by Longchenpa
In the second case, how could such a position be tenable? One might say that because phenomena derive from the mind, they are the mind. But that is like saying that the child produced from a woman is the woman, whereas this is clearly not the case. It would also mean that the filth excreted by the body were the body itself, whereas it is evident that it is not so.
One could also object that since phenomena appear to the mind, they are the mind. But then it would follow that forms are the same as the visual consciousness, for they appear to the mind. And since in the past, the Buddha appeared within the experience of deluded beings, it would follow that he was the minds of such beings. And if this were so, the absurd consequence would follow that the beings with deluded minds are buddhas. Conversely, since beings appeared to the Buddha, it would follow that either all the beings were buddhas or that the Buddha, free from stain, were an [unenlightened] being. Such defective conclusions are unavoidable.
Again it might be argued that if there is no mind, there are no phenomena; and this is why they are said to be the mind. But the problem here is that, in that case, the actual cause and the actual result are rendered identical because if the former is not present, the latter cannot appear. Also one’s enemy and one’s anger would be identical because if there were no enemy, the anger aroused by him would not manifest. Moreover it does not make sense to say that phenomena are the mind because they are mind-created, for in that case, the painting becomes the painter since it was the painter who made it.
How therefore can it be right to say that extramental phenomena—earth, rocks, mountains, and cliffs—are the mind? To be sure, they are indeed the hallucinatory appearances produced by the mind’s habitual tendencies. But if they were the mind, it would follow that when a hundred people see a single vase, the vase seen by them all would be the consciousness of them all, in which case they would all have the same consciousness. And if one were to say this, then when one person attains buddhahood, all beings would become Buddha; and when one being falls to the lower destinies, all beings would go there too. It would also follow that in the entire world there is but one single being—just as you or I—for the entire aggregate of other beings would be none other than that single being’s mind. It would not be tenable for there to be any other being beside a single buddha, such as Śākyamuni. For all the beings seen by him would be but his own mind. One may think that this is so, but the evident fact is that we are all here!
It seems that there are many scholars nowadays who think in this way. All one can say is that they are extremely confused in their understanding of the Mahāyāna.
Their vast forms garlanded with lotuses,
Their ears with flowers adorned,
Their faces gleaming from the golden paint—
They’re just majestic elephants and nothing else!
But what then are these appearances? They could indeed be understood according to the stainless doctrine of the Cittamātra False Aspectarians. The latter do indeed say in their texts that all that appears to oneself is indeed one’s own mind. But the appearing object is not the mind. In the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra it is said,
All perceptions are the mind,
And yet the objects that appear are not.
The product of deluded tendencies from time without beginning,
They are like floating hairs before the eyes.
The False Aspectarians, however, fail to distinguish between the perception (that is, the perceived appearance of an object—snang ba) and the appearing object itself (the object that appears—snang yul).151
When the mind clearly apprehends as separate from itself a mountain (the appearing object) with the thought “This is a mountain,” a mental experience of a mountain occurs in dependence on the visual sense organ. And this aspect (of the mountain), which is held by the mind wherever one happens to be, is the mind’s own subjective experience. When one goes elsewhere, the appearing object (the actual mountain) does not follow, but the propensity for it to appear to perception has been imprinted by the former visual consciousness. A meaning generality, the mental image (of the mountain), nonexistent yet clearly appearing, manifests vividly to the mental organ. Therefore, all the perceptions, or perceived appearances, evaluated by one’s intellect, together with their retention, are mind. Likewise, the perceptions of all the other beings, and the retention of such perceptions, are mind. Nevertheless, the objects that trigger the conceptualization of the mental consciousness, and all the objects of the five senses, appear while being nonexistent, on account of the mind’s beginningless habitual tendencies. They are like hairs floating in the air as seen by someone suffering from a visual disorder.
Some may object saying that, if this is so, phenomena bifurcate and become twofold because the appearing object (snang yul) and its perceived appearance (snang ba) are established as distinct. To which it might be replied that if that were so, the mind itself would be divided into two. For the opponent is implying that the mind that is the appearance is outside (extramental), while the mind that apprehends the appearance is within. To this the opponent might answer that they are both the same in being the mind—they are of one and the same kind even though one speaks as though they were two. But here also, the appearing object that occurs [extramentally] through one’s deluded tendencies, and the perceived appearance through which this object is apprehended as something definite are both appearances of what does not exist. They are not different even on the conventional level: they are both cases of deluded propensity. Since these two do not in fact exist, it is established that they are not distinct.
When this is examined from our own Madhyamaka point of view, not only is the appearing [extramental] object not said to be the mind, but even the perceived appearance [the mental aspect] is not said to be the mind either. For the inner mind is not externalized [as the outer object], and the outer appearances occurring for each of the sense powers are merely discerned inwardly by the mind. If the perceived appearance [the mental aspect] were left outside the mind [existing as an outer object], it would be possible either for a person to have simultaneously two consciousnesses or else to be an inanimate thing [because the mind is outside]. These and many other difficulties would follow. Therefore, although the apprehension of the appearance, or nonappearance, of something (both perception and lack of perception) is the mind, the appearing object itself is not the mind. It is just as when the ear consciousness detects the sound of a drum, the hearing consciousness does not become the drum’s sound.
In short, although it seems that the mind is projected outwardly, it does not in fact go outside [it is not the outer object]. And since it is only the aspect of the outer phenomenon that appears within, that which appears outwardly is not at all the inner mind. What then is the actual situation? Though phenomena have no real existence, they nevertheless appear. For this reason, the whole array of phenomena that arise in their different colors, white and red, appear in the manner of the falling hairs seen by people whose sight is impaired by a phlegmatic disease. The things that appear are found neither outside nor inside the mind—nor somewhere in between. While appearing, they have no inherent existence or, to put it another way, they are said to be empty of intrinsic being. Therefore, insofar as both assertions indicate the assumption of real existence, there is no difference in saying that phenomena exist as the mind or that they exist as something other than the mind.
It could be argued that the assertion that outer objects are not the mind is like that of the Vaibhāṣika view of the śrāvakas, but it is not the same. The Vaibhāṣikas say that sense objects are inert phenomena existing by way of their own characteristics. We, on the other hand, affirm that, like dreams, phenomena are the hallucinatory appearances of our own habitual tendencies—which the mind perceives without their being existent. Such a way of being need not be refuted even by the Mādhyamikas and is perfectly tenable. “But what is this?” it will be said. “The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas refute all assertions!” Yes, but they d
o not refute mere perceived appearance! What they do refute, however, is the assumption of the true existence of things. As master Nāgārjuna has said,
Thus appearance is not refuted
But just the thought that things are truly real.
In the Cittamātra school, whereas the True Aspectarians assert that the appearing phenomenon is the mind, both they and the False Aspectarians say that the self-cognizing mind exists on the ultimate level. And this is an object of refutation for the Mādhyamikas. On the other hand, how could the Mādhyamikas refute hallucinatory appearances, which are the result of habitual tendencies and occur even though they in fact have no existence? And how indeed could they refute the assertions expounded correctly by the [Cittamātra] tenet system? For when the conventional level is posited, Madhyamaka and Cittamātra are in agreement. So much then for the dependent nature on the outer level.
We must further examine the position that, just as a later cognition arises on the basis of an earlier cognition, perceived appearance [the mental aspect] is also dependent on a preceding object—on account of which one speaks of the dependent nature on the inner level. However, if one speaks in this way simply because it is on the basis of an earlier object that a perceived appearance subsequently occurs, its “other-dependence” is simply a matter of words. In fact, they are the same thing. One may say that they are different and separate, but since they are both the mind, they cannot be truly different from each other. On the contrary, to claim that they are is a contradiction of their own tenet and is therefore incorrect. As it is said in the earlier text,
Because these various appearances
Seem to be dependent upon something else,
One speaks of an impure dependent nature
(Owing to the subject-object duality)
And of a pure dependent nature.
Although in truth they aren’t dependent,
It’s thus that they appear and thus they are explained.
THE ACTUAL NATURE
The actual nature (pariniṣpanna, yongs grub) is also twofold. There is the changeless actual nature and the unmistaken actual nature.
The Changeless Actual Nature
The changeless actual nature (’gyur ba med pa’i yongs grub) is ultimate reality, naturally pure. It is the emptiness inherent in all things and is simply the case whether one is deluded or not. Since it remains so without variation throughout the passage of time, it is said to be changeless. It is the fundamental way of being of phenomena.
Regarding this, three kinds of emptiness are posited: emptiness of self (rang stong), emptiness of other (gzhan stong), and emptiness of both (gnyis kyis stong). Emptiness of self or self-emptiness is again twofold. On the one hand, it refers to things that do not exist according to their own characteristics, like the moon reflected in water—which appears to be there but is not. It also refers to designations that are empty by their nature and yet causally effective—even though there is no difference between themselves (the designation) and other (the designated).
Other-emptiness is also twofold. On the one hand, there is an emptiness of that which is extraneous (of what is not possessed) and, on the other hand, there is an other-emptiness that refers to names.
Emptiness of both (self and other) refers to the emptiness of designations [related to both self-emptiness and other-emptiness] and to the emptiness of the specific characteristics of names and things.
Regarding self-emptiness, the following may be said. [In terms of the ground,] the luminous nature of the mind, the tathāgatagarbha, the “essential element” (snying po’i khams), is empty of every defect and is replete with every excellent quality—even though, from the point of view of the purity of the ultimate nature, it is actually beyond the elimination of negative, and the accomplishment of positive, qualities.
Hallucinatory appearances—phenomena, which arise in various forms, together with cognition, namely the eight consciousnesses—have no existence in fundamental reality and are thus empty of a nature of their own. These phenomena are also empty of their names, such as “pillar” or “pot,” and they exhibit a defective character. From the point of view of the purity of the ultimate nature, however, they are beyond the elimination of negative, and the accomplishment of positive, qualities. In terms of the path, this too is empty by its nature while yet displaying certain qualities and defects. From the point of view of the purity of the ultimate nature, the path transcends the respective elimination of negative, and the acquisition of positive, qualities. [In terms of the result,] when the ultimate purity is attained, this is empty of both defects and habitual tendencies but is not empty of the qualities of the tathāgatagarbha, which are finally actualized. From the standpoint of the purity of the ultimate nature, [the result] is beyond the elimination of negative, and the accomplishment of positive, qualities.
In short, “self-emptiness” means that each and every phenomenon is by nature unreal; it is empty of real existence. There is moreover a twofold classification of self-emptiness. Granted that the defining characteristics of phenomena are empty of themselves, either these characteristics have no existence at all, as in the case of a rabbit’s horns, or else they appear to deluded minds but have no real existence, being empty like the moon reflected in water.
Now designations, which are empty by their nature, consist in the ascription of names, words, and syllables. They are merely posited by the mind. They are not the specifically characterized objects themselves. A small child may be given the name Leo or Lion. Now the objective referent of the name “lion” is an animal with a turquoise mane, but neither the name, nor the thing nominally referred to, is to be found anywhere in the child’s body. Nevertheless, this name, which brings about an understanding, is able to indicate the object that is to be understood. All verbal ascriptions are the same: they are causally effective [they do the job of indicating], even though they are empty [of objective content].
The term “emptiness of other” or “other-emptiness” is used when a thing is said to be empty of something other than itself. Again there is a twofold classification. First, there is an emptiness of other that refers to something that is not possessed, as in the case of the sun’s being devoid of darkness, or of a thing’s being devoid of specifically characterized phenomena that are other than it—as in the case of the sun being devoid of other things like a pillar or a cloth. Second, there is the emptiness of other that refers to names, as in the case of the sun’s being referred to by various terms, for example, “the light giver” or “the seven-steeded.” But all such classifications and expressions of particular features of the sun’s nature do not make contact with the actual, specifically characterized object, namely, the sun. Thus, the sun itself is empty of them.
“Emptiness of both” refers to the fact that all phenomena are both self-empty and other-empty. In terms of further classification, emptiness of both again has two aspects: in relation to imputed designations (rnam grangs btags pa ba) and in relation to specifically characterized things (don rang mtshan pa). In the case of the emptiness of imputed designations, it can be said that the designation “deluded in saṃsāra” is empty of the aggregates, elements, sources of the specifically characterized three worlds because it is merely posited as an expression by the conventional mind. As for the emptiness of specifically characterized things, this means that if a phenomenon is devoid of specific character, it does not follow that it has the characteristics of something else. It is empty like the son of a barren woman or the water seen in a mirage. Moreover, even though phenomena do not exist truly, their clear appearance is not in any way obstructed; they are empty like the dependent nature.
Thus when the three kinds of emptiness are subdivided, we arrive at six kinds of emptiness, which can be grouped into two classes, both of which transcend the intellect: the emptiness of things indicated by words (that is, “phenomena are utterly pure by their very nature”) and the emptiness of the words that indicate them. This is how emptiness of phenomena should
be understood [according to the Cittamātra view].
Those who propound emptiness in the sense of a mere nothingness fail to understand the nature of emptiness, and their doctrine is similar to that of the non-Buddhist Cārvākas. Furthermore, the emptiness of those who say that “some things are empty and some things are not empty” is a lesser kind of emptiness. Their view is similar to the teachings of the eternalists as well as of the Buddhist śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. All such doctrines fall into the extremes of believing in either permanent existence or annihilation and therefore should not be followed.
The Unmistaken Actual Nature
The unmistaken actual nature (phyin ci ma log pa’i yongs grub) is the path of supreme liberation. When the fundamental way of being of phenomena is understood exactly as it is, the aspect of appearance is not discarded. It is thus that, on the relative level, merit is accumulated and, on the ultimate level, through the contemplation of the nature of emptiness, wisdom is accumulated through persevering in the meditation on space-like ultimate reality, which is neither one nor many. As it is said in the Middle-Length Prajñāpāramitā, “What has been defined as “unmistaken” (the unmistaken actual nature) is perfectly subsumed in the truth of the path.”
In brief, when the unchanging ultimate nature, the luminous character of the mind, is assimilated, and when one has realized that all phenomena are empty in being simply the imputed reality or nature, if one practices on the path, impure hallucinatory appearances, together with the conceptual mind, will be transmuted or purified. And reaching the primordial state, one will acquire a perfect mastery of the pure buddhafields of the inexhaustible ornaments of the enlightened body, speech, and mind.