Stormtroopers in the Foreign Office
All five men who entered the diplomatic service from the SA were highly decorated ‘Old Fighters’. The ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in the summer of 1934 had left its scars on these SA generals – von Killinger, Kasche, Beckerle, and Ludin had only narrowly escaped the death squads – but had guaranteed their loyalty to the party and to Hitler, who could expect them to assert his interests on three fronts: against possible resistance from the professionally trained diplomats in the Foreign Office, whom the Führer (by and large needlessly) regarded with suspicion; against possible objections from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, for whom military needs were ultimately more important than ideological positions; and against the ever-growing influence of the SS.7 However, the appointment of SA diplomats was not without risk. Although all of them shared a common belief in core National Socialist values, they lacked proper diplomatic training. They formed a distinct group within the Foreign Office, supported there by a few fellow stormtroopers and committed National Socialists like Undersecretary Martin Luther, the ‘almighty man in the Foreign Office’ until his fall from grace in 1943.8 At least some career diplomats regarded their new colleagues from the SA with suspicion, as one of Beckerle’s diary entries makes plain. Several days after he arrived in Sofia, one of his assistants told him that many members of the Foreign Office in Berlin were critical of the new SA diplomats and believed them to be ‘brutal KZ-men’ with a ‘personal concentration camp’ at their disposal.9
In sharp contrast to this perception, Beckerle – who had studied economics (Volkswirtschaft), philosophy, and law in the 1920s – regarded himself as a political leader, a Führungspersönlichkeit with cultural interests and taste, and an artist.10 He used his spare time in Sofia to dry-point and to write short stories and poems.11 The pseudonym he chose for his only published book, an autobiographical travel account that recounted his adventures in South America during the 1920s, is revealing: Edelmann – a person of noble rank. This pseudonym must also have pleased the woman Beckerle married in 1935: the actress Silke Edelmann.12 Unlike Beckerle, who could only aspire to high social rank, von Jagow descended from the Prussian aristocracy and held its values in high esteem, blended together with Nazi ideology. In a letter to his son, written at the beginning of the Second World War, von Jagow reminded his five-year-old of the family’s ‘tradition of honour, loyalty, knightliness and bravery’, while also urging the boy not to be a ‘moral coward’ (Duckmäuser) and to remain faithful to the ‘National Socialist idea’ unto death.13
This group of SA diplomats in southeastern Europe was headed by the significantly older Manfred von Killinger, a former Navy lieutenant, Freikorps leader, and a leading member of the extreme right-wing paramilitary Bund Wiking who had been involved in the murder of Matthias Erzberger, the former Reich Finance Minister, in 1921. Von Killinger entered the ranks of the SA in 1928, was appointed Minister President of Saxony in May 1933, and served as German consul in San Francisco from 1937 to 1939. In 1939 and again in 1940, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, sent him on two extensive journeys through the Balkans to collect information on the activities of German institutions and organizations such as the embassies and the Sicherheitsdienst, or SD, the Security Service of the SS.14 Von Killinger was thus already a kind of ‘expert’ on southeastern Europe by the time he was appointed German ambassador to Slovakia in July 1940.15
The five SA diplomats operating in the region knew each other from their paramilitary activities in the 1920s and later repeatedly met at Nazi Party rallies, SA meetings, and training courses. Together, they formed an old boys’ network that was bound together by a common past in the Kampfzeit-era SA and an imagined bright future in a German-dominated Europe after the Second World War.16 Their correspondence and personal papers reveal that they trusted their ‘SA comrades’ more than their professionally trained colleagues in the diplomatic service. These bonds were so close that their families spent holidays together, a practice they continued even after 1945.17 At least in the initial phase of their missions, Beckerle and Kasche – whose personal papers have survived – were anxious to learn about the perspectives and aspirations of their colleagues.18 They all seemed to understand that their new positions were temporary ones, albeit further steps in their careers.
However, the level of satisfaction these men felt for their new tasks differed sharply. On 4 October 1941, Beckerle noted that Kasche had recently told him that rumours that he (Kasche) was going to be assigned to Moscow were true.19 According to Beckerle, this assignment was a matter of friction within the party: the recently appointed Reichsminister for the occupied eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg, was pressing for such a move, much to the distaste of von Ribbentrop.20 Whereas Kasche – who, as we have seen, maintained a strong interest in the colonization and ‘Germanization’ of eastern Europe – seemed to enjoy his new position in Croatia, the majority of his colleagues had some problems adapting to a life filled with representational duties and social gatherings. Dietrich von Jagow was initially ‘deeply unhappy’ about being called to the diplomatic service and apparently complained about attending meetings and ceremonies while his comrades were fighting at the front.21 Hanns Ludin in Bratislava was rumoured to join the German forces at the eastern front on his holidays, a rumour, however, that cannot be verified and seems unlikely to be true.22
Fighting behind the Scenes
There has been some speculation as to why these men from the ‘uncompromising generation’, who glorified the ideal of the strong German fighter and believed in the power of physical violence as well as rhetoric, were appointed to these diplomatic posts during the first years of the war.23 While the existing documents indicate that the reasons for these appointments were primarily political, they contain few details about the key players in, or the overall strategy of, this decision. One reason for the promotion of high-ranking SA generals to ambassadorial posts was certainly to counter the influence of the increasingly powerful SS and SD. In a letter to Himmler from 17 April 1941, Gottlob Berger, the head of the SS main office, complained about a veritable ‘fight against the SS’ within the Foreign Office and identified Undersecretary Luther as the main adversary. By exclusively appointing SA-Obergruppenführer to posts in southeastern Europe, Berger claimed, Luther was attempting to ‘prove his loyalty to the party’ and ‘assure himself of the powerful protection of the SA and thereby the Wehrmacht’.24 According to information from a ‘credible source’, Berger claimed that von Jagow was slated for Budapest, Kasche for Agram/Zagreb, and Beckerle for Sofia. All these predictions proved correct. The only exception was Fritz von Twardowsky, who since 1939 had served as director of the Cultural Department (Kulturabteilung) in the Foreign Office. Von Twardowsky was originally slated for Belgrade but ended up as consul general in Istanbul in 1943.25
A second letter from Berger to Himmler nine days later, on 26 April 1941, contained additional information on the appointment of the SA generals. Berger reported that Hitler had recently conferred with SA Chief of Staff Lutze for over an hour, and that afterward Lutze and von Ribbentrop had spoken for ninety minutes.26 In the course of this conversation Lutze allegedly offered his best men to von Ribbentrop, assuring him that the SA leadership would abstain from any direct interference with the Foreign Ministry once these appointments were made.27 From Lutze’s point of view, this was not an altruistic offer, but an attempt to bring the SA back into the front row of wartime politics, if only through the back door. Its motive was to reaffirm the important role of SA leaders in the colonization and ‘Germanization’ of eastern Europe, in competition with Himmler’s SS.28 This insertion of the SA in ‘his’ affairs infuriated the Reichsführer-SS. In early 1943 he lost his temper when the name Kasche was mentioned and insulted him as an ‘enemy of the Reich’ whom he would ‘smash’.29
The documents also make clear that the appointments of SA generals to diplomatic posts must be seen against the background of the radicalizat
ion of German foreign policy during the Second World War and the implementation of the so-called Generalplan Ost. A memorandum of a meeting between Hitler, Rosenberg, Göring, and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel at the Führer’s headquarters on 16 July 1941 provides some insight into the political motives as well as problems of these appointments.30 Hitler explained that the approach toward eastern Europe was a matter ‘of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to exploit it.’31 Detailed plans of which territories should be annexed to the Reich and who should govern those areas only temporarily occupied by the Wehrmacht were made. Rosenberg supported Lutze’s idea of appointing high-ranking SA leaders as Reichskommissare, or governors. Apart from the names already mentioned, those present discussed the possible assignment of Wilhelm Schepmann to Kiev; Arno Manthey, Heinrich Bennecke, and Karl-Siegmund Litzmann to Estonia; and Otto-Heinrich Drechsler to Latvia.32 Furthermore, Rosenberg informed Hitler that he had received a letter from von Ribbentrop asking for active participation of the Foreign Office in the territories under discussion. Rosenberg, however, took a different view, arguing that ‘the internal organization of the newly acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Ministry’. According to the memorandum, Hitler ‘absolutely’ shared this view and likewise voiced no objections to the employment of SA leaders in a diplomatic capacity.33
A short essay written in the autumn of 1941 by a certain Dr Otto from Budapest, and sent to the OSAF for publication, contains further information on the appointment of SA generals as diplomats. Entitled SA-Obergruppenführer und Diplomat, it set out to present the recent appointments of SA generals to the diplomatic service as the latest step in a policy that Otto von Bismarck had begun in the second half of the nineteenth century. Based on the assumption that ‘the true National Socialists of all peoples’ would respect each other ‘as National Socialists’, the appointment of the SA generals as diplomats was, Dr Otto argued, a clear sign of paradigmatic change. From now on, diplomats would no longer act on the interests of states, but would work to further the interests of peoples. Particularly in southeastern Europe, with its many German allies, Dr Otto argued, a process had begun in which Western role models would be replaced by a ‘realistic understanding of life [wirklichkeitsnahe Lebensauffassung]’, according to which the legitimate interests of peoples would be more important than legal claims for territory and state sovereignty: ‘The reactionary tricky diplomacy [Winkeldiplomatie] of the cabinets is wiped out. The clear, honest and generous diplomacy of the peoples, of their delegated political soldiers, is at work, to serve the vital needs of the peoples and Europe’s destiny as honest brokers faithful to Bismarck’s legacy.’34 Whether the governments of southeastern Europe would understand such reasoning as a promise or a threat is hard to determine. The Foreign Office in Berlin feared the latter and prevented the publication of the essay, arguing that although its reflections were essentially correct, a public discussion of the points raised would not be in the German interest ‘for the time being’, especially as its ally Italy might reap some unwelcome consequences.35
Within this context the role of the SA diplomats in southeastern Europe now begins to take shape. They are best understood not as envoys in the traditional sense, but as designated German governors or future Reichskommissare, who, for the time being and because of diplomatic considerations, officially acted as ambassadors.36 Hitler made it clear that although it would be best at present to convey the impression of exercising a temporary mandate only, Germany would ‘never withdraw’ from the occupied areas of eastern Europe.37 Against this background, one particular detail in the biographies of Beckerle, Ludin, von Killinger, and von Jagow merits closer attention: all had held leading positions in the police of the Third Reich. Beckerle had served as police president in Frankfurt an Main from September 1933 to 1939, and as temporary head of police in the Polish city of Łódź after the German occupation in the autumn of 1939; Ludin as acting police president of Karlsruhe in February and March 1933; and von Killinger and von Jagow as Reichskommissare in Saxony and Württemberg respectively.38 In these roles they had actively contributed to the establishment of the Third Reich by intimidating and incarcerating political rivals of the NSDAP. They had also been complicit in the imprisonment and murder of alleged opponents of the Third Reich during these years, as well as the concealment of these crimes.39
In other words these SA generals might not have been the best diplomats available, but they were experienced and ideologically loyal activists, accustomed to the use of violence for political and personal means. Their big moment was yet to come, or so they thought. Once the war was over these men expected to rule over large parts of southeastern Europe and help establish German supremacy in the Balkans and Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the meantime, as the war continued, their principal task was to push through Hitler’s agenda in close cooperation with the existing national governments and to ensure that the Wehrmacht’s needs did not take precedence over the long-term political goals of the regime.
In everyday politics the influence of these SA diplomats was nevertheless limited, with notable exceptions. The most prominent and at the same time most controversial example of their influence is their contribution to the murder of European Jewry. Although SS, SD, police, and Wehrmacht units organized the deportations and committed the actual murders of the Jews, often in collaboration with local forces, the SA diplomats actively supported the Holocaust by pressuring the local governments to cooperate with Berlin. In Hitler’s words, the envoys were ‘experienced experts’ of whom he expected support for National Socialist attempts to deal effectively with the ‘Jewish question’ in their respective regions.40 The ‘achievements’ of these individuals, however, differed greatly as a result of their diverse local circumstances. The following section aims to elucidate the role of these SA diplomats in the implementation of the Holocaust in southeastern Europe, a topic that is usually passed over in the otherwise excellent and detailed literature on the murder of European Jewry in the region.41
Organizing the Holocaust in Slovakia
In Slovakia, where von Killinger served as envoy in the second half of 1940, followed by Ludin in January 1941, the task was comparatively easy. Although recent studies have argued that Slovakia, after its declaration of national independence from the Czechs on 14 March 1939, pursued a more independent policy toward the Third Reich than was previously claimed,42 it must be emphasized that the new Slovak Republic had extremely close ties to Germany and was dependent on the Third Reich militarily and economically. However, it is also important to note that Slovakia had implemented its own laws to marginalize its Jewish population politically, economically, and legally before von Killinger and Ludin were appointed to their posts.43 The main task of the two envoys was therefore to exploit these ‘home-grown antisemitic policies’ for the benefit of the Nazi regime’s ultimate goal.44 As became clear to those involved in high-level bi-national talks over the course of 1941 and 1942, this was the notorious ‘final solution’, the murder of all European Jews.45
To understand Ludin’s role in Bratislava, some background information on Slovakia’s policies on the ‘Jewish question’ is needed here, particularly as the Germans initially cooperated closely with the Slovakian government. It was not until relatively late, beginning in the summer months of 1942, that the Slovakian government distanced itself from the Nazis’ attempt to murder all the country’s Jews, but by this time the vast majority had already been deported and killed, and their property confiscated by the state or simply looted. In his defence the former Slovakian head of state, the Catholic priest-turned-politician Jozef Tiso, reasoned after the war that the Slovakian government had ‘tried to solve the Jewish question’ in order to prevent a German occupation in the autumn of 1938.46 In contrast to more radical Fascist attempts by the Foreign Minister, Vojtech Tuka, and by the Interior Minister and leader of the Hlinka guards, Alexander Mach, to inc
arcerate and deport thousands of (male) Slovakian Jews, Tiso claimed to have favoured a more ‘conservative’ solution that would have reduced the impact of the Jews on the Slovakian economy (down to 4 per cent of the overall economy, in line with their numbers in the overall population) but would not have completely removed them from public life.47 After the Slovakian government issued anti-Jewish legislation targeting non-Slovakian Jews in February 1939, Tiso assured a Jewish telegraph agency reporter that the Slovakian government supported Jewish emigration to Palestine.48
With the beginning of the war, however, emigration was no longer a viable option, and the legal exclusion and deportation of Slovakian Jews, as well as the plundering of their property, increased dramatically, tolerated and in many cases even encouraged by the Tiso government. The situation resembled that which had occurred in Austria after the Anschluss: privately owned Jewish properties, bank accounts, and businesses were strictly regulated or taxed at high rates. After the establishment of the Central Economic Office (CEO) in August 1940, Jewish businesses were increasingly ‘Slovakized’, with the effect that by the end of 1941, 84 per cent of all Jewish businesses had been liquidated. The Jewish population, forced to wear the Star of David starting on 22 September 1941, quickly fell into poverty.49 This process of political marginalization and social exclusion led to numerous attacks on Jews that ranged from blackmailing, looting, and beatings to outright murder. In one of these incidents, several elderly Jews were burned alive in 1940, after being forced to leave their Jewish retirement home in Bratislava and transported to barracks in the former Patrobka cartridge factory that was subsequently set on fire.50
Stormtroopers: A New History of Hitler's Brownshirts Page 42