battlefield commission in Holland, had always been a member of the 3rd Platoon and through some pull with Colonel Sink, stayed with his platoon as assistant platoon leader.
Battered Bastards of Bastogne Page 11