by Edwin Black
Object: Census of the Jews
The June 2, 1941 law, published in the Journal Officiel on June 14, 1941, orders a census of all persons who are considered Jewish in the eyes of the law of that same date regarding the status of Jews.
The inquiry that… your General Commissariat is going to undertake greatly interests the Demographics Department, which was given responsibility for all statistical operations regarding the population of France….
This Service just organized, in the unoccupied zone, the first census about professional activities of all persons 14 to 65 years old. The information gathered, as well as all information coming from further inquiries conducted in both the occupied and unoccupied zones, will be used to create and maintain an updated file on each individual summing up their activities. This will be used to produce, at any given moment, the general demographic profile of the nation.
It seems to me that in these conditions, the special [June 14] census of the Jews could possibly bring complementary information that is even more interesting given that the inquiries cover not only people, but their belongings as well. These considerations lead me to ask you to please tell me right now how your inquiry will be conducted, details about the questions asked, and later on, the results you will have obtained.
In case the model of Jewish census forms is not definitively established, I am at your service to study… a form that should permit your General Commissariat, as well as the Demographics Department, to unify all useful information about the Jews. This will allow us to discover those [Jews] who have not yet made their declaration, so we can organize an inquiry as to the status of their belongings and their potential transfer… and definitively clarify the Jewish problem.
I am sending an Administrator of the Demographics Department to explain to you the organization of the Service, its work methods, and the results obtained by using tabulation processes to manage individual files. He will also examine with you the conditions in which collaboration between the Services concerned would be advantageous to you.
René Carmille125
Like many French bureaucrats, Vallat was resistant to Carmille’s contraptions. He worried that commencing a punching operation from scratch would delay the reports. Vallat trusted the Tulard system, even though it was manual—and probably because it was manual. So on June 21, Vallat wrote back to Carmille, “I have thought about integrating this census with the operations your department handles, but it did not seem possible to me, first to prolong the process, given the economic urgency of the census of Jewish persons and belongings, and second, given the particular nature of the information that I need. And I decided to immediately order a [Tulard] file which has proved valuable in the occupied zone and which I will distribute to prefects and mayors in the coming week. I will always be happy to provide you with any information thus obtained.”126
Only when Vallat’s people were confronted with the mountains of forms to be assimilated did they realize that Carmille presented the only hope of efficiently identifying the Jews. Vallat transferred the processing assignment to him. On October 11, 1941, Carmille formed the National Statistical Service, which subsumed the General Statistics Office of France and merged it with the Demographic Service. Carmille stated, “The new statistical service would have a different point of departure, namely to establish files for individuals.” He added, “We are no longer dealing with general censuses, but we are really following individuals.” Carmille made clear, “the new organization must now be envisioned in such a way that the information be obtained continuously, which means that the updating of information must be carefully regulated.”127 Carmille was now France’s great Hollerith hope.
On December 2, 1941, Vallat notified Carmille, “The Jewish census operations in the occupied zone, as ordered by the law of 2 June 1941, is finished; we collected approximately 140,000 declarations.”128 On December 19, a seemingly impatient Vallat complained to the Ministry of the Interior, “The file would normally be established by your Police service. But it has become apparent from several conversations with your offices that it has neither the personnel required nor the equipment necessary for this operation. Due to this situation we have thought to ask the help of the designated Demographic Service to ensure the completion of this task for which they are equitably suited. They have agreed and they have offered to forward this task to their tabulating workshops in Clermont-Ferrand and Limoges.”129
Vallat later asked the Ministry to pay the considerable cost of the tabulation services, 400,000 francs, and to arrange for transportation of materials to Carmille offices. That was approved.130 Now the Jewish forms were all in the possession of Carmille.
But the numbers were just not matching up. Vallat was to have sent 140,000 personal declarations. But on June 3, 1942, Carmille’s office confirmed it had “received to date 109,066 declarations, of which 20% (exactly 17,980 declarations) were not received until 4 May 1942.”131 Things were going much slower than anyone expected.
To further delay the operation, CEC was now defaulting on its rigid delivery schedule. CEC just could not manufacture machines as required while Dehomag was usurping all its resources. In early 1943, the subsidiary in Paris informed IBM NY, “A certain number of transactions with the National Statistical Service have… caused the application of penalties…. The amount of these penalties might reach a figure of 4 million [francs] in view of the size and importance of the deals, and because of the company’s inability to deliver machines according to contract schedules…. A one year delay and waving of penalties was requested.”132
In the meantime, Berlin would not wait. Using the less efficient Tulard cards, it began organizing round-ups of Jews in Paris. In early May 1941, 6,494 summonses were left at presumed Jewish residences, mainly foreign Jews. They were instructed to report on May 14 to one of seven centers with their identification in hand. Nazi-allied officials could not be certain exactly which addresses were accurate and up-to-date. With Carmille’s tabulations not yet ready, the Germans, in essence, relied on the Jews to turn themselves in. The results yielded only half what the Nazis had hoped for. On the appointed day, May 14, 1941, an estimated 3,400 to 3,700 Jews, mainly of Polish origin, did report as requested. They were immediately sent to camps.133
A second raid was conducted on August 20, 1941. This time, French agitators, including many professionals, in Paris’ 11th Arrondissement were targeted. The Tulard files offered precise lists of names and addresses and even stairwells of many Jews. But the numbers again fell short. Police units cordoned off major intersections—and even blocked the subway exits, grabbing any Jewish man be tween the ages of 18 and 50. But only 3,022 Jews were arrested. For three more days, the authorities tried to locate more Jews. The inefficient operation only netted 609 on August 21. Then on August 22, they located 325 more. On August 23, as the word spread and Jews everywhere in the District tried to disappear, only 122 Jews were nabbed. The total for the four days was 4,078. The men were sent to the Drancy transit concentration camp. Paris was shocked and outraged because the raids seized both foreign and French-born Jews.134 But for the Germans, it meant the updated data from Tulard was profoundly inefficient.
A third major raid on December 12, 1941, hoped to snare 1,000 Parisian professionals. The obsolete Tulard files only yielded 743 correct addresses. To round out the numbers, foreign Jews were picked up at random on Paris streets.135
Where was Carmille? Where were his Holleriths?
By the end of 1941, numerous Vichy officials had concluded the elaborate census of June 1941 conducted in both zones was completely nonfunctional. A new one was needed.136
On January 13, 1942, the Vichy Finance Minister, conscious of the extraordinary expense, bitterly objected to the Interior Ministry. “A general census of the Jews has already been done,” the Finance Minister complained. “If all the desired information had been requested at the time, it would be superfluous to undertake a new census a few months later. I ask you please do not proceed w
ith the projected census or with other measures of this nature without consulting the National Statistics Service. Their experience in this matter could be helpful in avoiding gaps or repeated information that could present serious problems from a technical as well as a financial point of view.”137
Again, where was Carmille?
By February 1942, Eichmann’s office in Paris reported that the prefecture lists were completely insufficient, asserting, “our offices are constantly demanding corrections.”138 Something needed to be done.
German officials began turning to the French Jewish Council for names. The Union Generale des Israelites en France, the so-called UGIF, became a prime source for the Gestapo. The UGIF was vested with the sole authority for all Jewish welfare and any other communication between the Jews in Occupied France and the German authorities. Therefore, Jews invariably came to the UGIF offices to sign up for welfare services and submit inquiries about interned loved ones. French Jews even paid special communal assessments to the UGIF. The Germans granted the UGIF unprecedented access to all Vichy census lists and allowed the organization to manually update them. These were then turned over to the Nazis by the UGIF. In fact, the UGIF maintained a whole department for providing lists to the authorities. They called it Service 14.139
When one list was not up-to-date, the Germans asked for a revision—again and again until perhaps on the fourth revision the names were complete.140
In many cases, Nazi agents merely waited to abduct those Jews who ventured to the constantly watched UGIF office.141
Although many Parisian Jews feared appealing to the UGIF for assistance, at some point of economic, emotional, or familial desperation, a number would risk the approach. All too often, that contact would presage their apprehension. The UGIF’s efforts to comply with German demands for continually updated names could only be described as relentless.142
For example, in July 1942, the UGIF Bulletin published a notice regarding the children of incarcerated parents. These children, living in terror, were essentially being hidden by family friends and relatives. “We are composing a central listing,” read the UGIF notice, “of all those Jewish children whose parents were arrested recently. If the children were taken in by a private organization or by individual families, and you have knowledge of this, we request you let us know immediately.” The notice was published within the framework of UGIF welfare services that sought to render financial assistance to abandoned or orphaned Jewish children.143
However, in a telling rebuttal some weeks later, another quasi- sanctioned Jewish organization aligned with the resistance declared: if welfare assistance to the displaced children involved produced a list of the families who have taken them in, the UGIF should not bother.144
Later, when the UGIF tried to impose a special head tax to finance a new UGIF census, the underground press condemned it in no uncertain words.
NOTICE FROM THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND
In order to participate in the expenses of the Union Generale des Israelites en France, and to compensate for the insufficient voluntary contributions, all Jews… will be subject to a head-tax of 120 francs for the occupied zone, and 360 francs for the non-occupied zone…. The tattletaling… enterprise created by the Gestapo needs money and, filled with audacity, imposes a contribution upon its victims, “whose voluntary contributions” are insufficient—and with good reason…. Everyone knows how the UGIF helps the unfortunates. Like in Paris, where she turns over to the Gestapo the children entrusted to her care; like in Marseilles where the Jews who go to collect their dole are immediately attacked by the Gestapo, forewarned by this organization of traitors…. Solidarity is practiced by the Jews… [but not by] the traitors who want one more chance to earn the salary their masters in Vichy and Berlin allocate for them, by organizing a new census of the Jews. For this is also the meaning of the new contribution….
Boycott this new census! Do not give a penny to the UGIF!
Not a penny to the Germans!145
In July 1942, Eichmann arrived in Paris with direct orders from Himmler. All the Jews of France—foreign or native-born—were to be immediately sent to camps. Eichmann began personally supervising the systematic deportation of Jews. Berlin had assigned 37,000 freight cars, 800 passenger cars, and 1,000 locomotives to Occupied France. But local authorities were constantly falling short on the quotas.146
On July 15, one train could not leave on time. Eichmann was outraged, calling the missed departure “disgraceful” in view of how much effort had gone into the schedule. A Nazi official assigned to the Jewish solution recalled the moment: Eichmann threatened, the Nazi recalled, that perhaps he might “drop France entirely as a country to be evacuated.” The beleaguered Nazi promised Eichmann no more trains would be late. Frantic local officials did everything they could to comply with Eichmann’s obsessive demand for Jews. Hence all attempts to create a hierarchy of exemptions within the French ultra-conservative mindset, such as for women or children, or French nationals or war veterans—these all quickly eroded.147
Typical was the frenzy exhibited by one French policeman when he scribbled a note on September 12, 1942: “Under our current obligation to come up with one thousand deportees on Monday, we must include in these departures… the parents of sick [children] and advise them that they could be deported, with their child remaining in the infirmary.”148
Throughout 1942, the Germans must have wondered what had happened to Carmille’s operation. GCJQ Commissioner Vallat had assured the Ministry of the Interior that Carmille would provide “day-to-day maintenance of the file using perfected tabulation processes…. our Services will have permanent access to an updated database for its work.” To this end, Carmille had been given a card file of 120,000. He had the only copy. There was no duplicate.149
But Carmille continued a mystery.
In October 1943, Rene Carmille traveled under an assumed name to the town of Annemasse, near the Swiss border, for a secret meeting with relatives of Emile Genon, director of IBM Belgium. Genon was now stationed in Geneva and had been assigned by IBM NY to maintain up-to-date information on all European subsidiaries being operated by German-appointed custodians. Genon wanted intelligence about Westerholt, the SS man appointed CEC trustee. What were his strengths and weaknesses? Carmille gladly provided it, as he needed the continued help of IBM for his punch card operation. Indeed, just after the War, Watson would dispatch a personal emissary and long-time aide, J. J. Kenney, to meet with Carmille’s widow in Paris at the Hotel Georges V. At that post-war meeting, Kenney extended Watson’s personal thanks for Carmille’s regular information.150
Clearly, Carmille was running an active tabulator operation. Why wasn’t he producing the Jewish lists?
By November 8, 1942, the Americans, along with some British troops, had landed in Algeria. As many hoped, local French forces joined the Allied campaign against Hitler. On December 5, 1942, French forces seized the entire National Statistics Service branch office in Algiers. Using Carmille’s system of tabulators and punch card files, DeGaulle’s people were able to organize a seemingly miraculous rapid mobilization of thousands of Frenchmen and others into specific units. As soon as January 17, 1943, the loyal French elements in Algeria were ready to fight as a cohesive and efficient army.151
Instantly mobilized French forces in Algeria fiercely fought the German army along the Algerian-Tunisian border until the Reich was dislodged. It was the beginning of the end of Hitler’s army in North Africa. Those French units proceeded to Italy and continued to fight throughout the war.152
The Germans could not understand how the French army in Algeria was assembled so quickly. Carmille’s office there had only been tracking Jews, farm workers, and general laborers.
Just days after the French mobilized in Algeria the Nazis discovered that Carmille was a secret agent for the French resistance. He had no intention of delivering the Jews. It was all a cover for French mobilization.
SECTION III F
German I
ntelligence
The Section received from Paris a dossier in which there was found information about a special bureau in Lyon which, under the cover of a census of the population, was in fact a secret mobilization office. We had been informed that nearly all the directors of that office were General Officers or Superior Officers [of the resistance]. The Demographic Office could find, in a matter of moments, using special cards, all the specialists (Aviators, Tank Drivers, Mechanics, etc…. [both the] officers and enlisted personnel) needed to make up organized units…. This was not a census bureau but rather an office of mobilization.
Walter Wilde
special agent153
Carmille had deceived the Nazis. In fact, he had been working with French counter-intelligence since 1911. During the worst days of Vichy, Carmille was always considered one of the highest-placed operatives of the French resistance, a member of the so-called “Marco Polo Network” of saboteurs and spies. Carmille’s operation had generated some 20,000 fake identity passes. And he had been laboring for months on a database of 800,000 former soldiers in France who could be instantly mobilized into well-planned units to fight for liberation. Under his plan, 300,000 men would be ready to go. He had their names, addresses, their military specialties, and all their occupational skills. He knew which ones were metal workers specializing in curtain rods, and which were combat-ready troops.154
As for column 11 asking for Jewish identity, the holes were never punched—the answers were never tabulated.155 More than 100,000 cards of Jews sitting in his office—never handed over.156 He foiled the entire enterprise.
Two punch cards were secretly obtained and sent to Gestapo headquarters at Hotel Lutetia in Paris. Carmille was exposed. Some German officers demanded his immediate arrest along with the fourteen-member senior staff of the National Statistics Services. But German intelligence officer Wilde reasoned that someone needed to run the tabulators so that crucial work brigades could still be marshaled to Germany. After all, the strictly occupational information was indeed up-to-date. So Carmille was allowed to continue his operation. But automated Jewish information was now beyond Nazi reach.157