by Guy Arnold
Belgium concentrated its aid upon its three ex-colonies or mandates – Zaïre, Burundi and Rwanda – and in 1976 its ODA came to 0.51 per cent of GNP, considerably more generous than Britain’s contribution. One third of its aid went to two Most Seriously Affected (MSA) countries, Burundi and Rwanda, and 41 per cent to Zaïre, which also attracted the bulk of Belgium’s overseas private investment. The heavy concentration of Belgian aid in Zaïre was an indication of its high interest in the economy of that country, an interest that was greatly increased at the time because Mobutu had reversed his nationalization policy.
Dutch aid to Africa grew rapidly during the 1970s from US$73.24 million in 1974 to US$327.97 million in 1977. The Netherlands had no residual colonial connection except its long-standing and deep-seated relationship with South Africa. However, with the Scandinavian countries the Netherlands became one of the first countries to achieve a goal of one per cent of GNP provided in aid. Countries of concentration in Africa were Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. The Swedish aid programme, in both its terms and volume, was more generous than most. Sweden claimed four goals for its aid: a growth of resources; economic and social equalization; economic and political independence; and democratic social development. As one of the richest Western countries with minimal historical involvement in Africa, it was considerably easier for Sweden to produce what might be described as ideologically ‘pure’ aid than was the case for the other major donors. More important, and much welcomed at the time, was Sweden’s aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. According to an official document, Sweden’s Policy for International Development Co-operation (Extracts from the Budget and Finance Bill for Fiscal Year 1978/79):
Particular attention is given to the situation in southern Africa. Increased support is proposed to the so-called front-line states in the area. Sweden’s assistance to the liberation movements, refugees and victims of apartheid in Southern Africa has increased substantially during the last year. Approximately Skr60 million will be used during fiscal year 1977/78 for assistance to the peoples suffering under oppressive military regimes in southern Africa.
Both the stand and the language employed set Sweden apart from the major Western donors. Like Sweden, Norway emerged as one of the most generous aid donors during the 1970s: in 1970 its aid as a percentage of GNP stood at 0.22 per cent but by 1977 had risen to 0.82 per cent. Norway’s response to demands for a New International Economic Order was to emphasize the achievement of broad economic and social progress and a reduction of the rich-poor gap. Norway, in terms of its economy, was substantially more generous than Britain at this time and the Norwegian government reacted angrily in 1978 when Judith Hart claimed that Britain was the first donor to give grant aid. This was untrue, but the fact of the Norwegian anger illustrated one of the constant problems accompanying all aid efforts: the nationalistic rivalries between the various donors. Such rivalries often inhibited the best aid processes: in a recipient country, where it might make sense for different donors to concentrate upon different sectors, none is willing to undertake the least glamorous or politically least rewarding sectors; and all compete with one another for prestige activities while, too often, failing to work properly together. Denmark’s aid contribution was understandably small in relation to the size of its economy; most of its aid in Africa was concentrated upon Kenya and Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zaïre. Aid provided by these smaller European countries – the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark – was generally well received in Africa since the donors were not perceived to be acting in a neo-colonial fashion.
During the 1970s the US approach to African affairs was largely strategic: to support the positions of its two major Western allies, Britain and France, on the continent; and to counter Communist influence wherever this became apparent. Thus, the US became deeply involved in the Horn of Africa following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 when Ethiopia’s military Dergue turned to Moscow for support in its wars against Somalia in the east and secessionist Eritrea in the north; and it also became increasingly involved in Southern Africa when the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, began what was to turn into a long lasting US policy of support for UNITA in opposition to the Marxist MPLA government in Angola. In 1976 Kissinger also attempted to broker a peace initiative in Rhodesia with the principal object of preventing a Marxist form of government coming to power there. In two cases, Tanzania and Botswana, the United States was chiefly concerned to appear to be doing something to counter the more spectacular activity of the Chinese construction of the TANZAM railway. It therefore undertook the upgrading of a stretch of road from Dar es Salam to Morogoro and, according to the rumour current in Dar es Salaam at the time, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) deliberately worked slowly since they were determined to maintain a presence in the country as long as the Chinese were there. More important was USAID’s selection as an aid project of the so-called BOTZAM road in Botswana (it was chosen from a long list of possible projects on which it was placed sixteenth) in order to demonstrate that the United States could also build a ‘Uhuru’ highway.
Africa as a source of minerals was also becoming more important to the United States as the Russian African specialist, L. Valentin, wrote in Pravda:
In US imports, the share of strategic raw materials imported from Africa amounts to 100 per cent of industrial diamonds, 58 per cent of the uranium, 44 per cent of the manganese, which is used in the steel smelting industry, 36 per cent of the cobalt, essential for aircraft engines and high strength alloys, 33 per cent of its oil and 23 per cent of its chromium, used in the manufacture of armour, aircraft engines and gun barrels.2
Pravda emphasized the military aspect of the US pursuit of raw materials; but growing dependence on African minerals was a key to American policy in Africa, especially in relation to a country such as Zaïre. Despite these strategic considerations, and the rather artificial black American-African relationship that grew up at this time, there was a general US lack of interest in Africa which was amply testified to in mid-1978 when Senator George McGovern said: ‘Africa is not fundamental to American interests, and we cannot do much about it anyway.’ The United States was generally much more ruthless than other donors in giving or withholding aid according to the level of support it received, for example in the United Nations, from its aid recipients. Small nations that opposed the American position in the United Nations over Zionism or Korea found their aid agreements running into trouble. These might be delayed or cancelled and, as one US official put it: ‘When our Ambassador comes to them and complains about their votes in the UN, and a few weeks later an aid transaction falls through, they get the message.’
Two other substantial donors were Canada and Japan. Like most other Western donors, Canada began to put greater emphasis upon assistance to the poorest, and in Africa concentrated upon rural development and food production. Uniquely among Western donors, Canada was bilingual in English and French and made a point of providing aid equally to Anglophone and Francophone African countries. During this decade Canada enjoyed a high reputation as an aid donor, not least because it was not regarded as a threat and in any event its aid by the mid-1970s had only reached a figure of just over US$100 million a year. Japan was principally interested in obtaining a range of African minerals. Japan’s aid programme in Africa began slowly but was stepped up dramatically in 1977, by which year Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Niger, Gabon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Madagascar were all substantial recipients of Japanese aid. By the end of the decade Japan had become a major donor in Africa, on a par with Britain and France; its concern was to find new sources of raw materials for its huge industrial expansion and new markets for its exports.
The growing emphasis placed upon aid to the poorest by Western donors through the decade was in response to the demands for a New International Economic Order. None of the Western donors was interested in ch
anging the existing order – the 16 DAC countries had all voted against the NIEO or abstained in the United Nations General Assembly – but they did feel the political necessity of doing something. An increase in aid, with the emphasis upon the poorest people and countries, was part of their response.
One other major non-Communist source of aid at this time came from the oil states and despite African frustration at what they regarded as a slow start3, aid disbursements from the oil-rich states were to reach a level of five per cent of GNP in the second half of the 1970s as opposed to the much lower average of 0.5 per cent for the DAC countries. There was, however, a great imbalance in Arab aid disbursements, with Arab states such as Egypt and Sudan being favoured first before non-Arab, non-Islamic states elsewhere in Africa. Even so, by the late 1970s something like 10 per cent of aid to Africa from all sources was then coming from the Arab world.
COMMUNIST AID
Both the Soviet Union and China were already significant aid donors in Africa when the 1970s began and both were concerned with the Cold War dimensions of their aid. Speaking of Soviet aid to Africa, Leonard Brezhnev said that ‘the Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate aspirations of young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth’. And, according to Polar Star, it was the Soviet view that the best way for such states to build up a powerful and independent economy lay through the development of their own industry: ‘Assistance in the formation and development of this is the main direction of the Soviet Union’s co-operation with new African states.’4 The Soviet Union had agreements for economic and technical co-operation with more than 30 African states. The Russians insisted that their credits had no political, economic or other strings attached to them and, to quote Brezhnev again, ‘the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases’. Had all this been true the Soviet aid performance would have been unique. A statement of Soviet aid principles in the June 1978 issue of Polar Star highlighted the most important aspect of Soviet assistance, which was mutual advantage:
Mutual advantage is an important principle of Soviet economic cooperation with African countries. On the one hand, developing states consolidate their economies with Soviet assistance, and, on the other hand, the USSR receives, as payment for its credits, the commodities necessary for its own economy: minerals, tropical timber, coffee, cocoa, etc. Importantly, in addition to traditional African exports, the Soviet Union is getting increasingly more industrial products from the enterprises built with Soviet technical assistance.
The aim of Soviet aid, which was almost entirely bilateral, was to contribute to a division of labour between the USSR and recipients, so that the former obtained raw materials and light manufactured goods in return for heavy industrial goods. This Soviet approach ‘raises the question whether economic co-operation with the Soviet Union implies a real alternative for the developing countries to the economic co-operation with the Western capitalist countries’.5 Although it was probably the case that Soviet aid did promote a different development pattern to that of aid from the West, the amount on offer was insufficient to make a serious difference. The Soviet Union was mainly concerned to import from Africa such commodities as long-staple cotton, fruit and edible oils, coffee, cocoa and raw hides. As with Western donors, Soviet aid – apart from contributions to multilateral organizations such as the World Bank to which it did not belong – divided into similar categories as Western aid: grants, loans with a considerable grant element, technical assistance and trade credits. Most Soviet aid was capital intensive and led to a considerable demand subsequently for spare parts and maintenance. By the mid-1970s Africa had built more than 350 power projects in collaboration with socialist countries. The main countries of concentration for Soviet aid were Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo, Somalia and Guinea.
China’s first real economic impact on Africa came in 1964 when Chou En-lai visited Africa and in Mali enunciated the eight principles of Chinese aid. Between 1954 and 1971 Chinese credits and grants amounted to US$1.112 billion although the figure is misleading since a considerable proportion of the sum represents credits that were never taken up. Even so, the figure represents just over half of all Chinese aid for the period. Up to 1972 the main beneficiaries of China’s aid were Mali, Egypt, Sudan, Guinea and Algeria but from that date China expanded its activities to include Togo, Rwanda, Burundi, Ghana, Cameroon and Zaïre. In 1973 it expanded its activities again into Chad, Senegal and Upper Volta, and that year Chinese commitments south of the Sahara made it the chief Communist donor in the region. Once African countries had begun to establish diplomatic relations with China in the early 1970s, the Chinese response was to offer aid. There was no obvious pattern to Chinese aid although the guiding principle at this time was the desire to become a leader of the Third World. The exception was the TANZAM railway. China began the construction of this 1,100-mile rail line in 1970, the year the Russian-built Aswan High Dam in Egypt was completed, and it became the largest single aid project under construction on the continent. It showed China in a favourable light, both with regard to its Communist rival, the Soviet Union, and in relation to the principal Western donors. The sheer size of the TANZAM project (see below, chapter 18) placed China in the forefront of aid donors in Africa and, for a time, persuaded African leaders that there was a viable alternative to Western aid.
By the 1970s the phrase ‘trade not aid’ had become a constant in discussions about development and in 1962 the UN General Assembly had recognized trade as ‘the chief engine of development’. Unfortunately, for Africa, the weakness of its trading position lay in the fact that 70 per cent of its revenues came from the export of primary products and that the control of prices for these products was not in the Africa producer states’ hands. This fact made the deliberations of such bodies as UNCTAD of crucial importance to the continent as a whole. The Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) was held in Santiago, Chile, from 13 April to 19 May 1972. It represented a new global effort to change the existing pattern of world trade in order to assist developing countries and initiate reforms in the international monetary system. The UN had declared the 1970s the Second Development Decade and set a target of boosting the growth of developing countries by at least 6 per cent a year and per capita income by 3.5 per cent. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Manuel Perez Guerrero, pointed out that the capital resources transferred by the developed countries as a group to the developing countries were lower as a proportion of GNP in 1970 than they had been in 1960. He said that aid should be defined to include only those flows which are ‘concessional’ in nature and whose primary purpose is development; and that an equitable sharing of aid obligation required that all developed countries supplied at least a minimum amount of ‘official development assistance’. Of the 25 countries nominated as the least developed, 16 were in Africa: Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta.6
At a meeting in the Philippines in preparation for UNCTAD IV in 1976, the Manila Declaration was issued calling for measures to be taken by the developed countries and international organizations, such as the World Bank, to resolve and alleviate ‘the critical debt problem of developing countries’. However, no agreement was reached on the question of debts at the UNCTAD IV meeting held in Nairobi, although subsequently a number of countries, led by Canada, unilaterally cancelled ODA debts owed by the least developed countries. That year 20 low-income African countries were in debt to the extent of US$6,908 million and of those six owed debts in excess of 35 per cent of their GNPs. Over these years a steady proliferation of organizations concerned with aid and development made their appearance on the international stage and an eloquently dry comment on this process of growth was made in the 1978 Report of the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA), Adebayo Adedeji:
The year 1978 did not differ in terms of conventional measurements from 1977 or the years before that. Demand and production in advanced countries… continued to affect African exports unfavourably, with the exception of cocoa, coffee, timber, uranium and bauxite. Inflation continued. Debt accumulation continued too. So did imports of food, all with consequent effects on growth rates…
In other words, despite (or because of) all the aid efforts of all the donors, both bilateral and multilateral, the position of the recipients remained as bad and as dependent as ever. The financial operations in Africa of the World Bank and its affiliates, the IMF and the private banks, were very substantial and money was available – at a price – for development purposes. Personnel were also available, on terms of one kind or another, and the UNDP, for example, was heavily engaged in Africa. Yet, despite the size of aid inputs and statistics that revealed marginal increases in growth, higher literacy rates or some other ‘development’ improvement, developing countries still required massive assistance while, at the same time, the gap between them and the advanced economies grew larger and self-reliance eluded them.
At the end of February 1979, representatives of the Third World met in Arusha in preparation for UNCTAD V, which was scheduled for the following May in Manila. The meeting brought out the weakness of Third World countries. President Nyerere called upon the Third World to forget its differences and speak with one voice in its negotiations with the developed world:
The truth is that we need power to negotiate, just as we need power to go on strike. So far we have been negotiating as noisy and importunate supplicants. We need to negotiate from a position of steadily increasing power.
It was one thing to pinpoint the weakness of the Third World negotiating position, yet at the end of the decade no African state was on record as saying that it did not want aid or could dispense with it; in most cases it was simply a question of how much they could obtain.