“The rods came halfway, and then stopped”: Korol, author interview, 2015.
30 percent burns: Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 51.
In their big corner apartment: Viktor and Valentina Brukhanov, author interview, 2015.
When Veniamin Prianichnikov got through: Prianichnikov, author interview, 2006.
In the small hours: Esaulov writes that the convoy arrived at Borispol at three thirty in the morning (City That Doesn’t Exist, 28–29).
“People are resting”: Handwritten log of events for April 26–27, in File on Special Measures in Pripyat Zone, Internal Affairs Department of the Kiev Oblast Party Committee, archive of Chernobyl Museum, 13.
9. SUNDAY, APRIL 27, PRIPYAT
The first of the transport helicopters: Nikolai Antoshkin, author interview, Moscow, October 2015.
Dispatched from the central command post: The expert was Colonel Anatoly Kushnin. See his account of events in Kiselyov, “Inside the Beast,” 50. Additional details: Lubomir Mimka, author interview, Kiev, February 2016.
As soon as he arrived: He reported first to Ivanov, head of civil defense, and the commander of the Soviet chemical troops Vladimir Pikalov, who finally arrived at eleven thirty on Saturday night, according to Voznyak and Troitsky, Chernobyl: It Was Like This, 214.
“We need helicopters”: Antoshkin, author interview, 2015.
Using a telephone: Ibid.; Mimka, author interview, 2016; Colonel Boris Nesterov, author interview, Dnipro, Ukraine, December 2016; Major A. Zhilin, “No such thing as someone else’s grief” [Чужого горя не бывает], Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika, no. 8 (August 1986): 10.
Inside the hotel: Prushinsky, “This Can’t Be—But It Happened,” 318.
Legasov estimated: Legasov, “My duty is to tell about this,” in Mould, Chernobyl Record, 292.
The intense heat could soon melt: Legasov Tapes, cassette One, 8.
A rate of around one tonne an hour: Legasov, “My duty is to tell about this,” in Mould, Chernobyl Record, 292; Legasov Tapes, cassette One, 8. For Legasov’s report to the Politburo about his analysis, see Maleyev, Chernobyl: Days and Years: “Meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee: Protocol No. 3” [Заседание Политбюро ЦК КПСС 5 мая 1986 года: Протокол № 3], 249–52.
The blaze could roar on for more than two months: Legasov’s guess for the total weight of graphite in Unit Four, both before and after the explosion, significantly exceeded most others. But even the lower estimates for how much graphite remained inside the core after the accident—such as the 1,500 tonnes cited by a KGB memo on May 11, 1986—made for around two months of continuous burning. See the KGB memo in Danilyuk, ed., “Chernobyl Tragedy,” Zarkhiviv, document no. 31: Special Report of the UkSSR OG KGB Chief in the Town of Chernobyl to the UkSSR KGB Chairman.
Ordinary firefighting techniques: V. Bar’yakhtar, V. Poyarkov, V. Kholosha, and N. Shteinberg, “The Accident: Chronology, Causes and Releases,” in G. J. Vargo, ed., The Chornobyl Accident: A Comprehensive Risk Assessment (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 2000), 13.
The graphite and nuclear fuel were burning: Legasov Tapes, cassette One, p. 8; Grigori Medvedev, The Truth about Chernobyl, 176; Zhores Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 43.
Colossal fields of gamma radiation: Bar’yakhtar et al., “The Accident: Chronology, Causes and Releases,” 13.
One physicist, unable to find the answer: Evgeny Ignatenko, ed., Chernobyl: Events and Lessons [Чернобыль: события и уроки] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 128.
In his office at the Kurchatov Institute: Legasov Tapes, cassette One, 9; Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 176.
Meanwhile, the team: Armen Abagyan, account in Voznyak and Troitsky, Chernobyl: It Was Like This, 220.
At 2:00 a.m., Scherbina telephoned: Vladimir Dolgikh, interview transcript, June 1990, 2RR archive file no. 1/3/5, 4. The fact that Scherbina’s mind was not yet made up at 2:30 a.m. is attested to by a senior Kiev transportation official who, at around that time, arrived near Pripyat with the column of buses and came to the White House, where he reported to Scherbina. The chairman asked him, “And who sent you?” V. M. Reva, first vice president of the Ukrainian State Automobile Transport Corporation, testimony at the 46th session of the Supreme Rada, December 11, 1991, transcript online at http://rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4642.html.
By the time the scientists finally crawled into their beds: Drach, author interview, 2017; Nesterov, author interview, 2016.
“I’ve made my decision”: Ivanov’s diary entry, reproduced in “Chernobyl, Part 3: Evacuation” [Часть 3: Эвакуация], Voennye Znaniya 40, no. 3 (1988): 38.
Ivanov gave him the radiation report: Ibid.; Leonenko, author interview, 2016. A different view is presented by Leonid Drach (author interview, 2017), who recalls that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, Pikalov was among those who told Scherbina he had no choice but to evacuate the city.
But he still held back from giving the order: According to the handwritten notes in the log kept at the Pripyat militsia headquarters, at 6:54 a.m., the first secretary of Kiev Oblast Party Committee, G. I. Revenko, reported that “the decision on evacuation will be made after 9:00 a.m.” The KGB confirmed this forecast at 7:45 a.m. Pripyat militsia, File on Special Measures in the Pripyat Zone (Chernobyl Museum), 12–13.
Soon after 8:00 a.m.: Time of the flight is given by Antoshkin in Regarding Chernobyl (unpublished memoir) as 8:12 a.m.
They were joined by Generals Pikalov and Antoshkin: Nesterov, author interview, 2016; Zhilin, “No such thing as someone else’s grief,” 10.
To even the most recalcitrant Soviet eye: Legasov Tapes, cassette One, p. 6; Mould, Chernobyl Record, 291; Margarita Legasova, Academician Valery A. Legasov, 119.
As the helicopter headed back to Pripyat: Legasov in Mould, Chernobyl Record, 290.
At ten o’clock: Vladimir Pikalov, “Interview with Commander of Chemical Troops,” interview by A. Gorokhov, Pravda (December 25, 1986), translated in JPRS, Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Documents, 92; Ivanov, “Chernobyl, Part 3: Evacuation,” 38.
At 1:10 p.m.: The time of the broadcast is given as 1:10 p.m. in Voznyak and Troitsky, Chernobyl: It Was Like This, 223. Others recall this happened on or before noon: Drach, author interview, 2017.
In a strident, confident voice: For the original text of the announcement, see Andrei Sidorchik, “Deadly Experiment. Chronology of the Chernobyl NPP Catastrophe” [Смертельный эксперимент. Хронология катастрофы на Чернобыльской АЭС], Argumenty i fakty, April 26, 2016, www.aif.ru/society/history/smertelnyy_eksperiment_hronologiya_katastrofy_na_chernobylskoy_aes. A recording of the announcement can be found at www.youtube.com/watch?v=1l3g3m8Vrgs.
Drafted that morning: Leonid Drach (author interview, 2017), said that he worked on a draft of the announcement with Nikolai Nikolayev, deputy chairman of the Ukraine Council of Ministers. Sklyarov recalls working on it as well, together with Ivan Plyushch, deputy chairman of the Kiev region ispolkom (Sklyarov, author interview, 2016).
The emergency proclamation: Esaulov, City That Doesn’t Exist, 45. Vitali Sklyarov explained that the proclamation was designed not only to preclude panic but also to discourage the citizens from filling the available transport with heavy luggage and personal possessions. Sklyarov, author interview, Kiev, February 2016.
They should close their windows: Lyubov Kovalevskaya, quoted in Shcherbak, “Report on First Anniversary of Chernobyl,” trans. JPRS, pt. 1, 41.
Earlier that morning: Natalia Yuvchenko, author interview, 2015.
Almost a month’s salary: As a schoolteacher, Natalia was earning 120 rubles a month.
On the second floor of the White House: Protsenko, author interview, 2016.
In all, there were some 51,300: These numbers are from the handwritten log of emergency response measures kept by the local militsia major general, who noted later that 47,000 people h
ad been evacuated and that up to 1,800 plant operators and 2,500 construction workers remained behind. Also staying in Pripyat were 600 to 700 staff of the Department of Internal Affairs and armed forces, in addition to city administrators and civil defense personnel (Pripyat militsia, File on Special Measures in the Pripyat Zone, April 27, 1986, 29). However, a large proportion of the population had left the city by other means long before the evacuation began, although the estimated numbers of those who did so vary considerably (see detailed note below).
To get all the families out safely: Protsenko, author interviews, 2015 and 2016; Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Report no. 287c/Gd [287с/Гд], April 27, 1986 (confidential, signed by Interior Minister Ivan Gladush), archive of the Chernobyl Museum.
At the same time, in Kiev: “Report of the Ministry of Transport of the Ukrainian SSR to the Ukraine Central Committee of the Communist Party,” April 27, 1986 (no. 382c, confidential, signed by Minister Volkov), archive of the Chernobyl Museum.
By 3:50 a.m.: Pripyat militsia, File on Special Measures in the Pripyat Zone, 10–13.
The bus stops of Kiev were crowded with frustrated passengers: Shcherbak, “Report on First Anniversary of Chernobyl,” trans. JPRS, pt. 1, 42–43.
Boiled potatoes, bread, lard: Natalia Khodemchuk, author interview, Kiev, 2017.
Despite warnings to stay inside: Anelia Perkovskaya (the secretary of the Komsomol at Pripyat gorkom), account in Shcherbak, “Report on First Anniversary of Chernobyl,” trans. JPRS, pt. 1, 40 and 43.
Some families set off: Boris Nesterov, Heaven and Earth: Memories and Reflections of a Military Pilot [Небо и земля: Воспоминания и размышления военного летчика] (Kherson, 2016), 240.
At the same time, the crews of two helicopters: Antoshkin would later insist that “bombing” of the reactor was forbidden before the evacuation was complete (author interview, 2017), but it seems likely this is wishful thinking, with the benefit of hindsight, and is contradicted by other accounts. For example, Boris Nesterov, who flew these first missions, said he began dropping material into the reactor at around 3:00 p.m. and could see the evacuation unfold from his cockpit (author interview, 2016).
The operation, approved by Boris Scherbina: A. A. Dyachenko, ed., Chernobyl. Duty and Courage [Чернобыль. Долг и мужество], vol. 1 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 2001), 233.
A complex cocktail of substances: Legasov Tapes, cassette One, 10; Shasharin, “The Chernobyl Tragedy,” 91.
Lead, in particular: Sklyarov, Chernobyl Was . . . Tomorrow, 61 and 69.
In the meantime, Scherbina sent General Antoshkin: Shasharin, testimony in Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 192; Protsenko, author interview, 2015; Mimka, author interview, 2016; Antoshkin, author interview, 2017. In the interview, Antoshkin disputed Shasharin’s suggestion that during this episode the general was filling sandbags while still wearing his full dress uniform.
The quantities required were enormous: Dyachenko, ed., Chernobyl. Duty and Courage, 234.
Eventually between 100 and 150 men and women: Mimka, author interview, 2016; Logachev, author interview, 2017.
Scherbina remained implacable: Gennadi Shasharin and Anatoly Zagats (chief engineer of Yuzhatomenergomontazh), testimonies in Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 192–93.
If he was aware of the rising level of contamination: Sklyarov, Chernobyl Was . . . Tomorrow, 52.
Early on Sunday afternoon, the first ten bags of sand: Shasharin, testimony in Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 193; Mimka, author interview, 2016; Nesterov, author interview, 2016.
There were 1,225 buses in all: Report of Ukraine Ministry of Transport of the Ukrainian SSR to the Ukraine Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on April 27, 1986 (no. 382c), archive of the Chernobyl Museum; Protsenko, author interview, 2016; Natalia Yuvchenko, author interview, 2016.
At 2:00 p.m.: The time is given as one thirty in the report of the Ministry of Transport to the Ukraine Central Committee, archive of the Chernobyl Museum; but as 2:00 p.m. in the handwritten chronology of events in the Pripyat militsia log of Chernobyl accident response measures (File on Special Measures in the Pripyat Zone, Chernobyl Museum, 29–30). A Kiev transport official who oversaw the buses also states 2:00 p.m. (Reva, testimony at the Supreme Rada, December 11, 1991).
Maria Protsenko was waiting: Protsenko, author interview, 2015.
Outside the 540 separate entrances: Ivanov, “Chernobyl. Part 3: Evacuation,” 38; Voznyak and Troitsky, Chernobyl: It Was Like This, 223.
At around 3:00 p.m., Colonel Boris Nesterov: Nesterov, author interview, 2016; Nesterov, Heaven and Earth, 236–43.
At 5:00 p.m., Maria Protsenko folded her map: Protsenko, author interview, 2015. A large number of residents left by their own means, either before learning of the accident or after. The local branch of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry estimated this number to be 8,800 people: “Situation report as of 8 p.m., April 28, 1986,” in Pripyat militsia log of Special Measures in the Pripyat Zone, Chernobyl Museum, 30. Other sources estimate this number to be as high as 20,000: Baranovska, ed., Chernobyl Tragedy, document no. 59: “Memorandum of the Department of Science and Education of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine on Immediate Measures Pertaining to the Accident at Chernobyl NPP,” April 29, 1986. This memorandum states that only 27,500 people were evacuated using buses and other transport specially provided by officials.
As the multicolored convoy of buses wound its way: Natalia Yuvchenko, author interview, 2015.
Part of the convoy was well beyond: Logachev, author interview, 2017.
One member of the power station staff: Glukhov, author interview, 2015.
Viktor Brukhanov’s wife, Valentina, wept: Viktor and Valentina Brukhanov, author interview, 2016.
The passengers whispered anxiously: Natalia Yuvchenko, author interview, 2015.
On the third floor of the White House: Protsenko, author interview, 2015.
Part 2. Death of an Empire
10. THE CLOUD
Unleashed in the violence of the explosion: World Health Organization (WHO), “Chernobyl Reactor Accident: Report of a Consultation,” Regional Office for Europe, report no. ICP/CEH 129, May 6, 1986 (provisional), 4.
The cloud carried gaseous xenon 133: Helen ApSimon and Julian Wilson, “Tracking the Cloud from Chernobyl,” New Scientist, no. 1517 (July 17, 1986): 42–43; Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 89–90.
At its heart, it pulsed: ApSimon and Wilson, “Tracking the Cloud from Chernobyl,” 45; Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 195.
By the time Soviet scientists finally began regular airborne monitoring: At this point, the cloud initially released by the explosion had already crossed into Poland and Finland: Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 195.
Within twenty-four hours: WHO, “Chernobyl Reactor Accident: Report of a Consultation,” 4.
At midday on Sunday, an automatic monitoring device: Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 196–97.
Late that night, the plume encountered rain clouds: ApSimon and Wilson, “Tracking the Cloud,” 42 and 44; Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 197.
Shortly before seven o’clock on Monday morning: Cliff Robinson, author interview by telephone, March 2016.
They were building a large underground repository: The facility was finished in 1988. See “This is where Sweden keeps its radioactive operational waste,” Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), November 2016, www.skb.com/our-operations/sfr.
The reactor was only six years old: Erik K. Stern, Crisis Decisionmaking: A Cognitive Institutional Approach (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2003), 130.
At 9:30 a.m., the plant manager, Karl Erik Sandstedt: Stern, Crisis Decisionmaking, 131–32; Nigel Hawkes et al., The Worst Accident in the World: Chernobyl, the End of the Nuclear Dream (London: William Heinemann and Pan Books, 1988), 116.
Thirty minutes later: Robins
on, author interview, 2016.
But by then, state nuclear and defense agencies: Stern, Crisis Decisionmaking, 134–36.
At around eleven in the morning Moscow time, Heydar Aliyev: Heydar Aliyev, interview transcript, 2RR archive file no. 3/1/6, 14–15.
One of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union: Aliyev headed the KGB in Azerbaijan from 1967 to 1969: “Heydar Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan” [Гейдар Алиев, президент Азербайджанской Республики], interview by Mikhail Gusman, TASS, September 26, 2011, http://tass.ru/arhiv/554855.
Authorities in Kiev, without prompting from Moscow: Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), 41–42.
Aliyev realized: Aliyev, interview transcript, 2RR, 14–15.
The dozen men: List of participants: minutes from the Politburo meeting (April 28, 1986), in Maleyev, Chernobyl. Days and Years, 241; Gorbachev’s office: Aliyev, interview transcript, 2RR, 14–15.
In spite of recent renovations: Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 162–63.
“What happened?”: Alexander Yakovlev, interview transcript, 2RR archive file no. 3/10/7, 5.
Vladimir Dolgikh, the Central Committee secretary: Dolgikh, interview transcript, 2RR archive file no. 1/3/5, 4.
He described an explosion: Working record of the April 28, 1986, Politburo meeting reproduced in Rudolf G. Pikhoya, Soviet Union: The History of Power 1945–1991 [Советский Союз: История власти. 1945–1991] (Novosibirsk: Sibirsky Khronograf, 2000), 429–30.
Information was still scant, and conflicting: Yakovlev, interview transcript, 2RR, 5. Some Party elders struggled to grasp the significance of even the few hard facts they did receive. In a copy of one of the first KGB reports on the accident delivered to the Ukrainian Central Committee in Kiev on April 28, someone underlined the recorded radiation figures and scribbled in the margin, “What does this mean?” See the second page of the document titled “On the Explosion at the NPP” [О взрыве на АЭС], April 28, 1986, archival material of the State Security Service of Ukraine, f. 16, op. 11-A [ф. 16, оп. 11-А], www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Chornobyl_30/GDA_SBU/index.php?2.
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