by Guy Arnold
SOMALIA AND THE OGADEN BORDER
‘Somalia is probably the one country in Africa where the people can justifiably claim to be of the same origin. The various clan groupings notwithstanding, there is a remarkable degree of homogeneity in the origins of the Somali people. Theoretically, therefore, one might presuppose it should be reasonably simple to devise workable solutions that could cater for the aspirations of all the various groupings in Somalia.’8 Siad Barre worked on that assumption after coming to power by means of a coup on 1969. By 1973 Siad Barre had provided Somalia with three and a half years of strong government. The economy had vastly improved and a sense of nationhood seemed to have developed. In Mogadishu notices proclaimed: ‘We have chosen Scientific Socialism because it is the only way for rapid transformation of the country into a developed and economically advanced nation.’ President Barre had preached a fiery new Marxist ideology and had tried to grab his country by the scruff of its neck and impose discipline, dedication and development. A revolution was needed in traditional Somali society most of whose three million people were cattle-rearing nomads. According to one sympathetic observer of Barre’s government at this time, ‘Soon the nomads will be driving their cattle to projected state farms and World Bank fattening centres, where the animals will be kept on irrigated pastures and fed modern feedlots until ready for export. President Siad Barre has developed military-style campaigns to eradicate tribalism, and to get the people to work and transform the economy into a modern state.’ It was an idyllic picture of reform and even if correct at the time it was not to last. ‘No longer is Somalia a banana economy, reeling under the closure of the Suez Canal. Though the banana trade is healthy, with Italy taking its quota and new markets opening in the Arab states, livestock is now by far the most important export and the giant Russian meat factory at the southern port of Kismayo is canning meat to capacity, with plans for vast expansion in frozen meat and corned beef.’9 Up to 1973 the most successful part of the Barre revolution was the livestock programme, which accounted for 70 per cent of export earnings, while 60 per cent of the population depended upon it. The programme emphasized the introduction of new veterinary services and improved breeding stock.
Perhaps the most important social reform at this time was the introduction of Somali as a written language using the Latin script. The first Somali newspaper appeared in October 1972 and civil servants had to sit a language examination in January 1973 while Somali was now to be the sole language, replacing English and Italian. Small-scale industries were established but agriculture remained the core activity and, apart from cattle, consisted of maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, sugar, sesame seed, bananas and other fruit. US reports at the time indicated the presence in Somalia of 2,500 Russian military advisers and argued that the USSR wanted Somalia to give it a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean though this US conclusion was denied by the Somali government. Siad Barre had turned away from the West after the revolution that brought him to power to seek aid from Russia and China ‘where there would be no strings attached’. He made plain his non-commitment in the Cold War: ‘Somalia has told Russia and China that she will not be used as a base in the defence strategy of the Communist powers and that the Horn of Africa cannot be militarily aligned with any of the great power blocs. This is because Somalia does not want to jeopardize her policy of “positive neutrality” and endanger her peacekeeping role in Africa.’10 However, Barre came to realize that the money, materials, arms and expertise provided with apparent magnanimity by Russia and China had a price after all. There occurred at this time widespread distribution in Somalia of anti-capitalist literature and pro-Marxist and pro-Maoist ideological material.
Despite the successes of his revolution, Barre had to deal with the Ogaden question, which was central to Somali nationalism. Successive Somali governments had disputed the status of the Ogaden region ever since independence in 1960. The Somalis referred to the Ogaden as Western Somalia, regarded it as a Somali region under foreign (Ethiopian) domination and demanded self-determination for it. Ethiopia, on the other hand, took the view that the Ogaden region was an integral part of its territory and regarded Somali claims as acts of aggression against Ethiopian integrity and insisted that Somalia should accept the boundaries as they had existed when it became independent in 1960. This Ethiopian position had been greatly strengthened when the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in Cairo in July 1964, had passed one of its first and most important resolutions ‘that all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence’. This resolution had not been accepted by Somalia. Relations between the two countries deteriorated in 1964 when Somalia supported guerrilla incursions across the border. However, in 1967 the Somali government of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal favoured dialogue and a communiqué published simultaneously in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu on 22 September affirmed that Ethiopia and Somalia had agreed to ‘eliminate all forms of tension’ between them.
However, when Siad Barre came to power in 1969 he determined to reopen the border question and his determination was reinforced by the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974. However, he soon discovered that the Dergue, which took over the government of Ethiopia, was no more willing to open the question than had been the old Emperor. In 1977, therefore, the Somali government stopped restraining the various Somali irredentist groups that regularly infiltrated into the Ogaden. The chief group was the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), followed by the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). As a result guerrilla violence escalated through 1977 and in September the Somalis captured the Ethiopian town of Jigiga and then advanced on Harar. In January 1978 an Ethiopian counter-attack, supported by Soviet and Cuban forces, was launched and in early March Jigiga was recaptured followed by a number of strategic points in the region. Even so, Somali guerrilla forces continued to operate over a wide area of the Ogaden while broadcasts from Mogadishu claimed they had inflicted heavy casualties on the Ethiopians and their Cuban allies.
Meanwhile, the USSR had changed sides. In 1977, as the Marxist-oriented Dergue emerged with absolute control in Ethiopia, the USSR abandoned its policy of providing arms for Somalia and threw its support behind Ethiopia, which it saw as being strategically far more valuable as an ally. On 9 February 1978, Somalia ordered a general mobilization and the following day the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, declared that the US would supply arms to Somalia in the event of Ethiopian aggression, which was a somewhat curious statement given that Somalia had been the aggressor. Only on 21 February did the Somali government admit the presence of its troops in the Ogaden alongside the WSLF guerrillas, by which time Somalia was claiming that Ethiopia had launched air attacks upon its towns. On 8 March, responding to a US peace proposal, the Somali government announced that all regular Somali troops were to be withdrawn from the Ogaden. Somalia then appealed to the great powers to ensure ‘the withdrawal of all foreign forces present in the Horn of Africa’ and called for ‘recognition by the interested parties of the right to self-determination’ of the Ogaden people and sought the initiation of a process which would lead to ‘a negotiated, peaceful, just and durable settlement’. Ethiopia responded on 11 March that the requirement for a just and durable peace would be the unconditional abandonment by Somalia of all claims to territory in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The dispute would continue after the Ogaden war of 1977–78 was over with ongoing Somali support for the WSLF though it denied direct involvement. By May 1978 thousands of refugees from the Ogaden were pouring into Somalia. It took until the end of 1980 for Ethiopian forces to reoccupy almost all the territory of the Ogaden up to the Somali border, having by then expelled most of the WSLF guerrillas. On 4 December 1980, following a visit to Kenya by Mengistu, Ethiopia and Kenya issued a joint communiqué from Nairobi emphasizing their co-operation against what was described as Somali expansionism. The communiqué called on Somalia to ‘renounce publicly and unconditionally all claims to the territories of
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti’.
Sudan, by contrast, was a substantial player in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. It provided support for the Eritreans through the 1970s and following an attempted coup against President Nimeiri in July 1976 became far more open in its support once Nimeiri had accused Ethiopia of assisting the Sudanese National Front to attempt his overthrow. However, Sudan did not become belligerent, the government contenting itself with providing back-up support for the Eritreans and through necessity rather than choice becoming the temporary home for many thousands of Eritrean refugees. Nonetheless, a generally hostile Sudan was a factor that Ethiopia had to take into account throughout the years of its revolution.
DJIBOUTI
Throughout the confrontations between Ethiopia and Somalia the tiny enclave territory of Djibouti sat uneasily on the sidelines between its two large neighbours, both of which made claims to it. On 27 June 1977 France granted independence to its Territory of the Afars and Issas, which was renamed Djibouti, and the leader of the Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l’Indépendence (LPAI), Hassan Gouled Aptidon, whose party was supported by Somalia, became the country’s president, while Ahmed Dini (an Afar), the Secretary-General of the LPAI, became prime minister. By agreement with the independent government, France stationed about 4,500 troops of the French Foreign Legion in the country ‘at the disposal of the government’. Their local expenditure made a major contribution to what was a minuscule economy. This, in fact, consisted largely of trade through the international port of Djibouti, which up to 1976 handled 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s imports and 40 per cent of its exports. The Ogaden War of 1977–78 led to a temporary closure of the railway although a recovery followed during the latter part of 1978. Violent disturbances between the Issas (a Somali clan) and the Afars at the end of 1977 led to the arrest of 600 Afars, prompting the resignation of Ahmed Dini and four other Afar ministers from the government: they complained of discrimination against the Afars. In March 1979 Gouled announced that a new party would replace the LPAI. This was the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP). In response Abdullah Mohamed Kamil, who had been head of government under the French prior to independence, formed an underground opposition party, Front Démocratique pour la Libération de Djibouti (FDLD). He criticized Gouled for his over-dependence upon France, though the government had few options available to it, and this rivalry paved the way for further dissension in the 1980s.
THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF HAILE SELASSIE
On 27 February 1974 the Ethiopian government resigned after two weeks of strikes, growing disorder and an army mutiny. These were largely the result of a rapid rise in living costs and increasing unemployment. On 26 February, protesting at their low pay, troops had seized control of Asmara. This army mutiny was led by junior officers of the Second Division Infantry. The Emperor sent a delegation to Asmara to treat with the rebels but the Navy and the Air Force had joined the mutiny before any talks could take place. At Massawa junior officers took control of the navy’s flagship and Rear Admiral Desta, Haile Selassie’s grandson, fled to Djibouti. Much closer to Addis Ababa, mutinous members of the Air Force seized the base at Debre Zeit, only 30 miles from the capital. The Emperor accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Habte-Wold and received pledges of loyalty from his troops in Addis Ababa. In a speech to the troops he claimed that the troubles had been caused by a small group which was supported from outside the country. Although he had recently granted an army pay increase of 25 per cent, he promised a second one. He then appointed Endalkatchew Makonnen as Prime Minister and the new government immediately announced a further 10 per cent pay increase for the armed forces. By this time, however, the mutineers were in charge of the capital as well as Asmara and it was felt advisable to postpone a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers. Calm appeared to return to the capital in early March, arrested ministers were released and the students held peaceful demonstrations for elections to be held under interim military rule. The new prime minister announced a cabinet that included members who were regarded as ‘progressive’, who fulfilled the dual role of reassuring the traditionalists because they came from the great families while persuading the modernists that new policies would follow.11 The appointments represented a classic compromise decision that could not last in what was rapidly developing into a revolutionary situation as demands for change multiplied.
On 5 March the Emperor announced forthcoming constitutional reforms but two days later the trade unions came out on strike. The Ethiopia Labour Federation demanded a minimum daily wage of E$3 (£0.70) and a revision of the labour laws. The university students called for more radical reforms than the Emperor had promised. The government gave in to all the trade union demands and the strikers went back to work on 11 March. Teachers, however, remained on strike while the university students continued to press for radical changes. Makonnen said his was a caretaker government and that he proposed to put a six-month programme of action into law; by the end of March, however, he threatened to resign unless the armed forces and the public gave him a chance to put reforms into practice. He clearly did not read the public mood accurately and in April was shouted down in parliament by the elected deputies who demanded answers to specific problems such as corruption and what was being done about the drought rather than statements on general policy. One hundred and twenty-five members of the upper house, who had been appointed by Haile Selassie under the terms of the 1955 constitution (then under revision), watched this revolt of the deputies in shocked silence as they now criticized the former government, claiming it had allowed 250,000 people to starve to death. A joint parliamentary session then approved a list of 30 questions to be put to the Prime Minister for answers.
On 28 April the army rebels arrested a number of leading military figures including the commander of the Emperor’s bodyguard, the former commander of the Ground Forces and the Deputy Chief of Staff as well as former ministers including the ex-Prime Minister Habte-Wold and his brother. By this time control of events appeared to be in the hands of middle-ranking army and police officers; they made it a condition of their support for the government that former ministers and chiefs of staff should be arrested. About 200 senior figures in all were detained. A peasant revolt erupted in the southern provinces where farms were burned down along a 250-mile stretch of the country’s most fertile area of the Rift Valley. About 15 people were shot dead by the police, the regional administration was reduced to chaos and the Governor fled to Addis Ababa. By this time escalating inflation, continuing corruption and the need for land reform were the main causes of the continuing unrest. The old order was increasingly threatened: ‘The drought and the unrest in the armed forces have somehow jolted the traditionally docile peasants into political activity. It is aimed primarily at the landlords who have long exploited them but it is now spilling over into a challenge against the police and authorities.’12 Although the original army mutiny of February 1974 had been about conditions and pay, it introduced the six-month period that saw Haile Selassie progressively lose his authority and in the end his throne. Up to May it still seemed possible that a peaceful transfer of power to another system might have been put in place but the momentum of events now speeded up.
On 28 June the armed forces seized the radio and telecommunications centres and took effective power. This move followed a demand by eight members of Parliament that 25 former cabinet ministers who had been detained ever since the fall of the previous government at the end of February should be released. This demand was made in the face of growing student and junior army officer insistence that the former ministers should be tried for corruption and maladministration. Up to the end of June the army had taken the view that the government of Endalkatchew Makonnen should introduce reforms and bring an end to the exploitation of the majority by the wealthy landowning classes. Now the army made further arrests which, according to The Times13, fell into three groups: the Emperor’s closest advisers, who were members of the traditional ruling class, go
vernment officials including MPs and administrators. The Emperor’s grandson, Prince Eskinder Desta, the Rear Admiral who had fled to Djibouti and subsequently returned to Addis Ababa, was arrested, bringing those in danger ever closer to the Emperor himself. Others arrested at this time included the head of the Security Forces, a Supreme Court Judge and the Finance Minister. The Emperor, meanwhile, continued his normal routine, travelling daily from his Imperial Palace to his office in the Menelik Palace. On 3 July he received leaders of the military and agreed to pass on their demands to the Prime Minister; these included the demand for the immediate surrender of 27 officials whom they had failed to find and 20 of these then gave themselves up. A warning was issued that people should not help the other missing officials or try to dispose of their property. An army manifesto of 13 points, consisting of guidelines for the future government of the country, was issued. It made plain that the Army was determined to play a leading role in the new administration, and would work with the civilian government and act as a watchdog. It said a new constitution that would strip the Emperor of many of his traditional powers should be ‘implemented on a priority basis’. While still pledging loyalty to the Emperor, the Army promised better labour relations, aid to the drought victims and the elimination of ‘traditional beliefs and customs, which may hamper the unity and progress of Ethiopia’. A 15-man Anti-Corruption Committee was set up with members nominated by the Army and Parliament. Dr Breket Hapte-Selassie, then with the World Bank, and Dr Mesfin Wold-Mariam, a leading geographer and outspoken critic of previous governments, were appointed to the commission, prompting the Financial Times to claim that the name Mesfin confirmed earlier reports that leading figures previously out of favour because of their direct or indirect involvement in the 1960 coup attempt were being rehabilitated.