by Guy Arnold
In a move that might appear the height of folly for a government that was already facing so many problems at home, Zimbabwe decided to support President Kabila of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in his civil war. In August 1998 6,000 troops, fighter aircraft and attack helicopters were sent to DRC to assist Kabila against the rebels who were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. The cost of this operation was Z$60 million a month and led to a 46 per cent increase in the defence budget. The government argued that it was necessary for the security of its commercial contracts. Kabila granted Zimbabwe mining concessions in payment for its support. Another, more personal reason involved the antipathy that existed between Mugabe and Mandela, with the latter advocating that SADC should attempt a peacekeeping role. Mugabe, with Angola and Namibia, wished SADC to support Kabila and that is what the three countries proceeded to do. This involvement in the Congo war added to discontents at home. The war was not Zimbabwe’s business and the huge costs increased the economic hardships already being suffered at home where it was extremely unpopular. In October there were demonstrations in Harare against a 67 per cent increase in fuel prices; in November two successful national strikes were organized by the ZCTU, forcing the government to call for talks with business, labour and civic authorities to resolve the economic troubles. During the year the Zimbabwe stock exchange lost 60 per cent of its value. The IMF, which had been committed to a US$176 million standby loan, took Zimbabwe off its agenda while it awaited information on the financial impact of the Congo war, the land acquisitions and general financial targets. By the end of the year the Zimbabwe dollar stood at 62 to the pound sterling, inflation was running at 47 per cent, interest rates were at 50 per cent, unemployment had reached a new high and the country’s reserves were at their lowest on record. On 17 December the Sunday Standard carried a story to the effect that a number of senior army officers had been arrested for inciting colleagues to join in a military coup against the regime.
The economic crisis deepened in 1999 with rising unemployment, inflation passing 70 per cent, fuel and commodity shortages and a foreign exchange crisis. The IMF refused to alter its stand and insisted that the government must assert greater control over spending, inflation and the growing deficit before it would act. On 12 January, Mark Chavunduka, the editor of the Sunday Standard, was arrested for exposing the attempted coup of the previous December. He and a colleague were imprisoned and tortured. When four Supreme Court judges appealed to the President to confirm that he was committed to the rule of law, Mugabe’s response was to launch an attack upon the judiciary and call for the resignation of the judges. A subsequent demonstration in Harare of lawyers and activists demanding ‘zero tolerance of any erosion of human rights’ was tear-gassed by the police. In May the government appointed its own Constitutional Commission headed by Judge Godfrey Chidyausika to hold a series of open consultations about a new constitution. Its draft proposals were tabled in November although several of the commissioners complained that dissenting views concerned with curtailing the powers of the President had been suppressed. Mugabe subsequently amended the proposals further ‘to reflect what the people want’ and announced a constitutional referendum for early 2000. Meanwhile, a new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was created to combine workers, trade unionists and peasant farmers. The MDC was led by the ZCTU chairman, Gibson Sibanda, and Morgan Tsvangirai. A pause in constantly mounting tensions occurred when the old political warhorse Joshua Nkomo died on 1 July. Mugabe decreed him a hero’s funeral and then in October announced plans to compensate civilian victims of the Gukurahundi military campaign of the 1980s in Matabeleland. By mid-year the unpopular intervention in the Congo war, where 10,000 troops were then deployed, was costing the country Z$2.3 million a day and defence spending was again increased. The release of figures of the depredations of the AIDS epidemic added to the gloom: the country’s growth rate had been reduced from 3.3 per cent in 1980 to one per cent and AIDS was killing 1,700 people a week.
The referendum to agree amendments to the constitution that would increase the powers of the President was held on 12 February 2000. It became a popular expression of opposition to Mugabe and his government, the amendments being defeated by a 55 per cent ‘no’ vote. Mugabe accepted the result but then launched a campaign of intimidation against suspected or known opponents and the subsequent violence did further damage to Zimbabwe’s international reputation. The referendum defeat was probably the final turning point for Mugabe who saw this (or said he saw it) as the work of white farmers supported by Britain. What had become clear was his dual determination to hold onto power by any available means and dispossess the white farmers. The 4,500 white farmers became the main target of government anger. They owned 11 million hectares of the best land while 16 million hectares were shared by more than a million black farmers. The government now condoned the mass invasion of white farms by landless squatters, many of whom claimed to be veterans of the 1970s war of liberation. By the beginning of March 2000 142 white-owned farms had been occupied, often violently, and early in April a white farmer, David Stevens, was killed. Mugabe blamed the colonial past for the land crisis and called on Britain to compensate the farmers. Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply and were not helped when British diplomatic bags were opened in Harare airport. The British Foreign Office called the action ‘uncivilized and paranoid’. At the April Euro-African Conference in Cairo the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, raised the possibility of funding a land compensation scheme with Mugabe in return for a commitment to the rule of law by ZANU-PF. The Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union obtained a court ruling that the farm invasions were illegal although the Attorney-General, Patrick Chinamasa, dismissed it as unenforceable. Nonetheless, the government rushed through legislation that legitimized the seizure of designated farms without compensation.
The legislative elections were held at the end of June and the preceding campaign was tense and resulted in 31 deaths, mostly of government opponents. Opposition rallies were constantly harassed and attacked by government supporters, leading the British Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, to describe the attacks as ‘thuggery licensed from on high’. Nonetheless, MDC rallies attracted enthusiastic crowds. John Nkoma, chairman of ZANU-PF, said ZANU-PF would form the next government regardless of the ballot and that ‘President Mugabe is an institution’. In the event, there was a 65 per cent turnout of voters: the MDC obtained 47.06 per cent of the vote and 57 seats, ZANU-PF 48.45 per cent of the vote and 62 seats although it also controlled the 30 non-elective seats. International monitors said intimidation had been high in the rural areas. On 14 July 100 white-owned farms were designated for immediate seizure and a further 2,197 were listed for appropriation by the end of the year. The veterans who invaded the farms were led by Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi. Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa, attempted to restrain Mugabe but to no avail. Then on 29 September South Africa’s former president, Nelson Mandela, publicly criticized Mugabe’s ‘use of violence and the corroding of the rule of law’. In November a ruling of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court that the land resettlement was unconstitutional and illegal provoked Mugabe into attacking the judiciary: he said the government was at war with the whites. The economy continued to decline throughout the year: foreign reserves fell, there were continuous shortages of petrol and electricity and rises in the costs of most basic requirements, including food. In August the Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by 24 per cent. The Minister of Finance, Simba Makoni, said Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congo war had cost the country Z$10,000 million since 1998 and was unsustainable. In his November budget he cut military expenditure by 13.4 per cent. Tourism, a mainstay of the economy and the third foreign exchange earner after agriculture and mining, slumped drastically with 200,000 fewer visitors than in 1999. The Congo war may have been a drain on the official economy but Zimbabwean involvement was maintained. ‘Both at home and abroad, the Congo intervention was seen as a sign of Mugabe’s growing m
egalomania. Opinion polls showed it to be deeply unpopular. Western governments queried the need for providing Mugabe with financial assistance for land reform if he was prepared to squander money on foreign adventures.’6 However, the army in the Congo was deeply corrupted and all kinds of people were making money out of the intervention. General Vitalis Zvinavashe won contracts to haul supplies to the Congo and, to keep the army happy, special allowances were paid to all soldiers serving there and both officers and other ranks were encouraged to make their own deals. ‘There are fortunes to be made in the Congo,’ said Col. Tshinga Dube on television. ‘They import everything there, even potatoes and cooking oil,’ he added, ‘so why rush to conquer the rebels?’7
The policy of farm seizures was pursued relentlessly in 2001 and by June 95 per cent of all white-owned farms had been listed for resettlement and by the end of the year 4,874 farms were either occupied or under threat. These seizures were carried out by the ‘war veterans’ and clearly acquiesced in by the police who did nothing to stop them and were accompanied by considerable violence. Apart from the white farmers, thousands of black farm workers were displaced and lost their jobs. According to a report of September by the human rights organization, the Amani Trust, the farm invasions had led to the deaths of 27 black farm workers, assaults on 1,770 and the eviction of 20,000. Although some farms were staked out for small-scale cultivation, many of the most productive were given to leading politicians and ZANU-PF supporters. Meanwhile, after a campaign of harassment, the Chief Justice, Anthony Gubbay, was forced from office and two other judges retired early. Thereafter, the Supreme Court, with a ZANU-PF majority, declared the government land seizures to be legal. Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader, was constantly harassed.
In May Nkosana Moyo, the Trade and Industry Minister, fled the country. A relief to many people came in the middle of the year when on 4 June Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi died of an AIDS-related illness. Pressures against any person or institution seen as antagonistic to the government were applied relentlessly. The independent Daily News was threatened by the Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo, who said it was a threat to security and would be ‘silenced’. A short time later its presses in Southerton, Harare, were blown up with anti-tank mines that were available only to the army. Since the IMF continued its refusal to provide financial assistance to Zimbabwe, Mugabe called for it to be reformed and said that balance-of-payments support should be paid to developing countries ‘whether human rights have been violated or not’, a point that would be appreciated through most of Africa where the politicization of the IMF by its principal Western donors was deeply resented. In September President Gaddafi of Libya guaranteed oil supplies worth US$90 million to Zimbabwe, but at a price in the form of grants of land and equities in the country. Also in September, President Obasanjo of Nigeria persuaded Mugabe (as he thought) that a restitution of the rule of law in the land resettlement programme would open the way for £36 million from Britain for compensation. Mugabe subsequently did nothing and the presumed offer fell away. In June fuel costs were increased by 70 per cent, adding to food and transport costs while the Zimbabwe dollar, which was pegged at 55 to the pound sterling, was trading at the rate of 430 to the pound by the end of the year. With a death rate from AIDS of 2,000 a week, Zimbabwe seemed about to become the first state in the world to report a zero population growth while life expectancy was predicted to fall to 27 by 2010.
The presidential elections were set for March 2002 and Mugabe was to be challenged for the presidency by Morgan Tsvangirai. His rallies were to be routinely interrupted by ZANU-PF ‘war veterans’ or prohibited under various regulations by the police. Desmond Tutu, the former Archbishop of Cape Town, said, ‘Zimbabwe was sliding towards dictatorship’. On 18 February the EU imposed ‘smart sanctions’ on Mugabe and 19 of his leading supporters; these included a prohibition on travel and the freezing of overseas bank accounts. On 3 March the Commonwealth deferred a decision on whether or not to suspend Zimbabwe until after the election so that it could first study a report on how these had been conducted. Over the two days of the election it was found that there were 50 per cent fewer polling stations in the urban areas (the MDC strongholds) than in the 2000 election while there was an increased number of polling stations in the rural areas from which ZANU-PF drew most of its support. As a result, only 28 per cent of the registered voters had been able to cast their votes by the end of the second day of polling. The MDC appealed to the High Court and there was a part-extension of polling time for a third day. The result, after two revisions of the count, gave Mugabe 56.2 per cent of the vote to Tsvangirai’s 41.9 per cent, a margin of 463,000 votes. However, according to the Helen Suzman Foundation of Johannesburg, 700,000 votes had been ‘discovered’ and added to Mugabe’s vote. African countries were quick to accept the result. Observers from South Africa declared the election free ‘to a degree’. The EU observer mission had been withdrawn after Zimbabwe expelled its leader, the Swede Pierre Schori, though the Commonwelth mission remained. The United States declared the result flawed and did not recognize Mugabe as President. There was continuing violence after the election as retribution was visited upon constituencies that had favoured the MDC.
On 8 September 2,900 of the remaining white farmers were ordered off their land without compensation and prime farms were appropriated by politicians and friends of the President. Earlier, a state of disaster had been declared on 1 May and by August a third of the population was at risk of starvation. In an outrageous statement, Didymus Mutasa, a close confidant of Mugabe and a former Speaker of the Assembly, said ‘we would be better off with only six million… of our own people who support the liberation struggle’.8 By the end of the year about two million Zimbabweans had emigrated or migrated illegally into neighbouring countries. Mugabe, however, appeared as entrenched in control as ever.
No matter how Mugabe’s actions were regarded and condemned, the case for land reform was unanswerable. The question, however, was in what manner should it be implemented. By 2000 it was clear that Mugabe blamed the British and believed they were working with the white farmers. The Lancaster House Conference of 1979 had written into the constitution a clause that protected the white farmers from any compulsory purchase for 10 years. It is impossible to say whether the absence of such a clause would have made any difference for Mugabe ‘wanted a Zimbabwean government to be able to seize land compulsorily from white farmers and pay no compensation. He got the exact reverse – a constitution that protected farmers by ruling out compulsory land acquisitions and guaranteeing full compensation. Moreover, these clauses would be set in stone and shielded from amendment for 10 years. Mugabe signed up to this reluctantly, in order to bring peace to his country.’9 Much of the land acquired went to rich, powerful blacks in place of whites and was not divided into peasant farms. For small farms to work, especially for people who had not farmed for years, huge back-up services would also be required and these were clearly not catered for under the land seizures.
Britain’s relations with Zimbabwe have never been easy, neither were they much better with Rhodesia even before Smith made his unilateral declaration of independence. As Harold Macmillan came to realize on his visit to Rhodesia in 1960, the Central African Federation had been a mistake. And if in the late 1990s Tony Blair found Mugabe difficult to deal with so earlier had Harold Wilson found Smith just as awkward a proposition. Bad Anglo-Rhodesian, Anglo-Zimbabwean relations appeared to have entered the political bloodstream of the two countries. Mugabe was always deeply suspicious of Britain’s motives and given its record during the UDI years he had reason to be so. Britain, moreover, always used its bilateral assistance, despite claims to the contrary, as a lever to influence policy. In the early 1990s Britain was the largest aid donor to Zimbabwe and one of its two main trading partners. This fact ought to have made possible a sensible solution, acceptable to both sides, of the land issue, yet by the end of the decade the relationship had collapsed into one of two-way name-cal
ling. Was this simply due to the intransigence of Robert Mugabe, or the arrogance of Britain, or the anti-Mugabe machinations of the white farmers? The Blair government clearly understood nothing about Africa when it came to power in 1997 and did not begin to appreciate how to handle the Zimbabwe situation and was ham-handed, to put it no worse, in its dealings with Mugabe. Alienation would seem to be the appropriate word to use and it stretched back a long way.
Blair and Mugabe met at the Commonwealth Edinburgh summit of October 1997 and apparently took an instant dislike to one another and given their totally opposed characters – the charismatic, moralizing, sincere, heart-on-sleeve Blair and the dour, intellectual, narrow-visioned, race-conscious Mugabe – this is not surprising. Blair, moreover, was reluctant to acknowledge the assurances about financial assistance that John Major had given Mugabe on the land issue. Then Clare Short, Labour’s Minister for the Department for International Development (DIFID), entered the picture when she wrote a letter to the Zimbabwean Agriculture Minister in November 1997: ‘I should make clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the cost of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized not colonizers.’10 This letter caused outrage in Zimbabwe and was released to the press. If the deliberate intent had been to create bad relations between Britain and Zimbabwe Short could not have done better than first deny any sense of responsibility for what, by any criteria, was a major leftover problem of British imperialism and then add her absurd personal Irish connection as though this could excuse her government attempting to evade its responsibilities. In 1999, on the eve of the farm invasions, the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, clearly as ignorant on the subject of Zimbabwe as Clare Short, tried to persuade Lord Carrington to intervene on his behalf though the latter had resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1982. This escapist suggestion was vetoed by the Foreign Office. Blair paid little attention to Zimbabwe until 2000 when he was at last obliged to take note of what was happening. At Edinburgh Mugabe had wanted Britain to pay for land reform in accordance with the 1979 Lancaster House promise – to which he had only reluctantly acceded – that he believed to be an unconditional commitment. The Conservatives had paid over a total of £44 million, the last tranche in 1995. However well or badly that money had been spent, a great deal more was clearly required if the land resettlement problem was to be completed. DIFID under Clare Short, however, regarded land reform as a development project rather than an obligation from the imperial past. Between them, Blair and Short had sent indifferent and hostile signals to the prickly Mugabe that he would neither forget nor forgive. The British, with all their ‘experience’ in Africa, managed to demonstrate a bewildering ignorance of how the continent worked. When Peter Hain, who had risen to fame as a young man demanding a boycott of South African cricketers in the 1970s and by 2000 was a minister and rising star in New Labour, delivered an attack upon Mugabe through the Daily Telegraph (8 March 2000), in choicely undiplomatic language, he said: ‘The political leadership is bankrupt… the politics pursued by Robert Mugabe are economically illiterate, indeed innumerate – after 20 years, Zimbabwe is all but on its knees, and there is only one group responsible for that – the ruling party,’ he was signalling loud and clear that Labour washed its hands of any further attempt to find a solution and left the white farmers to their fate. Stan Mudenge, Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister, described this outburst as an ‘unprecedented anti-Zimbabwe crusade’.11 By the 2001 Labour Party Conference Blair was comparing Mugabe with Osama bin Laden. What neither Blair nor Hain understood was that they had made it almost de rigueur for other African leaders to support Mugabe against these attacks from the former metropolitan power. Subsequent British government or media attacks upon Mugabe appeared petty and useless in face of a man who knew exactly what he wanted and was fighting for political survival.