37. Karatnycky, ‘Decline of Illiberal Democracy’, pp. 116 f.
38. LeDuc and Niemi (eds.), Comparing Democracies, tables 1.1–1.7.
39. Blais and Massicotte, ‘Electoral Systems’, p. 67.
40. John Vincent, ‘All That Matters is What Tony Wants’, London Review of Books, 16 March 2000, p. 11. The House of Lords has always been appointed by the Crown: the main change introduced by the Blair government has been the abolition of the hereditary principle which allowed those elevated to the peerage to pass on their title and seat in the Lords to their male heirs.
41. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy’, p. 87.
42. Shin, ‘Democratization’, p. 159. Cf. Przeworski et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’, p. 45.
43. Shin, ‘Democratization’, p. 160.
44. Grilli, Mascandiero and Tabellini, ‘Political and Monetary Institutions’, p. 356.
45. Giddens, Runaway World, p. 63.
46. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, pp. 8 f.
47. ‘The average of the democracy indicator in sub-Saharan Africa peaked at 0.58 in 1960 (26 countries), then (for 43 countries) fell to low points of 0.19 in 1977 and 0.18 in 1989 before rising to 0.38 in 1994’: Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 36.
48. For details of the three versions of the Polity dataset, see Gurr, ‘Persistence and Change in Political Systems’; Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, ‘Transformation of the Western State’; Jaggers and Gurr, ‘Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave’; Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Double Take’.
49. Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 17–21.
50. For a sample of over a hundred countries, Gastil’s democracy index (modified by Barro to range from 0.00 for no democracy to 1.00 for complete democracy) shows a peak in the mean of the index at 0.66 in 1960, a low point of 0.44 in 1975, followed by a rise to 0.58 in 1994: Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 35. Cf. Gastil, Freedom in the World.
51. Modelski and Perry, ‘Democratisation in Long Perspective’, p. 25 n.
52. Though overtly xenophobic in its opposition to immigration, the Freedom Party had an undoubted democratic mandate. The further irony of a German Chancellor lecturing Italians that they would suffer the same fate if the National Alliance should enter a coalition requires no comment (interview with Gerhard Schröder, Corriere della Sera, 17 February 2000).
53. Economist, World in Figures, pp. 38 f.
54. Karatnycky, ‘Decline of Illiberal Democracy’, p. 123. According to another Freedom House study of post-Communist countries, ‘consolidated democracies and market economies averaged a growth rate of 4.7 per cent in 1997; transitional polities and economies registered an average growth rate of 1.4 per cent; and consolidated autocracies and statist economies in the region averaged close to a 3 per cent drop in GDP’.
55. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy’, pp. 75–85.
56. Ibid., p. 103.
57. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, pp. 8 f.; Lipset, Seong and Torres, ‘Comparative Analysis’, pp. 165–71.
58. Bollen and Jackman, ‘Political Democracy’.
59. Przeworski et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’, pp. 41, 49.
60. Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 1.
61. Friedman, ‘Other Times, Other Places’, pp. 2, 29. See also pp. 54, 86.
62. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, p. 16.
63. Ibid., p. 17. But see Przeworski et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’, p. 42, for a contrary view.
64. Muller, ‘Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality’, and ‘Economic Determinants of Democracy’. See also Muller and Seligson, ‘Civic Culture and Democracy’; Przeworski et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’
65. The correlation was between average annual growth in real GDP and the average Freedom House political freedom ranking (ranging from 1, the most politically free, to 7, the least). The correlation coefficient for the sample as a whole was 0.18.
66. Broadberry, ‘How did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain?’
67. Przeworski et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’, p. 42.
68. Joll, Europe since 1870, p. 357.
69. See Schiel, ‘Pillars of Democracy’. I am grateful to Juliane Schiel for her assistance with this point.
70. Gasiorowski, ‘Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change’, pp. 883 f., 892.
71. Calculated from figures in Rummel, Lethal Politics and Mitchell, European Historical Statistics.
72. Easterly and Fischer, ‘Soviet Economic Decline’.
73. Przeworski notes that of twenty investigations he reviewed, eight found that democracy was better for growth than authoritarianism, eight found the opposite, and four found no difference. Przeworski, ‘Neo-liberal Fallacy’, p. 52.
74. Landes, Wealth and Poverty, pp. 217 f.
75. Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 32.
76. Schwarz, ‘Democracy and Market-oriented Reform’.
77. Alesina and Rodrik, ‘Distributive Policies’.
78. Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 37.
79. Ibid., pp. 2 f. Emphasis added.
80. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, pp. 9, 25, 92–7. To be precise, Eichengreen applies Lipset’s idea that proportional representation will lead to unstable government, especially when the electorate is polarized. ‘Cross-cutting cleavages’ – for example when religious and economic divisions are not congruent – will tend to reduce this problem; hence, for example, the relative stability of Holland in the period. Cf. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites of Democracy’, pp. 91 f.
81. Barro, ‘Determinants of Economic Growth’, p. 34.
82. Alesina et al., ‘Political Instability’, pp. 21 f.
83. Hansard, 11 November 1947, col. 206.
84. Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 112, 154.
85. Ibid, p. 24.
86. Weber saw ‘rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling’ as ‘one of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism’: ibid., p. 180. But elsewhere he acknowledged the irrational character of ‘Christian asceticism’: ‘The ideal type of the capitalistic entrepreneur … gets nothing out of his wealth for himself, except the irrational sense of having done his job well’. The ‘man exists for the sake of his business, instead of the reverse’, which ‘from the view-point of personal happiness’ was ‘irrational’: pp. 70 f. Even more problematic is Weber’s scathing sideswipe at the Jews, who posed the most obvious exception to his argument: ‘The Jews stood on the side of the politically and speculatively oriented adventurous capitalism; their ethos was … that of pariah-capitalism. But Puritanism carried the ethos of the rational organisation of capital and labour’: p. 166. Weber was also mysteriously blind to the success of Catholic entrepreneurs in France, Belgium and elsewhere.
87. See e.g. Lal, Unintended Consequences.
88. Landes, Wealth and Poverty, passim. See also Sacks, Morals and Markets.
89. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
90. Lipset, Seong and Torres, ‘Comparative Analysis’, pp. 165–71. See also Bollen, ‘Political Democracy’; Bollen and Jackman, ‘Political Democracy’.
91. Lipset, Seong and Torres, ‘Comparative Analysis’.
92. See e.g. Soto, Mystery of Capital.
93. North, Institutions, esp. pp. 96–103, 113 f., 127 f., 139 f.
94. See most recently, Phillips, Cousins’ Wars.
13. Fractured Unities
1. Rezzori, Snows of Yesteryear, pp. 65 f.
2. Ibid., pp. 283, 285.
3. Burleigh, Third Reich, p. 620.
4. Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben.
5. Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 51–63 and table 1.
6. Schiel, ‘Pillars of Democracy’, citing Otto Junghahn, Minorities in Europe (New York, 1932), pp. 114–19.
7. Ash, History of the Present, p. 373.
&
nbsp; 8. See Davies, The Isles. For a critique see Clark, ‘Protestantism’.
9. Hobsbawm, Age of Capital, p. 107.
10. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 33 f.
11. Ibid., p. 46.
12. Quoted in Knock, To End All Wars, p. 35.
13. Ibid., p. 77.
14. Ibid., p. 113.
15. Ibid., pp. 143 ff.
16. Ibid., p. 152.
17. Keylor, ‘International Diplomacy’, p. 492.
18. Gilbert, First World War, pp. 528, 530.
19. Goldstein, ‘Great Britain: The Home Front’, p. 151.
20. Quoted in Fink, ‘Minorities Question’, p. 258.
21. Mazower, Dark Continent, p. 61.
22. Petzina, Abelshauser and Faust (eds), Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, vol. iii, p. 23.
23. Overy, Times Atlas of the Twentieth Century, p. 51.
24. Rummel, Statistics of Democide, appendix, table 16A.1, and Democide: Nazi Genocide, tables 1.1 and 1.3.
25. Rummel, Lethal Politics, tables 1.3 and 1.B. Cf. Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 484–9, and Nation Killers, pp. 64, 111; Martin, ‘Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, p. 851. I am grateful to Erik Brynhildsbakken for his assistance on this point.
26. Chesnoff, Pack of Thieves, p. 283.
27. Rubinstein, ‘Entrepreneurial Minorities’.
28. Mazower, Dark Continent, table 1.
29. Cook and Paxton (eds.), European Political Facts. Cf. The Economist, 3 January 1998.
30. Alesina and Wacziarg, ‘Openness’, p. 4; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, ‘Economic Integration’, pp. 1, 23.
31. The Economist, 3 Jan. 1998.
32. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 175.
33. Alesina and Spolaore, ‘Number and Size of Nations’.
34. Alesina and Wacziarg, ‘Openness’, passim.
35. Alesina and Spolaore, ‘International Conflict’, passim.
36. Ibid., p. 18.
37. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You. The catalyst for the slaughter was the assassination of the (Hutu) president Juvenal Habyarimana following his peace agreement with the (Tutsi-led) Rwandan Patriotic Front.
38. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Economic Causes of Civil War’, pp. 568 ff. Their research on modern Africa stresses ethnic polarization – when there are two groups, one in the majority – rather than ethnic heterogeneity – multiple groups – as a source of conflict.
39. Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, ‘Economic Integration’, p. 26.
40. One obvious defect is that World Bank increasingly does business that could be done by the private sector: 70 per cent of its non-concessional lending over the past seven years went to eleven big countries which had full access to world capital markets (among them China, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil): The Economist, 18 March 2000.
41. James, Globalization and its Sins, pp. 42–9.
42. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 174.
43. Prospect, April 2000. Cf. Simon Jenkins, ‘The Power of NGOs’, Institute of United States Studies: Lanesborough Lunch, 5 April 2000.
44. Hutchinson Almanac 2000, p. 345.
45. The Economist, 19 December 1998; OECD, Economic Outlook, 65 (June 1999), p. 252.
46. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 315.
47. Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil.
48. Caplan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, pp. 25 f.
49. Ibid., pp. 26 f.
14. Understretch: The Limits of Economic Power
1. From ‘The White Man’s Burden’. To avoid offending modern sensibilities, this might be amended to read: ‘The Rich Person’s Burden’.
2. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. xvi, xxvi.
3. Ibid., p. 567. See also p. 254.
4. Ibid., pp. xvi, xxvi.
5. Ibid., pp. 696 f.
6. Ibid., pp. 573 f.
7. Ibid., p. 668. This page is also remarkable for the statement: ‘The present state of Mexican–United States relations … makes the Polish “crisis” for the USSR seem small by comparison.’
8. Ibid., p. 689.
9. Ibid., pp. 665 ff.
10. O’Brien, ‘Imperialism and the Rise and Decline’.
11. Olson, Rise and Decline.
12. Ibid., p. 236.
13. See the discussion in Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy, pp. 46–53.
14. Quoted in Nef, War and Human Progress, p. 342.
15. Ibid., p. 333.
16. Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. III, ch. 4.
17. Nef, War and Human Progress, pp. 341 f.
18. Angell, Great Illusion, p. 295.
19. Friedman, Lexus, pp. 248–75.
20. Luard, War in International Society, pp. 239 f.
21. Ibid., pp. 80 f.
22. Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, pp. 351 ff.
23. Ibid., p. 357. Cf. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 172.
24. Towle, ‘Nineteenth-century Indemnities’.
25. Ibid. I am grateful to Dr Philip Towle for providing this and other figures for nineteenth-century indemnities.
26. Ferguson, World’s Banker, pp. 666 ff. Statistics for Prussian military expenditure are from Jahrbuch für die Statistik des Preussischen Staats (1869), pp. 372–443, 466–545.
27. White, ‘Making the French Pay’, p. 23. Figures for the 1870 Prussian defence budget are taken from the Correlates of War database.
28. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 48–51.
29. Muto, ‘Spanish System’, pp. 248 f.; Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p. 564 and n.
30. Bonney, ‘Revenues’.
31. White, ‘Making the French Pay’, esp. pp. 21 ff. Cf. Kindleberger, Financial History, pp. 219 ff.
32. Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, p. 382. Cf. Buxton, Finance and Politics, vol. i, p. 6.
33. Hardach, First World War, p. 153.
34. White, ‘Making the French Pay’, p. 23. For a full discussion of the issue see Ferguson, ‘Balance of Payments Question’.
35. See Schuker, ‘American “Reparations”’.
36. Calculated from figures in Abelshauser, ‘Germany’, p. 143.
37. Calculated from figures in the Correlates of War database.
38. Naimark, Russians in Germany.
39. Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, p. 345; White, ‘France and the Failure to Modernize’, p. 5.
40. O’Brien, ‘Inseparable Connections’.
41. Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’.
42. Statistics from the Correlates of War database.
43. Ferguson, Pity of War, passim.
44. Harrison, ‘Overview’, p. 10.
45. Ibid., p. 17.
46. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, p. 360.
47. Harrison, ‘Overview’, p. 3.
48. Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 15.
49. Harrison, ‘Overview’, p. 6. Note: these figures exclude China from the Allies.
50. Ibid., p. 26.
51. Broadberry and Howlett, ‘United Kingdom’, p. 55; Rockoff, ‘United States’, p. 101; Abelshauser, ‘Germany’, p. 162; Hara, ‘Japan’, p. 254.
52. Johnson, Nazi Terror, pp. 315 f.
53. Harrison, ‘Soviet Union’.
54. Quoted in Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, p. 1160.
55. Gates, Knutsen and Moses, ‘Democracy and Peace’, p. 6.
56. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, p. 1162.
57. Calculated from available figures in latest SIPRI and Freedom House surveys.
58. Russett, ‘Counterfactuals about War’, pp. 181.
59. Ibid., p. 185.
60. Maoz and Abdolali, ‘Regime Types’; Dixon, ‘Democracy’.
61. Ward and Gleditsch, ‘Democratizing for Peace’.
62. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 799 n.
63. O’Brien, Power with Profit, pp. 34 f.
64. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
, pp. 407, 413.
65. Ibid., pp. 127, 159.
66. Correlation coefficients for defence spending as a percentage of GDP/GNP as against real GDP/GNP growth are as follows: UK 1850–1997: 0.001; US 1890–1998: 0.06; UK 1961–97:-0.03; US 1961–98: 0. 07. The closest positive or negative correlation possible is plus or minus 1.00.
67. Defence spending as a proportion of GDP figures calculated from SIPRI’s annual totals; average growth figures from The Economist. The correlation coefficient for the 59 countries in the sample was -0.05.
68. See Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, pp. 293 ff.
69. Author’s calculations based on real GDP figures from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.
70. If President Carter had miraculously secured three terms in office, and had been succeeded by Bill Clinton, total defence expenditures (assuming unchanged policy) would have been $6.1 billion from 1977 to 1998. Actual expenditures amounted to $7.4 billion. The annual cost is this figure spread over the entire period from Ronald Reagan’s period in office to 1998, i.e. including both the investment in the Strategic Defence Initiative and other Reagan-era arms spending, and the post-1989 ‘peace dividend’.
71. FitzGerald, Way Out There.
72. As late as 1992, after a 22 per cent reduction in the number of superpower warheads, the total yield of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal was more than 4 million kilotons, compared with a figure of just over 1 million for the US. Fieldhouse, ‘Nuclear Weapons Developments’, pp. 74–119. It is worth remarking that the destructive capability of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal was substantially greater than that of the US by a factor of almost four. The possibility cannot be discounted that the Soviets were over-armed.
73. Schultz and Weingast, ‘Democratic Advantage’, pp. 30–40.
74. O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, ‘Balance Sheets’.
75. O’Brien, ‘Imperialism and the Rise and Decline’, pp. 56, 65 f., 75.
76. Offer, ‘British Empire’. Cf. Offer, ‘Costs and Benefits’.
77. Edelstein, ‘Imperialism: Cost and Benefit’, p. 205. Admittedly, this is based on a worst-case scenario in which, in the absence of imperial control between 1870 and 1913, trade to the Dominions would have been reduced by 30 per cent and trade with the other colonies by 75 per cent. In a more benign counterfactual, in which tariffs would have risen but trade would have remained the same, the cost would have been more like 1.6–3.8 per cent of GNP.
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