by Noah Raford
37 World Bank, “The Interlinked and Evolving Nature of Modern Organized Violence,” in World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 67–68, http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/fulltext.html.
38 United Nations Security Council, “ ‘Arc of Instability’ across Africa, If Left Unchecked, Could Turn Continent into Launch Pad for Larger-Scale Terrorist Attacks, Security Council Told,” May 13, 2013, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11004.doc.htm.
39 Abdelkader Abderrahmane, “The Sahel: A Crossroads between Criminality and Terrorism,” Institute Français de Relations Internationales, October 10, 2012, www.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux/actualite-mom/sahel-crossroads-between-criminality-and-terrorism.
40 Tuesday Reitano, “What Hope for Peace? Grief, Grievance and Protracted Conflict in Somalia,” Yale Journal for International Affairs, April 2013, http://yalejournal.org/2013/04/02/what-hope-for-peace-greed-grievance-and-protracted-conflict-in-somalia.
41 C. S. Chivvis and A. Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” Rand Corporation, 2013.
42 START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), Global Terrorism Database (data file), www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
43 Economist, “Why America Refuses to Pay Ransoms,” August 24, 2014, www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/08/economist-explains-18.
44 World Bank, “Repeated Violence Threatens Development,” in World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 52–66, http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/fulltext.html.
Chapter 6. Warlord Governance
1 In terms of motivations, the explanations put forward take different forms, all of which—to a significant extent—are linked to the issue of legitimacy, both directly (raising social capital), as well as indirectly (deterring potential defections or “robbing the state of the legitimacy it derives through the social contract”). See Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008), 350–70.
2 Lindsay Heger and Danielle F. Jung, “Negotiating with Rebel Governments: The Effect of Service Provision on Conflict Negotiations,” (paper presented at the Sié Research Seminar Series, Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, February 4, 2013).
3 This difference is clearest when we consider that warlords’ longer-term status in the local community depends simultaneously on the extent of their military prowess and their social responsibility toward the community under their control—and less on hereditary prestige or strictly defined territory.
4 Both have currently enrolled in the 2014 race for presidential elections in Afghanistan—Ismail Khan for vice president on the ticket with the controversial Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Dostum as a vice-presidential candidate on a ticket with Ashraf Ghani, the final winner of the elections. In what seems to shape as an electoral confrontation between (former?) warlords in 2014, other figures include Gul Agha Sherzai and Mohammad Mohaqiq. As the former UN special representative to Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010, Kai Eide explained, “the prominence of the old warlords on the candidates’ list reflects the reality of Afghan society today.” See Kai Eide, “Wooing the Warlords,” Foreign Policy, (November 18, 2013), available online at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/18/wooing_the_warlords.
5 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 94.
6 Antonio Giustozzi, “Respectable Warlords? The Politics Of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan,” Crisis State Research Center working paper 33, (London: LSE Crisis States Programme, 2003), 3.
7 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Mauricio Barón, “Re-Stating the State: Paramilitary Territorial Control and Political Order in Colombia (1978–2004),” Crisis State Research Center working paper 66 (London: LSE Crisis State Programme, 2005), 9.
8 For more details, rarely discussed, see Garry Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (London: Zed Books, 2011), especially chap. 3, “The FARC’s Social Project,” 38–55.
9 Sanín and Barón, “Re-Stating the State,” 27.
10 Sanín and Barón, “Re-Stating the State,” 26.
11 Kirill Nourzhanov, “Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons? Warlord Politics in Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey 24, no. 2 (2005): 110.
12 William Reno, “Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone,” International Politics and Society 2, no. 2 (2003): 61.
13 Conrad Schetter, “The ‘Bazaar Economy’ of Afghanistan. A Comprehensive Approach,” Südasien-Informationen 3 (2004): 6, pointing to the the case of Nouristan and Hazarajat.
14 Giustozzi, “Respectable Warlords?” 2. As this chapter intends to show, while the most compelling evidence of the development of the warlord domain as a form of “political complex” are the insights, old and new, from the Chinese case of the 1920s and 1930s, contemporary cases—among which Afghanistan figures prominently—also contain elements that justify his remarks.
15 Olivier Roy defines the “group of solidarity” in terms of the feeling of “belonging to a local primary group, to which one is attached through birth and which determines an informal network of loyalties and solidarity … which can be itself hierarchically organized.” While kinship affiliation plays a significant role in the definition of the solidarity group referred to in Afghanistan as qwam, it is not the only form of its manifestation. To the clan or tribal affiliations of the qwam, one might add ethnic or linguistic affiliations. For more details, see Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: La Difficile Reconstruction d’un Etat, Chaillot Papers 73 (Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 22.
16 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 220.
17 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 234–35.
18 Gordon Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2, (2003): 188.
19 Brian Glyn Williams, The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led US Special Forces to Topple the Taliban Regime (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2013) 167.
20 M. George, “Profile: Ismail Khan”. BBC News Online: 2 December 2002.
21 Gulshan Dietl, “War, Peace and Warlords: The Case of Ismail Khan of Herat in Afghanistan.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 3, no. 2–3 (2004), 48.
22 Peter Marsden, “Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process,” International Affairs 79, no. 1 (2003).
23 Roy, Afghanistan: La Difficile Reconstruction d’un Etat, 39.
24 Mark Duffield, quoted in Jonathan Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 159.
25 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London, I. B. Tauris & Co, 2004): 208.
26 Roy, Afghanistan: La Difficile Reconstruction d’un Etat, 24.
27 Paul B. Rich, ed., Warlords in International Politics (Basingstoke and London, Macmillan Press, 1999), xv.
28 Alfred H. Y Lin, “Building and Funding a Warlord Regime: The Experience of Chen Jitang in Guangdong, 1929–1936,” Modern China 28, no. 2 (2002): 183.
29 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 15 (my emphasis).
30 Nourzhanov, “Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons?” 110.
31 Sanín and Barón, “Re-Stating the State,” 25.
32 Reno, Warlords Politics and African States.
33 Olivier Roy, “Afghanistan: Internal Politics and Socio-Eco
nomic Dynamics and Groupings,” Working Paper No 14. Geneva, UNHCR Emergency and Security Services, (2003): 2.
34 Andreas Mehler, “Oligopolies of Violence in Africa South of the Sahara,” Nord-Süd Aktuell 18, no. 3 (2004): 540–41.
35 Mehler, “Oligopolies of Violence in Africa South of the Sahara,” 541.
36 I am using here the terminology of Joel Migdal as presented in his influential Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
37 William Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, 97.
38 Schetter, “The ‘Bazaar Economy’ of Afghanistan,” 12.
39 Georg Elwert, “Intervention in Markets of Violence,” in Potentials of Disorder, Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and the Former Yugoslavia, edited by Jan Koehler and Christophe Zurcher (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2003), 219.
Chapter 7. 5GW
1 William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (1989).
2 See Chet Richards, If We Can Keep It: A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration, (Washington: Center for Defense Information, 2008).
3 Ibid.
4 Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co Inc, 1990).
5 Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003).
6 Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79, Third Edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
7 Ibid., 294.
8 Ibid., 271.
9 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: New Republic Books, 2002).
10 Chris McGreal, “French Politicians Accused of Assisting Rwandan Genocide,” Guardian, August 5, 2008, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/06/rwanda.france.
11 Interviews: Philip Gourevitch, 2008.
12 Thomas P. Odom, Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).
Chapter 8. Weaponizing Capitalism
1 Mahendra Kumawat, “Naxal Movement Has Shown Tremendous Grit,” Rediff News, April 9, 2010.
2 Waquar Ahmed, Amitabh Kundu, and Richard Peet, India’s New Economic Policy: A Critical Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2011).
3 Bibhudatta Pradhan and Santosh Kumar, “Pillai to End Maoist Grip on $80 Billion Investments,” Bloomberg Businessweek, September 17, 2010.
4 Government of India, “Fact Sheet On Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),” Ministry of Commerce and Industry, February 11, 2011, http://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_FDI_February2011.pdf.
5 Rahul Nilakantan and Saurabh Singhal, “The Economic Costs Of Naxalite Violence and the Economic Benefits of a Unique Robust Security Response,” 2010. www.aae.wisc.edu/mwiedc/papers/2011/Singhal_Saurabh.pdf.
6 “Chhattisgarh’s Entire Forest Area A Minefield?” Times of India, May 10, 2010.
7 Manoj Prasad, “Former Jharkhand CM Marandi on Their Hitlist, Naxals Kill Son, 17 More,” Indian Express, October 28, 2007.
8 Press Trust of India, “Maoists Storm Jehanabad Jail,” Rediff News, November 14, 2005.
9 Sudheer Pal Singh, “Illegal Mining May Impede Divestment in Coal India,” Business Standard, August 21, 2010.
10 Government of India, “Loss of Coal Production in Naxalite Areas,” Press Information Bureau, August 4, 2010, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=64116.
11 “Chronology of Naxal Attacks on Trains,” India Today, May 28, 2010.
12 Law Kumar Mishra, “Maoists Blow Up Track on Gaya-Dhanbad Section, Rail Traffic Disrupted,” Times of India, September 13, 2010.
13 “Naxal Attacks Doubled in 2009, Rlys Lost Rs 500cr: Mamata,” Times of India, April 23, 2010.
14 Manoj Prasad, “Naxal Attacks, Escalated Cost Derail Jharkhand Railway Projects,” India Express, April 12, 2010.
15 Ishita Ayan Dutt, “Naxal Hits to Pull NMDC Net Down by Rs 1,000 cr,” Business Standard, April 20, 2010.
16 “NMDC to Lay 12 mt Pipeline on Highways to Avoid Naxal Attacks,” The Financial Express, July 20, 2010.
17 “Naxals Obstruct Road Works,” The Hindu, May 9, 2011.
18 Dutt, “Naxal Hits to Pull NMDC Net Down by Rs 1,000 cr.”
19 Sandeep Joshi, “550 More Mobile Towers to Boost Fight Against Naxalites,” The Hindu, June 30, 2010.
20 Baba Umar, “A Mobile War against the Naxals,” Tehelka, June 15, 2013, www.tehelka.com/a-mobile-war-against-the-naxals.
21 Manu Joseph, “India’s Underground Economy”, The New York Times, June 25, 2014: Venu, M.K. “Opinion: For Black Money, Look in India, Not Switzerland—NDTV.” Profit.com. July 7, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2014. http://profit.ndtv.com/news/opinions/article-opinion-for-black-money-look-in-india-not-switzerland-584565.
22 “World Bank Approves $1.5 Billion for India’s Rural Roads Scheme,” Press Trust of India, December 22, 2010.
23 Prassana Mohanty, “Maoists’ Financing—The Blood Flows as Long as the Cash Flows,” Governance Now, April 7, 2010.
24 Sujeet Kumar, “Maoists Extort Rs 300 Crore Annually in Chhattisgarh,” The Economic Times, July 5, 2009.
25 Bharti Jain, “Rs 150 Crore: Maoists Extortion Amount From Chhattisgarh SSIs,” The Economic Times, April 10, 2010.
26 Ajit Kumar Singh and Sachin Bansidhar Diwan, “Red Money,” Outlook India, April 5, 2010.
27 Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010–2011 Annual Report (Delhi: Government of India, 2011).
28 Mohanty, “Maoists’ Financing—The Blood Flows as Long as the Cash Flows.”
29 Bhupendra Pandey, “Naxal Ranks Split Over Share in Extortion Spoils, Say Cops,” Indian Express, December 13, 2009.
30 Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “India’s Illegal Coal Mines Turn Into Death Pits,” The Washington Times, November 24, 2006.
31 Prasoon Majumdar, “Our Own Banana Republics!” Indian Institute of Planning and Management, August 26, 2010, http://prasoonmajumdar.blogspot.com/2010/08/our-own-banana-republics.html.
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “India is a Major Drug Hub: US,” September, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/india/en/rajiv_quoted_et.html.
33 “Maoists extort up to Rs 2,000 crore across India” Rediff News, April 28, 2010. http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/apr/28/slide-show-1-drugs-extortion-violence-fund-maoists-movement.html.
Chapter 10. The Politics of a Post-Climate-Change World
1 It is possible that relatively compact, well-established, high-functioning nation-states, or regional/metropolitan subunits of such, that have secure access to fresh water, that are remote from major refugee flows and powerful aggressors, and whose territory is mostly at considerable altitude or at 40 degrees or more above or below the equator (and not subject to inundation by rising sea levels) will survive for a long time, perhaps even long enough to weather the thousand-year storm—perhaps linked to, and protective of, surviving city states beyond their boundaries, perhaps even organized into one or more international federations capable of environmental cooperation and collective self-defense. But would such be fortresses of privileged survivalists, waiting out (and forcefully insulating themselves from) hundreds of years of horrific mass suffering and death in the rest of the world? Or might they (or some of them) devote themselves to doing everything possible to support the survival of wider humanity and parts of the natural world? Sad to say, the former seems more likely. As the classic American “wise man,” George Kennan, famously wrote in his February 1948 secret mem
o to his fellow wise men, Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary Dean Acheson: “Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3 of its population.… Our real task in the coming period is to … maintain this position of disparity.… To do so we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming; … We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction … We should dispense with the aspiration to ‘be liked’ or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism. We should stop putting ourselves in the position of being our brothers’ keeper and refrain from offering moral and ideological advice. We should cease to talk about vague … unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization.… The less we are hampered by idealistic slogans the better.” Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum No. 23, February 1948 (declassified June 17, 1974); quoted in Ross Jackson, Occupy World Street: A Global Roadmap for Radical Economic and Political Reform (White River Junction, VY: Chelsea Green, 2012), 125. It should be noted that this quotation is taken from the section of Kennan’s memo devoted to the “Far East,” and amounts to a “realist” refutation of the McCarthyite accusation that China was the United States’s to “save” and the State Department had “lost” it. Nonetheless, Kennan’s views warrant rebuke.
As Christian Parenti writes, “There is a real risk that strong states with developed economies will succumb to a politics of xenophobia, racism, police repression, surveillance, and militarism and thus transform themselves into fortress societies while the rest of the world slips into collapse. By that course, developed economies would turn into neofascist islands of relative stability in a sea of chaos. But a world in climatological collapse—marked by hunger, disease, criminality, fanaticism, and violent social breakdown—will overwhelm the armed lifeboat. Eventually all will sink into the same morass.” Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (New York: Nation Books, 2011), 20.