by Ian Kershaw
With the invasion of Russia in the autumn of 1940, as initially proposed by Hitler, excluded on practical grounds by Jodl, other ways of retaining the strategic initiative had to be sought. Hitler was open to a number of suggestions. Ribbentrop was able to resurrect the idea he had promoted before the war, of an anti-British bloc of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The new situation in the wake of the German victories in western Europe now also offered the prospect of extending the anti-British front through gaining the active cooperation of Spain and Vichy France in the Mediterranean zone, together with a number of satellite states in south-eastern Europe.256 For Japan, the overrunning of the Netherlands and defeat of France, together with the serious weakening of Britain, offered a clear invitation to imperialist expansion in south-eastern Asia. The Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China provided irresistible temptation, with the lure of the British possessions – including Singapore, British Borneo, Burma, and beyond that India itself – as an eventual further prize. Japan’s interests in expanding to the south made her willing now to ease the long-standing tensions in relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Japan was keen to improve relations with Germany, soured since the Hitler-Stalin Pact, in order to have a free hand in south-eastern Asia, unimpeded by potential German ambitions towards Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. Already in May, Ribbentrop assured the Japanese of Germany’s lack of interest in these territories. Hitler at this time opposed any formal alliance with Japan, or granting of a free hand in south-eastern Asia. Only in late summer, persuaded that Britain would not accept his ‘offer’, and concerned that America could soon enter the war (a step appearing closer since the news of the destroyer deal with Britain), did Hitler reverse this position.257 The negotiations that began in late August led to the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940, under which Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to assist each other in the event of one of the signatories being attacked by an external power not involved in the European or Sino-Japanese conflicts – meaning, of course, the United States.258
Raeder, too, was able to take advantage of Hitler’s uncertainty in the late summer and autumn of 1940. In September the Commander-in-Chief of the navy put forward two memoranda strongly advocating a strategy directed at destroying Britain’s strength in the Mediterranean and Near East. Raeder’s aim was transparent enough: he wanted the bigger, more powerful navy that such a strategy would demand. For Hitler, the frontal assault on British possessions, providing the basis for further attacks on the British Empire, amounted to a reversal of his own long-held strategy.259 Even so, keeping his options open for the time being on the best way to eliminate Britain from the war and deter the Americans from entering the conflict, Hitler was not discouraging to Raeder’s ambitious proposal – aimed squarely against Great Britain – to seize control (with Spanish assistance) of Gibraltar and then the Suez Canal, before pushing through Palestine and Syria to the Turkish border. Bases in Dakar, Casablanca, and the Azores would strengthen Germany’s hand in the Atlantic. Dominance of the Mediterranean would, in Raeder’s grandiose vision, rob the British of their key strategic centre and force them out of the Near East. At the same time, it would secure Italian sway in East Africa (allowing Italy to fight at sea in the Indian Ocean), and block the possibility of the Americans acquiring bases in North-West Africa prior to entering the war. With Britain by this time compelled to sue for terms, Germany would be in such a strong position that she would have nothing to fear from the USA. Raeder even pandered to what he evidently knew to be Hitler’s instinctive predilection for an attack on the Soviet Union. With Turkey ‘in our power’, the threat of the Soviet Union would be diminished. It would be ‘questionable whether then moving against the Russians from the north would still be necessary’, he concluded.260
Hitler did not demur. He remarked that after the conclusion of the alliance with Japan he wanted to carry out talks with Mussolini and perhaps with Franco before deciding whether it was more advantageous to work with France or Spain. He thought it more likely that the choice would fall on France, since Spain would demand a good deal, notably French Morocco, but offer little.261 So it proved.
Franco had opportunistically looked to join the Axis in mid-June, counting on spoils in a war about to be won (as it seemed). He wanted Gibraltar, French Morocco, and Oran, the former Spanish province currently in French Algeria. There was at the time every reason for Hitler to avoid acting on proposals that could have jeopardized the armistice. In September, a diplomatic balancing-act to ensure the support for the Mediterranean strategy of France, Spain, and Italy now appeared desirable and timely. Ribbentrop and Ramon Serrano Suñer, Franco’s brother-in-law and personal emissary, soon to be the Spanish Foreign Minister, met in Berlin on 16 September. Serrano, pro-Axis but a proud nationalist and pedantic lawyer as well as a devout Catholic, detested Ribbentrop, tactless and arrogant as usual, from the moment he saw him. Serrano rejected the request for the grant of one of the Canary isles as a German base, was non-committal about further proposals, and repeated Franco’s shopping-list of demands made the previous June. Hitler was prepared to grant French Morocco if Germany could have bases and mining rights in the colony. Franco was having none of that. Serrano repeated the high Spanish price for entering the war. All that was forthcoming was an offer by Franco to meet Hitler on the Spanish border in October.262
Before that, on 4 October, Hitler met Mussolini again – as in March, at the Brenner. Ribbentrop, feeling unwell and uncharacteristically quiet, and Ciano were also present. Hitler attributed the British prolongation of the war, despite extensive German bombing, to the hope of American intervention and Russian aid. He thought the Tripartite Pact had reduced the risk of the former, and that the German troops moved to the eastern border were a deterrent to Stalin. Hitler raised the question of Spanish intervention, outlining Franco’s demands. He indicated Germany’s need for a base in Morocco, before attaining her own colonies in western Africa. Conceding the territorial demands of Franco (apart from Gibraltar), he went on, might provoke English occupation of the Canaries and the adhesion of North Africa to the Gaullist movement. Natural enemy of the Axis though she was, he did not rule out the possibility of gaining France for the anti-British coalition. Mussolini agreed on the stance to be taken towards Spain, reaffirming Italian demands of France to cede Nice, Corsica, Tunis, and Djibouti – claims in effect placed in cold storage at the armistice.263 Ciano drew the conclusions from the meeting that the proposed landing in Britain would not take place, that the aim was now to win over France to the anti-British coalition, since Britain was proving more difficult to defeat than anticipated, and that the Mediterranean sector had, to Italy’s advantage, won greater significance. Hitler, in Ciano’s view, had also shown himself once more extremely anti-Bolshevik.264
The meeting had been cordial. But eight days later Mussolini’s patience was stretched once more when he heard, without prior warning, that a German military commission had been dispatched to Bucharest and that the Germans were taking over the defence of the Romanian oil-fields. Mussolini’s retaliation was to order the invasion of Greece for the end of the month, to present Hitler this time with a fait accompli.165 Hitler had warned against such a venture on numerous occasions.266
On 20 October Hitler, accompanied by Ribbentrop, set out in his Special Train for southern France, bound first of all for a meeting, two days later, with Pierre Laval, Pétain’s deputy and foreign minister in the Vichy regime. This proved encouraging. Laval, full of unctuous humility, opened up the prospect of close French collaboration with Germany, hoping for France’s reward through retention of its African possessions and release from heavy reparations – both at the expense of Great Britain – once a peace-settlement could be concluded. Hitler did not seek firm details. Leaving no doubt that some African possessions would fall to Germany after the war, he was content to offer the inducement that the ease of terms for France would depend on the extent of French cooperation and rapidity with wh
ich the defeat of Britain could be attained. He extended an invitation to talks to Marshal Pétain, which Laval swiftly agreed to arrange.267
Hitler’s train travelled on to Hendaye, on the Spanish border, for the meeting with the Caudillo on the 23rd. From Hitler’s point of view, the meeting was purely exploratory. The next day, as arranged with Laval, he would be talking with Pétain in the same vein. The repulsing by Vichy forces of a British-Gaullist landing at Dakar, the French West African port, a month earlier, and attempt to seize West Africa encouraged the already existing inclination of Hitler and Ribbentrop towards France over Spain if the respective interests of the two could not be reconciled.268 Hitler knew that his military chiefs were opposed to attempts to bring Spain into the war, and that Weizsäcker had also strongly advised that there was ‘no practical worth’ in Spain joining the Axis.269 From Franco’s angle, the aim was not to keep Spain out of the war but to make maximum gains from her entry.270
The meeting at the border station in Hendaye began behind schedule. Franco’s rickety train, despite travelling only a short distance, was late arriving.271 While they waited, Hitler and Ribbentrop walked up and down the platform, talking about how to handle the meeting. Hitler said he was unwilling to put in writing any territorial concessions to the Spaniards from French possessions. Given ‘Latin garrulousness’ the French would be sure to hear of them. In any case, went on Hitler, he could not expect the French to give up any of their possessions to the Spaniards, quite apart from the fact that the French Empire would then go over en bloc to General Charles de Gaulle (the leader of ‘Free France’, exiled in London), when the next day he was going to attempt to persuade Pétain to commit the French to active involvement in the conflict with Britain.272 This meant, in effect, that Hitler had little or nothing to offer Franco, who wanted a great deal. The contours were set for the difficult meeting to follow.
It took place in the salon of Hitler’s train.273 Franco – little, fat, swarthy in complexion, his droning sing-song voice reminiscent, it was later said, of that of an Islamic prayer-caller – opened by stating his pleasure at the opportunity to meet the Führer and thanked him for all that Germany had done for Spain. Close bonds between the countries had been established during the Civil War, and he hoped they would continue. Spain would gladly fight on the side of Germany during the current war. However, the economic difficulties of the country ruled this out. Unmistakably and disappointingly to Spanish ears, however, Hitler spent much of his rambling address dampening down any hopes Franco might have had of major territorial gains at minimal cost. He began by outlining German military strength. He then pointed to the major problem: the danger of the French colonies going over to de Gaulle and the Allies and of Britain and America occupying the Atlantic islands – the Azores and Canaries – off the African coast. It was necessary, he continued, to bring the war to a speedy end. As long as the fight against Britain went on, Germany needed France as a base and to take up a clear position against England. His wish, Hitler said, was to construct ‘a very big front against England’. But ‘Spanish wishes and French hopes were hindrances’ to this. He then went on – doubtless to Franco’s irritation – largely to talk of his interest in reaching an arrangement with the French. He was prepared to offer France favourable terms and compensate her in a final peace settlement for territorial losses in Africa in return for support to bring the war to a speedy end. It became ever plainer, however, that he had little concrete to offer Spain. He proposed an alliance, with Spanish entry into the war in January 1941, to be rewarded by Gibraltar. But it was evident that none of the colonial territory in north Africa, coveted by Franco, was earmarked for Spain in Hitler’s thinking.274 The Spanish dictator said nothing for a while. Then he unfolded his list of exorbitant demands for foodstuffs and armaments. He added for good measure that in his view the German expectations of an early end to the war – Hitler had begun by claiming that militarily the war was as good as won – were exaggerated, and that the British government and fleet, backed by the USA, would continue the conflict from Canada. At one point, Hitler’s irritation was so great that he got up from the table, stating that there was no point in continuing. But he calmed down and carried on. The talks produced, however, no more than an empty agreement, leaving the Spanish to decide when, if ever, they would join the Axis. Hitler was heard to mutter, as he left the meeting: ‘There’s nothing to be done with this chap (Mit diesem Kerle ist nichts zu machen.)’275 Franco’s comment to his foreign minister was: ‘These people are intolerable. They want us to come into the war in exchange for nothing.’276
Ribbentrop was in a rage at the ‘ungrateful coward Franco’ when he flew the next day to Bordeaux, en route to the meeting with Pétain.277 At Florence a few days later, Hitler told Mussolini that he ‘would prefer to have three or four teeth taken out’ than go through another nine hours’ discussion with Franco – ‘a brave spirit’, he said, but not cut out to be a politician or organizer.278 More privately, he raged about ‘Jesuit swine’ and ‘misplaced Spanish pride’.279
The discussions with Pétain and Laval in Montoire on 24 October were no more fruitful. After the opening diplomatic niceties, Hitler, as he had done with Franco, underlined German military strength, the weakness of Britain’s position, and his keenness to bring the war to an early end. He sought France’s cooperation in the ‘community’ of countries he was in the process of organizing against Britain. The aged leader of Vichy France was non-committal and unspecific. He assured Hitler that everything would be done to sustain the security of French colonial territories in Africa (following the attempt on Dakar). He could confirm the principle of French collaboration with Germany, which Laval had agreed at his meeting with Hitler two days earlier, but could not enter into detail and needed to consult his government before undertaking a binding arrangement. Laval added that Pétain would need to summon the National Assembly – something he would be loath to do – before any declaration of war on Britain. Both Pétain and Laval hinted that the extent of French cooperation hinged on generous treatment by Germany and the acquisition of colonial territory after a final peace. Hitler had offered Pétain nothing specific. He had in return received no precise assurances of active French support, either in the fight against Britain or in steps to regain the territory lost in French Equatorial Africa to the ‘Free French’ of de Gaulle, allied with Britain.280 The outcome was therefore inconsequential.281
Hitler professed himself content at the end of the meeting, and afterwards said he had been impressed by Pétain.282 But coming on top of the strained discussion with Franco, and the greater significance thus falling on France’s role in the Mediterranean, it was not surprising that Hitler and Ribbentrop travelled back to Germany with a sense of disappointment at the hesitancy of the French.283 It was a slow journey, during which Hitler, dispirited and convinced that his initial instincts had been right, told Keitel and Jodl that he wanted to move against Russia during the summer of 1941.284
On crossing the German border Hitler received news that did nothing to improve his mood. He was informed that the Italians were about to invade Greece. He was furious at the stupidity of such a military action to take place in the autumn rains and winter snows of the Balkan hills.285
However, during the meeting of the two dictators and their foreign ministers in Florence on 28 October – essentially a report on the negotiations with Franco and Pétain – Hitler contained his feelings about the Italian Greek adventure, and the meeting passed in harmony.286 Hitler spoke of the mutual distrust between himself and Stalin. However, he said, Molotov would shortly be coming to Berlin. (Ribbentrop had earlier that month persuaded Hitler to invite the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs for talks.) It was his intention, he added, to steer Russian energies towards India. This remarkable idea was Ribbentrop’s – part of his scheme to establish spheres of influence for Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia (the powers forming his intended European-Asiatic Bloc to ‘stretch from Japan to Spain’).287 It was an ide
a with a very short lifetime.
Briefing his military leaders in early November on his negotiations with Franco and Pétain, Hitler had referred to Russia as ‘the entire problem of Europe’ and said ‘everything must be done to be ready for the great showdown’. But the meeting with his top brass showed that decisions on the prosecution of the war, whether it should be in the east or the west, were still open. Hitler had seemed to his army adjutant Major Engel, attending the meeting, ‘visibly depressed’, conveying the ‘impression that at the moment he does not know how things should proceed’.288 Molotov’s visit in all probability finally convinced Hitler that the only way forward left to him was the one which he had, since the summer, come to favour on strategic grounds, and to which he was in any case ideologically inclined: an attack on the Soviet Union.
Relations with the Soviet Union were already deteriorating seriously by the time Molotov had been invited to Berlin. Soviet designs on parts of Romania (which had been forced earlier in the summer to cede Bessarabia and northern Bukowina) and on Finland (effectively a Soviet satellite following defeat in the recent war) had prompted direct German involvement in these areas. Anxious about the Ploesti oilfields, Hitler had agreed in September to Marshal Antonescu’s request to send a German military mission comprising a number of armoured divisions and air-force units to Romania, on the face of it to reorganize the Romanian army. Russian protests that the German guarantees of Romania’s frontiers violated the 1939 pact were dismissed. In late November Romania came fully within the German orbit when she joined the Tripartite Pact. The German stance on Finland had altered at the end of July – the time that an attack on the Soviet Union had first been mooted. Arms deliveries were made and agreements allowing German troops passage to Norway were signed, again despite Soviet protests. Meanwhile, the number of German divisions on the eastern front had been increased to counter the military build-up along the southern borders of the Soviet Union.289