by Epictetus
What then? Must I proclaim this to all men? No, but I must treat with consideration those who are not philosophers by profession, and say, “This man advises for me that which he thinks good in his own case; therefore I excuse him.” For Socrates excused the jailor who wept for him when he was about to drink the poison, and said, “How generously he has wept for us!” Does he, then, say to the jailor, “This is why we sent the women away”? No, but he makes this latter remark to his intimate friends, to those who were fit to hear it; but the jailor he treats with consideration like a child.
CHAPTER XXX
What aid ought we to have ready at hand in difficulties?
When you come into the presence of some prominent man, remember that Another looks from above on what is taking place, and that you must please Him rather than this man. He, then, who is above asks of you, “In your school what did you call exile and imprisonment and bonds and death and disrepute?” “I called them ‘things indifferent.’” “What, then, do you call them now? Have they changed at all?” “No.” “Have you, then, changed?” “No.” “Tell me, then, what things are ‘indifferent.’” “Those that are independent of the moral purpose.” “Tell me also what follows.” “Things independent of the moral purpose are nothing to me.” “Tell me also what you thought were ‘the good things.’” “A proper moral purpose and a proper use of external impressions.” “And what was the ‘end’?” “To follow Thee.” “Do you say all that even now?” “I say the same things even now.” Then enter in, full of confidence and mindful of all this, and you shall see what it means to be a young man who has studied what he ought, when he is in the presence of men who have not studied. As for me, by the gods, I fancy that you will feel somewhat like this: “Why do we make such great and elaborate preparations to meet what amounts to nothing? Was this what authority amounted to? Was this what the vestibule, the chamberlains, the armed guards amounted to? Was it for all this that I listened to those long discourses? Why, all this never amounted to anything, but I was preparing for it as though it were something great.”
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
That confidence does not conflict with caution
Perhaps the following contention of the philosophers appears paradoxical to some, but nevertheless let us to the best of our ability consider whether it is true that “we ought to do everything both cautiously and confidently at the same time.” For caution seems to be in a way contrary to confidence, and contraries are by no means consistent. But that which appears to many to be paradoxical in the matter under discussion seems to me to involve something of this sort: If we demanded that a man should employ both caution and confidence in regard to the same things, then we would be justly charged with uniting qualities that are not to be united. But, as a matter of fact, what is there strange about the saying? For if the statements which have often been made and often proved are sound, namely that “the nature of the good as well as of the evil lies in a use of the impressions of the senses, but the things which lie outside the province of the moral purpose admit neither the nature of the evil, nor the nature of the good”; what is there paradoxical about the contention of the philosophers, if they say, “Where the things that lie outside the province of the moral purpose are involved, there show confidence, but where the things that lie within the province of the moral purpose are involved, there show caution”? For if the evil lies in an evil exercise of the moral purpose, it is only in regard to matters of this kind that it is right to employ caution; but if the things which lie outside the province of the moral purpose and are not under our control are nothing to us, we ought to employ confidence in regard to them. And so we shall be at one and the same time both cautious and confident, yes, and, by Zeus, confident because of our caution. For because we are cautious about the things which are really evil, the result will be that we shall have confidence in regard to the things which are not of that nature.
However, we act like deer: when the hinds are frightened by the feathers and run away from them, where do they turn, and to what do they fly for refuge as a safe retreat? Why, to the nets; and so they perish because they have confused the objects of fear with the objects of confidence. So it is with us also; where do we show fear? About the things which lie outside the province of the moral purpose. Again, in what do we behave with confidence as if there were no danger? In the things which lie within the province of the moral purpose. To be deceived, or to act impetuously, or to do something shameless, or with base passion to desire something, makes no difference to us, if only in the matters which lie outside the province of the will we succeed in our aim. But where death, or exile, or hardship, or ignominy faces us, there we show the spirit of running away, there we show violent agitation. Therefore, as might be expected of those men who err in matters of the greatest concern, we transform our natural confidence into boldness, desperateness, recklessness, shamelessness, while our natural caution and self-respect we transform into cowardice and abjectness, full of fears and perturbations. For if a man should transfer his caution to the sphere of the moral purpose and the deeds of the moral purpose, then along with the desire to be cautious he will also at once have under his control the will to avoid; whereas, if he should transfer his caution to those matters which are not under our control and lie outside the province of the moral purpose, inasmuch as he is applying his will to avoid towards those things which are under the control of others, he will necessarily be subject to fear, instability, and perturbation. For it is not death or hardship that is a fearful thing, but the fear of hardship or death. That is why we praise the man who said
Not death is dreadful, but a shameful death.
Our confidence ought, therefore, to be turned toward death, and our caution toward the fear ot death; whereas we do just the opposite — in the face of death we turn to flight, but about the formation of a judgement on death we show carelessness, disregard, and unconcern. But Socrates did well to call all such things “bugbears.” For just as masks appear fearful and terrible to children because of inexperience, in some such manner we also are affected by events, and this for the same reason that children are affected by bugbears. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of instruction. For where a child has knowledge, he is no worse than we are. What is death? A bugbear. Turn it about and learn what it is; see, it does not bite. The paltry body must be separated from the bit of spirit, either now or later, just as it existed apart from it before. Why are you grieved, then, if it be separated now? For if it be not separated now, it will be later. Why? So that the revolution of the universe may be accomplished; for it has need of the things that are now coming into being, and the things that shall be, and the things that have been accomplished. What is hardship? A bugbear. Turn it about and learn what it is. The poor flesh is subjected to rough treatment, and then again to smooth. If you do not find this profitable, the door stands open; if you do find it profitable, bear it. For the door must be standing open for every emergency, and then we have no trouble.
What, then, is the fruit of these doctrines? Precisely that which must needs be both the fairest and the most becoming for those who are being truly educated — tranquillity, fearlessness, freedom. For on these matters we should not trust the multitude, who say, “Only the free can be educated,” but rather the philosophers, who say, “Only the educated are free.” — How is that? — Thus: At this time is freedom anything but the right to live as we wish? “Nothing else.” Tell me, then, O men, do you wish to live in error? “We do not.” Well, no one who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear, in sorrow, in turmoil? “By no means.” Well then, no man who is in fear, or sorrow, or turmoil, is free, but whoever is rid of sorrows and fears and turmoils, this man is by the self-same course rid also of slavery. How, then, shall we any longer trust you, O dearest lawgivers? Do we allow none but the free to get an education? For the philosophers say, “We do not allow any but the educated to be free”; that is, God does not allow it. — When, the
refore, in the presence of the praetor a man turns his own slave about, has he done nothing? — He has done something. — What? — He has turned his slave about in the presence of the praetor, — Nothing more? — Yes, he is bound to pay a tax of five per cent, of the slave’s value. — What then? Has not the man to whom this has been done become free? — He has no more become free than he has acquired peace of mind. You, for example, who are able to turn others about, have you no master? Have you not as your master money, or a mistress, or a boy favourite, or the tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? If not, why do you tremble when you goto face some circumstance involving those things?
That is why I say over and over again, “Practise these things and have them ready at hand, that is, the knowledge of what you ought to face with confidence, and what you ought to face with caution — that you ought to face with confidence that which is outside the province of the moral purpose, with caution that which is within the province of the moral purpose.” — But have I not read to you, and do you not know what I am doing? — What have you been engaged upon? Trifling phrases! Keep your trifling phrases! Show me rather how you stand in regard to desire and aversion, whether you do not fail to get what you wish, or do not fall into what you do not wish. As for those trifling periods of yours, if you are wise, you will take them away somewhere and blot them out. — What then? Did not Socrates write? — Yes, who wrote as much as he? But how? Since he could not have always at hand someone to test his judgements, or to be tested by him in turn, he was in the habit of testing and examining himself, and was always in a practical way trying out some particular primary conception. That is what a philosopher writes; but trifling phrases, and “said he,” “said I” he leaves to others, to the stupid or the blessed, those who by virtue of their tranquillity live at leisure, or those who by virtue of their folly take no account of logical conclusions.
And now, when the crisis calls, will you go off and make an exhibition of your compositions, and give a reading from them, and boast, “See, how I write dialogues”? Do not so, man, but rather boast as follows: “See how in my desire I do not fail to get what I wish. See how in my aversions I do not fall into things that I would avoid. Bring on death and you shall know; bring on hardships, bring on imprisonment, bring on disrepute, bring on condemnation.” This is the proper exhibition of a young man come from school. Leave other things to other people; neither let anyone ever hear a word from you about them, nor, if anyone praises you for them, do you tolerate it, but let yourself be accounted a no-body and a know-nothing. Show that you know this only — how you may never either fail to get what you desire or fall into what you avoid. Let others practise lawsuits, others problems, others syllogisms; do you practise how to die, how to be enchained, how to be racked, how to be exiled. Do all these things with confidence, with trust in Him who has called you to face them and deemed you worthy of this position, in which having once been placed you shall exhibit what can be achieved by a rational governing principle when arrayed against the forces that lie outside the province of the moral purpose. And thus the paradox of which we were speaking will no longer appear either impossible or paradoxical, namely, that at the same time we ought to be both cautious and confident, confident in regard to those things that lie outside the province of the moral purpose, and cautious in regard to those things that lie within the province of the moral purpose.
CHAPTER II
On tranquillity
Consider, you who are going to court, what you wish to maintain and wherein you wish to succeed; for if you wish to maintain freedom of moral purpose in its natural condition, all security is yours, every facility yours, you have no trouble. For if you are willing to keep guard over those things which are under your direct authority and by nature free, and if you are satisfied with them, what else do you care about? For who is master of them, who can take them away from you? If you wish to be self-respecting and honourable, who is it that will not allow you? If you wish not to be hindered nor compelled, what man will compel you to desire what does not seem to you to be desirable, to avoid what you do not feel should be avoided? Well, what then? The judge will do some things to you which are thought to be terrifying; but how can he make you try to avoid what you suffer? When, therefore, desire and aversion are under your own control, what more do you care for? This is your introduction, this the setting forth of your case, this your proof, this your victory, this your peroration, this your approbation. That is why Socrates, in reply to the man who was reminding him to make preparation for his trial, said, “Do you not feel, then, that with my whole life I am making preparation for this?”— “What kind of preparation?”— “I have maintained,” says he, “that which is under my control.”—” How then?”— “I have never done anything that was wrong either in my private or in my public life.” But if you wish to maintain also what is external, your paltry body and your petty estate and your small reputation, I have this to say to you: Begin this very moment to make all possible preparation, and furthermore study the character of your judge and your antagonist. If you must clasp men’s knees, clasp them; if you must wail, then wail; if you must groan, then groan. For when you subject what is your own to externals, then from henceforth be a slave, and stop letting yourself be drawn this way and that, at one moment wishing to be a slave, at another not, but be either this or that simply and with all your mind, either a free man or a slave, either educated or uneducated, either a spirited fighting cock or a spiritless one, either endure to be beaten until you die, or give in at once. Far be it from you to receive many blows and yet at the last give in! But if that is disgraceful, begin this very moment to decide the question, “Where is the nature of good and evil to be found? Where truth also is. Where truth and where nature are, there is caution; where truth is, there is confidence, where nature is.”
Why, do you think that if Socrates had wished to maintain his external possessions he would have come forward and said, “Anytus and Meletus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me”? Was he so foolish as not to see that this course does not lead to that goal, but elsewhere? Why is it unreasonable, then, to add also a word of provocation? Just as my friend Heracleitus, who had an unimportant lawsuit about a small piece of land in Rhodes; after he had pointed out the justice of his claim he went on to the peroration in which he said, “But neither will I entreat you, nor do I care what your decision is going to be, and it is you who are on trial rather than I.” And so he ruined his case. What is the use of acting like that? Merely make no entreaties, but do not add the words “Yes, and I make no entreaties,” unless the right time has come for you, as it did for Socrates, deliberately to provoke your judges. If you, for your part, are preparing a peroration of that sort, why do you mount the platform at all, why answer the summons? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come; but if reason decides that you should answer the summons and do your best to have what you say carry conviction, you must act in accordance therewith, but always maintaining what is your own proper character.
Looked at in this way it is also absurd to say, “Advise me.” What advice am I to give you? Nay, say rather, “Enable my mind to adapt itself to whatever comes.” Since the other expression is just as if an illiterate should say, “Tell me what to write when some name is set me to write.” For if I say, “Write Dio,” and then his teacher comes along and sets him not the name “Dio,” but “Theo,” what will happen? What will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are able also to prepare yourself for everything that is dictated to you; if you have not practised, what advice can I now offer you? For if circumstances dictate something different, what will you say or what will you do? Bear in mind, therefore, this general principle and you will not be at a loss for a suggestion. But if you gape open-mouthed at externals, you must needs be tossed up and down according to the will of your master. And who is your master? He who has authority over any of the things upon which you set your heart or which you wish to avoid.
CH
APTER III
To those who recommend persons to the philosophers