EXAMPLES FROM THE HISTORY OF HUMAN ARTIFACTS AND CULTURES.
I presented arguments for punctuational models of human biological evolution in a previous section (pp. 908–916). But I have also been struck by the frequency of punctuational explanations advanced for patterns in the development [Page 953] of human artifacts and cultural history, processes that must “evolve” under causes and mechanisms quite different from the genetic variation and natural selection that regulate our Darwinian biology. Moreover, the Lamarckian character of human cultural change — the inheritance by teaching of useful innovations acquired during the life of an inventor — provides an entirely plausible mechanism for a more accumulative, progressive and gradual style of change in this realm than the Darwinian character of physical evolution (and the explicit denial of Lamarckian effects) should permit for the history of our anatomical changes. Thus, the discovery of punctuational patterns in cultural change might be viewed as even more surprising than the application of punctuated equilibrium to our morphological evolution.
For example, although more gradual and accumulative change may prevail in the history of tools following the origin of Homo sapiens (and, one presumes, a markedly increased capacity for cultural transmission), many scholars have noted, usually with surprise, a remarkable lack of change in the Homo erectus tool kit during more than a million years. For example, Mazur (1992, p. 229; see also Johanson and Edey, 1981, and Roe, 1980) states: “the early tool cultures were remarkably stable over long periods of time. The constancy of the Acheulean handax tradition has been especially noted, for hand axes have been found at sites widely separated in distance and across a million years of Homo erectus's existence look very similar to one another, their uniformity more striking than regional differences.” Such collateral data support a view of Homo erectus as an individuated biological species, an entity rather than an arbitrarily defined segment of a continuity in anagenetic advance.
The history of scholarly research on European Paleolithic cave art provides an especially interesting example of how belief in progressivistic and gradual anagenesis can operate as a limiting preconception, and how punctuated equilibrium can play a salutary role as a potential corrective, or at least as a source of novel hypotheses for consideration. No aspect of the prehistory of artifacts has stunned or moved modern humans more than the parietal (wall) art of the great caves of Lascaux, Altamira, and many others, with their subtle and beautiful animal paintings that establish an immediate visceral link of aesthetic equality between the anonymous prehistoric artists and a Leonardo or Picasso. At least by standards of human history, these caves span a considerable range of time, from Chauvet at greater than 30,000 years BP (by radiocarbon evidence) to several at about 10,000 years of age.
Unsurprisingly, all great scholars of cave art have wanted to learn if any “evolution” can be discerned in the temporal sequence of these images. Two preeminent scientists built sequential schools of thought that virtually define the intellectual history of this subject in the 20th century. These men, the Abbe Henri Breuil and Andre Leroi-Gourhan, shared a firm belief that gradualistic evolution through a series of progressive stages provides a primary organizing theme for the history of parietal art (see Gould, 1998b, for an epitome of their beliefs), even though, in other philosophical respects, their [Page 954] worldviews could not have been more different. (In fairness, no techniques of absolute dating were available to these scientists, so they used the traditional methods of art history in attempting to establish chronology by a series of developmental stages. But for human art in historical times, we can back up such aesthetic theories with known dates of composition, so the argument does not become intrinsically circular.)
The Abbe Breuil viewed the paintings functionally as a form of hunting magic (if you draw them properly, they will come). He accepted the linearly progressivist view of evolution that his late 19th century education had inculcated, and that his religious convictions about human perfectability also favored. He therefore conceived the chronology of cave art as a series in styles of improvement, leading to rigidification and a final “senile” decline. In an early article of 1906, he wrote: “Paleolithic art, after an almost infantile beginning, rapidly developed a lively way of depicting animal forms, but didn't perfect its painting techniques until an advanced stage.”
Leroi-Gourhan, a devoted follower of Levi-Strauss and his functionalist school, embraced the opposite concept that cave art embodies timeless and integrative themes of human consciousness, based on dichotomous divisions that define our innate mental style of ordering the complex world around us. Thus, we separate nature from culture (the raw vs. the cooked in Levi-Strauss's famous metaphor), light from darkness, and, above all, male from female. Leroi-Gourhan therefore read the caves as sanctuaries where the numbers and positions of animals (with, for example, horses as male symbols, and bisons as female) reflected our unchanging sense of natural order based on a primary sexual dichotomy — with an appended set of symbolic, and similarly dichotomized, attributes, including the conventional and sexist active vs. passive, and rational vs. emotional.
Given his view of cave art as representing the unchanging structure of human mentality, Leroi-Gourhan might have emphasized an implication of stasis for the duration of this form of expression. In fact, matching Breuil in commitment to the notion of gradualistic progress, Leroi-Gourhan contrasted a stability in conceptual intent with continual improvement in fidelity of artistic rendering for images of unchanged significance — that is, a gradual progression in overt phenotypes (the only aspect of change that an “evolutionist” might note and measure) contrasted with a constancy in symbolic meaning. Leroi-Gourhan wrote in 1967: “The theory ... is logical and rational: art apparently began with simple outlines, then developed more elaborate forms to achieve modeling, and then developed a polychrome or bichromate painting before it eventually fell into decadence.”
This scenario sounds eminently reasonable until one subjects the argument to further scrutiny, with an explicit effort to identify and question gradualistic biases. After all, we are not examining a lineage of enormous geological extent spanning a range of phenotypic complexity from amoeba to mammal, or even from one species to another. We are tracing about 20,000 years in the history of a single species, Homo sapiens that remained anatomically stable [Page 955] throughout this time. Of course, cultural achievements can accumulate progressively while Darwinian biology remains unaltered. And, of course again, we assume that the first person who ever took ochre to wall could not render a mammoth with all the subtlety developed by later artists; some substantial learning and development must have occurred. But then, the earliest known cave paintings do not record these initial steps, for our oldest data probably represent a tradition already in full flower — so that we observe, in the total range now available to us, something analogous to the history of Western art from Phidias to Picasso (with much change in style, but not directional progress), not the full sweep from the first hominid who ever pierced a hole in a bear tooth and then strung the object around his neck, to the Desmoiselles of Avignon. Why then should we ever have anticipated a linear sequence of change in the known history of Paleolithic parietal art?
Indeed, and to shorten a longer story, the discovery and dating of Chauvet cave in 1994, abetted by improvements in radiocarbon methods that provide accurate results from tiny samples, have now disproven the controlling gradualist and progressivist assumption in an entire tradition of research. The paintings at Chauvet, dated as the oldest of all known sites (30,000 to 34,000 years BP), include all features previously regarded as identifying the highest, and latest, stage of achievement in a sequence of increased artistry (as found in the much younger caves of Lascaux and Altamira). In other words, the full range of styles extended throughout the entire interval of dated caves, with the most sophisticated forms fully present at the oldest site now known.
Bahn and Vertut (1988) invoked punc
tuated equilibrium in their prescient anticipation of the disproof that would soon follow. They also made an astute argument — based on punctuated equilibrium's concept of species as discrete individuals with considerable capacity for spatial variation at any one time vs. the tendency of anagenetic thinking to regard the phenotype of any moment as a uniform stage in a temporal continuum — that geographic variation, in itself, should have precluded any expectation of a simple chronological sequence, even if a general trend did pervade the entire series. After all, why should areas as distant as southern Spain, northeastern France and southeastern Italy go through a series of progressive stages in lockstep over 20 thousand years? Regional and individual variation can swamp general trends, even today in our globally connected world of airplanes and televisions. Why did we ever think that evolution should imply a pervasive signal of uniform advance? Bahn and Vertut (1988) write:
The development of Paleolithic art was probably akin to evolution itself: not a straight line or ladder, but a much more circuitous path — a complex growth like a bush, with parallel shoots and a mass of offshoots; not a slow, gradual change, but a “punctuated equilibrium,” with occasional flashes of brilliance . . . Each period of the Upper Paleolithic almost certainly saw the coexistence and fluctuating importance of a number of styles and techniques, ... as well as a wide range of talent and [Page 956] ability . . . Consequently, not every apparently “primitive” or “archaic” figure is necessarily old . . . and some of the earliest art will probably look quite sophisticated.
A similar reconceptualization and corrective, for a more restricted region at a smaller scale of centuries rather than millennia, has been offered, citing punctuated equilibrium as a source of ideas, in Berry's (1982) treatise on the history of the Anasazi people of western North America. Berry treats the Anasazi as a geographically variable cultural entity, in many ways akin to a biological species under punctuated equilibrium, and not, as in most previous writing, as a group in continuous flux, with nearly all variation expressed temporally. Eldredge and Grene (1992, p. 118) write of Berry's work:
Rather than interpreting the pattern as a linear history, in which change sometimes occurred rapidly and at other times at a more leisurely pace, Berry argues that the patterns of stasis interrupted by spurts of rather profound cultural change do not represent linear evolution, but rather a sequence of habitation and replacement. The Anasazi are a historical whole, as regionally diverse and as temporally modified as they were. They were replaced by another cultural system, not as a smooth evolutionary outgrowth but because the Anasazi were eventually (and rather abruptly) no longer able to occupy their territory.
Several social scientists have used the model of punctuated equilibrium as a guide to reconstructing patterns in social and technological development as punctuationally disrupted and then reformulated, rather than gradually altering — as in Weiss and Bradley (2001) on climatic forcing as a prod to rapid societal collapse in early civilizations throughout the world, over several millennia of time and types of organization. Adams (2000) has generalized this argument about “accelerated technological change in archaeology and ancient history.” He explicitly cites the Lyellian tradition as a former impediment to recognizing and resolving such social punctuations (2000, pp. 95-96): “Built into traditional Darwinian 'descent with modification' was an acceptance of the standpoint of Lyell's geological gradualism. In its time, his assumption of uniformitarian change in the earth's geological history carried the day against competing doctrines of catastrophism. Today, however, there is increasing recognition of great diversity in rates of evolutionary change ... Accelerated phases of change, often referred to in evolutionary biology as punctuations, invite closer study by students of human as well as natural history.”
Finally, as a generality for the key transition to agriculture that marks (through the accumulation of wealth leading to social stratification, and the initiation of fixed-placed dwelling leading to towns and cities) the multiple inception of what, for better or worse, we generally call “civilization” — Boulding (1992, p. 181) cites active stasis and rapid punctuation as the predominant pattern, in opposition to a uniformitarian tradition most famously promulgated in Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics, one of the most [Page 957] influential textbooks ever written, and a volume that, through decades and numerous editions, bore on its title page the Leibnizian, Linnaean, and Darwinian maxim: Natura non facit saltum. Boulding writes: “In the economy we certainly find periods of relative stability, in which society is getting neither much richer nor much poorer, but these periods of stability do seem to be punctuated by periods of very rapid economic development. The transition from hunting-gathering societies to agriculture at any particular locality seems to set off a period of rapid economic growth. This transition was usually rather rapid and, it would seem, irreversible.”
EXAMPLES FROM HUMAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEORIES ABOUT THE NATURAL WORLD. If relatively prolonged periods of actively maintained stability, followed by episodic transition to new positions of repose, mark the most characteristic style of change across nature's scales, and if we have generally tried to impose a gradualistic and progressivistic model of change upon this different reality, then we must often face anomalies that engender confusion and frustration in our personal efforts to improve our lives or to master some skill. To cite two mundane examples from my own experience, I spent several, ultimately rather fruitless years learning to play the piano. Whenever I tried to master a piece, I would become intensely frustrated at my minimal progress for long periods, and then exhilarated when everything “came together” so quickly, and I could finally play the piece. I also liked to memorize long passages of poetry and great literature, primarily Shakespeare and the Bible, an activity then practiced and honored in the public primary and secondary schools of America. I would get nowhere forever, or so it seemed — and then, one fine day, I would simply know the entire passage.
Only years later — and perhaps serving as a spur to my later interest in punctuated equilibrium — did I conceptualize the possibility that plateaus of stagnation and bursts of achievement might express a standard pattern for human learning, and that my previous frustration (at the long plateaus), and my exhilaration (at the quick and rather mysterious bursts), might only have reflected a false expectation that I had carried so long inside my head — the idea that every day, in every way, I should be getting just a little bit better and better.
I don't know that explicit instruction in the higher probability of punctuational change, and the consequent appeasement of frustration combined with a better understanding of exhilaration, would improve the quality of our lives. (For all I know, the frustration and exhilaration yield important psychological benefits that outweigh their inadequate mapping of nature.) But I do suspect that a general recognition of the principles of punctuational change — leading us to understand that learning generally proceeds through plateaus of breakthroughs, and that important changes in our lives occur more often by rapid transition than by gradual accretion — might provide some distinct service in our struggles to fulfill the ancient and honorable Socratic injunction: know thyself.
I also think that an explicit application of punctuational models to many [Page 958] aspects of change in human institutions and technologies might improve our grasp and handling of the social and political systems that surround and include us. For example, in a stimulating paper emanating from her own research on “project groups” formed to study and initiate organizational change, Gersick (1991) explored the commonalities of punctuational change at six distinct levels of increasing scope — in the lives of individuals, the structures of groups (her own work), the history of human organizations, the history of ideas, biological evolution (our work on punctuated equilibrium), and general theory in physical science (Prigogine on bifurcation theory). Her paper, published in the Academy of Management Review, bears the title, “Revolutionary change
theories: a multilevel exploration of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm,” and begins by stating: “Research on how organizational systems develop and change is shaped, at every level of analysis, by traditional assumptions about how change works. New theories in several fields are challenging some of the most pervasive of these assumptions, by conceptualizing change as a punctuated equilibrium: an alternation between long periods when stable infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of revolutionary upheaval.” (See also Wollin, 1996, on the utility of punctuated equilibrium for resolving the dynamics of growth of complex human and social systems in general: “A hierarchy based approach to punctuated equilibrium: an alternative to thermodynamic self-organization in explaining complexity.”)
In her own work on “task groups,” Gersick (1988) reached a surprising conclusion. These associations did not proceed incrementally towards their assigned goals, but rather tended to hem, haw and dither until they reached a particular, and temporally definable, point of quick transition towards a solution. “Project groups,” she writes (1991, p. 24), “with life spans ranging from one hour to several months reliably initiated major transitions in their work precisely halfway between their start-ups and expected deadlines. Transitions were triggered by participants' (sometimes unconscious) use of the midpoint as a milestone, signifying 'time to move.'”
These particular results inspired Gersick's more general consideration of punctuational models. In so doing, she explicitly follows both approaches previously advocated (p. 928) as strategies for transcending metaphor and discovering causally meaningful connections among punctuational phenotypes of change across levels and disciplines: the identification of “conjoints,” or properties correlated with the basic punctuational pattern (the basic strategy of documenting a complexity in number and interaction of parts too high to attribute to causally accidental resemblance, and therefore necessarily based on homology); and the proposal of a general rationale, transcending the particular of any scale of analysis or class of objects, for the punctuational character of change.
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory Page 152