by Guy Arnold
Poverty across the Sahel belt, remoteness and the desire of politicians to break the French stranglehold on their economic systems contributed over these years to make for political upheavals. Moussa Traoré became Mali’s undisputed head of state in April 1971. He improved relations with France (after his predecessor Keita’s more aggressive anti-French socialism) but he did not break relations with the USSR. Traoré faced several coup attempts during the early 1970s and unrest among the military, the civil service and the students who remained loyal to Keita. The government found it was unable to reform state enterprises without the co-operation of the civil service, which was withheld, and there were no willing foreign investors. In June 1974 the government held a referendum on a new constitution and claimed a 99 per cent vote in favour of its proposals, which included a return to civilian rule. The effect was spoilt, however, when the government announced that it would remain in power for a further five years while a new political party was formed. This party, the Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), was announced in 1976. The death of the former ruler Keita in detention in 1977 provoked a series of anti-government riots. In 1979 a constituent congress of the UDPM was held and a national council of the party was chosen. This was followed in June by presidential and legislative elections in which the official list of candidates received 99 per cent of the votes.
President Hamari Diori ruled Niger from independence in 1960 to 1974 during which time French influence was pervasive; the French maintained a presence in the country and a military garrison at Niamey much as though the colonial era had not come to an end. President Pompidou visited the country in October 1972 and his appearance led to anti-French demonstrations by students while President Diori, agreeing with the students, said publicly that France’s attitude towards Niger was paternalist and outdated. He criticised SOMAIR, the French mining consortium, which had failed to reach its targets in extracting the country’s rich uranium deposits. Diori’s conversion to mild radicalism came too late and in April 1974 he was overthrown in a coup that brought the Army Chief of Staff Lt-Col. Seyni Kountché to power as President. Kountché was considerably more radical than his predecessor: he tackled the problem of endemic corruption and tried to deal more effectively with the impact of the Sahel famine. He established a Conseil Militaire Supreme (CMS), demanded the withdrawal of French troops and exerted pressure upon SOMAIR to accept a 33 per cent government holding. A decree of 27 March 1975 banned foreigners from participating in a number of business activities. Then, in February 1976, Kountché sacked four of the top military men in his government and created a mainly civilian government.
In Chad the rebel Front de Libération National du Tchad (FROLINAT) (Chad Liberation Front) became steadily more powerful during the early 1970s under the leadership of Goukouni Oueddei and Libya became its principal backer, providing offices for it in Tripoli. Following an attempted coup against him, President Tombalbaye broke diplomatic relations with Libya. Thereafter Gaddafi openly backed FROLINAT and provided it with tanks and anti-aircraft missiles. Although under Goukouni’s leadership FROLINAT achieved some substantial successes and captured a number of northern towns such as Bardai and Faya-Largeau, the movement like many others split into a number of factions. Goukouni was too independent for Gaddafi who switched his support to a rival group under Ahmed Acyl. Another faction, the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) (Northern Armed Forces), emerged under the leadership of Hissène Habré and this gradually became the dominant arm of FROLINAT. In 1973 Libya moved troops into the Aozou Strip. This region of approximately 50,000 square miles adjoined the southern border of Libya and contained rich uranium deposits. Libya based its claim on a 1935 Franco-Italian protocol that, however, had not been ratified. In 1975 the army overthrew Tombalbaye and Gen. Félix Malloum became President of the Supreme Military Council. The war continued indecisively to 1978 when Malloum met Habré in Khartoum and the two men agreed a ceasefire, which, however, collapsed almost at once. The Chad army then suffered a series of reverses at the hands of FAN under Habré. In mid-1978 France, which had withdrawn its forces from Chad in 1972, sent a substantial number of troops to support the government of Malloum; Libya responded by sending between 2,000 and 3,000 troops in support of FROLINAT. In February 1979 Habré ousted Malloum in a coup and this led in turn to a civil war in the south of the country between Muslims and blacks. Chad’s neighbours now became seriously alarmed at the possibility of the war spreading into neighbouring countries and their pressures, as well as those of France, persuaded Gaddafi to withdraw – at least for the time being. The war would continue through the 1980s.
East of the Sahel, Africa’s largest state, Sudan, was to enjoy its best decade since independence. When he came to power in 1969 Gaafar Nimeiri inaugurated a policy of Sudanese Socialism. In 1971 the Communists led by Maj. Hashim al-Ata carried out a coup on 19 July, temporarily ousting Nimeiri who went into hiding. However, a popular uprising in favour of Nimeiri brought an end to the takeover in three days. Nimeiri’s popularity then soared and relations with the West improved though he did not break off relations with the Communist countries. In presidential elections that October Nimeiri obtained four million votes against 56,000 nos. Then, in March 1972, Nimeiri achieved his greatest success when the Addis Ababa Agreement with the Anya Nya rebels brought the civil war to an end and gave regional autonomy to the South. Nimeiri then embarked upon a pragmatic policy that included a number of important development projects. He excluded from government the right-wing parties and these then organized themselves in the National Front (NF). In 1977 he entered into a secret agreement with Sadiq al-Mahdi, who enjoyed considerable popular support, for a policy of National Reconciliation, with the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) as the sole legitimate party. Nimeiri was to retain his appeal to the people and his grip on politics until the end of the decade.
In Kenya, through the 1970s until his death, Kenyatta became increasingly autocratic, a role that appealed to the remaining white settlers who liked ‘strong government’ by ‘good old Mzee’. The National Assembly was largely bypassed while effective power was wielded by a triumvirate of ministers under Kenyatta: Mbiya Koinange, the Minister of State in the President’s office; Njoroge Mungai, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General. In the elections of 1974 Kenyatta was returned unopposed as President but of 158 members of the assembly 88 lost their seats to be replaced by other KANU candidates under the one-party structure. There was mounting unrest during 1975 that included bomb explosions in Nairobi. Then, in March, came the murder in mysterious circumstances of Josiah Kariuki, probably by a government ‘hit’ squad. At that time Kariuki was the most popular radical figure in the country and the focus of anti-government criticism. A parliamentary committee investigated his death, but the names of two leading politicians mentioned in the report as being linked to his death were deleted at Kenyatta’s insistence and no charges were brought. Accusations of corruption were increasingly levelled at the Kenyatta family, and especially at Mama Ngina, the President’s wife. Elections scheduled for 1977 that might have revealed the extent of anti-government feelings were cancelled. On 22 August 1978 Kenyatta, aged 82, died peacefully in his bed at the Mombasa State House. Despite predictions of trouble, especially in the British press, and suggestions that a bloodbath would ensue after Kenyatta died, nothing of the sort happened. Kenyatta’s body was flown to Nairobi to lie in state until what was to be the grandest and most solemn funeral witnessed anywhere in independent Africa took place. Daniel arap Moi, Vice-President since 1967, succeeded to the presidency smoothly, according to the constitution and a campaign to secure his acceptance that was brilliantly masterminded by Charles Njonjo who became a powerful ‘kingmaker’ in the process. Moi began his presidency well. He demoted members of the Kikuyu old guard and appointed Mwai Kibaki, a younger, more radical Kikuyu, his Vice-President. He announced immediate elections and indicated his determination to tackle the endemic corruption that appeared to have become part
of national life. If anything, Moi became more pro-West in his external policies than his predecessor. The press became noticeably more outspoken during this honeymoon period. By 1980, however, criticism of Moi’s government in the National Assembly and from students increased sharply. Despite attempts by Moi to attract him back into the ranks of KANU, Oginga Odinga, who had been sacked as Vice-President by Kenyatta in 1966 for his ‘radical’ views, instead launched an attack upon land grabbing and the 1980s seemed set for widening political conflict.
In the tiny states of Burundi and Rwanda Hutu-Tutsi antagonisms were rarely far from the surface. In April 1972, in an attempt at a comeback, Ntare V mounted an unsuccessful coup against President Micombero of Burundi only to provide him with an excuse to blame the Hutu and carry out an extensive purge; this escalated into a number of bloody massacres in which at least 100,000 Hutus were murdered while deliberate efforts were made to eliminate all literate Hutu. A further 100,000 were rendered homeless and many fled as refugees into neighbouring countries. Micombero restructured the government in 1973 by appointing a seven-man bureau with himself as President and Prime Minister. The following year a new constitution turned Burundi into a one-party state under Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) with Micombero as its Secretary-General. On 1 November 1976 the Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Jean Baptiste Bagaza overthrew Micombero in a coup. Bagaza tried to reconcile the Hutu and Tutsi. He initiated major land reforms that gave Hutu peasants title to land and he reduced the semi-feudal powers of the Tutsi landlords. Yet, despite his efforts, ethnic hatreds resulting from the massacres of 1972 and a longer past of such confrontations remained deeply embedded in the national conscience and the Tutsi continued as the dominant force in the country. Burundi, which was dependent upon coffee exports for its economic survival, was one of the poorest countries in Africa with a per capita income at that time of about US$220.
In neighbouring Rwanda Hutu-Tutsi rivalries had persisted since before independence in 1962 and by 1965 the Hutu were in total control and had turned Rwanda into a one-party state. In the elections of 1965 and 1969 the Parti de l’Emancipation du Peuple Hutu (Parmehutu) candidates had been returned unopposed and Gregoire Kayibanda was re-elected President. In 1973 there was an outburst of Hutu-Tutsi violence; at the same time there developed increasing distrust between the Hutus at the centre (the government) and those of the north and on 5 July the army, which was mainly controlled by officers from the north, carried out a bloodless coup and Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana from Gizenyi became the new President. The army then dissolved Parmehutu and suspended the 1962 constitution. The new regime was moderate in its approach to Hutu-Tutsi relations and Habyarimana adopted the slogan ‘Peace and national unity’. The policy led to better relations with Burundi. In 1975 Habyarimana formed a new political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND). His aim was to unite the population in economic, social and cultural development. A new constitution was approved by referendum in December 1978 by a 90 per cent vote; President Habyarimana was confirmed in office by a 99 per cent vote.
THREE AFRICAN TYRANTS
The story of Amin’s rule in Uganda – 1971–79 – reflects many of the things that went wrong in Africa at that time. Idi Amin was a brutal, virtually illiterate soldier who was able to seize power in a coup and rule Uganda for nine years during which time he became increasingly tyrannical and was responsible for a growing number of massacres and murders. His coup was quickly recognized by Britain under Edward Heath, who had deeply resented President Obote’s pressures upon him not to sell arms to South Africa at the January 1971 Commonwealth Summit in Singapore. Amin was also quickly recognized by Israel for his then known pro-Israeli stand, though when he later reversed his attitude to Israel he was supported with troops by Gaddafi. In 1979, when Nyerere helped bring about his overthrow, the OAU, which had scrupulously refrained from criticizing Amin’s brutal internal policies, took Nyerere to task for intervening in the internal affairs of a member state.
In January 1971, at the urging of President Nyerere of Tanzania, Obote had gone to the Singapore Commonwealth Summit to oppose plans by the newly elected British Conservative government of Edward Heath to sell arms to South Africa. Before leaving Kampala Obote foolishly asked Amin, then head of the army, for an explanation for his overspending. On 25 January, while Obote was in Singapore, Amin seized power in a bloodless coup. There was considerable evidence to suggest that both Britain and Israel were behind the coup and certainly both were quick to recognize Amin’s government and confer legitimacy upon him. Amin visited several European countries in mid-1971 and in Britain was entertained by the Queen at Windsor Castle, a mark of favour conferred upon the simple soldier as opposed to the socialist Obote. Under Amin Uganda became notorious for the brutalities and massacres carried out on his orders and sometimes with his direct participation so that, despite recognition, he was largely isolated by African opinion as he did increasing damage to the continent’s image, in the process providing racist white Southern Africa with a wonderful ‘justification’ for its supremacist policies.
In the early days after his coup Amin was greeted with enthusiasm. After making himself President and head of state he promised to return Uganda to civilian rule after five years. He gave an amnesty to 55 political prisoners and gained popularity with the Buganda by arranging for the body of the late Kabaka, who had died in London, to be returned home for burial. At the same time, however, Amin carried out a series of massacres of Lari and Acholi troops known to be loyal to Obote and he warned the Asian community to be loyal to his government. In August 1972 Amin announced that all non-citizen Asians should leave Uganda within 90 days. The move was popular with many sections of Uganda society and Britain was forced to accept about 30,000 of them. Britain severed diplomatic relations with Amin and imposed a trade embargo on Uganda; Amin responded by nationalizing all British companies in Uganda without compensation. Such a move was popular elsewhere in Africa since any head of state who stood up to the former colonial powers earned a certain kudos. Amin’s principal and growing preoccupation was with security, control of the army and the elimination of enemies – actual, potential or imagined. His soldiers acted with increasing lawlessness which went unpunished while purges of those seen as inimical to Amin’s power, murders and disappearances became increasingly frequent. In September 1972 pro-Obote soldiers and exiles launched an ill-considered invasion from Tanzania, which proved a disaster. Amin retaliated by bombing Bukoba and Mwanza. By late 1972 Amin had reversed his earlier pro-Israel stand and as a result Gaddafi provided him with arms and troops. In June 1976 an Air France plane en route to Tel Aviv was hijacked to Entebbe by PLO terrorists and 200 passengers were taken hostage with the collaboration of Amin and the army. Israel carried out a spectacular rescue: commandos were flown in and saved all but three hostages while killing a number of Ugandan soldiers and destroying military aircraft, to inflict a devastating blow upon Amin’s prestige. Between 1976 and 1979 Amin’s support in Uganda evaporated and he became increasingly paranoid as he saw plots everywhere. In October 1978, to divert attention from his home problems Amin launched an attack upon Tanzania, devastating the country through which his troops passed in the Kagera salient and reportedly placing troops of doubtful loyalty in the front and then having them massacred from behind. In January 1979 the Tanzanian army invaded Uganda in return in the hope of inspiring a general insurrection to force Amin from power. Two Ugandan exiles, Lt-Col. David Oyite-Ojok and Yoweri Museveni, formed the Uganda National Liberation Army and invaded alongside the Tanzanians. Amin’s army retreated to Kampala and though Gaddafi airlifted in 1,500 troops to assist Amin, and 400 of these perished in the fighting in Kampala, which fell to the anti-Amin forces on 10–11 April. Amin fled, first to Libya and then to Saudi Arabia. In May the invaders occupied the West Nile region forcing troops loyal to Amin to flee into Zaïre and Sudan. A period of disorder followed and continued into the 1980s. An estimated 300,000 Ugandans were
massacred, murdered or disappeared during the Amin years.