by Guy Arnold
Apart from mining, the manufacturing and construction sectors were small scale and ‘closer integration of Namibia and South Africa springs largely from the interlocking ownership of much of the industry but it is also a result of increasing intervention by South African parastatal organizations, and Afrikaner-owned financial interests’. The South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) operated two mines in the territory – a tin mine and a zinc mine – while large sums of South African and foreign money had been spent up to that time (1973) on prospecting for oil.14 At the same time, animal husbandry accounted for 98 per cent of the value of commercial farming output and was worth R60 million a year. Cattle ownership by whites in 1971 came to 1.8 million head, with 502,000 exported in 1972, with the bulk railed to South Africa for an average price of R82 a head. There were three abattoirs in Namibia and in 1972 130,000 head of cattle were slaughtered in them with 90 per cent exported to Europe. The other principal export product was the wool from karakul sheep that had been introduced into the territory by the Germans in 1908. One other major source of wealth was to be found in Namibia’s coastal waters, which are a rich source of pelagic fish of several varieties. The industry was based on the harbour of Walvis Bay, which had nine canning and processing factories in 1973. That year 705,937 tonnes of fish were landed at Walvis Bay. When the Namibian and South African fishing catches are combined the fishing industry was the sixth largest in the world; the catch from South African waters was consistently lower than that from Namibian waters.
SWAPO
Sam Nujoma and Andimba Toivo ja Toivo were the joint founders of SWAPO. In 1960 SWAPO decided to make Nujoma its external representative and he left Windhoek, evaded the police and made his way to Dar es Salaam where President Nyerere provided him with a letter to serve as a passport. In June 1960 Nujoma appeared before the UN Committee on South West Africa. He returned to Dar es Salaam where he set up SWAPO headquarters in March 1961. In 1966 Nujoma chartered a plane and flew to Windhoek to challenge the South African claim that anyone was free to move in and out of the country. He was briefly imprisoned before being expelled to Zambia. On 26 August that year SWAPO launched its armed struggle with attacks on targets in northern Namibia; this provoked the South Africans to arrest SWAPO personnel inside Namibia, including Toivo ja Toivo who was to be imprisoned in 1968 where he remained until 1984. In 1969 Nujoma launched the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). In October 1971 he gave evidence before the UN Security Council where he made a good impression. Despite the South African strategy, launched in 1975, to bring about an internal settlement by working through minority parties in Namibia, Nujoma stuck to the UN formula, which sought independence for Namibia ‘through free and fair elections under the control and supervision of the UN’. At the end of the decade Namibia still faced another 10 years before it would achieve independence under Nujoma as its first President.
In 1966 the United Nations formally recognized the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) as the legitimate liberation movement representing Namibia. As a military organization SWAPO was never likely to win a war against the South Africans. On the other hand, a slow yet steady escalation of guerrilla activity took place in the Caprivi Strip during the late 1960s and early 1970s (when Angola was still under Portuguese rule) and SWAPO had to operate from Zambia. The pressures it created were sufficient to oblige South Africa to establish its first fighting unit of black police, armed with automatic weapons, which operated in the Caprivi Strip. Although SWAPO actions were militarily insignificant they did establish the fact that a war of liberation was in progress and they did force South Africa to deploy an increasing number of troops along the country’s northern border. SWAPO guerrilla activity was sufficient to make parts of the Caprivi Strip ‘no go’ areas. Following Ian Smith’s closure of the Rhodesian border with Zambia in January 1973, South Africa moved substantial extra forces into the Caprivi Strip. The South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) was specially created by South Africa to fight this colonial war in the north of Namibia.
During its many years in exile SWAPO’s external wing worked through the UN Council for Namibia and in Lusaka, where SWAPO had moved its headquarters from Dar es Salaam, through the UN Namibia Research Institute whose role was to enable SWAPO to prepare for independence by obtaining training for its exiled personnel. Following Angola’s independence in 1975 SWAPO was able to increase its activities once it had established bases in southern Angola and these became regular targets, as well as excuses, for South African military incursions across the border from Namibia. From 1976 onwards the guerrilla war in northern Namibia and southern Angola cost an estimated 1,000 casualties a year for both sides combined and involved between 30,000 and 40,000 combatants. The struggle, inevitably, took its toll of the SWAPO leadership. Divisions surfaced in 1975 when a split occurred and some 50 SWAPO members led by Andreas Shipanga were arrested in Zambia and then detained in Tanzania. Later, after they had been released, Shipanga formed the breakaway SWAPO Democrats. In 1979 Peter Katjavivi was dismissed from the ruling hierarchy and in 1980 another SWAPO leader, Mishake Muyongo, defected. Despite such upsets Nujoma remained SWAPO President and continued to control the majority of its forces. As early as December 1975, 5,000 Ovambo had crossed the border into Angola to obtain military training and by the late 1970s Cuban instructors were providing SWAPO with military training in Angola. By 1980 South Africa had established 40 bases along the Namibia–Angola border and a further 35 bases elsewhere in Namibia and the government had embarked upon a policy of forced removals of the population and the creation of ‘protected villages’ so as to control the people and deny support to the guerrillas. In March 1980 – an indication of the increasingly sophisticated weaponry at its disposal – SWAPO shot down a South African plane in southern Angola. By 1981 SWAPO had an estimated 8,000 guerrillas in Angola or operating in Namibia. Inside Namibia SWAPO was never banned outright although it was closely watched and harassed by the South African authorities.
Although for most of the 1970s the guerrilla war was small scale with occasional escalations of activity, it had three effects: it tied down increasing numbers of South African troops in the north of Namibia; it spread the war across the border into Angola; and the publicity from it ensured continuing international pressures upon Pretoria. At the end of the decade, war incidents increased from 500 in 1978 to 900 in 1979. In May 1978, for example, the South Africans raided deep into Angola to attack the Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga, killing 612 refugees and 63 Angolan soldiers as well as wounding a number of civilians. Parallel with the war was the long-drawn-out duel between the United Nations and South Africa, with the world body trying to prise control of the territory from Pretoria, while South Africa manipulated minority groups in Namibia so as to create an ‘independent’ state associated with South Africa. In this contest the South African government responded as little as possible to UN pressures but as much as was necessary to maintain a dialogue with the international community since any form of dialogue with an increasingly hostile outside world was seen to have propaganda value for a beleaguered Pretoria. This South African defiance of the UN while it applied its own solutions to Namibia became a regular aspect of the Southern African scenario through the decade. The UN appeared ineffective.
In 1973 South Africa convened an Advisory Council for South West Africa under the chairmanship of Vorster, a move that was widely opposed inside Namibia, and which was rejected by SWAPO and by the Paramount Chief of the Herero people, Chief Clemens Kapuuo. Further, the National Convention of non-whites, which grouped SWAPO, SWANU, the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), the Damara Executive Council and the Rehoboth Volkspartei, said the nominations being received by the government were not representative of the country’s black people. There were many protests and refusals by tribal groups to nominate representatives to the Council. The first session of the Council was presided over by Vorster in the former Police Divisional Headquarters in Windhoek on 2
3 March 1973. At the conclusion of the meeting Vorster described their deliberations as ‘very successful’. In August the government suffered another setback when a massive boycott reduced to a farce the first elections for the Legislative Council of the new Bantustan of ‘Ovambo’ in northern Namibia. When polling took place only six of the 56 seats were contested and none of the candidates represented the main opposition parties – SWAPO and DEMCOP (the Democratic Cooperative Development Party). Government supporters filled the 35 nominated seats and members of the pro-government Ovambo Independence Party were returned unopposed to 15 seats. The government favoured the independence of Ovambo as a region while SWAPO and DEMCOP sought independence for Namibia as a whole. In reaction to these moves and following pressures from SWAPO and independent African states, the UN Security Council voted 15–0 on 11 December to halt further dialogue with South Africa on the issue of the independence of Namibia and appointed Sean McBride as Commissioner for Namibia.
The new UN Commissioner for Namibia announced on 28 March 1974 that he intended to establish a Namibia Research Institute in Lusaka and rejected the idea of fresh UN overtures to South Africa at that time. South Africa clamped down on SWAPO activities in Namibia. In the meantime, on 15 February an official silence on police activity in Namibia was imposed. The Administrator of South West Africa, Mr Ben van der Walt, said ‘circumstances are such at the moment that it is no longer necessary for me to issue press statements in connection with police action against possibly offensive activities of the SWAPO Youth League’.15
The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola at the end of 1975 changed significantly the freedom to operate of SWAPO, which was then able to establish bases in southern Angola. Thereafter, the war against SWAPO in Namibia became inextricably intertwined with the civil war in Angola and South African incursions into Angola would sometimes be directed against Angolan (MPLA) government targets and in support of the rebel UNITA forces, and sometimes against SWAPO bases. Once South Africa had decided to intervene in Angola it abandoned its policy of détente with independent Africa. At first the intervention (at the end of 1975) by flying columns threatened SWAPO, which had built up relations with UNITA. Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader, supported the South African intervention against the MPLA government and, in turn, had the backing of Zaïre and Zambia in requesting South African military intervention. However, the rapid collapse of the South African invasion – MPLA had substantial help from the Cuban troops already in the country – meant that South Africa had discarded its former policy of not intervening militarily; it had lost any earlier advantages to be derived from détente with black Africa; and had broken the terms of the Mandate by using Namibia as a military launch pad. South Africa had not bought time for itself against the liberation movements; instead, for the remainder of the decade the MPLA was largely on top of the military situation in Angola. As a consequence, South Africa had to expand its forces in Namibia. In 1976 it designated Kavango and Caprivi as security areas as well as Ovambo so that 55 per cent of the territory’s population was placed under martial law. In December 1976 the UN General Assembly denounced repressive measures by South Africa, called on the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria regime and recognized the justice of SWAPO’s military campaign. From this point onwards South Africa backed UNITA in southern Angola, in order both to harass the MPLA government and to deny the SWAPO forces in Angola access to Namibia.
AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT?
In 1975 constitutional talks were held in Windhoek (at the Turnhalle) between the South West Africa Legislative Assembly and representatives of the tribal authorities. These led (18 August 1976) to proposals for the establishment of an interim government and an independent South West Africa/Namibia by 31 December 1978. The United Nations, however, rejected the proposals. Over two years the Turnhalle Conference met to discuss the territory’s constitutional future although SWAPO would not take part but, instead, demanded direct negotiations with South Africa under UN auspices after South African military forces had withdrawn from Namibia. In March 1977 a draft constitution for a pre-independence interim government proposed a three-tier system to include a multiracial central administration and the final division of the territory into 11 ethnic governments – 10 Bantustans and a white region. The leader of the white delegation, Dirk Mudge, declared that South African military forces would remain in Namibia after independence while South Africa said that Walvis Bay would revert to South Africa. These proposals were repudiated by both the OAU and the UN Council for Namibia and were later abandoned. The UN response to these South African proposals was the creation of the five-nation Western ‘contact group’ consisting of Britain, the United States, France, Canada and West Germany. South Africa maintained an ambivalent attitude: while arguing that the UN had no jurisdiction over Namibia and that Pretoria would impose its own solution, it was always prepared to continue talking with the UN and the Western contact group in order to demonstrate that it was not totally isolated and possessed legitimacy. This South African need to talk, without any intention of yielding to UN demands, had become a psychological necessity for Pretoria although it had the effect of undermining its claim to total sovereignty over Namibia. Having given the impression that it would accept the UN–contact group proposals, including UN-supervised elections, South Africa then announced in September 1978 that it would pursue its own solution and hold elections in December 1978 for a Namibian constituent assembly. These elections were subsequently boycotted by SWAPO, SWAPO Democrats and the Namibian National Front and of 50 seats 41 went to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).
This period of South African pseudo-negotiations with the UN was characterized by Western reluctance to take any overt actions that would force Pretoria’s hand. ‘The African Group at the UN, in an attempt to introduce more effective pressure, presented a draft resolution to the Security Council in June 1975 proposing an arms embargo against South Africa. It was blocked by vetoes cast by Britain, France and the United States. However, there was growing concern among the three Western members that Pretoria’s refusal to consider any solution could lead to greater pressure on them to impose sanctions.’16 It was for this reason that the contact group was created. It did not seriously attempt to bring about change but, with South Africa, tried to give the impression that progress towards an independent Namibia was somehow under way. In essence it was a charade. Meanwhile, South Africa made plain that it would never accept a SWAPO government. When, on 20 September 1978, South Africa announced that it would proceed with its own internal settlement, the UN responded by adopting Security Council Resolution 435 on 29 September, which formalized acceptance of the UN Action Plan on Namibia. This set out a framework for the achievement of Namibian independence and followed with the creation of a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to help the Special Representative achieve the independence of Namibia through fair elections, the so-called Waldheim Plan. At the same time the Security Council declared null and void any unilateral measures taken by South Africa in relation to the electoral process.
Intense UN–contact group–South African negotiations continued over the years 1978–81, following the passing of Resolution 435. SWAPO, however, called for an end to the Western mediating role since it saw this as biased in favour of South Africa. For the three years 1978–81 on-off negotiations at least suggested that a settlement could be reached. In May 1979 South Africa’s Foreign Minister Roelf ‘Pik’ Botha declared that there was ‘no hope’ of breaking the existing deadlock over an internationally acceptable settlement. Then in January 1981 the United Nations brought matters to a head and called a conference at Geneva, which was attended by SWAPO, South Africa (including the Namibian internal parties), the Western contact group and the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Those attending the conference had ‘accepted’ the terms of Resolution 435; it was, apparently, a question of working out the details and mode of implementation. The plan
envisaged a ceasefire, the creation of demilitarized zones along the Namibian borders with Angola and Zambia, the reduction of South African forces in Namibia from 20,000 to 1,500, the deployment of a UN force of 7,500 to supervise the South African withdrawal and the SWAPO forces, followed by UN-supervised elections for a constituent assembly that would work out an independence constitution. This programme was to take place during 1981; in fact, the South Africans walked out of the conference within a week and the plan collapsed. The UN, however, kept Resolution 435 ‘on the table’. In 1980, accurately as it turned out, South Africa’s Gen. Magnus Malan predicted that South Africa would be able to hold on to Namibia for another 10 years. The possibility that this prediction would prove correct was enormously strengthened in 1981 when the United States decided to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the implementation of Resolution 435 in Namibia. South Africa promptly endorsed the US decision by announcing that it would not consider implementing Resolution 435 until Cuban troops had been withdrawn from Angola.