by Epictetus
In every act observe the things which come first, and those which follow it; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will approach it with alacrity, without having thought of the things which will follow; but afterwards, when certain base (ugly) things have shewn themselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympic games. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine thing. But observe both the things which come first, and the things which follow; and then begin the act. You must do every thing according to rule, eat according to strict orders, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are bid at appointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold water, nor wine as you choose; in a word, you must deliver yourself up to the exercise master as you do to the physician, and then proceed to the contest. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out of joint, swallow much dust, sometimes be flogged, and after all this be defeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go to the contest: if you do not, you will behave like children, who at one time play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again as gladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actors: so you also will be at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at all; but like an ape you imitate every thing that you see, and one thing after another pleases you. For you have not undertaken any thing with consideration, nor have you surveyed it well; but carelessly and with cold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard one speak, as Euphrates speaks, — and who can speak as he does? — they wish to be philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what kind of thing it is: and then examine your own nature, if you are able to sustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a wrestler? Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For different men are formed by nature for different things. Do you think that if you do these things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in the same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things? You must pass sleepless nights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be despised by a slave, in every thing have the inferior part, in honour, in office, in the courts of justice, in every little matter. Consider these things, if you would exchange for them, freedom from passions, liberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children, you be not now a philosopher, then a servant of the publicani, then a rhetorician, then a procurator (manager) for Caesar. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must either cultivate your own ruling faculty, for external things; you must either exercise your skill on internal things or on external things; that is you must either maintain the position of a philosopher or that of a common person.
τὰ καθήκοντα ὡς ἐπίπαν ταῖς σχέσεσι παραμετρεῖται. πατήρ ἐστιν: ὑπαγορεύεται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, παραχωρεῖν ἁπάντων, ἀνέχεσθαι λοιδοροῦντος, παίοντος. ‘ἀλλὰ πατὴρ κακός ἐστι.’ μή τι οὖν πρὸς ἀγαθὸν πατέρα φύσει ᾠκειώθης; ἀλλὰ πρὸς πατέρα. ‘ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἀδικεῖ.’ τήρει τοιγαροῦν τὴν τάξιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν μηδὲ σκόπει, τί ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ ποιήσαντι κατὰ φύσιν ἡ σὴ ἕξει προαίρεσις: σὲ γὰρ ἄλλος οὐ βλάψει, ἂν μὴ σὺ θέλῃς: τότε δὲ ἔσῃ βεβλαμμένος, ὅταν ὑπολάβῃς βλάπτεσθαι. οὕτως οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ γείτονος, ἀπὸ τοῦ πολίτου, ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὸ καθῆκον εὑρήσεις, ἐὰν τὰς σχέσεις ἐθίζῃ θεωρεῖν.
Duties are universally measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts blows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akin to a good father? No; but to a father. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards him, and do not examine what he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be conformable to nature. For another will not damage you, unless you choose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged. In this way then you will discover your duty from the relation of a neighbour, from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you are accustomed to contemplate the relations.
τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὡς ὄντων καὶ διοικούντων τὰ ὅλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ εἴκειν πᾶσι τοῖς γινομένοις καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν ἑκόντα ὡς ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης γνώμης ἐπιτελουμένοις. οὕτω γὰρ οὐ μέμψῃ ποτὲ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε ἐγκαλέσεις ὡς ἀμελούμενος. [2] ἄλλως δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρῃς ἀπὸ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μόνοις θῇς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὡς, ἄν γέ τι ἐκείνων ὑπολάβῃς ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνῃς ὧν θέλεις καὶ περιπίπτῃς οἷς μὴ θέλεις, μέμψασθαί σε καὶ μισεῖν τοὺς αἰτίους. [3] πέφυκε γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶν ζῷον τὰ μὲν βλαβερὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ αἴτια αὐτῶν φεύγειν καὶ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα καὶ τὰ αἴτια αὐτῶν μετιέναι τε καὶ τεθηπέναι. ἀμήχανον οὖν βλάπτεσθαί τινα οἰόμενον χαίρειν τῷ δοκοῦντι βλάπτειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αὐτῇ τῇ βλάβῃ χαίρειν ἀδύνατον. [4] ἔνθεν καὶ πατὴρ ὑπὸ υἱοῦ λοιδορεῖται, ὅταν τῶν δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τῷ παιδὶ μὴ μεταδιδῷ: καὶ Πολυνείκην καὶ Ἐτεοκλέα τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίησε πολεμίους ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἴεσθαι τὴν τυραννίδα. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς λοιδορεῖ τοὺς θεούς, διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ναύτης, διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἔμπορος, διὰ τοῦτο οἱ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἀπολλύντες. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐπεῖ καὶ τὸ εὐσεβές. ὥστε, ὅστις ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ὀρέγεσθαι ὡς δεῖ καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ εὐσεβείας ἐπιμελεῖται. [5] σπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν καὶ ἀπάρχεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια ἑκάστοτε προσήκει καθαρῶς καὶ μὴ ἐπισεσυρμένως μηδὲ ἀμελῶς μηδέ γε γλίσχρως μηδὲ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν.
As to piety towards the Gods you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and that they administer the All well and justly; and you must fix yourself in this principle (duty), to obey them, and to yield to them in every thing which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will never either blame the Gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by placing the good and the evil only in those things which are in our power. For if you think that any of the things which are not in our power is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and when you fall into those thi
ngs which you do not wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the cause of them; for every animal is formed by nature to this, to fly from, and to turn from the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire the things which are useful and the causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he gives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good: and it was this which made Polynices and Eteocles enemies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It is for this reason that the cultivator of the earth reviles the Gods, for this reason the sailor does, and the merchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their children. For where the useful (your interest) is, there also piety is. Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid (ἐκκλίνειν) as he ought, at the same time also cares after piety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do.
ὅταν μαντικῇ προσίῃς, μέμνησο, ὅτι, τί μὲν ἀποβήσεται, οὐκ οἶδας, ἀλλὰ ἥκεις ὡς παρὰ τοῦ μάντεως αὐτὸ πευσόμενος, ὁποῖον δέ τι ἐστίν, ἐλήλυθας εἰδώς, εἴπερ εἶ φιλόσοφος. εἰ γάρ ἐστί τι τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μήτε ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε κακόν. [2] μὴ φέρε οὖν πρὸς τὸν μάντιν ὄρεξιν ἢ ἔκκλισιν μηδὲ τρέμων αὐτῷ πρόσει, ἀλλὰ διεγνωκώς, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὁποῖον δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ, ἔσται αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι καλῶς καὶ τοῦτο οὐθεὶς κωλύσει. θαῤῥῶν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ συμβούλους ἔρχου τοὺς θεούς: καὶ λοιπόν, ὅταν τί σοι συμβουλευθῇ, μέμνησο τίνας συμβούλους παρέλαβες καὶ τίνων παρακούσεις ἀπειθήσας. [3] ἔρχου δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μαντεύεσθαι, καθάπερ ἠξίου Σωκράτης, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἡ πᾶσα σκέψις τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἰς τὴν ἔκβασιν ἔχει καὶ οὔτε ἐκ λόγου οὔτε ἐκ τέχνης τινὸς ἄλλης ἀφορμαὶ δίδονται πρὸς τὸ συνιδεῖν τὸ προκείμενον: ὥστε, ὅταν δεήσῃ συγκινδυνεῦσαι φίλῳ ἢ πατρίδι, μὴ μαντεύεσθαι, εἰ συγκινδυνευτέον. καὶ γὰρ ἂν προείπῃ σοι ὁ μάντις φαῦλα γεγονέναι τὰ ἱερά, δῆλον ὅτι θάνατος σημαίνεται ἢ πήρωσις μέρους τινὸς τοῦ σώματος ἢ φυγή: ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεῖ ὁ λόγος καὶ σὺν τούτοις παρίστασθαι τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι συγκινδυνεύειν. τοιγαροῦν τῷ μείζονι μάντει πρόσεχε, τῷ Πυθίῳ, ὃς ἐξέβαλε τοῦ ναοῦ τὸν οὐ βοηθήσαντα ἀναιρουμένῳ τῷ φίλῳ.
When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know how it will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner. But of what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are a philo- sopher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do not then bring to the diviner desire or aversion (ἔκκλισιν): if you do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your mind that every thing which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and does not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your power to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with confidence to the Gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shall have been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you will have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as Socrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the inquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given either by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is the subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend’s danger or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner whether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a token of death or mutilation of part of the body or of exile. But reason prevails that even with these risks we should share the dangers of our friend and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who ejected from the temple him who did not assist his friend when he was being murdered.
τάξον τινὰ ἤδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξεις ἐπί τε σεαυτοῦ ὢν καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων. [2] καὶ σιωπὴ τὸ πολὺ ἔστω ἢ λαλείσθω τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγων. σπανίως δέ ποτε καιροῦ παρακαλοῦντος ἐπὶ τὸ λέγειν λέξον μέν, ἀλλὰ περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν τυχόντων: μὴ περὶ μονομαχιῶν, μὴ περὶ ἱπποδρομιῶν, μὴ περὶ ἀθλητῶν, μὴ περὶ βρωμάτων ἢ πομάτων, τῶν ἑκασταχοῦ, μάλιστα δὲ μὴ περὶ ἀνθρώπων ψέγων ἢ ἐπαινῶν ἢ συγκρίνων. [3] ἂν μὲν οὖν οἷός τε ᾖς, μετάγαγε τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις καὶ τοὺς τῶν συνόντων ἐπὶ τὸ προσῆκον. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις ἀποληφθεὶς τύχοις, σιώπα. [4] γέλως μὴ πολὺς ἔστω μηδὲ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς μηδὲ ἀνειμένος. [5] ὅρκον παραίτησαι, εἰ μὲν οἷόν τε, εἰς ἅπαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκ τῶν ἐνόντων. ἑστιάσεις τὰς ἔξω καὶ ἰδιωτικὰς διακρούου: [6] ἐὰν δέ ποτε γίνηται καιρός, ἐντετάσθω σοι ἡ προσοχή, μήποτε ἄρα ὑπορρυῇς εἰς ἰδιωτισμόν. ἴσθι γάρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν ὁ ἑταῖρος ᾖ μεμολυσμένος, καὶ τὸν συνανατριβόμενον αὐτῷ συμμολύνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, κἂν αὐτὸς ὢν τύχῃ καθαρός. [7] τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα μέχρι τῆς χρείας ψιλῆς παραλάμβανε, οἷον τροφάς, πόμα, ἀμπεχόνην, οἰκίαν, οἰκετίαν: τὸ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν ἢ τρυφὴν ἅπαν περίγραφε. περὶ ἀφροδίσια εἰς δύναμιν πρὸ γάμου καθαρευτέον: [8] ἁπτομένῳ δὲ ὧν νόμιμόν ἐστι μεταληπτέον. μὴ μέντοι ἐπαχθὴς γίνου τοῖς χρωμένοις μηδὲ ἐλεγκτικός: μηδὲ πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐ χρῇ, παράφερε. [9] ἐὰν τίς σοι ἀπαγγείλῃ ὅτι ὁ δεῖνά σε κακῶς λέγει, μὴ ἀπολογοῦ πρὸς τὰ λεχθέντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου διότι ‘ἠγνόει γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ προσόντα μοι κακά, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα μόνα ἔλεγεν.’ [10] εἰς τὰ θέατρα τὸ πολὺ παριέναι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ δέ ποτε καιρὸς εἴη, μηδενὶ σπουδάζων φαίνου ἢ σεαυτῷ, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι. θέλε γίνεσθαι μόνα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ νικᾶν μόνον τὸν νικῶντα: οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ἐμποδισθήσῃ. βοῆς δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιγελᾶν τινι ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ συγκινεῖσθαι παντελῶς ἀπέχου. καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι μὴ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων διαλέγου, �
��σα μὴ φέρει πρὸς τὴν σὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν: ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, ὅτι ἐθαύμασας τὴν θέαν. [11] εἰς ἀκροάσεις τινῶν μὴ εἰκῇ μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως πάριθι: παριὼν δὲ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἅμα ἀνεπαχθὲς φύλασσε. [12] ὅταν τινὶ μέλλῃς συμβαλεῖν, μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δοκούντων, πρόβαλε σαυτῷ, τί ἂν ἐποίησεν ἐν τούτῳ Σωκράτης ἢ Ζήνων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπορήσεις τοῦ χρήσασθαι προσηκόντως τῷ ἐμπεσόντι. [13] ὅταν φοιτᾷς πρός τινα τῶν μέγα δυναμένων, πρόβαλε, ὅτι οὐχ εὑρήσεις αὐτὸν ἔνδον, ὅτι ἀποκλεισθήσῃ, ὅτι ἐντιναχθήσονταί σοι αἱ θύραι, ὅτι οὐ φροντιεῖ σου. κἂν σὺν τούτοις ἐλθεῖν καθήκῃ, ἐλθὼν φέρε τὰ γινόμενα καὶ μηδέποτε εἴπῃς αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ‘οὐκ ἦν τοσούτου:’ ἰδιωτικὸν γὰρ καὶ διαβεβλημένον πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός. [14] ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ἀπέστω τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τινων ἔργων ἢ κινδύνων ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ ἀμέτρως μεμνῆσθαι. οὐ γάρ, ὡς σοὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ τῶν σῶν κινδύνων μεμνῆσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ τῶν σοὶ συμβεβηκότων ἀκούειν. [15] ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ τὸ γέλωτα κινεῖν: ὀλισθηρὸς γὰρ ὁ τρόπος εἰς ἰδιωτισμὸν καὶ ἅμα ἱκανὸς τὴν αἰδῶ τὴν πρὸς σὲ τῶν πλησίον ἀνιέναι. [16] ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς αἰσχρολογίαν προελθεῖν. ὅταν οὖν τι συμβῇ τοιοῦτον, ἂν μὲν εὔκαιρον ᾖ, καὶ ἐπίπληξον τῷ προελθόντι: εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ γε ἀποσιωπῆσαι καὶ ἐρυθριᾶσαι καὶ σκυθρωπάσαι δῆλος γίνου δυσχεραίνων τῷ λόγῳ.