Many other proofs exist of the secret complicity of the United States in the capture of Central Europe by the Soviets. During 1942, large quantities of uranium, cadmium, and heavy water thorium, aluminum tubes, and copper wiring (all materials required for the creation of a nuclear reactor) were sent to the Soviet government from an air base in Great Falls, Montana, established specifically for this purpose. This incredible high-tech military smuggling, organized from the White House, is known through the publication of notes taken by Captain George Racey Jordan, who participated in the delivery of these cargoes, which included many other kinds of industrial equipment (From Major Jordan’s Diaries, 1952). This secret assistance to the Soviets was supervised by Harry Hopkins, who had been placed in the White House by Bernard Baruch. Also delivered to Moscow were duplicates of United States Treasury plates, together with tons of paper and gallons of the appropriate ink for printing unlimited quantities of dollar bills.343 The transfers were supervised by Harry Dexter White, a protégé of Henry Morgenthau Jr. and a liaison officer between the Treasury and the State Department, who was also the principal US official at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and closely associated with the founding of the International Monetary Fund. Born Weit Magilewski of Lithuanian Jewish parents, White was charged with espionage on behalf of the Soviets, alongside Alger Hiss, following the denunciation of another repentant spy, Whittaker Chambers.
In 1941 Hitler had made the bold bet that England would at least accept a truce to allow Germany to defeat the Soviet Union. He had reason to believe it. Since 1917 Churchill had not ceased to present Bolshevism as the worst scourge of mankind. “Bolshevism is not a policy; it is a disease,” he said in the House of Commons on May 29, 1919, adding that “it is not a creed; it is a pestilence.” He prescribed gas as “the right medicine for the Bolshevist.” Later in the same year, on November 6, he compared the Germans sending Lenin back to Russia as sending “a phial containing a culture of typhoid or cholera to be poured into the water supply of a great city.” And he declared: “Of all the tyrannies in history, the Bolshevist tyranny is the worst, the most destructive, and the most degrading. It is sheer humbug to pretend that it is not far worse than German militarism.” But twenty years later, on September 3, 1939, the same Churchill declared in the House of Commons: “We are fighting to save the whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man.” And, whereas he had, in 1919, recommended to Lloyd George to “Feed Germany; fight Bolshevism; make Germany fight Bolshevism,” in 1939 he denounced Chamberlain’s refusal to initiate a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.344 Nevertheless, Hitler was betting on Churchill’s self-interest when in May 1941 he parachuted his closest associate Rudolf Hess into Scotland with a mission to secretly inform the British government of his imminent offensive against the USSR and to propose a peace treaty. Hess was captured, Churchill refused to hear him, imprisoned him until the end of the war, then refused to release him as a prisoner of war and sentenced him in perpetuity for “conspiracy and crime against peace.”345
The very first day of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941, Churchill spoke on the BBC to explain that Nazism was worse than communism: “The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels all forms of human wickedness in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression.” The British government, Churchill went on to say, has “but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime.” And so, “any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. That is our policy and that is our declaration. It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.” Suddenly, Churchill stopped speaking of the Soviet Union, but of the “Russian people”: “The cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe. Let us learn the lessons already taught by such cruel experience. Let us redouble our exertions, and strike with united strength while life and power remain.”346
In a text dictated on February 4, 1945, and included in his Political Testament, Hitler analyzed Churchill’s refusal. According to him, Churchill should have understood England’s need to “come to terms with me,” in order to preserve the “balance of power” and maintain Europe’s independence from the “two giants, the United States and Russia”; “When I attacked eastwards and lanced the communist abscess, I hoped thereby to rekindle a spark of common sense in the minds of the Western Powers. I gave them the chance, without lifting a finger, of making a contribution to an act of catharsis, in which they could have safely left the task of disinfecting the West in our hands alone. […] I had underestimated the power of Jewish domination over Churchill’s England.”347 What Hitler could not understand was that, behind the scenes of Anglo-American power, it had been decided not only that Nazi Germany was a worse enemy than the USSR, but that the USSR was not an enemy to be defeated at all. In fact, the leadership had decided to deliver half of Europe to Stalin.
“An old Zionist like [Churchill]”
Another thing that Hitler could not know is how deeply Churchill was committed to helping Weizmann make the war the springboard for the foundation of Israel. It was only after his retirement that Churchill confessed. He declared publicly, on the fourth anniversary of the independence of Israel, that he had been “a Zionist from the days of the Balfour Declaration,” and he wrote to US President Eisenhower in 1956: “I am, of course, a Zionist, and have been ever since the Balfour Declaration.”348
Churchill’s Zionism helps explain how the Balfour Declaration became such a cornerstone of British policy. Churchill had always claimed that the intention of the Balfour Declaration was that Palestine might in the course of time become “an overwhelmingly Jewish State.” In his 1920 article “Zionism versus Bolshevism” he had already affirmed the British Government’s responsibility “of securing for the Jewish race all over the world a home and a centre of national life. […] if, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown, which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event would have occurred in the history of the world which would, from every point of view, be beneficial, and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire.”
In 1922, as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Churchill issued a White Paper crafted to reassure the Arabs, whose apprehensions, it said, “are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the [Balfour] Declaration.” By “a Jewish National Home in Palestine,” the Declaration “does not mean a Jewish government to dominate Arabs. […] We cannot tolerate the expropriation of one set of people by another.” Yet that White Paper imposed no limitation to Jewish immigration in Palestine, nor to the purchase of lands by Jews, which were the great concerns of the Arabs. It simply said, in terms alarmingly vague: “For the fulfillment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. […] Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions.” Moreover, if Churchill’s White Paper said that Jews will not rule over Arabs, it could be understood to mean that they will rule in a land free of Arabs. It was, therefore, carte blanche for the Zionist plan.
In 1939, a new Labour majority undermined Churchill’s influence in Parliament. A new White Paper was voted for by a large majority, which limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for the next five years, with the stated purpose of preserving an Arab majority in Palestine. This was a serious reversal of policy regarding Zionism: The 1939 White Paper was unequivocally against letting Palestine become a Jewish State. This provoked not only a
strong protest from Ben-Gurion’s Jewish Agency, but also the mobilization of military groups (Haganah, and its offshoot the Irgun) against the British authorities in Palestine.349
Churchill fought relentlessly against this 1939 White Paper, which he regarded as a betrayal of Great Britain’s commitment to the Balfour Declaration. His thoughts, he would say in 1942, were “99 per cent identical” with Weizmann’s. He had often consulted him in private meetings since 1919. In May 1939, the new White Paper was debated in the House of Commons. Churchill invited Weizmann to his London apartment to go over his speech and, as Weizmann recalled in his memoirs, “he asked me if I had any changes to suggest.” In 1951, Churchill would refer to himself, in a letter to Weizmann, as “an old Zionist like me.”
In the words of Martin Gilbert, author of Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship (who also documents Churchill’s intimate family ties with the Rothschilds and other Jewish bankers), Churchill “refused to allow the 1939 White Paper, despite its passage into law by an overwhelming majority of Members of Parliament, to come into effect. This was certainly unconstitutional.” In December 1939, as Weizmann was planning a trip to the USA, the Foreign Office sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in the USA reiterating the guidelines of the new White Paper. Churchill protested to his War Cabinet colleagues that this would undermine Weizmann’s endeavor “to bring United States opinion as far as he possibly can on to our side.” In a memorandum that he wrote for the War Cabinet on Christmas Day 1939, he expressed his opposition to the restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine by reminding his Cabinet colleagues that: “it was not for light or sentimental reasons that Lord Balfour and the Government of 1917 made the promises to the Zionists which have been the cause of so much subsequent discussion. The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the highest importance, and we did not feel ourselves in such a strong position as to be able to treat it with indifference. […] when the future is full of measureless uncertainties, I should have thought it was more necessary, even than in November 1917, to conciliate American Jewry and enlist their aid in combating isolationist and indeed anti-British tendencies in the United States.” In another memorandum dated 19 May 1941, Churchill expressed his hope for the establishment after the war of a “Jewish State of Western Palestine” with the fullest rights for immigration and development, and with provision “for expansion in the desert regions to the southwards which they would gradually reclaim.”350
In 1945, Churchill was defeated by a Labour majority. The new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, appointed Ernest Bevin, a man not well disposed toward Zionism, as Foreign Secretary. Churchill understood that the new British government would stick by the 1939 White Paper, and that the hopes of Zionism now rested on the USA. He then argued for the UK to give up on “a responsibility which we are failing to discharge and which in the process is covering us with blood and shame,” and to return the Mandate to the United Nations. As soon as the British handed the Mandate back to the UN, the Zionists declared the founding of the State of Israel, which the US and the Soviet Union immediately recognized. Churchill urged the British Government to do the same. In 1955, he even supported a suggestion by James de Rothschild that Israel, the nation that had founded itself by ousting Great Britan from Palestine by terrorism, should now be admitted to the British Commonwealth: “It would be a wonderful thing,” he said during a lunch at Buckingham Palace. “So many people want to leave us; it might be the turning of the tide.”
Birth of the “Jewish State”
The fate of Palestine was not on the agenda of the Yalta Conference (February 1945); Franklin Roosevelt wanted to discuss it first with King Ibn Saud of Arabia. He did so immediately after the conference, from February 12 to 14, 1945, aboard the cruiser USS Quincy. Ibn Saud expressed his fears about the consequences of US support for the Zionists and Roosevelt gave him his word, confirmed by a letter dated April 5, that he “would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.” In describing his meeting with Ibn Saud, Roosevelt told Congress: “On the problem of Arabia,” he said, “I learned more about that whole problem—the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem—by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in the exchange of two or three dozen letters.”351
Roosevelt died on April 12th. “If Roosevelt had not died, there might not have been a Jewish state,” has commented Nahum Goldmann, one of Zionism’s most influential representatives with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann. (He was president of the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization from 1956 to 1968.) “Our great luck was that Roosevelt was replaced by Harry Truman, who was a simple and upright man. He said, ‘My friends are Jews; the Jews want the partition, so I am giving it to them.’”352 David Niles, Roosevelt’s assistant “for minorities” (i.e., for the Jews), expressed the same feeling to Stephen Isaacs: “Had Roosevelt lived, Israel would probably not have become a state.”353 Niles, one of the few FDR advisors retained by Truman, was the gray eminence of Zionism in the White House. It was he who, behind Truman’s back but on his behalf, orchestrated the campaign of intimidation and corruption that obtained a two-thirds majority in favor of the 1947 Partition Plan at the General Assembly of the United Nations.354
In his Memoirs published in 1956, Truman commented—in eloquent but somewhat hypocritical terms—on the circumstances of the vote: “The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly.”355
In December 1945, a few months after Roosevelt’s death, Truman publicly expressed his aversion to the idea of a “Jewish state”: “The Palestine Government […] should be the Government of the people of Palestine, irrespective of race, creed or color.”356 However, on May 15, 1948, Truman recognized the State of Israel ten minutes after the announcement of its unilateral proclamation. This decision went against the recommendations of his secretary of state George Marshall, his defense secretary James Forrestal and all his advisers, as well as British Foreign Minister Ernest Benin. Moreover, it betrayed the spirit of the Quincy Pact. How was Truman “turned around”? Based on documents revealed by the Truman Library in 2003, an article in the Jewish World Review entitled “Truman did it to save his own skin” shows that his recognition of the Jewish state was strongly advised by his campaign director Clark Clifford, with the aim of securing the famous “Jewish vote” (a half-fiction cleverly maintained by the Zionist elites to increase their power) but also in exchange for campaign funding. Truman’s patron Abraham Feinberg, president of the Americans for Haganah Incorporated, which raised money for the Jewish militia against the Arabs, made no secret of having funded the Truman campaign in recorded testimony for the Truman Library in 1973.357
On May 28, 1949, a year after his recognition of the Jewish state—and six days after the alleged suicide of US Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, who more than anyone else had tried to deter Truman from recognizing Israel—Truman expressed in a letter to the government of Ben-Gurion his “deep disappointment at the Israeli refusal to make any of the desired concessions on refugees and boundaries.” He demanded Israel’s withdrawal to the borders of the UN Partition Plan and, in a pathetic plea revealing his helplessness, warned that if Israel pursued this path, “the U.S. will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable.” Ten days later Truman received an answer indicating that “The war has proved the indispensability to the survival of Israel of certain vital areas not compr
ised originally in the share of the Jewish state.” As for the Palestinian refugees, they were “members of an aggressor group defeated in a war of its own making.”358
Truman should have known as early as 1947 that Israel, founded as a “Jewish State” on the “Land of Israel” by its Declaration of Independence, would not be content with the borders granted by the UN Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947. Many of the “founding fathers” of Israel rejected the Partition in the name of the sacred principle of “The Sanctity of the Indivisibility of the Land,” to quote from Menachem Begin: “The dismembering of our homeland was illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature of institutions and individuals on the dissection contract it totally invalid.” Ben-Gurion signed the resolution in November, but only after having warned, in May, that “We want the Land of Israel in its entirety,” and before declaring in December that the boundaries assigned to Israel by the resolution were “not final.”359
Ben-Gurion’s government later refrained from such a politically damaging public stance, but it surfaced again in the euphoria of the 1967 conquest. According to Yitzhak Tabenkin, a founding father of Zionism from the 1930s, “The goal of our entire project was then, and remains: a Greater Israel within its natural and ancient borders; from the Mediterranean to the desert and from Lebanon to the Dead Sea—as the reborn homeland of the entire Jewish people. This is the original Zionist ideal.” It was advocated as public policy by dozens of prominent Israelis who wrote and signed the document “For a Greater Israel” published in September 1967.360 Israel has not yet, to this day, endowed itself with a constitution, which would oblige it to define its borders, that is to say, what it means by “the land of Israel.”
From Yahweh to Zion Page 29