by Guy Arnold
The political alignments and changes that occurred in the Horn during the 1970s were bewildering in their reversals, but though the two superpowers became heavily engaged, the wars – between Ethiopia and Somalia and Ethiopia and Eritrea – were nationalist rather than ideological and this was despite the socialist policies advocated by the two principal political leaders, Mengistu and Barre. It was the outsiders, the US and USSR plus Cuba, who provided a Cold War dimension to these African struggles and they did so, of course, because for them the Horn was only one piece in a world jigsaw that they were contending to bring within their control. By the end of the decade both Ethiopia under Mengistu and Somalia under Barre faced a long haul to reconstruct their countries after the devastation of war. In the case of Ethiopia the Eritrean war had yet to run its course; in the case of Somalia the framework of Barre’s socialist revolution had been largely shattered and he faced a decade in which clan rivalries would again move to the centre of Somalia’s political life, though they had never been far from the surface. In both cases the ordinary people in one of the poorest regions of Africa had been rendered even poorer and, as they would discover, more dependent upon external assistance and that, as they had already found, only came at a price.
CHAPTER TWENTY
Rhodesia
By the end of the 1960s the white Rhodesians were beginning to realize that UDI had not solved their problems; instead, an escalating guerrilla war was making white control increasingly precarious while their beleaguered status rendered them more and more dependent upon South Africa. In June 1969, the Rhodesian Secretary of Defence said: ‘Should terrorist infiltration continue on the increasing scale evidenced to date, it will be necessary for further money to be found to maintain the army at the standard that will be required to meet this emergency.’ His statement set the tone for the 1970s. Further, the Land Tenure and Constitution Acts strengthened racial barriers in Rhodesia and established apartheid as the basic philosophy of the government. In any case, land under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was divided roughly 50–50 between the 230,000 whites and the five million blacks. The new Land Tenure Act extended the power of the minister to enforce racial segregation. On 2 March 1970 the government proclaimed Rhodesia a Republic and scheduled elections under a new republican constitution for 10 April. The British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, said the Republic, like UDI, was illegal. The United States said that it would not recognize the Republic and on 9 March announced the closure of its consulate; other countries followed suit. At the United Nations Britain attempted to get a quick resolution passed through the Security Council condemning Rhodesia’s assumption of republican status in order to outflank any tougher resolution but this manoeuvre failed as African countries delayed the debate until on 12 March another, tougher resolution was introduced, backed by Russia and Poland, which condemned ‘the persistent refusal of the government of the United Kingdom to use force’ and called for sanctions against South Africa. The resolution was vetoed by Britain and the United States. A further resolution of 19 March at least stiffened sanctions. Although the Rhodesian Government claimed an immigrant boom, the figures did not bear this out. In 1960 there had been 214,000 whites while natural increase had added another 30,000 and new immigrants a further 82,000 so that the population ought to have stood at 326,000 whites by 1970. In fact it was only 234,000 as 90,000 whites in the meantime had left the country so that it had lost the equivalent of all the new immigrants plus an additional 10,000.
The return to power in Britain of a Conservative government under Edward Heath in June 1970 raised hopes in white circles of a favourable settlement in Rhodesia. By October it had become clear that the Heath government was initiating new talks with the Smith regime and Smith insisted that Britain must negotiate with Rhodesia as a sovereign independent state. On 10 November 1970, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, told the House of Commons that preliminary talks were in progress to ascertain whether detailed negotiations could begin. Following Britain’s row with the African members of the Commonwealth at the January 1971 Singapore summit over its announced intention of resuming the sale of arms to South Africa, Smith described Heath and Douglas-Home as ‘very reasonable gentlemen’. Meanwhile, his government announced that a new Property Owners (Residential Protection) Bill would be debated the following March; it was opposed by the 25,000 Asians and Coloureds against whom it was aimed since it would allow their removal from any residential area the President declared to be exclusive. Whites defended the Bill on the grounds that it promoted racial harmony. However, the Bill was dropped from the agenda for the Rhodesian Parliament that opened on 2 March as a tactical move to improve the chance of talks with Britain that Sir Alec Douglas-Home appeared about to initiate. Meanwhile, a survey of 200 white sixth-form boys and girls in Salisbury showed that half wanted to leave Rhodesia and half of these did not want to return: their reasons were repression, people afraid to express themselves, too insular, sport-mad, narrow minded, no scope in advanced technology and the future too dependent upon politics.
Lord Goodman, a sort of multiparty ombudsman solicitor and troubleshooter for British governments, visited Rhodesia early in June 1971 on behalf of the Foreign Secretary for talks with members of the Smith regime. Smith was under pressure to seek a settlement with the British Conservative government, which was seen as more sympathetic to Rhodesia than its Labour predecessor. In Britain there was opposition to any settlement that did not adhere to the five principles; for example, in July an interdenominational group of churchmen in London insisted that a settlement must embody the reality as well as the form of the five principles. The talks continued through the summer. Then in November the Foreign Secretary announced that he was to visit Rhodesia for substantive talks. In a letter to The Times,1 Sir Bernard de Bunsen, Chairman of the Africa Bureau (with 10 signatories), said: ‘In the view of the Africa Bureau the five principles can only serve as a basis for negotiation with men who genuinely wish to see African political advance; all the signs since 1965 have been that the Rhodesian Front wishes to perpetuate White minority rule…’ After detailing events, the letter continues: ‘Against such a background no agreement concluded between the British Government and the Smith regime alone could be acceptable to either the British people or the majority of the people of Rhodesia.’ The Guardian said of the proposed settlement: ‘Unless he has reliable grounds for thinking that Mr Smith has retreated a long way from his previous stands, Sir Alec’s announcement must look like the second step on the slippery slope towards a sell-out. The first step was Sir Alec’s willingness to have “one more try” to settle with the Rhodesian Front even though Labour’s experience and the subsequent apartheid legislation in Rhodesia both showed that negotiations on the basis of the five principles were doomed to futility.’2 As the talks approached, Lord Acton and Garfield Todd, the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, said: ‘The British Government has not grasped the fundamental truths about Rhodesia. The White Rhodesians are not prepared to accept majority rule ever. The Black Rhodesians do not want independence under a Rhodesian Front government. They have not asked for the lifting of sanctions. The White electorate will gladly accept the removal of sanctions. They have not asked for the lifting of sanctions.’3
On 15 November Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who had already told the House of Commons that an agreement had to be consistent with the five principles, arrived in Salisbury for settlement talks and agreed a formula with the Smith regime although this was to be subject to the findings of a commission that they were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The settlement proposals were presented to the British Parliament on 24 November 1971 and were based on the Republican Constitution adopted by the Smith government in 1969. Certain modifications were made, which included a proposal for a new roll of African voters to be created with the same qualifications as those for the European voters’ roll. When the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equalled 6 per cent of the number of voters then
registered on the European roll, two additional African seats would become due; and when the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equalled 12 per cent of the number of voters then registered on the European roll, a further two additional African seats would become due, two at a time, for each such proportionate increase of 6 per cent in the number of voters registered on the African higher roll, until 34 additional African seats had been created… The complications of this process, which was laid out at length, led Dr Claire Palley to suggest in an article of 28 November in the Sunday Times that the settlement would mean that African majority rule would not be achieved in the lifetime of present White Rhodesians (which, after all, was the object of the 1969 Constitution) and that 2035 was the earliest at which an African majority could be achieved in the Assembly and even that majority would still only represent the wealthy minority of Africans who would have qualified for the vote. These 1971 proposals provided for no external safeguards whatever, before, during or after the test of acceptability.
In Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere said: ‘If they have agreed, then they have agreed a sell-out.’ Smith said: ‘We have the happiest Africans in the world.’ At the United Nations the General Assembly voted 94 to 8 to reject the Douglas-Home-Smith settlement terms. That December Lord Goodman, a major architect of the settlement, said: ‘The African is not profoundly discontented although he is increasingly resentful of the situation.’
THE PEARCE COMMISSION
The Douglas-Home-Smith agreement included the provision for a commission to sound out opinion in Rhodesia as a whole and though this was not the intention, the Pearce Commission marked a watershed in white Rhodesian fortunes, which were to deteriorate thereafter. Opposition to the settlement inside Rhodesia and outside rose rapidly once its terms were known, leading to the formation of the African National Council under Bishop Abel Muzorewa to co-ordinate African opposition, which from December 1971 became very active. The Smith government insisted that a settlement could be reached and denied all allegations that Africans were being obstructed from holding meetings or expressing their views. When demonstrations occurred because of restrictions the security forces were ordered out and strong measures were taken against all demonstrators while Smith argued that Africans were showing their unsuitability for the concessions made to them. Optimistically, Smith told the Rhodesia Herald that he thought ratification of the agreement and the lifting of sanctions would be achieved by April 1972 and that he believed support from Europeans and Africans would be overwhelming.4 Acceptance of the agreement was conditional on the Pearce Commission sounding out both white and black opinion.
Lord Pearce, a former Lord of Appeal, was selected by Sir Alec Douglas-Home as chairman of the Commission (he was not the Foreign Secretary’s first choice). While his appointment led to criticism in Britain that he was too old and right wing, such critics were to be confounded. The other members of the Commission were Sir Glyn Jones, the former Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Maurice Dorman, the former Governor of Sierra Leone, and Lord Harlech, the former Ambassador to Washington. On 20 December 1971 Pearce told a press conference in London that his terms of reference were ‘to satisfy themselves’ that the Anglo-Rhodesian terms ‘have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia’ and ‘to ascertain by direct contact with all sections of the population whether the people as a whole regard these proposals as an acceptable basis for independence.’ Later, when carrying out his mission in Rhodesia, Pearce complained that the regime infringed the terms of the settlement to allow normal political activity by arresting and imprisoning such people as Garfield Todd and his daughter Judith, and Mr and Mrs Chinamano. The Commissioners continued their tours of Rhodesia until mid-February 1972.
The Pearce Report was published on 23 May 1972 and stated: ‘We believe that taking into account the explanation given by the Rhodesian authorities, the activities of those opposing or promoting the proposals, the distribution of our simplified version of the proposals and the explanation given by the Commission at meetings and over the radio, the great majority of those who gave us their opinions had a sufficient understanding of the content and implications of the proposals to enable them to pass judgement on them. We are satisfied that the proposals have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia.’ Having made this plain, the Report continued: ‘We are satisfied on our evidence that the proposals are acceptable to the great majority of Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the proposals. In our opinion, the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence.’ The Report had found that of 120,730 people of all races interviewed, 107,309 Africans rejected the proposals. Reacting to the Report, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said there must now be time for reflection and Smith said the Commission Report was mistaken. The failure of the Pearce Commission to endorse the Douglas-Home settlement proposals, as he had hoped, and so bring an end to sanctions, led Smith to announce that there would be no further talks with Britain on constitutional matters.
White Rhodesians, who had been led to believe that the Pearce Commission would endorse the settlement proposals, were stunned by the result. Never before had their clearly expressed will been so decisively overruled, but then never before had so many Africans been asked what they thought. Opening the annual debate to renew sanctions on 9 November 1972, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said the aim was not to bring Rhodesia to its knees but to bring it back into the comity of nations. He said that as a result of the proposals of November 1971 and of the findings of the Pearce Report he believed that there was a growing awareness in Rhodesia of the need for compromise. The Europeans endorsed it emphatically by accepting the November proposals. The African National Council had since declared in favour of compromise and on a negotiated settlement. However, African distrust of Britain had been increased by the Heath government’s attempt to do a deal with the Smith regime. The situation in Rhodesia was to change dramatically at the end of 1972. On 21 December ZANU guerrillas attacked Altena farm in the north-east of the country to signal a new phase in the guerrilla war and from this time onward all white farms became potential targets.
The performance of Sir Alec Douglas-Home over Rhodesia can be seen as the last effort of a disappearing British attitude that still saw the Empire, or what remained of it, in white race terms. Heath had given Sir Alec a free hand as Foreign Secretary to deal with Rhodesia as he saw fit and the latter believed that Smith was a prisoner of his own hard-liners. In November 1970 Smith had begun a secret correspondence with Sir Alec, emphasizing that in the proposed forthcoming talks Rhodesia would not be negotiating from weakness. He wanted a settlement, as long as terms were acceptable, which for him meant continuing white control. When Joshua Nkomo met Sir Alec he argued that there could be no settlement outside NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule) while Sir Alec wanted a compromise settlement so as to avoid a bitter race war. What Sir Alec either never grasped or ignored was that a compromise with Smith was not a compromise but a clear victory for him. Although Smith conceded the principle of majority rule, the timetable for this goal was unacceptable to Africans whose mistrust of Smith was total. ‘Clauses about a Declaration of Rights and a commission to investigate racial discrimination did not alter the fact that the basis of the settlement was an amended version of Smith’s 1969 constitution. The white population were of course in favour, but the African leaders – Nkomo, Mugabe, Muzorewa and Sithole – were united in their opposition. Smith’s belief, shared by Douglas-Home, that the agreement would be acceptable to the African population was unrealistic.’5 In a letter of 3 December 1971 to Lord Pearce, Douglas-Home said: ‘I would like you to be certain from the start that my feeling is exactly [the opposite], namely that all those who will be talking to Africans should say quite clearly that the proposals are sponsored by Her Majesty’s Government who consider them just and fair. I thou
ght that on that point you would like to know my view.’6 At the time, the Conservative right wing and others felt that the Commission should have gone to Rhodesia at once, but its members had to be assembled and Christmas intervened. They believed the time lag gave African nationalists time to organize opposition. The Commission arrived in Salisbury on 10 January 1972. Pearce personally saw as many leaders of African opinion as he could while other members of the Commission went into the bush to meet villagers. Pearce was not appreciated by the Rhodesian ‘right’. After two months Pearce returned to Britain and presented his report to Douglas-Home on 4 May and it was published on 23 May. On relinquishing office in 1974 Douglas-Home wrote, revealingly, to Miles Hudson, ‘I think that Rhodesia is the only real disappointment which I take away with me but even then in a lurking hope that 1970 will not be too wide of the mark when the settlement comes.’7 His hope, still, was on behalf of the white minority.