by Edwin Black
But among American forces, there existed a cohesive group of men with a common identification. As former employees of International Business Machines on leave from their company jobs, they affectionately referred to themselves as “IBM Soldiers.”
The framework for IBM’s continuing bond with its employees at war began long before America joined the conflict. At Christmas 1940, Watson informed all employees soon to be drafted into the military that they would be granted three months pay, up to $4,000, while absent. The money would be paid to inductees in twelve monthly installments, a comforting stipend for the family back home while the men were in uniform.26
Making it clear they were still part of the IBM Family with careers waiting after military service, Watson announced, “We shall miss you during the time you are away, but we feel that your year’s training will be beneficial to you physically, mentally and morally. As a result of this training, we believe you will come back to our company better equipped for future service in the IBM…. If such is the case, you will be given an opportunity to earn increased compensation. We want you to know that your friends in the company are back of you in every way, and if at any time we can be of help to you please let us know.”27
When the U.S. military formed its Machine Record Units (MRU), IBM employees, or those IBM had trained, became the backbone of the elite MRU forces. IBMers also commanded in other key areas, especially in administrative units, where their experience would be instrumental. In the minds of many of these men, unswerving loyalty to Thomas Watson and devotion to IBM was completely consistent with military discipline in the field and loyalty to the Allied cause. As a result, when IBM Soldiers happened upon Dehomag equipment and factories, they did not see evidence of a war crime to docket or a key Nazi industrial installation to capture. They saw something inspiring and beloved that needed protection and to be returned to its rightful owner. IBM’s cause was their cause.
SOMEWHERE IN GERMANY
Thursday, April 26, 1945
Dear Mr. Watson:
Today I received your letter of congratulations upon my promotion to Corporal. It is impossible to state the wonderful effects your letter gives me especially as a morale builder. And in this respect I feel certain that I am speaking for each and every one of the fellow IBM Soldiers. Your letters and those of the executives received by us go a long way to make our lives over here in the ETC [European Theater Command] a much happier one.
It seems appropriate that today I should receive your letter; the day I returned from paying a visit to the “Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft” in Sindelfingen. My Captain, a fellow [IBM] soldier, and myself were the first Americans to set foot in the plant since the war. [Dehomag employees] Mr. Otto Haug and Mr. Wiesinger were our personal guides and I can assure you, Mr. Watson that I felt a little thrilled seeing on a small scale what I witnessed in your factory at Endicott in the winter of 1940. The entire [Dehomag] factory is intact, spared for some unknown reason by our airmen.
At Sindelfingen, I found a sub-assembly plant with many parts on hand and in very good condition. Every tool, every machine is well-preserved ready to start work at a moment’s notice…. a card stock of over a million cards [is] ready for shipment plus two hundred rolls of paper stock, stored away securely in a properly ventilated cellar.
At Holzgerlingen, six kilometers south of Sindelfingen there is a service bureau; two tabulators type 297, one multiplier—601, two sorters—080, 522 summary key punch and four key punches—016. Mr. Haug moved the service bureau here because it appeared safer from bombing attacks.
Time and duty did not permit me to investigate further but the following items Mr. Haug gave me: all spare parts and replacement parts were moved from Stuttgart to Kuchen. Here also you shall find the wiring department, plugboard and small assembly plants. Hechingen is the gathering point for all sub-assemblies. Here everything was assembled and Mr. Haug believes the plant is not bombed but in good condition. At Berlin, there is still a sub-unit assembly plant. Mr. Rottke, Mr. Hummel and Mr. Haug sometime in last autumn made all the above changes… as a safety measure. At Sindelfingen, Mr. Haug and Mr. Wiesinger have done a wonderful job in spite of very trying difficulties and the plant being 100 % intact could be very beneficial to the Allied Armies for spare parts, paper stock and such.
As you so well know Mr. Watson, fraternization is forbidden, but in this instance I was working under orders handed down in a directive to all MRUs from the Supreme Headquarters. All my dealings with Mr. Haug and Mr. Wiesinger were only of this nature but I know they would like to be remembered to you.
Sincerely yours,
James T. Senn
Fourth MRU28
Senn’s letter was typical. Watson received reports from any number of sources, whether IBM Soldiers or Dehomag employees. Dehomag staffers were able to direct their messages through IBM Soldiers, who would pass them on through the ordinary mail. Whether an IBM Soldier or a Dehomag employee, most asked for instructions guiding their next effort on behalf of the corporation.
For example, on May 10, just two days after Berlin fell, Dehomag engineer Alfred Dicke, dutifully dispatched an emergency message to Watson in New York: “Hereby I wish to inform you,” reported Dicke, “of the transfer of the Patent Department… from the plant in Berlin to Hechingen/Hohenzollern, a town… which you know from your visit in former days. On account of the frequent air attacks on Berlin and the approach of the Allied Armies it became impossible to remain in Berlin any longer, and it was necessary to bring the valuable patent files, of which many documents cannot be reproduced, to safer places.29
“The plant in Berlin,” Dicke continued, “has been gradually destroyed by incendiary bombs since 1943. Most of the departments have been transferred to different places in southern Germany, so that one cannot speak any more of a main office in Berlin…. Would you find it advisable to move the complete files to the ‘Compagnie Electro-Comptable’… [in] Paris or to the ‘International Business Machines Corporation’ in Geneva?”30
On August 22, 1945, Capt. Leonard V. Salisbury, A Company, 750 Tank Battalion, sent a short note to IBM advising that a letter from IBM’s Berlin tax attorney had been sent via the Rochester, New York, factory. Salisbury also dispatched a report of his own personal inspection of the Lichterfelde factory and office. “The outstanding observation I noticed,” reported Salisbury, “was the optimism of [Dehomag managers] Mr. Cimbal, Mr. Kolm and Mr. Brockman for the future business of IBM in this, a shattered city. With such a spirit, the future is very bright. If I can be of any aid as liaison or otherwise will be only be too glad to do so… I hope to see all my IBM friends by Christmas.”31
The same steady flow of information reached IBM NY from American forces elsewhere in liberated Europe. In one instance, IBM became impatient for reports on the Dehomag facility in Austria when it had heard no news for three weeks. William W. Bass of IBM NY’s Foreign Trade Department communicated with his son, an army lieutenant stationed in Vienna. Lieutenant Bass in turn provided a report which was passed from the military headquarters in Vienna to the State Department in Washington, and from there to IBM NY.32
In the chaotic first months of the Allied occupation of Germany, a faithful, if officious, network of IBM Soldiers tried to outdo each other in advancing the cause of Dehomag. Perhaps none caused the waves that Lt. Col. Lawrence G. Flick did. The Russians arrested Rottke on May 11 for his Nazi connections. Allied forces arrested Hummel shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Colonel Flick, an MRU officer, tried his best to help IBM by restoring Dehomag’s prior management.33
On September 2, 1945, Flick wrote a long letter to Watson. “I am leaving Berlin tomorrow for Frankfurt,” he advised. “There I shall endeavor to locate Karl Hummel and do what I can to expedite his return to Berlin. As you will see later, there is a considerable difference of opinion amongst those involved in handling the affairs of Dehomag. But on two things all seem to be agreed. One is the return of Dr. Rottke. This I am afraid is highly probl
ematical. Although some have returned after arrest by the Russians, they are few and usually not in the best physical condition. Second is the return of Hummel. This can be accomplished if his health permits his travelling under the existing very trying conditions.34
“Last evening,” continued Flick, “I spent with Captain Arthur D. Reed, Property Control Officer of the Military Government. He is the custodian of all businesses, a highly intelligent and earnest man of about forty…. Captain Reed is in accord with any personal efforts I have and can make on behalf of my company. He is sold on… Fellinger, and has given him a position of trust with his section, that of trustee of former Nazi businesses. He also uses Fellinger as counsillor on IBM policy.35
“After my conversation with Captain Reed,” Flick went on, “it was agreed that I might communicate with Fellinger through him, and, if you so desire, I will forward any directions in this manner until more normal communications are restored. Also through Reed, I was able to locate Major Andrew Haensel from whom you may have heard through [Watson aide] Jack Kenney. I spent the morning with Haensel and am forwarding some reports on this meeting as enclosures hereto…. Haensel has done an outstanding job of cooperation insofar as he can do so within existing regulations. The same is true of Captain Reed. I made arrangements with Haensel, to forward any communications to the present executives of the company here in Berlin, with a copy to Reed and vice versa. Thus, any correspondence will be entirely on the up and up, and will by the same token be subject to military screening. The three of us will keep in touch with one another as stated.”36
Flick also addressed the difficulty of significant cash accounts in Germany that were blocked and therefore unavailable to defray the day-to-day needs of Dehomag.
“The company [Dehomag] needs cash,” wrote Flick. “Reed, Haensel, and Fellinger have all indicated that a matter of one hundred fifty thousand marks will keep the breath of life in the organization for a period of three months when it might be possible to operate more normally once again. If I get to Hamburg I will endeavor to do something about this if it can be done within existing regulations. Haensel, who is quite thoroughly informed, holds out little hope that any capital in Berlin will be available for a long time.”37
Flick concluded his long report to Watson, “In the meanwhile I would appreciate hearing from you on the matter of how much interest any of the IBMers should continue to take in European business, etc. Until I hear further, I shall endeavor to pick up any and all data that may be of interest to you. It is of course obvious that much of the data may already be available to you or may duplicate information, which you have had for some time. There is no way of avoiding this, and it is only with the hope that what is gathered may be of help to the home office, that we in the field, are gathering with considerable difficulty, the material which is being sent in.”38
Watson did not appreciate the help. In IBM’s view, the IBM Soldiers rendered invaluable service to the company. But he saw Flick’s helpfulness trying to restore Hummel as unwanted interference. Watson had no intention of re-empowering the leaders of the Dehomag revolt, and any manager with a claim to a percentage on profits. Watson possessed the ability to send a single letter from his office that would reach directly into the bombed-out sectors of Berlin. He wanted Flick silenced and removed. He ordered Chauncey to Washington with a letter.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1945
The Honorable William L. Clayton
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I have just received a letter from Lt. Col. Lawrence G. Flick, who is on leave of absence from the International Business Machines Corporation, in the Military Service, a photostatic copy of which I enclose. In the first and fourth paragraphs he refers to restoring Mr. Karl Hummel to the Management. We do not want any of our IBM people in the Military Service discussing anything of this kind with any of our German representatives because we do not know how many of the German employees we will take back into the organization, when our business is re-instated in Germany.We would like to have Colonel Flick notified of this, and I am asking you to advise Mr. H. K. Chauncey, who presents this letter, as to how the matter can be handled, consistent, of course, with the policies and wishes of the Military authorities in charge.
Sincerely,
Thomas J. Watson
President39
The response was swift. Several days later, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton wrote to his counterpart at the Pentagon.
Dear General Hilldring:
On 21 September 1945 Mr. H. K. Chauncey, of the International Business Machines Corporation, delivered two letters to the Department, copies of which are attached for your information, which indicate that Lt. Colonel Lawrence G. Flick, now on leave from the International Business Machines Corporation and currently assigned to G5 Industry Branch in Berlin, is actively interfering in the management of the German subsidiary of the International Business Machines Corporation. You will note that Mr. Thomas J. Watson, President of the International Business Machines Corporation, requests in his letter to me that Lt. Colonel Flick and any other personnel now on leave from the International Business Machines Corporation while in the military service, be restrained from discussing policy with respect to the affairs of the German subsidiary. I assume that you will request the proper authorities to notify Colonel Flick to this effect….
Sincerely yours,
William Clayton
Assistant Secretary40
Clayton reported back to Watson the same day.
My Dear Mr. Watson:
Pursuant to the suggestion advanced in your letter of September 20, delivered by Mr. Chauncey to officers of this Department, I have addressed a communication to General Hilldring of the War Department General Staff, Civil Affairs Division, notifying him that it is your desire that former employees of the International Business Machines Corporation, now in the military service, shall not perform any actions relating to the management or operation of your German subsidiary. I have advised General Hilldring that the Department at this time does not favor the restoration of private business connections or relations with German firms by persons who are or claim to be acting for the benefit of principals located in the United States.
Sincerely yours,
William Clayton
Assistant Secretary41
In mid-November, Major General Hilldring at the Pentagon forwarded a copy of Watson’s letter directly to Gen. Lucius Clay, Deputy Military Governor in Berlin. This prompted a full army brass investigation of Flick’s well-intentioned actions. By November 19, General Clay had completed the investigation. On November 27, 1945, Hilldring reported back to the State Department, “Lt. Colonel Flick is being returned to the United States for retirement from the Army. Therefore, General Clay has recommended that no further action is necessary.”42
Dehomag, the Berlin company so integral to the Hitler war machine, was never treated as an enemy entity. It was welcomed back as a precious American interest and still under the control of Thomas J. Watson.
* * *
RECAPTURING DEHOMAG was a long, involved process that began within days of Germany’s surrender. On May 18, 1945, IBM NY sent three letters to the State Department’s War Problems Division. The first explained that IBM owned a company called Dehomag that installed equipment around Germany. Certainly, much of that machinery had been moved in the last days of the Third Reich. IBM wanted State Department help in locating every one of those devices. “From January 1937,” IBM’s letter claimed, “Dehomag has failed to give us detailed information of installations in Germany…. Consequently, we do not know the exact location of the machines. We attach a list of the places in which at one time we knew machines were located.” A two-column list itemized eighty-eight German cities and towns where Holleriths had been installed. The statement about not knowing addresses since 1937 was made in spite of IBM’s assistance in preparing the Civil Guide, which included up-to-date addresses
as of 1944 on numerous key Hollerith installations.43
The company’s second letter to the War Problems Division included the addresses of two residential properties that had been managed by IBM’s tax attorney. IBM wanted the rents. “He has, no doubt, accumulated a substantial amount of money for the rentals of the buildings.”44
A third letter just reminded the State Department that by immediately establishing communications with Dehomag, a list of the precise locations of shifted equipment could be obtained.45
Shortly thereafter, the State Department sent instructions to American foreign service officers in Germany and Austria to “extend such protection as may be possible to the property.”46
On October 24, 1945, Chauncey returned triumphantly to Germany to reclaim Dehomag. The setting was quite different from his last visit. Then, in 1941, he never knew from moment to moment whether he would run afoul of the Nazi Party. Now he was in the company of victors.47
Chauncey’s journey began in liberated France, where the U.S. Army assigned Capt. Philip Kober as his escort. The two men traveled to Frankfurt where another escort, Capt. Philip Hayter, joined them. Their first stop was IBM’s Frankfurt office. As he entered the property, Chauncey was abundantly cautious in his demeanor. General Eisenhower had decreed strict “non-fraternization,” forbidding such common courtesies as shaking hands with Germans, engaging in friendly conversation, or visiting in German homes. IBM could adapt to any geo-political setting. When the rule was banquets and social graces, the company could summon up corporate celebrations and par-take of festive extravangazas at a moment’s notice. Now under strictures of cold communication, IBM could exhibit regulation chilliness. In that vein, Chauncey visibly asked his military escorts’ permission before conversing with anyone, spoke only in the presence of officers, and even declined to look at papers unless cleared in advance. After first obtaining permission to speak to IBM’s Frankfurt manager, Chauncey, in a dispassionate, formal tone, requested a complete list of financial data on the office. Little more was discussed with the Dehomag manager.48