by Ian Kershaw
68. TBJG, II/11, 397–8 (4 March 1944).
69. The amphibious landing had taken the German forces by surprise. But the Allied commanders had not seized the opportunity to advance, and the consolidation of their position allowed Kesselring time to marshal no fewer than six divisions to surround the Allied perimeter. Heavy fighting continued throughout February, and it was spring before the Allies, by now heavily reinforced, were able to break out. Allied losses totalled over 80,000 men (with some 7,000 killed); German losses were estimated at 40,000 (including around 5,000 killed). (Churchill, V. ch. xxvii; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 188–91; Weinberg III, 661; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 231; Oxford Companion, 45–6.)
70. TBJG, II/11, 399–400 (4 March 1944).
71. TBJG, II/11, 400 (4 March 1944).
72. TBJG, II/11, 401 (4 March 1944).
73. TBJG, II/11, 403 (4 March 1944).
74. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 248–9; Bloch, 398–9; Weinberg III, 671–2; Irving, HW, 611.
75. Warlimont, 412; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249; Irving, HW, 611.
76. Schmidt, 587.
77. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249. When they met again on 23 March, Hitler told Antonescu – something the Romanian leader had long been waiting to hear – that Germany was renouncing its commitment to the territorial settlement of 30 August 1940 on account of Hungary’s disloyalty, but requested him to keep this confidential for the time being. The announcement of this step which Hitler promised Antonescu never materialized (Staatsmänner II, 391–2).
78. Warlimont, 413.
79. Bloch, 399.
80. Schmidt, 587–8.
81. Domarus, 2091; also IfZ, ZS Eichmann 807, Fol.2703 (Eichmann-Prozeß, Beweisdokumente: Horthys Aussage am 4.März 1948 über Treffen mit Hitler in Klessheim).
82. Schmidt, 587–9; also Irving, HW, 612–13; Bloch, 399–400.
83. When speaking to his party leaders on 17 April, Hitler told them that raw materials and manpower would be available from Hungary. ‘In particular,’ noted Goebbels, ‘he wants to put the 700,000 Jews in Hungary to activity useful for our war purposes’ (TBJG, II/12, 137 (18 April 1944)). Even before his party leaders, Hitler held to the fiction that the Jews were being put to work (though the wording, as Goebbels reported it, was ambiguous). In fact, more than half of them were deported within three months to Auschwitz.
84. Longerich, Ermordung, 322 – 4.
85. Randolph L. Braham, The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. A Documentary Account, New York, 1963, vol.I, 399 (facsm., 13 June 1944).
86. Hilberg, Destruction, 547. And see Staatsmänner II, 462–6, for Hitler’s comments to the new Hungarian premier Sztojay at Klessheim on 7 June 1944.
87. Goebbels (TBJG, II/11, 515 (20 March 1944)), recorded the meeting taking place at Klessheim, but Manstein (531, 533), who was present, wrote of being summoned to the Obersalzberg, and the meeting taking place there.
88. TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944), 454–5 (11 March 1944); II/12, 128 (18 April 1944).
89. See above, note 22.
90. Manstein, 532. Hitler had been particularly pleased that Manstein, his most openly critical field-marshal, had signed the declaration (TBJG, II/11, 475 (14 March 1944)).
91. Manstein, 532; TBJG, II/11, 515 (20 March 1944).
92. Manstein, 536–43. Goebbels, when he heard about it, was dismayed at the weakening of the western front. So, he had heard, was Jodl. According to his own remarkable logic, the more the Soviets advanced, the better the German political situation would be, since the western allies would then see their own peril from Bolshevik expansion. Should, however, a western invasion succeed, then the Reich would indeed be in a ‘fateful situation’ (TBJG, II/11, 568–9 (28 March 1944). See also 556–7 (26 March 1944) and 564 (27 March 1944) for Goebbels’s strong criticism of Manstein then, typically, acceptance of Hitler’s volte-face.)
93. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 250.
94. Manstein, 544.
95. TBJG, II/11, 589 (31 March 1944), II/12, 33 (1 April 1944); Manstein, 544–6. The passage in Tb Reuth, v.2030–1 (31 March 1944), deviates from the entries in TBJG.
96. Weisungen, 289.
97. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 251–2.
98. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 194.
99. TBJG, II/12, 128 (18 April 1944); Irving, HW, 624.
100. TBJG, II/12, 129–30 (18 April 1944).
101. TBJG, II/11, 472 (14 March 1944).
102. Domarus, 2090; TBJG, II/11, 456 (11 March 1944).
103. TBJG, II/12, 132 (18 April 1944).
104. TBJG, II/12, 134–40 (here, 136).
105. TBJG, II/12, 126 (18 April 1944), for Goebbels’s reporting to him on poor mood.
106. TBJG, II/12, 155 (20 April 1944).
107. TBJG, II/12, 167 (22 April 1944).
108. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 214.
109. VB (Süddeutsche Ausgabe), 20 April 1944, printed in Hans Mommsen and Susanne Willems (eds.), Herrschaftsalltag im Dritten Reich: Studien und Texte, Düsseldorf, 1988, 88–9: ‘Niemals hat das deutsche Volk so gläubig zu seinem Führer aufgeschaut wie in den Tagen und Stunden, da ihm die ganze Schwere dieses Kampfes um unser Leben bewußt wurde…’
110. Below, 367; TBJG, II/12, 160 (21 April 1944); Irving, HW, 619.
111. Below, 367–8; TBJG, II/12, 168 (22 April 1944), 191 (27 April 1944), 194–5 (27 April 1944); Domarus, 2099.
112. Staatsmänner II, 418ff.; trans. N & P, iii.868.
113. Speer, 336–47; Sereny, Speer, 409–28.
114. Speer, 344.
115. Speer, 347–8.
116. Speer, 348–54; also Below, 368–9; and Sereny, Speer, 428–30; Fest, Speer, 282–9.
117. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944 (copy of Göring’s comments on the need to increase bomber production, at a meeting on 23 May 1944 on the Obersalzberg, attended by Speer, Milch, Koller, and others); Irving, HW, 626–8.
118. Irving, HW, 580; Irving, Göring, 410–11; Carr, Hitler, 80.
119. Speer, 372–3.
120. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944: former Major-General Galland’s post-war testimony at Hitler’s explosion on learning that the Me262, despite Messerschmitt’s promise (as he saw it) was being produced as a fighter. For Göring’s anger – reflecting Hitler’s anger with him – at his advisers at Messerschmitt for what he took to be misleading advice (also from Messerschmitt himself to Hitler) on the practicality of producing the jet-bomber, see IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, ‘Stenographische Niederschrift über die Besprechung beim Reichsmarschall am 24.Mai 1944’, 1–4. The file also contains a copy (from BA, NS6/152) of a note for Bormann of 21 October 1944, relating to Hitler’s commission in the previous October to develop the Me262 as a bomber and his expectation that it would be used to repulse an invasion in the west. The note stated: ‘On account of the failure of the Luftwaffe, the type Me262, now developed as a bomber, was not ready on time.’ (‘Infolge Versagens der Luftwaffe wurde der nunmebr als Bomber entwickelte Typ Me 262 nicht recbtzeitig fertig’). Also in the file are extracts from a further meeting on construction of the Me262 on 25 May. See also Below, 370–71; Irving, HW, 628–30.
121. Speer, 357–60. Hitler agreed to the transfer on 4 June.
122. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944’, Militargescbicbtlicbe Mitteilungen, 2 (1976), 123–70, here 134.
123. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 135, 167 n.74; IfZ, MA–316, Bl.2614608–46, Rede des Reichsführers-SS am 24.5.44 in Sonthofen vor den Teilnehmern des politisch-weltanschaulichen Lehrgangs (Generale), quotation Bl.2614639 (and printed in Himmler: Geheimreden, 203): ‘Eine andere Frage, die maßgeblich für die innere Sicberbeit des Reiches und Europa war, ist die Judenfrage gewesen. Sie wurde nach Befehl und standesmäßiger Erkenntnis kompromißlos gelöst.’
124. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 136.
125. Wil
helm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 146–7.
126. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 155.
127. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 156; see also 168 n.77. See also Wilhelm, ‘Wie geheim war die “Endlösung”?’, 131–48, here 134–6.
128. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 157.
129. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 161.
130. Below, 370; Speer, 359; Monologe, 406–12. Goebbels remarked, after discussions with Albert Bormann on arrival at the Berghof on 5 June: ‘Up here only the top leadership notices something of the war; the middle and lower leadership are rather apathetic towards it’ (TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944)).
131. TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944); Below, 372.
132. TBJG, 11/12, 408 (6 June 1944).
133. Weisungen, 291–2.
134. TBJG, 11/12, 407 (6 June 1944).
135. Speer, 363–4; TBJG, II/12, 407 (6 June 1944).
136. Below, 373.
137. TBJG, 11/12, 410, 413 (6 June 1944).
138. TBJG, 11/12, 414–15 (6 June 1944); and see Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen. Der Oberbefehlshaber west und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion, Stuttgart, 1982, 101–2.
139. Irving, HW, 884. According to the KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 7, the sighting of around 100 warships west of Le Havre and in the Barfleur area offered final confirmation, at 6.42a.m., that it was the beginning of the invasion.
140. German intelligence failed miserably in the build-up to the landing. Later analysis suggested that about four-fifths of reports on the coming invasion from Abwehr agents, received before 6 June, were inaccurate. The OKW seems, in addition, to have been dismissive of reports reaching it at the beginning of June and indicating an imminent invasion. (See Irving, HW, 884, and IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, for cables of 2–3 June 1944 from the SD warning of imminent invasion on the basis of detected coded radio messages to French resistance groups.)
141. Weinberg III, 686.
142. Weinberg III, 688.
143. Irving, HW, 638, 883–4. Rundstedt had requested the release ‘for all eventualities (für alle Fälle)’ of the two reserve divisions based between the Loire and Seine at 4.45a.m. (KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 4. See also KTB OKW, iv.i, 311–12.)
144. Speer, 364–5.
145. This was only partially accurate. It had, in fact, been Rommel who had placed greatest stress on the possibility of a landing in Normandy, whereas Hitler, while not excluding this, had been more inclined to follow Rundstedt in presuming the landing would take place in the Pas de Calais, at the shortest sea-crossing over the Straits of Dover (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291).
146. Here, too, Hitler was over-optimistic. The weather on 6 June, though cloudy and windy, had improved from that of the day before (when it had been bad enough to cause ‘Operation Overlord’ to be postponed). While the German defenders thought the weather too bad for an invasion, Eisenhower had adjudged that it was just good enough. (Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197; Weinberg III, 684.)
147. TBJG, II/12, 418–19 (7 June 1944); Below, 374; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42.
148. Based on Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291–2; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197–8; Weinberg III, 686–8; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.6: Triumph and Tragedy, London etc., 1954,6; Oxford Companion, 853. The accounts give differing numbers of ships engaged in the landings. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197, has 2,727 vessels approaching, multiplying to 6,939 as the smaller landing craft left their parent ships. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291, has 5,134 ships and vehicles (Fahrzeuge). Oxford Companion speaks of nearly 7,000 ships and landing-craft, including 1,213 naval warships. Parker’s figure for ships on approach has been used.
149. Weinberg III, 686, 688.
150. Irving, Göring, 426–7; see also Parker, Struggle for Survival, 196.
151. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 198–9; Weinberg III, 687.
152. Weinberg III, 688.
153. See Speer, 366.
154. Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641 (with slightly different figures from those of Speer); TBJG, II/12, 479 (17 June 1944).
155. Speer, 366; Hölsken, V-Waffen, 132. Göring had tried to blame the initial failure of the Vi on Milch. When Hitler, changing his tune completely, now demanded increased production, Göring predictably attempted to claim the credit.
156. Weinberg III, 691.
157. Die Wehrmachtherichte 1939–1945, Cologne, 1989, iii.12.8ff.: ‘Southern England and the area of London were last night and this morning bombed (belegt) with new explosives of the heaviest caliber.’ See also Domarus, 2106; and Tb Reuth, v.2058, n.125 for Dietrich’s propaganda.
158. TBJG, II/ 12, 480 (17 June 1944), 491–2 (18 June 1944). Goebbels’s dampening of expectations is mentioned in Elke Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 196–224, here 217–18; and Reuth, Goebbels, 542–4. For the disappointed mood and the propaganda failure over the VI, see especially Gerald Kirwin, ‘Waiting for Retaliation. A Study in Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and German Civilian Morale’, JCH, 16 (1981), 565–83.
159. Irving, HW, 642.
160. Below, 375; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42; Domarus, 2106; Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641.
161. Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944. Ein Beitrag zu Rommels und des Reiches Schicksal, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1949, 113–14.
162. Below, 375.
163. Speidel, 114–17.
164. Speidel, 118; Below, 375.
165. Speer, 366.
166. LB Stuttgart, 573–4; Weinberg III, 688.
167. Weinberg III, 687–9.
168. Below, 375–6.
169. TBJG, II/12, 463 (14 June 1944), 517 (22 June 1944).
170. TBJG, II/12, 516–18 (22 June 1944).
171. TBJG, II/12, 518–19 (22 June 1944).
172. TBJG, II/12, 519–21 (22 June 1944), quotation 521.
173. TBJG, II/12, 521–2, 527 (22 June 1944), quotation 522.
174. TBJG, II/12, 523–6 (22 June 1944).
175. IfZ, F19/3, Hitler’s speech, 22 June 1944 (quotations, page 7: ‘… daß das Ende im Falle des Nachgebens immer die Vernichtung ist, auf die Dauer die restlose Vernichtung’); ‘Vorsehung’, page 12, and his comment on page 47: ‘Ich babe das Leben schon im Weltkrieg als Geschenk der Vorsebung aufgefaßt. Ich konnte so oft tot sein und bin nicht tot. Das ist also schon ein Geschenk gewesen; ‘Der Jude ist weg ...’, page 39; ‘Niemals wird dieser neue Staat kapitulierern’, page 67); see also, especially, 55, 59, and 62 (‘Wir kämpfen hier für die deutsche Zukunft, um Sein oder Nichtsein’).
176. Below, 376. The speech was frequently interrupted by applause, and was followed by shouts of ‘Heil’ (IfZ, F19/3, page 70). Hitler was in much less good form when he spoke on 26 June – the military situation had worsened during the previous four days – to about 100 leading representatives of the armaments industry, to try to assuage them about Party interference in the economy. During this speech, there was barely applause, and Hitler’s vague philosophizing did not come across well. The attempt, which Speer had hoped would rouse the morale of the assembled businessmen, did not succeed. (The text is printed in von Kotze, 35–68; and see Speer, 369–71.)
177. TBJG, II/12, 524 (22 June 1944). Goebbels had been more sceptical. Heavy bombing attacks against German rear areas began on the night of 21–22 June; the main attacks commenced the following day (Glantz and House, 204).
178. DZW, vi.35–6; Glantz and House, ch.13.
179. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 252; Weinberg III, 704; David Glanz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London/Totowa NJ, 1989, 362–79, here 463, 467/ff.; DZW, vi.33.
180. Irving, HW, 643–4.
181. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer, Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1960, 452.
182. TBJG, II/12, 538–9,
542 (24 June 1944).
183. Weisungen, 281–5. The principle of the twelve bastions created in the theatre of Army Group Centre, with three divisions assigned to each of the strongholds, was to suck in the Red Army, tying them down, then building the basis for a successful counter-operation. The tactic backfired drastically in the Soviet offensive of June 1944.
184. Below, 377–8.
185. See DZW, vi.34.
186. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253.
187. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; Weinberg III, 706–8; Below, 378. The Soviet offensive in the Centre, South, and North is extensively described in DZW, vi.30–52, 52–70, 70–81.
188. Wistrich, Wer war wer, 188; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; DZW, vi.41.
189. Speidel, 127; Guderian, 334; Irving, HW, 649–51.
190. Domarus, 2110.
191. Guderian, 334.
192. Below, 378; Irving, HW, 648; Wistrich, Wer war wer, 301; Domarus, 2130.
193. Below, 378.
194. Below, 379.
195. Below, 380.
196. Below, 380.
197. Domarus, 2118. See Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1905–1944, Cambridge, 1995, ch.9, especially 179–80, for Stauffenberg’s involvement in the North African campaign that led to his serious injuries, sustained on 7 April 1943, and 253–4 for his presence at the briefings on 6 and 11 July 1944.
198. Domarus, 2121; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 256–60; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 469–75.
199. Witnesses gave differing times for the explosion, between 12.40 and 12.50p.m. (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 493, 817 n. 43).
LIST OF WORKS CITED
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Adam, Uwe Dietrich, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1972.
——— ‘Wie spontan war der Pogrom?’, in Walter H. Pehle (ed.), Der Judenpogrom. Von der ‘Reichskristallnacht’ zum Völkermord, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 74–93.