Interaction with Western Audiences: Exotica Tibet
A very important dynamic shaping Tibetan political identity has been interaction with Western audiences. The role of the West can be examined as within rather than outside the Tibet question by looking at the theme of Western representations of Tibet and its interface with Tibetan (trans)national identity. Scholars like Lopez (1998) show that Tibetans are "prisoners of Shangri-la"-constrained by their image as a religious, peaceful, exotic, and idyllic community. The dominant representation of Tibetans in the West in the early twenty-first century is as peaceful, nonviolent, religious, spiritual, compassionate, and close to nature. A corollary to this representation is the idea that the inherently good-natured Tibetans are victims of forced modernization brought about by Chinese rule. The emphasis is both on the uniqueness of the Tibetan culture and on its universal relevance.
Exotica Tibet, presenting Tibetans as victims, has helped mobilize many non-Tibetans for the "Save Tibet" cause. The Tibet movement, referring to the transnational efforts made on the part of Tibetans and their non- Tibetan supporters to demand the right of self-determination for the Tibetan people, has gained some high profile support, including Hollywood stars, U.S. Congress members, and members of European parliaments. The worldwide network of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) is unique in this respect (see Ven-turino 1997). They include organizations focusing on a wide range of themes-Tibetan Buddhism, human rights, spreading awareness about the situation in Tibet, and demand for independence (rangzen is the term used for this). The presence of support for Tibet is particularly significant in the virtual world where most of the Internet sites related to Tibet are pro-Tibetan. In fact, there is an increasing realization within the Tibetan diaspora of the possibilities offered by the Internet as a means for disseminating information and mobilizing support. Though the motives of participants in the Tibet movement vary, [63] what seems to unite them is a broadly defined Tibet cause. When the Tibetans went in exile they found that "Tibet" already existed in the Western imagination, and given their limited options, they conformed to that image in order to gain support (see Lopez 1998). Tibetans, Tibetophiles, and Tibetologists all have contributed to the romance of Tibet-to Exotica Tibet-which paradoxically renders problematic the struggle for independence from Chinese occupation. Moran, on the basis of his study of Tibetan diaspora in Nepal, warns against an Orientalist valorization of Tibetans, for "there is also the danger that if Tibetans fail to deliver the uni-dimensional spiritualized goods, there is no basis through which to approach them except through scorn" (2004, 6-7). Even though Western patronage offers an important source of symbolic and economic capital for individual Tibetan refugees, it remains precarious (see Prost 2006).
The support of the "Free Tibet" movement is often based on the supposed cultural uniqueness of Tibetans rather than on the recognition of the political right to self-determination. Richard Gere, the Hollywood actor, uses the analogy of David and Goliath to offer hope to the Tibetans and reminds them, "You must maintain that sense of uniqueness and that genuine cultural commitment to nonviolence. If you pick up arms and become like the Palestinians, you'll lose your special status" (in Schell 2000, 56). As Baird recognizes in the New Internationalist (1995) special issue on Tibet, the romantic image has hampered the Tibetan struggle for self-determination: "If Tibetans are presented as a dreamy, unrealistic people, obsessed with religion, their struggle is unlikely to be taken seriously by a world driven by more secular values. Their demand for independence will be seen as pie-in-the-sky and their ability to rule themselves will be open to question" (1995, 1).
However, rather than paint Tibetans as victims, we can view the Shangri-la image in a different light. Exotica Tibet is not only restrictive of options but is also "a soft power resource that can be manipulated to get attention and to get some access to the stages of world politics" (Magnusson 2002, 211). For instance, Klieger (1997) argues that Tibetans have been active in the creation and presentation of their own identity. [64] Not only have they participated in portraying an image of themselves to outsiders but their self-perception too has been a result of this self-reflexivity. Calling this conscious and selective presentation of self "Tibetan hyperreality," he writes: "Tibetan hyperreality is created from a conscious and selective presentation of self to an audience with highly conditioned expectations. Tibetan culture as currently presented in most Tibetan cultural centres in the West is idealized, homogenated and pasteurized. It has… remarkably allowed the perpetuation of Tibetan identity despite the vicissitudes of exile" (ibid., 67).
In the process of strategically deploying their culture to the Western audience for mobilizing political support, Tibetans have redefined and reconstructed Tibetan culture and identity. The Dalai Lama-led government-in-exile self-consciously makes representations of reflexive, politicized notions of culture and identity that are dependent upon the globalized production of institutions and the flow of cultural resources made possible through the onslaught of modernity (see Huber 2001; McLagan 1997; see also Shakya 2001). Not only have they embraced modern technologies such as the Internet (see McLagan 1996) to promote their cause [65] but they have also projected their culture as being compatible with universalizing discourses such as environmentalism, (world) peace, and nonviolence. Representations, politicized culture, and an interaction with a Western audience affect the "domestic" and "international" politics of the Tibetan elite in the diaspora. In their search for outside support, the Tibetan elite have been learning the language of international politics dominated by the Western powers (see Frechette 2002; Kolas 1996).
"We live in a nationalised world" and we tend to see the world with a "nationalising eye" (Cubitt 1998, 1). Recognizing the dominance of nationalism as a source of legitimacy in contemporary international politics, for example, the Tibetan government-in-exile has molded its expositions on Tibetan identity accordingly. Though "Old Tibet" had elements of natio (Lopez 1998, 197-98), Hobs-bawm's protonationalism (Dreyfus 1994), and what Smith calls eth-nie, a modern sense of nationhood was absent (Ekvall i960, 382). Tibet as a nation is not a historical reality but a product of post-exilic imagination. [66] The Western influence can also be seen in the evolving cultural and political discourses, including the structure of the government-in-exile. In fact, the Dharamsala establishment has been moving toward democratization (see Boyd 2004) for gaining legitimacy in the West. These developments may be explained in terms of an image-building exercise, steps taken toward keeping up with the times, response to pressures from within the refugee community, and finally, the Dalai Lama's personal initiative.
In complying with dominant representational regimes, Tibetans are following tactics common to many groups who try to counter their relative powerlessness by negotiating within the dominant representational regimes and selectively appropriating favorable aspects. All third world resistance groups have to "negotiate both the post-cold war reframing of global politics and the lingering traces of Western post-colonial fantasies about their country and culture" (Bishop 1998, 123; see also Bishop 2000). Gandhi's adoption of the Orientalist trope of spiritualist Indians, feeding it into a wider political struggle against British imperialism as well as social evils within the Indian society, is a good example.
At the same time, these presentations should not be seen only in terms of a response to Orientalist representations, for often there are elements within the traditional society that facilitate this appropriation. Aris argues that the current predicament of Tibetans seeking Western support against an "Eastern" power (China) can be understood within traditional Tibetan historiography: "All Tibetan chronicles contain a stock chapter which speaks of the key process by which the embers of the doctrine in central Tibet were revived from the west and caused to flame from the east" and therefore "the idea of destruction, whether caused by external attack or internal collapse, is bound up with the idea of flight to a place of refuge and the possibility of return" (BOD MS Or. Aris 14 1990, 65, 67).
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p; The Dalai Lama speaks about spirituality and the peaceful nature of Tibetans. His Strasbourg Proposal of 15 June 1988 is an example: "My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage render it ideally suited for fulfilling the role of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia" (His Holiness the Dalai Lama 1988). Though some historians argue that there is a strong tradition of warriors among groups of Tibetans (Norbu 1986), this does not undermine the Dalai Lama's claim about a "profound spiritual heritage," for elements of compassion and the principle of nonviolence were present within traditional Tibetan society. Such strategies are more about the selective appropriation of historical narratives for contemporary purposes than about specific historical truths. The specificity of these strategies is shaped by the contemporary vocabulary available for expression. The vocabularies of nationalism and transnationalism are two such discourses that the Tibetans have adopted to make their case.
Transnationalism in the Service of Nationalism
Quite often, diasporas are considered to exist in opposition to nation-states, with diaspora consciousness correspondingly incommensurate with nationalism. Clifford, for example, argues that diaspo-ras can never be exclusively nationalist because they imply multiple attachments (1997, 135-36). However, in the case of the Tibetans, nationalist discourse is a product of the diaspora. Imagining Tibet as a nation is to a large extent a postexilic phenomenon. The most sophisticated articulation of Tibetan national identity thus comes from the more radical sections of the Tibetan diaspora. Western representations and diaspora conditions have also contributed to a shift in emphasis away from ethnicity (Tibetans as tsampa eaters) to religion (a "modern" version of Tibetan Buddhism) as the basis of Tibetanness (Lopez 1998, 198). In contrast, Shakya (1993) argues that the shift has been away from "faith" to "flag" as a result of the hegemony of nationalistic discourse.
At the same time, transnationalism, engendered substantially by the transnational Tibet movement, has been an integral part of Tibetan diasporic identity. This is not surprising given that "the Tibet movement represents an emergent form of transnational, inter-cultural political activism, one that is dependent upon the complex production and circulation of representations of 'Tibetanness' in various arenas that cross cultural and national boundaries" (McLagan 1997, 69; emphasis in original). Tibetan identity has strong constructive elements of transnationalism (Mountcastle 1997), including those that emphasize environment (on "green" Tibetan identity, see Huber 1997), peace, spiritualism, international human rights, universal compassion, and eclectic beliefs. As pointed out earlier, these are distinctly connected to Exotica Tibet. The constituency of Tibetan supporters often overlaps with other transnational social movements. Economically and politically, as well as symbolically, transnational connections feed into the Tibetan diaspora's nationalism. While recognizing the essentially modern aspect of the nationalist and transnationalist discourses prevalent among the Tibet diaspora, it cannot be denied that the traditional Tibetan principles of operating with the external powers have also facilitated this.
Working within the framework of a patron-client relationship, Tibetans have managed to construct and reinforce a national identity by drawing upon the patronage of transnational networks and connections. Klieger's analysis of Tibetan nationalism as a modern manifestation of the "patron-client dyad" argues that the Tibetans living in diaspora have been able to retain their status by converting the entire exile community into the client category (1994, 84-120). This is not to argue that a coherent ideology of nationalism accepted by the entire Tibetan diaspora has emerged. The idea of Tibet as a nation is a contested political construct that involves the manufacturing of unity out of tremendous difference and diversity.
Soliciting international support has been one of the main strategies of the Tibetan diaspora elite. The Dalai Lama's well-publicized and frequent trips to various countries are a significant part of this strategy of raising the profile of the Tibetan cause in the international media and mobilizing public opinion in the Western states. Conspicuous avoidance of the Tibet question in the conventional fora of international relations, epitomized by the lack of recognition of Tibetan statehood by any existing state, has forced the Tibetans to seek support through nonconventional means-cultural politics is a part of this. The ultimate goal behind the transnational mobilization remains the assertion of the right to self-determination. Tibetan-ness thus is a transnational phenomenon, a political practice that transgresses national boundaries but does not question the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations. In a dedication at the beginning of his autobiography, Palden Gyatso reflects a sentiment common to most Tibetans, a hope that international support might help them realize their goal of independence: "And to all of you who inhabit the world who also believe in the virtues of truth, justice and decency… Help to deliver us. Help us to be free, to be independent, to be able to do what we choose-in our own country" (1997).
The imaginative hold and consequent impact of Exotica Tibet is evident in the activities of various Tibet support groups. The support in the form of the "Free Tibet" movement is often based on the image of "Tibet as defenseless underdog, a spiritual society that was minding its own business only to get crushed under the jackboot of an aggressive, materialist overlord" (Schell 2000, 206). However, even the cultivation of this victimization paradigm reflects the agency of Tibetans. Though Tibetan global publicity campaigns consciously portray Tibetans as victims of Chinese oppression, this does not deny them their subjectivity. Instead, they have made conscious and extensive use of Western discourses-whether psychology, philosophy, physics, personal growth, or holistic health-in their attempts both to communicate with Westerners and to reconstitute themselves in conditions of exile (Bishop 1997, 67). Tibetans have colluded with, as well as contested, various Western images of Tibet.
Though many Westerners may like to overrate their own importance in nurturing Tibetan resistance to China, resistance to domination always exists in all societies (Bass 1990, 218), and Tibet is no exception. [67] Dominant cultural and political ideas (in this case Western and Chinese) influence the precise forms that the resistance takes. In the diaspora, it is the preservation of traditional culture and nationalism that is the main dynamic behind the politics of resistance. Within Tibet, this ranges from protest movements demanding independence to forces demanding accommodation of special rights within the Chinese state structure. In either case, it reveals the political agency of Tibetans.
The extent to which the awareness-raising campaigns of the Tibet support groups in the West translate into substantive political support and activism is open to question. In fact, the existing support for the Tibetan cause is based on Exotica Tibet, particular representations of Tibetans as inherently spiritual and peaceful people. This restricts the alternatives available to those Tibetans (see Lazar 1998; Shakya 1991) who might be disillusioned with the Dalai Lama's insistence on nonviolence and his renunciation of the demand for independence. Instead of deriving satisfaction solely from high-profile support for Tibet based on particularized images, many Tibetans are frustrated with the limitations imposed by this on their political struggle. Tsering expresses this sentiment very clearly when he writes, "As for our friends and supporters, while we greatly appreciate their sympathy and support, it is not for them to determine what the goal should be" (1998, 43). The adoption of a human rights model by a Tibetan exile elite, as discussed briefly in the previous chapter, has limitations as in the West this model provided a "language that could be used ambiguously so that the domestic audience would be seen as criticizing China while Chinese officials might be persuaded that the criticisms were sufficiently mild so as not to be threatening to fundamental concerns" (Barnett 2001, 291).
Thus, while molding their identity discourses according to Western exoticized imagery has helped Tibetans in gaining substantial popular support, there is a strong realization among many that this is not an end in its
elf. As Shakya points out, unlike other international political problems such as the Palestinian one, the Tibetan issue is seen in terms of sentimentality. "If the Tibetan issue is to be taken seriously, Tibet must be liberated from both the Western imagination and the myth of Shangri-la" (1991, 23). It therefore comes as no big surprise that while the international support for Palestinians often comes from other third world countries, Tibet support groups are more common in the civil society of the first world. [68] This has partly to do with the limited success of the Tibetan government-in-exile in establishing networks in the third world. The Tibetan exiles turned for support to former colonizers rather than to the formerly colonized and chose public relations rather than political alliance as their form of politics (Barnett 2001, 279).
TIBETAN (TRANS)NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE TENSIONS WITHIN
The institutional as well as the symbolic practices of the Dalai Lama-led Dharamsala establishment encourage people to act socially and cohesively as Tibetans in an "alien" environment. [69] The emphasis on constructing a unity does not mean an elision of differences within the community. As in any other vibrant society, one can find here differences based on generation, socialization, gender, religiosity, region, sect, period of departure from Tibet, class, and political opinions (see Ardley 2002; Diehl 1998). The popular tendency within the media, Tibet support groups, and many Tibetans themselves, is to represent the Tibetan diaspora community as united under the leadership of the Dalai Lama. However, significant differences can be seen within the diaspora between the Tibetans coming from the U-Tsang region and Khampas and Amdowas. Difference is definitely witnessed in religious matters, as in the Shugden affair [70] or the Rumtek monastery controversy, [71] or, for that matter, in less-publicized differences within the monasteries in South Asia between the old arrivals and the newcomers (see Strom 1997, 39-42). Significant generational differences are also found within the diaspora on matters such as the role of religion in society (is it an end in itself or a cultural resource?); outmigration from South Asia (whether to stay in the region close to the community or move out to Western countries for improvement in individual standard of living); influence of popular Indian and Western culture (should one assimilate with the dominant culture or retain separation?); and political priorities (whether to emphasize preservation of traditional Tibetan culture or focus primarily on the explicitly political demands). [72] In political matters too the diaspora is divided. Study of statements by the Tibetan government-in-exile reveals an ambiguity in their primary political demands (at http://www.tibet.com). While the right of Tibetans to self-determination is asserted, often it is argued in terms of significant and real autonomy within China, sometimes on the model of "One Country, Two Systems" as has been followed in the case of Hong Kong. On the other hand, there are more radical intellectuals and activists within the Tibetan diaspora who make a strong and unambiguous case for struggling toward complete independence (see Lazar 1998). [73] There are several other opinions on this matter. A middle ground is expressed in the Hear Tibet! campaign calling for a United Nations-backed referendum within Tibet allowing the Tibetan people themselves to choose their own political future (see Hear Tibet! 2001).
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