by Ian Kershaw
106. See a description of the damage in Bormann Letters, 168; also Schroeder, 197, 199; TBJG, II/15, 306 (5 February 1945), 320 (6 February 1945), 327 (7 February 1945); IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 138 (Junge); Boldt, 35; Anton Joachimsthaler, Hitlers Ende. Legenden und Dokumente, Augsburg, 1999, 58–60.
107. See Ada Petrova and Peter Watson, The Death of Hitler: the Final Words from Russia’s Secret Archives, London, 1995, 84; Boldt, 73; Joachimsthaler, 47ff.
108. Schroeder, 197, 378 n.364; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 137 (Junge); Joachimsthaler, 46–7, 65ff.
109. Joachimsthaler, 48, 75–7.
110. TBJG, II/15, 200 (23 January 1945).
111. Descriptions were provided by Hitler’s secretaries Christa Schroeder, Traudl Junge, and Johanna Wolf. See Schroeder, 197–8; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 124– 5; Galante (Junge), 138; Joachimsthaler, 73–81.
112. Guderian, 416.
113. Schroeder, 197, and 59–60, 318 n.75 for descriptions of the Old Reich Chancellery (Radziwill Palais).
114. Below, 405; Boldt, 37–8 (giving the impression that the meetings were still held in the undamaged wing of the Old Reich Chancellery).
115. Below, 403–4.
116. Schroeder, 197; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 124; Galante, 138 (Junge).
117. TBJG, II/15, 320 (6 February 1945); see also 371 (13 February 1945).
118. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 138 (Junge); Irving, Doctor, 216–17.
119. See the appointments diary kept by Heinz Linge, and preserved for the period 14 October 1944–28 February 1945, IfZ, F19/14, Fols.450–77 (for February 1945). The following description of Hitler’s daily routine is based on this appointments diary and Schroeder, 198–9.
120. For his medications, see Redlich, 243, 358–62; Irving, Doctor, 208ff.; Maser, 401–6; Heston, 82–9; Schenck, 446–50. Hitler, looking drained, told Goebbels in January that his working day was around 16–18 hours, and ran through the night (TBJG, II/15, 262 (29 January 1945)). Two months later, he informed Goebbels that he had had two hours sleep during the previous twenty-four hours (TBJG, II/15, 644 (31 March 1945)).
121. These were similar themes to the ‘table talk’ monologues of the earlier war years, noted down by Heim, Picker, and Koeppen. In 1951, a further series of monologues, allegedly by Hitler, dictated to Bormann, came to light (seventeen from February 1945, a last one on 2 April). The tone of the monologues is unmistakably that of Hitler. The themes are familiar, as are the rambling style and the discursive dips into history. There is talk, among other topics: of Churchill’s responsibility (influenced by Jews) for the war; of Britain’s rejection of German peace-offers which would have enabled the destruction of Bolshevism and saved the British Empire; of an unnatural coalition aiming to destroy Germany, a will to exterminate which gave the German people no other choice but to continue the struggle; of the example of Frederick the Great; of the need for eastward expansion, not the quest for colonies; of exposing to the world ‘the Jewish peril’ and of his warning to Jews on the eve of the war; of the timing and necessity of the war against the Soviet Union; of the difficulties caused for Germany by Italy’s weakness and blunders; of regrets that Japan did not enter the war against Russia in 1941, and the inevitability that the United States would enter the war against Germany; of the missed chance of going to war in 1938, which would have given Germany an advantage; of time always being against Germany; of being compelled to wage war as Europe’s last hope; and of the need to uphold the racial laws, and claim on gratitude for having eliminated Jews from Germany and central Europe. The monologues have a self-justificatory ring to them. They are intended for posterity, establishing a place in history. They have a reflective readiness – unusual, if not unique, for Hitler – to contemplate responsibility for errors, for example, in policy towards Italy and Spain.
The monologues were not, as those from 1941–4 were, the product of musings during meals attended by others in his entourage, or during the ‘tea hours’ with his secretaries. Neither a secretary nor anyone else mentioned them at the time, or apparently knew they were being compiled. Gerda Christian (formerly Daranowski), writing to Christa Schroeder long after the war, did not regard them as authentic, though she accepted that they could be a compilation of Hitler’s thoughts in the last months. She ruled out a possibility of Hitler summoning Bormann to dictate to him, pointing out from her own recollection how he hated verbatim accounts on paper of what he had said casually (Schroeder, 257). The main problem with the authenticity of the text is that no reliable and certifiable German version exists. It is impossible, therefore, to be certain. A great deal has to be taken on trust; and even then no safe mechanism for checking is available.
The original document containing the monologues was said to have been entrusted on 17 April 1945 by Martin Bormann to Walther Funk, Reich Minister for Economics, to remove from Berlin for safe keeping in a bank vault in Bad Gastein. While serving his term of imprisonment in Spandau after the Nuremberg Trials, fearing further incrimination should the document be discovered, Funk, it was claimed, commissioned a friend, Hans Rechenberg, with the destruction of the document. Rechenberg, the account continues, kept his promise in a literal sense; but he made a photocopy, and in 1951 handed it to François Genoud, a Swiss lawyer who had meanwhile acquired control over copyright matters pertaining to Bormann, Goebbels, and other Nazi leaders. Funk, after release from Spandau, authorized Genoud to seek out Hugh Trevor-Roper with a view to arranging publication outside Germany of the document. After the meeting with Trevor-Roper, according to Genoud, the photocopy was handed back to Funk. It thereafter went missing. Remarkably, it seems, no copy of the copy had been made before returning it. Genoud had made a French translation (La testament politique de Hitler. Notes recueillies par Martin Bormann, Paris, 1959), and in 1958 had had a translation back into German made from the French version. According to Genoud, this was at Funk’s wish, since he wished to compare the texts. Funk then allegedly corrected the re-translation in accordance with the still existing copy of the original, ‘so that’, in Genoud’s words, ‘a practically authentic text, coming from this time, exists’. An English edition, with an introduction by Trevor-Roper, was published in 1961 (François Genoud (ed.), The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents. February-April 1945, with an Introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper, London, 1961). This English version contains a very loose and untrustworthy translation of the German text – itself not guaranteed to be identical with any long-lost original or the lost copy of that original – which was eventually published only in 1981 (Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann Diktate von Februar und April 1945, mit einem Essay von Hugh R. Trevor-Roper und einem Nachwort von André François-Poncet, Hamburg, 1981). Further examination of the text in the meantime-though this was not mentioned by the German publishers – by Professor Eduard Baumgarten had established that the translation back into German from the French (carried out by a Dutchman) contained between the lines a second German text, written in the hand of François Genoud. The available German text is, therefore, at best a construct; neither the original nor the copy of that original exists. Baumgarten tended, since the content was consonant with Hitler’s thinking and expression, to accept the authenticity of the text. There is, however, no proof and, therefore, no reliable German text whose authenticity can be placed beyond question. (Institut für Zeitgeschichte (ed.), Wissensch-aftsfreiheit und ihre rechtlichen Schranken. Ein Kolloquium, Munich/Vienna, 1978, 45–51 (comments of François Genoud, Eduard Baumgarten, and Martin Broszat).)
122. Hermann Giesler, Ein anderer Hitler. Erlebnisse, Gespräche, Reflexionen, Leoni, 1977, 478–80. For the date of the unveiling of the model, Irving, HW, 478–80, 483.
123. See Kubizek, especially 97–110. Hitler was still dreaming when he told Goebbels, following his viewing of the Linz model, that modern tec
hnology would allow for a swift rebuilding of German cities after the war, and that housing capacity would be restored within five years (TBJG, II/15, 379 (13 February 1945)).
124. TBJG, II/t5, 321 (6 February 1945). He repeated this to Goebbels a few days later, though the Propaganda Minister noted that it could not be publicized since, otherwise, every future air-raid on Berlin would be attributed to the decision (TBJG, II/15, 370 (12 February 1945)).
125. TBJG, II/15, 320 (6 February 1945), 337 (8 February 1945), 365 (12 February 1945).
126. TBJG, II/15, 323 (6 February 1945).
127. TBJG, II/15, 368 (12 February 1945).
128. See Weinberg III, 802–9.
129. TGJG, II/15, 381–2 (13 February 1945).
130. Below, 402.
131. Speer, 433.
132. Giesler, 482.
133. Semmler, 183; Reuth, Goebbels, 581–2; Irving, Goebbels, 502.
134. LB Stuttgart, 902–3 (2 March 1945).
135. Guderian, 427 (trans. slightly amended); LB Stuttgart, 905 n.2. And see TBJG, II/15, 617, 620 (28 March 1945).
136. Jodl’s summary for Hitler of advantages and disadvantages of leaving the Geneva Convention argued that the way would then be clear for Allied usage of gas and chemical warfare at a time when they enjoyed obvious air-superiority; also that there were more German prisoners in Allied hands than Allied prisoners-of-war in Germany, so that massive retaliation would also be to Germany’s disadvantage. (IMG, xxxv.181–6, doc.606-D. See also IMG, ix.434, x.342, xiii.517–18, xvi.542, xviii.397–8, and xxxiiii.641–4, doc.158-C.)
137. Descriptions by Dr Giesing, in mid-February, and Percy Ernst Schramm a month later: Maser, 394–5, cit. Giesing report of 12 June 1945, 175ff.; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militärischer Führer. Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacbt, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, 134ff.; KTB OKW, iv/2, 1701–2. See also Irving, HW, 772–3; Irving, Doctor, 211.
138. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten. Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, 253.
139. Below, 402. Goebbels had remarked in his diary, early in February, that the Gauleiter had not been taking central directions from Berlin seriously and were running things in their own way (TBJG, II/15, 311 (5 February 1945)).
140. Jordan, 251–8; Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’. Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, 384–92 (where the meeting is wrongly dated to 25 February); Below, 402; Martin Moll, ‘Die Tagungen der Reichs – und Gauleiter der NSDAP: Ein verkanntes Instrument der Koordinierung im “Amterchaos” des Dritten Reiches?’, typescript, 60–61 (with best thanks to Dr Moll for the opportunity to see this valuable, as yet unpublished, paper); Irving, HW, 772–3; Toland, Adolf Hitler, 855 (based on oral testimony in 1971 of three Gauleiter present). The formal communiqué of the meeting confined itself to stating that Hitler had imparted to the Gauleiter ‘the guidelines for the victorious continuation of the struggle, for the comprehensive organization of all forces of resistance, and for the ruthless deployment of the Party in the fateful struggle of the German people’ (Domarus, 2207). In individual cases, Hitler was nevertheless even now able to rouse new hope. According to Christa Schroeder, Albert Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig-West Prussia, came to Berlin in March 1945 determined to tell Hitler the unvarnished truth about the desolate situation in Danzig. He came out of his audience reinvigorated, saying ‘he has told me he will save Danzig, and about that there can be no more doubt’ (Schroeder, 74).
141. Domarus, 2203–6. Domarus (2202, n.71, 2088) mistakenly thought the occasion had been dropped altogether in 1944. In fact, Hitler had given a speech on that occasion (24 February 1944), which Goebbels had described as ‘extraordinarily fresh’ (TBJG, II/11, 347 (25 February 1944)). In 1942, the Gauleiter of Munich and Upper Bavaria, Adolf Wagner, had read out a proclamation by Hitler (TBJG, II/3, 371 (25 February 1942)); in 1943, Hermann Esser read out the proclamation (TBJG, II/7, 412 (25 February 1943)).
142. StA Munich, LRA 29656, report of the SD-Auβenstelle Berchtesgaden, 7 February 1945: ‘… während bei der überwiegenden Zahl der Volksgenossen der Inhalt der Proklamation vorbei-rauschte wie der Wind in leerem Geäst’. Other reports underlined the impression that Hitler’s address had been unable to lift the mood and found no echo among the mass of the population (GStA, Munich, MA 106695, reports of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 7 March 1945, 7 April 1945). Some reports from mid-February noted that hope of a miracle was now confined to belief in Hitler himself (Volker Berghahn, ‘Meinungsforschung im “Dritten Reich”: Die Mundpro-paganda-Aktion der Wehrmacht im letzten Kriegshalbjahr’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1 (1967), 83–119, here 105.
143. TBJG, II/15, 420 (5 March 1945); Irving, Doctor, 212. Hitler, it seems, eventually did allow the pictures to appear in the press and newsreel, though, accommodating the delay, the impression was given that the visit had taken place on ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’, 11 March 1945. Domarus, 2211 and Hauner, Hitler, 200, give this as the date of Hitler’s last visit to the front, while Irving, HW, 776, has 15 March 1945 (possibly based on Below, 405, who has 15 February, though presumably in error for 15 March). Goebbels was with Hitler for several hours on the evening of 11 March, though there was no mention of a second visit to the Oder front that day. He referred to the new edition of the newsreel, shown that evening, containing scenes of Hitler’s visit to the front, though this presumably refers to the Wriezen visit, not any subsequent one (TBJG, II/15, 479, 487). Among captured soldiers on the western front, trust in Hitler had fallen by March 1945 to 31 per cent, half of what it had been in January (Gurfein and Janowitz, 81).
144. TBJG, II/15, 542 (19 March 1945).
145. TBJG, II/15, 420–21, 423 (5 March 1945), 450 (8 March 1945). Goebbels first noted that Himmler had an infection; then that he had suffered an angina attack. Guderian was told that the Reichsführer had been laid low with influenza, but found him ‘in apparently robust health’ on a visit to the Hohenlychen sanatorium (Guderian, 421). See also Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs 1940–1945, London, 1956, 276–7; Padfield, Himmler, 567.
146. TBJG, II/15, 421–2 (5 March 1945). Sepp Dietrich, in whose leadership in Hungary Hitler was pinning such hopes, had been highly critical of Hitler’s repeated interventions, down to company level, in military matters, leaving his commanders no room for manoeuvre (TBJG, II/15, 404 (3 March 1945)).
147. TBJG, II/15, 421–4 (5 March 1945), quotations 422, 424, 486 (12 March 1945).
148. TBJG, II/15, 426–7 (5 March 1945).
149. TBJG, II/15, 425–6 (5 March 1945).
150. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, (1947), Pan Books edn, London, 1973, 140.
151. TBJG, II/15, 383–4 (28 February 1935), 419 (5 March 1945), quotation 479 (12 March 1945). See also 557 (21 March 1945), 570 (22 March 1945).
152. Domarus, 2212.
153. Named after the Secretary of the US Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr, the plan envisaged dividing Germany into two and ‘pastoralizing’ the country. It was initially adopted both by Roosevelt and Churchill, and, though effectively discarded in the light of strong opposition from their advisers, was finally put to rest only in the post-war settlement at Potsdam in July-August 1945 (Churchill, vi.138–9; Weinberg III, 796–7; Oxford Companion, 758–9).
154. See Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 345–7 (and Pt.V in general), for post-war planning within German industry in the last months of the regime. See also Neil Gregor, Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich, New Haven/London, 1998, 100–108; and Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann, Anatomie des Krieges, East Berlin, 1969, 484–6.
155. Speer, 440–42, 581 n.5; Guderian, 422–3.
156. Speer, 443. Speer, 448, refers to his memorandum of 18 March. He suggests elsewhere, however, that he himself handed the memorandum to Hitler, and after midnight on 19 March (Speer, 445). Below, 404, writes of Speer passing the memorandum to him.
157. IMG, xli.4
20–25 (quotation, 424–5), Beweisstück Speer, Doc.23; IMG, xvi.546–7 (Speer testimony); and see also Speer, 443, 582 n.6; Guderian, 423; Below, 404–5.
158. Speer, 444–5.
159. Speer, 446 and 583 n.8. Domarus, 2214 and n.106 points out that Speer’s recollection probably did not match Hitler’s comment exactly. According to Speer, Hitler had stated that ‘the future belongs exclusively to the stronger people of the east’ – a phrase he is otherwise not known to have used, and which stood in contradiction to his belief in the primitivity of the Soviet population.
160. See Irving, HW, 784.
161. IMG, xli.430–31, Doc. Beweisstück Speer-25; Weisungen, 348–9.
162. Speer, 453; TBJG, II/15, 612–13 (28 March 1945).
163. See IMG, xli.425–37, Docs. Beweisstück Speer-24,–28,–29; Speer, 450–64; Guderian, 424. According to Guderian, 426, Hitler was by this time reluctant to see Speer and hear his pessimistic views about the war. He told Goebbels of his anger at Speer’s comments, and how he had let himself be influenced by industrialists. He intended replacing him with Saur (TBJG, II/15, 619–20 (28 March 1945), 645 (31 March 1945).)
164. TBJG, II/15, 613 (28 March 1945).
165. Schroeder, 209.
166. TBJG, II/15, 369 (12 February 1945).
167. Boldt, 86–7.
168. See, e.g., TBJG, II/15, 425 (5 March 1945), 569–71 (22 March 1945), 618–19 (28 March 1945).
169. Walter Schellenberg, Schellenberg, Mayflower Paperback edn, London, 1965, 175; Trevor-Roper, 133 and n.i; TBJG, II/15, 613–14 (28 March 1945); Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 434; Padfield, Himmler, 577. Dietrich did not carry out the order, but was even so not dismissed by Hitler – an indication that the order had been issued in enraged frustration. (Weingartner, 124. And see n.146 above.)
170. TBJG, II/15, 480 (12 March 1945). Himmler experienced the displeasure at first hand when he had his next audience with Hitler on 15 March.(TBJG, II/15, 521 (16 March 1945). See also Padfield, Himmler, 569.)