In its film version, Seven Years in Tibet (1997) loses almost all its ambiguity. It becomes the story of Harrer, a self-centered and individualistic Westerner, who is transformed in Tibet. Superlatives abound in descriptions of Tibet-"roof of the world," "highest country on earth," "most isolated," "medieval stone fortress towering in the centre of Asia," and so on. In Seven Years in Tibet the people of Lhasa "casually offer pearls of wisdom about the harmony of Tibet in comparison to the West" (Hansen 2001, 105): one Tibetan says, "We admire a man who abandons his ego, unlike you, who admire those who reach the top." Yet the movie, along with Martin Scorsese's Kundun (also see Frontline 1998a), played a crucial role in highlighting Tibet in the Western popular imagination. It brought to the attention of consumers of Hollywood that there is/was a place called Tibet. The film adaptation of Seven Years in Tibet follows a certain shift within Exotica Tibet-a conflation of the Dalai Lama with Tibet. While Tibet was clearly a set for an adventure for Harrer in the book, Brad Pitt as Harrer in the film is more humble and self-conscious, and the figure of the young Dalai Lama is particularly prominent.
4. The West and the Identity of "Tibet"
Tibet as it emerged in the modern world as a geopolitical entity has been scripted in a tale combining imperialism, Orientalism, and nationalism. This chapter foregrounds the role of Western representations in the framing of the "identity of Tibet," that is, Tibet as a geopolitical entity. The West is not seen as an outsider in the "Tibet question" but as a constituent part of it. Specific Western conceptualizations of territoriality, practices of imperial diplomacy, and contemporary foreign policies have constructed the "Tibet" within the "Tibet question." [46] Through a historical analysis of the crucial role played by British imperialism in the framing of the Tibet question in terms of sovereignty and independence, this chapter brings into relief the constitutive relation between the discourse of sovereignty and the practice of representation. It argues that Tibet is not some prediscursive geographical entity but a place that is discursively constructed through imaginative practices of the various actors involved. [47] The chapter also briefly explores ways in which popular imaginations of Tibet have impacted the foreign policy of prominent Western states toward Tibet since the Chinese takeover in 1951.
The contemporary Chinese claim over Tibet is based on a version of Chinese history that sees the present-day nation-state as a successor to a longer history of Chinese civilization marked by a number of imperial phases. Tibet was historically linked with various Chinese empires and therefore the Chinese deem it part of modern China. What the exact nature of Tibet was within different empires in China is not considered a crucial factor, for what is important is that Tibet was subordinate to the Sino-centric empires. It is this historical subservience that underpins the argument asserting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet forever. On the other hand, Tibetans have argued that "Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation when the armies of the People's Republic of China ('PRC') entered Tibet in 1950. Tibet at that time presented all the attributes of statehood" (TPPRC 2000, 1). They seek to explain the traditional Sino-Tibetan relations in terms of principles that are not transferable into the modern notion of sovereignty. The personal, religious, and ambiguous nature of Sino-Tibetan relations is ridden roughshod over by the modern concept of sovereignty-China never had sovereignty over Tibet. All sides (Tibetans less so than the others) underplay the fact that sovereignty talk itself is alien to the traditional modes of interaction in the Sino-Tibetan world (Sperling 2004; see also Constantinou 1998).
The status of Tibet vis-a-vis China before 1951 has been articulated in terms of various concepts, including sovereignty, suzerainty, independence, indirect rule, autonomy, vassalage, protectorate, overlordship, and colony (for a range of views, see Chiu and Dreyer 1989; Government of Tibet in Exile n.d.; Petech 1950; Norbu 1990; Shakabpa 1984; Smith 1996; Van Praag 1987; Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain 1997; Wang Lixiong 2002). However, for the most part, it is sovereignty that is asserted and contested. On the one hand, the Chinese state marshals arguments buttressing its historical claim of sovereignty over Tibet; on the other, Tibetan exiles and their supporters make counter claims and assert that Tibet was for all practical purposes independent from China. Though both sides mobilize history to make their claims, the concept of sovereignty is often left unproblematized. This is not surprising as sovereignty is an "essentially uncontested concept" (Walker 1990, 159; for different perspectives on sovereignty, see Bartelson 1995; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hannum 1990; Hinsley 1986; Hoffman 1998; James 1986; Krasner 1999; Shinoda 2000; Weber 1995).
Crucially, the revolutionary communist regime that took over China in 1949 had no qualms about staking claims in Tibet based on a debatable imperial legacy, which it had denounced in other spheres. There was no radical break from the past in making assertions over the boundary of China. The Chinese, who during the nineteenth century rejected the Western mode of international relations as alien, exerted their control over Tibet after 1950 using the absolutist modern European conception of sovereignty. Importantly, in the process it also ignored the different worldviews within which the Mongol and Manchu emperors interacted with Tibet (see Klieger 1994; Norbu 1990; Shakya 1999). Unlike the British, who used "suzerainty" and "autonomy" to designate Sino-Tibetan relations, since 1905 the Chinese have consistently argued that China's position is that of a sovereign and not a suzerain (see Carlson 2004, 2005). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, even though there is no space for "suzerainty" within international law and politics and all the states recognize the Chinese claim of "sovereignty" over Tibet, the pro-Tibet lobby contests this affirmation of sovereignty by highlighting the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty within international law. As Oppenheim argued: "Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally by the suzerain State" (in Van Praag 1987, 107).
IMPERIALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN TIBET
The genealogy of the modern idea of sovereignty as it was transplanted in the non-Western world reveals its close connection with European imperialism. Until the first half of the twentieth century, the international community of states was based on a double standard. While the "civilized" world (read as Europe, and later the United States and Japan) had a right to sovereign statehood, the rest of the world was open to various forms of imperial control. The "[d]egree of civilisation necessary to maintain international relations was considered as one of the conditions for statehood" (Hannum 1990, 16). The Tibetan example is typical of how imperial efforts throughout the non-European world were empowered by Western understandings of the non-Western states. Not only did imperial powers actively delegitimize non -Western modes of political interaction but they refused to recognize the intricacies of non-Western interstate relations (see Strang 1996). Within this context, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the traditional Sino-Tibetan relationship was considered by the British to be "irrational" and lacking legitimacy because it did not conform to the modern European ideas of diplomacy. For a large part of the nineteenth century, to the British in India, Tibet was a "forbidden land" ruled by "strange lamas" under some form of Chinese political control. While some, including Bogle, named this control "sovereignty" (Markham 1876, 195), most used the terms "overlordship" or "suzerainty." In one of the first European accounts, the Christian missionary Ippolito Desideri saw Tibet as part of the "Chinese dominion" (De Filippi 1932, 165). On the other hand, Fathers Huc (1982/1851) and Gabet, the "Lamas of the Western Heaven," in the middle of the nineteenth century described the Chinese rule as "nominal" (in Nish 1995, 294). This recognition of Chinese political dominance was based on the presence of Imperial amban (resident) and troops in Lhasa, the role of the Manchu emperors in the recognition of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and the Tibetan refusal to articulate Tibet's status in modern terms.
Due to their own familiarity with feudalism and with the Chi
nese international system of tributary relations (Wiggins 1995), it is not surprising that the British interpreted the Sino-Tibetan relations in terms of suzerainty and a protectorate system. British policy toward Tibet was shaped by conflicting dynamics including the infeasibility of direct colonization, the security of British India's northern frontiers, the conceptualization of Tibet as a buffer state with a strategic location (see McKay 2003), British commercial interests in the Chinese empire, shifting alliances within Europe, and the like (see Norbu 1990). These conflicting interests shifted over time.
Tibet as outside the Modern Geopolitical Imaginary
In the eighteenth century, Tibet was seen as a possible backdoor to China as well as a potential trading partner. [48] There were a few Europeans (mostly Christian missionaries) who had traveled and lived in Tibet and Lhasa before and after the British attempts to establish a relationship in the second half of the eighteenth century. While their accounts fed into the image of Tibet held by the British, their role was merely to arouse curiosity. The main focus of expanding British colonialism was on exploring the possibility of commercial interactions (see Cammann 1951). Even before the first-ever official attempt to establish relations with Tibet through George Bogle, the following observation was made about Tibet (in the Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations of 9 May 1774): "They are represented as a quiet people numerous and industrious, living under a well regulated Government, having considerable intercourse with other Nations, particularly with the Chinese & Northern Tartars, and possessing at home the principal means of Commerce, Gold and Silver in great abundance" (IOR: H/219 1768-84, 336; emphasis added).
This view is bolstered by Bogle (in Markham 1876) as well as Turner (1971/1800). Both official travelers to Tibet also made observations about Chinese influence in Tibet. Bogle in a letter in February 1775 mentions that while Teshoo Lama was influential, the real seat of government was Lhasa, and the "Emperor of China is paramount sovereign"; in another letter he further clarifies:
The Emperor of China is acknowledged the sovereign of the country, the appointment to the first officers in the state is made by his orders, and in all measures of consequences, reference is first made to the court at Pekin, but the internal government of the country is committed entirely to natives, the Chinese in general are confined to the capital, no tribute is extracted, and the people of Thibet except at Lahasa, hardly feel the weight of a foreign yoke. (IOR: H/219 1768-84, 354, 397-98; emphasis added)
Turner, in a letter dated 2 March 1784, points out that in Tibet there is an "acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Chinese government" (IOR: H/219 1768-84, 485). But there was no serious attempt to name Sino-Tibetan relations in precise terms. Representations of Tibet did not feed into political actions. There could be various explanations for why British imperialists did not seek to define Tibet at this moment. The empire in India itself was in the process of initial expansion and consolidation. Large parts of Asia and Africa remained outside European control and hence were seen as open space for inquiry. Tibet did not hold any special value. For the British, India and China did.
The nineteenth century witnessed a closure of Tibet to the Europeans. Some travelers did manage to get in (see Woodcock 1971), but there was no official interaction between Tibet and the rising and consolidating British empire in India. By the end of nineteenth century, British India had within itself the cis-Himalayan regions of Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Assam, some of which in turn had politico-religious relations with Tibet. Tibet saw these regions as under its influence. For British India this had a dangerous implication for the security of its northern frontiers and hence required clarity. But within the traditional Tibetan worldview, there was no imperative to define boundaries. McGranahan identifies five key features that made traditional Tibetan systems of statehood different from modern European systems: local determination and sanctioning of boundaries; sovereignty and boundary not coterminous; overlapping zones between polities; no imperative for an external ratification of rules; and privileging of power relationships between territory and center over territorial integrity (2003, 268).
Observations by Indian spies who had been active in the second half of the century pointed to continuing Chinese dominance. For instance, Sarat Chandra Das, who managed to reach Lhasa in disguise in the 1880s, argued that the "political relations between Tibet and China are now so intimate that the Imperial Residency established at Lhasa in the first quarter of the last century has converted Tibet from a protected state into a dependency of China" (1902, 178). But Tibetans refused to honor any Anglo-Chinese agreement concerning them without justifying their action by using a modern vocabulary of sovereignty or independence.
The British blamed this on the backwardness of Tibetan religion, narrow priestly interests, Chinese jealousy, and a lack of understanding of genuine friendly motives of the British (see Engelhardt 2002). The Times reported in 1885, "We hear complaints everywhere of the stagnation of trade. Here is a large market if we only insist on admission… Tibetans… are debarred from intercourse with India through sheer ignorance and the tenacity of tradition" (in Walker 1885, 27). Macaulay in his 1884 report blamed Cornwallis, who had succeeded Hastings as the governor- general of the East India Company, for not helping Tibetans in the Gorkha war in 1792 and thus contributing to their "closed" nature; he laments that had Hastings been in charge, he "would have required no pretext [for military action] beyond the fact that an unprovoked act of brigandage had been committed on a helpless child" (1972, 71; emphasis added). Paternal imperialism prevented the actors of the time to comprehend Tibetan actions in terms of fear deriving from an understanding of the violence of modern imperialism. Aris, on the basis of his study of a late-eighteenth-century Tibetan text, argues that a positive sympathy can be detected for the undefeated Marathas and their long oppositional stand against both the Mughals and the British (1994, 12)-this surely indicates some awareness among Tibetans of the nature of imperialism in India.
By the start of the twentieth century, the undefined Tibet was no longer an unmapped land to the north of the Himalayas but had come to be perceived as a buffer state, a state that could act as a buffer against the new threat on the horizon-Russian imperial expansion in Central Asia. [49] Tibet acquired new importance within the "Great Game," and the British sought to have a friendly state to buffer British India from hostile forces in the north. Chinese imperial power was in decline and seen more as a nuisance.
Filling in the Blank Space
At the start of the twentieth century, there were two phases in British India's policy toward Tibet, the watershed being Curzon's telegram of 8 January 1903. In the first phase, Curzon unsuccessfully tried a policy of direct approach, that is, of communicating with the Dalai Lama. That "the Dalai Lama had the temerity, one had almost say the cheek, to return the Indian Grand Mughal's letters unopened was sufficient cause, in Curzon's eyes, for a march to Lhasa, if only to show the Tibetan barbarians some elementary rules of human behaviour, of a code of (international) conduct!" (Mehra 1968, 360). Curzon pushed for a more active, confrontational policy.
The British Indian government informed the Home government, in a letter dated 13 February 1902,
The policy of isolation followed by the Tibetans is not compatible either with proximity to the territories of a great civilised power at whose hands the Tibetan Government enjoys the fullest opportunities both for intercourse and trade, or with due respect for the treaty stipulations into which the Chinese Government has entered on its behalf (IOR: V Cd.1920 [1904], 153; emphasis added)
The result of this new forward policy was the mission led by Francis Younghusband in 1903-4. In fact, this mission not only showed Tibetans their place in the imperial scheme of things but also em-placed Tibet in the modern geopolitical imaginary.
In his famous dispatch of 8 January 1903, Curzon mentions his two failed attempts (the third attempt was being made) to get in personal touch with the Dalai Lama; the failure of measures to "materially" impro
ve British position on the border; persistent rumors about the Russo-Chinese deal; and his own conviction that "some sort of relations" existed between Russia and Tibet, changing the scenario:
We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction-a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. China is always ready to break down the barriers of ignorance and obstruction, to open Tibet to the civilizing influence of trade, but her pious wishes are defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In the same way, Tibet is only too anxious to meet our advances, but she is prevented from doing so by the despotic veto of the suzerain. This solemn farce has been re-enacted with the frequency that seems never to deprive it of its attractions or its power to impose. (IOR: V Cd.1920 [1904], 154-55)
Many other British Indian officials agreed with Curzon's view of Chinese control as mere "tutelage" (Sandberg 1904, 13). Charles Cock's memorandum in 1903 pointed out that "China is a hopeless factor" that had "no real hold over Tibet, and was only made use of by the Tibetans as an excuse for not communicating directly" with the British (IOR: L/P &S/18/B144 1903, 41). But there were dissenting voices too. For instance, Curzon's position went against the observations made about de jure Chinese authority in a memorandum written by William Lee-Warner in 1902, arguing that the 1890 Convention "practically recognises Chinese sovereignty over Tibet," and after the rumors of a Russian protectorate over Tibet, "We have warned China, thus again recognising Chinese sovereignty" (IOR: L/P &S/18/B138 1902, 23).
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