Such deeds are always performed by those whom Putin and his gang label as “traitors to the nation” and “fifth columnists.” For now the protest movement itself has misfired. But moral-ethical protest has survived, if only among a very small part of the population. However paradoxical it may seem, one cannot dismiss the possibility that it is precisely the moral-ethical character of protest that may hold some promise for the future. Naturally, there are risks involved. A similar protest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was infiltrated in the end by unscrupulous political adventurers whom Fyodor Dostoevsky prophetically called devils, and it led to the collapse of the country.
Speaking of the extremely unlikely possibility that Russia may take the path of democracy, it should not be forgotten that during the era of the moribund Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, almost nobody could foresee that the end point of the trajectory of the communist dictatorship would be the democratization of the USSR followed by regime collapse. This reminder leads me to another observation.
The situation unfolding in contemporary Russia is not new. Russia found itself, if with certain important reservations, in a similar situation, usually called stagnation, during the period when Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko ruled the USSR. Stagnation possessed several distinct features: the unlimited power of a narrow circle of rulers unconstrained by the people, the disregard of domestic and international law, the Cold War, the arms race, the global opposition to democratic countries, the suppression of dissent, the constant mass hypnosis of the people regarding “successes achieved” and “hostile encirclement,” and the breakdown of civilian industry along with the buildup of military industry. The period of classical stagnation also had additional features that it shares with the current situation.
In essence, considering developments in Russia since Putin came to power—his success in establishing “stability” and constructing a “vertical of power,” on the one hand, and the sad historical experience, several aspects of which have been delineated previously, on the other—one may confidently refer to the contemporary neo-stagnation as a core element of Putinocracy. How long it will last is another question.
Although neo-stagnation is significantly different from the Brezhnev–Chernenko stagnation, the two do share many common features. This is evidenced above all by the dysfunctionality of the rulers involved, even though the two cases differ. The latter’s case of gerontocracy manifesting itself in senile indisposition, including dementia, is completely different in character from the former’s case of infantilism, which is characterized by an incomprehension of even the basics of governance and an inability and unwillingness to work. However, the consequences of both cases for Russia, its inhabitants, and the world are entirely comparable. The present authorities’ penchant for playing with power is no better than the beastly seriousness of the communist leaders.3
Another common feature of Putinocracy and classical stagnation is their ramping up of ideology; however, even here there are also profound differences. The rulers of the stagnating USSR, who mistook their dreams for reality, thought they possessed certain lofty goals and ideals. (Such people are easily and conveniently susceptible to self-deception.) While they did not even read the “holy books” of their anti-religion, they were mired in propagandist clichés and stereotypes, which, in any case, were based on their own convictions, their own experiences, their knowledge, and their lives.
The situation is fundamentally different with regard to those responsible for neo-stagnation. They have no personal experience or knowledge of what they advocate. Like little children they play at soldiers, toying with the fate of Russia and other countries. But they have an unshakable faith in the myth of the greatness of the USSR that, for them, is symbolized by Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and their ilk. They ignore the fact that the ascent of the human spirit, the victory in the Second World War, and other achievements were possible not because of the authorities but despite them. The mythology about the “accomplishments” of the Communist Party and the Soviet government turned out to be too firmly instilled in a population rendered hapless by heterodoxy. It turns out that the current cynical authorities—a criminal class that has acquired state power and turned the Kremlin, the Russian White House, the ministries, and the federal agencies into their own property—find this mythology convenient and to their liking.
The principal warriors against the ideals of democracy and human rights—the dyed-in-the-wool xenophobes, the anti-Semites, those who hate the humanity of human beings, the morally and intellectually limited creators and products of reality who are leading Russia to political, economic, and moral ruin—did not, and do not, understand that they are the blind leading the blind along a path that ends in the abyss.
The creeping rehabilitation of the Soviet authorities’ crimes against their own and other peoples that began under Yeltsin is much more amoral and cynical than what the “true Leninists” did. After the fall of the USSR, it was more difficult not to know what had transpired than it was to know the truth.
Naturally one may explain the return to stagnation by pointing to diverse reasons, ranging from the almost total historical illiteracy of its initiators and inspirers to their deeply hidden and perverted pro-Soviet convictions. The latter version looks even more convincing in that Putin’s United Russia party in essence mimics the CPSU and that the “warriors of the invisible front”—namely, Putin and his colleagues from the “Soviet overflow” who came to power—are simply committed Bolsheviks. We should not fail to recall the professional training they underwent in Soviet times. (I say this confidently as someone who belongs to that generation.) That the authorities found the Soviet model convenient has played a large role in recent developments.
Another common feature of both classical stagnation and Putinesque neo-stagnation is the absence of a dialogue not only between society and the authorities but also among the authorities themselves. Under Putin and his puppet Medvedev, the absence of a dialogue among the authorities is much more serious than it was in Soviet times. In his diaries, Anatoly Chernyaev writes of his horror that in what was then the highest organ of power, the Politburo, there was no discussion of the most complex and critical issues. However, leaders at every level were not averse to consulting with their subordinates, who considered it normal to express their disagreements and take issue with them, defending their own points of view and not infrequently succeeding in persuading their superiors to change their minds. The same thing happened under Yeltsin, although in a different form: they simply manipulated him.
With Putin’s ascension to the throne, dialogue with the authorities ceased. “Putin never alters his decisions,” I was told by one of his former KGB colleagues in response to an attempt to correct a glaringly mistaken decision by the then acting president. Soon another thing became clear: he also didn’t need the advice of experts. As president, he didn’t spend more than fifteen minutes a day reading documents.4 According to the journal Russkii newsweek (Russian newsweek), after Putin became prime minister, “they said that in the [Russian] White House there was simply no such format: Putin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, i.e. the prime minister, worked on the documents by himself. He came to a meeting for 15–20 minutes, met with [Vice Premiers Igor] Shuvalov, and [Aleksei] Kudrin, chaired the meeting, and left. . . . A swimming pool and two banquet halls were constructed on the fifth floor [the prime minister’s floor],” one of the prime minister’s subordinates confirmed, “and there the flies flew about.” At the time the report was published, apart from President Medvedev, the only persons with direct access to Putin were Vice Premiers Igor Sechin and Kudrin.5
During Yeltsin’s presidency, chaos reigned in the practice of personnel appointments. Chernyaev was indignant about the insecurity of personnel appointed to positions during the Brezhnev era. Appointments and tenure in office were a “function of the supreme leader’s personal sympathy or antipathy.”6 This practice returned under Yeltsin. Putin succeeded in extend
ing this instability to other spheres, including business, and even to the possibility of engaging in oppositional activity. This is the most vivid confirmation of neo-stagnation in Russia. As in classical stagnation, neo-stagnation has fostered maximum growth in the role of the punitive organs, although under Putin this growth has been incommensurately larger than it was under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko.
This is how the authorities have negotiated the next formidable series of hairpin turns. Having just escaped the Leninist-Stalinist rut, they returned to it, lightly disguising this fact with the semblance of democracy. It is purely out of Yevgeny Schwartz’s The Naked King, but for now no one in Russia or abroad dares say that the king is naked.7
Neo-stagnation will last longer than the stagnation of the Brezhnev–Chernenko era. Back then people were hoping for something better; they waited for and searched for it. Now most of them are nostalgic for the past of Stalin and Brezhnev. This neo-stagnation may be the most prolonged period of mediocrity and will last until people finally tire of it and realize the terrible destructiveness of such an existence. Neo-stagnation will inevitably be accompanied by the further brutalization of domestic politics and conflict abroad. Just how far can the Russian authorities go?
Russia has long been heading toward renewed confrontation with the West. After the breakup of the USSR, clear-thinking politicians initially neutralized this tendency. Gradually their influence declined, and many of them left the political stage. Although it began much earlier, this shift became particularly clear to me when I was working in the Security Council. The rise to power of the special services made the brutalization of Russian politics inevitable. From my own experience I know just how much one’s profession, and one’s specialization within that profession, influences a person’s worldview. Even if one speaks of Russia’s diplomatic service then, for example, the Americanists, as a rule, were distinguished by their greater toughness and the Europeanists, on the contrary, by their flexibility and their inclination to seek compromises. What can one say about persons who thought in terms of threats, enemies, and confrontations? It was impossible for them to execute a sharp turn while preserving face or wearing perhaps just a mask. They needed a long period of preparation to engage the Western leaders, among other things. After winning over President George W. Bush and Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and engaging the services of Germany’s ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Putin felt the moment had come for him to change his political mask.
After proclaiming its readiness to renew the Cold War, which had been overcome with such great effort, through the lips of pseudo-president Medvedev the Kremlin risked its cooperation with the European Union and NATO by playing the card of imperial ambition. In other words, it returned to the fallacious foreign policy that had led to the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union and, ultimately, to its disintegration. Unfortunately, the Kremlin’s political calculation turned out to be right. Western leaders did not consider the dismemberment of Georgia sufficient reason to spoil their relations with Moscow. This irresponsible approach echoed in Ukraine, initiating the worst crisis in the system of international security since the Cold War.
There are several possible explanations. One is a fear of what else this enormous, enraged state, with an impaired memory and intellectually and morally underdeveloped rulers, might do. Another is the West’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. Even if these two most plausible hypotheses are true, from a moral perspective the policies of several Western states still look very dubious. Not only are their positions vis-à-vis Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and international law at stake, but their own security and long-term interests are as well.
The stance of Western leaders who ignored the willingness of Russian authorities to destroy in an instant their normal relations with democratic countries that had been achieved through more than forty years of painstaking labor led to the crushing victory of the hawks over the doves in the eternal struggle within Russia. As has occurred repeatedly in Russian history, this was a victory over itself, over its own people, over common sense.
The West’s pusillanimous behavior toward Russia only exacerbated the situation and gave the Kremlin a feeling of impunity. Meeting no rebuff for actions that deserved to be punished by the international community, Putin came to believe he could get away with anything. His massive persecution of oppositionists and his repressive legislation failed to provoke an adequate reaction. But the trial and conviction of the female punk rock band Pussy Riot in 2012 and, especially, Russia’s homophobic law of 2013 could not remain unnoticed. Directly or indirectly they impacted very broad circles of public opinion in the West.
Further, no one doubts that it was on the direct orders of Putin that Mikhail Khodorkovsky spent almost ten years in captivity. The tragedy of Vasily Aleksanian, denied indispensable medical assistance when he refused to give false testimony on Khodorkovsky’s trial (see chapter 6), is the acme of meanness and sadism! A similar case was that of the accountant Sergei Magnitsky, driven to his death in the notorious Moscow pretrial isolation facility Matrosskaya Tishina in November 2009. He too was refused cancer treatment; moreover, there were several indications that he had been tortured. Magnitsky’s “crime” consisted of having disclosed a scheme to embezzle funds from the state budget. U.S. senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) very properly proposed that those responsible for Magnitsky’s death be punished. In 2011 the U.S. Department of State prohibited the entry of sixty Russian officials connected with Magnitsky’s death. In December 2012 the United States passed a law imposing personal sanctions on persons responsible for violating human rights and the principle of the supremacy of law, among them officials of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Federal Tax Service, the Arbitration Court, the Procurator General’s Office, and the Federal Service for Implementation of Punishment. The “Magnitsky list” was implemented in Great Britain. too. However, this action was obviously insufficient to teach Moscow a lesson.
Moscow’s reaction to even the mildest of Western criticism is difficult to describe. Within the framework of its own pseudo diplomacy, it then decided to deny its own orphans the right to be adopted by Americans in 2013. In other words, unfortunate Russian children paid a hundredfold for the utterly absurd patriotism of unscrupulous Russian politicians who turned them into hostages.
On February 27, 2015, the charismatic, truly democratic, and fearless oppositionist leader Boris Nemtsov was killed beneath the walls of the Kremlin. This area is under the intensive, round-the-clock control of the Russian special services—above all, the Federal Guard Service—consequently, nothing is possible there without their knowledge. Considering that both the Federal Guard Service and other special services report directly to the president of the Russian Federation, there cannot be the slightest doubt about who gave the order; an executioner merely carried it out. As a result of what moreover was the ritual murder of Nemtsov (Putin and his gang love infantile demonstrations!), Russia lost the most outstanding, uncompromising, authoritative, and experienced opponent of the Putin regime. (Nemtsov had held the posts of governor, minister, and first deputy premier.)
On January 21, 2016, retired High Court judge Sir Robert Owen announced the results of a public inquest by the High Court of London into the matter of Alexander Litvinenko’s death, which has been discussed earlier. On the basis of painstaking work, including secret documents from the British special services, Owen stated that the FSB was probably responsible for the murder of Litvinenko, and the operation to eliminate him was likely executed with the approval of the then director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev and President Vladimir Putin.8 In this context one should not be confused by the word probably. The court issued a definitive decision.
Why does Russian diplomacy block the ending of bloodletting in Syria? The answer has been rather simple from the start: it does so out of the infantile fear of setting a precedent that would allow taking analogous measures with respect to Russia. Pr
esident Medvedev spoke about this on February 22, 2011, when referring to the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. “Earlier they prepared such a scenario for us, and now they will try even harder to implement it,” he said. “In any case, this scenario will not take place. But everything happening there will have a direct influence on our situation, moreover we are talking about a rather long perspective, a perspective of decades.” To this, of course, is added the striving to demonstrate Russia’s weight in international affairs. (In this connection, Western comments about Russia’s return to the role of a world power are particularly bizarre.) Naturally, both economic and geopolitical considerations also play a role. In any case, largely as a result of Russia’s senseless and irresponsible power plays, according to UN statistics from March 15, 2011, to December 10, 2013, there were 128,000 Syrians killed and more than 2 million wounded, and the whereabouts of 16,000 persons arrested by the Syrian authorities are unknown.
Invoking the pretext of the struggle against terrorism, but in reality to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Russia commenced the bombing of Syria on September 30, 2015. Russia refused to distinguish between the opposition to the regime and the terrorists operating on Syrian territory. The result of Russian bombing, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, was that by September 30, 2016, no fewer than 9,364 persons had been killed, among which 3,804 were civilians, including 906 children and 561 women.
Russia's Dead End: An Insider's Testimony from Gorbachev to Putin Page 39