by Harry Yeide
Lieutenant John Hudson, just appointed “Ace” Edson’s exec, was riding in one of his M10s in place of an injured crewman when he spotted a Tiger as it poked its nose out of a barn. As the Mark VI pulled into full view, shaking off loose hay, the Americans could see that bales of hay were wired to the hull to provide very effective camouflage. Hudson told the gunner to fire his newly replaced 3-inch gun—so new that the red Ordnance tag was still on it. But the gun would not fire.
A hasty inspection revealed that there was no firing pin! Hudson ordered the crew to install the replacement pin from the on-board kit and aimed machine-gun fire at the panzer. The tracers set the hay ablaze, and the Mark VI backed slowly through the barn trailing flames and a one-hundred-foot column of smoke. Later in the day, the crew encountered a smoke-charred Tiger with hay around its exploded gas tank, but they could not tell for certain that it was the same vehicle.79
On 25 May, the southern front linked up with the beachhead. The men of the 701st by 26 May had been credited with destroying twenty-one German tanks, three self-propelled guns, and assorted antitank and artillery pieces during the breakout so far.80
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The 36th Infantry Division came into the line from reserve positions and by 28 May was knocking at the door of the strategic town of Velletri. Recon men of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion—the towed-gun outfit’s companies had been parceled out to reinforce self-propelled TD battalions—were working with the division. During the morning, Lt Arpod Sabo and his 1st Platoon spotted two Tiger tanks that refused to be drawn into the line of fire of nearby TDs. Arpod grabbed three soldiers and a bazooka and went after them. He sidled close to the first huge tank and fired three rockets into the thick frontal armor, but none penetrated. The frustrated lieutenant clambered to the turret top and blazed away with his carbine through a hatch. He killed every man but the driver, who backed the tank to safety—minus Arpod, who jumped free.81
* * *
It was 29 May, and one battalion of the 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, had launched two assaults on German trenches near Villa Crocetta, only to be driven back each time. The infantry battalion S-3, Capt William Galt, volunteered to lead one more attack against the objective. When the sole surviving tank destroyer from a platoon of Company C, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, allegedly refused to go forward, Captain Galt jumped on the M10 and ordered it to precede the attack. As the tank destroyer advanced, followed by a company of riflemen, Galt manned the machine gun on the turret, located and directed fire on an enemy 77mm antitank gun, and destroyed it. Nearing the enemy positions, Galt stood fully exposed in the turret, firing his machine gun and tossing hand grenades into the zigzag trenches despite the hail of sniper and machine-gun bullets ricocheting off the tank destroyer. As the tank destroyer moved, Galt so maneuvered it that forty of the enemy were trapped in one trench. When they refused to surrender, the captain pressed the trigger of the machine gun and dispatched every one of them. A few minutes later an 88mm shell struck the tank destroyer and Galt fell mortally wounded across his machine gun. He had personally killed forty Germans and wounded many more.
Captain Galt was awarded the Medal of Honor. Every man in the M10—themselves credited with killing forty German soldiers—died, and they did not even receive mention in their own battalion’s history.82
* * *
The informal history of the 601st probably spoke for many other TD outfits at this point: “The 601 that broke out of the Anzio beachhead was a tough, experienced, battle-hardened, confident battalion. The men had “got” forty-three Kraut tanks on the beachhead for the loss of three, and they weren’t afraid of anything the Kraut had, or made, or manned. They’d knocked out his IVs and VIs and his Panthers and his Ferdinands, and they were going to get to Rome if they had to put wings on the M10s and fly ‘em there!”83
Rome!
While all roads may lead to Rome, American troops in Italy cared about only two.
M10s from Company B, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 4 June were at the point of the 13th Armored Regiment’s column, pressing toward Rome up Highway 6. The column plowed through several German delaying positions and entered Rome at 0715 hours. Company B’s Charles Kessler recalled, “My tank destroyer rolled past a large ‘Roma’ sign marking the city limits and on into the capital. Ahead of me were five Sherman tanks and two TDs. Behind were the entire Fifth and Eighth armies. We had not gone two hundred yards into the city when a monster 170mm German self-propelled gun opened fire. The lead M4 burst into flame, and the rest of us deployed off the road. The enemy gun was well hidden, and it was several hours before we flanked and destroyed the SP gun.”84
Company C/636th, meanwhile, was carrying doughs of the 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, and spearheaded the advance up Highway 7. The column received orders to cross the Tiber River and establish defensive positions on roads departing Rome for the north. As the M10s rolled into the city, they encountered three Tigers deployed to place overlapping fire on a key intersection. One platoon was sent toward the right to swing around the panzers. While weaving through the maze of streets, the tank killers ran into three Panthers. Guns blazed in both directions. One Mark V took a direct hit, and the other two withdrew.85
Ellis Force, consisting of A/636th; elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 143rd Infantry Regiment; and the 751st and 753d Tank battalions, advanced up a secondary road between Highways 6 and 7. Recon Sgt Tom Sherman was ordered to lead a platoon of M10s forward to deal with an SP gun menacing Highway 7 at the entrance to Rome. Sherman was amazed to find the road blocked by a gaggle of rear-echelon types who had raced ahead to grab choice housing for their units. The major in charge did not want to let the TDs get by. He remained obstinate even when M10 crewmen called out suggesting that he and his men take care of the SP gun themselves. Sherman finally suggested he would report this to “Colonel”—normally known as Lieutenant—James Graham, Company A’s acting commander. The major relented, and the task force entered Rome in the early afternoon and linked up with the column headed by Company C.86
Other units rolled into Rome. The men of the 3d Infantry Division and 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion arrived, the latter pleased to observe that Rome was “clean, beautiful, full of lovely girls, and it had hardly been touched by the war.”87 The 1st Armored Division and 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion pulled in by 1500 hours.88 Also late in the day, the M10s of the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion entered Rome from the south. The difference between the Anzio and main forces had been completely erased, and the 804th joined Ellis Force the next day.89
Groping Toward Better Combined-Arms Solutions
With movement restored to the war, tank destroyer units found themselves at the point of advancing columns as they had been in North Africa. Nevertheless, tank destroyer outfits asserted that reconnaissance elements—not TDs—should lead any advance seeking to reestablish contact with the enemy in order to permit the destroyers to deploy and exploit their fire power when contact occurred. Recon men, it must be said, frowned on situations in which they were ordered to precede armored columns—ranging ahead of the far less vulnerable tanks in their little jeeps by up to fifteen hundred yards.90
After eight months of operations in Italy, basic communications issues between the tank destroyers and infantry units they supported remained unresolved. Major Charles Wilber, by June commanding the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, noted in his monthly report: “Tank destroyer companies attached to infantry regimental teams are usually broken down to one platoon with each infantry battalion. Although radios within the tank destroyer battalion are plentiful and no serious communications difficulty exists, there does exist a need for positive communication between the tank destroyer platoon supporting the leading infantry battalion and that battalion’s commander. Personal liaison between the two has been tried with results that are not entirely satisfactory due to the time element and the distances involved. A possible solution is that the tank destroyer plat
oon leader be equipped with a 300 series radio on the same frequency as that of the battalion commander…. ”91
Wilber’s view that coordination with the infantry needed improvement was widely held in the TD battalions, and a Fifth Army review of operations during early and mid-1944 pinned the blame mainly on infantry commanders who did not understand the powers and limitations of tank destroyers. Fifth Army also pointed a finger at the frequent reattachment of TD outfits to new divisions, a practice that prevented the two arms from developing ties of mutual understanding and trust through experience operating together. (Similar problems dogged the cooperation between the doughs and the separate tank battalions in Italy.)
The Fifth Army report also noted that the commanders of the 636th and 894th Tank Destroyer battalions complained that, during the breakthrough to Rome, their M10s had been ordered to advance ahead of the infantry to overrun points of resistance—a tank mission for which they were not suited.92 The tank killers’ view was clear: It was imperative that the thinly armored, open-topped TDs have a screen of infantry to prevent enemy infantry from closing for a quick kill. The M10 was not capable of performing the role of a tank within small-arms range of the enemy, they argued.93
One “offending” unit—the 34th Infantry Division—was unapologetic. The attached 191st Tank Battalion had suffered casualties so severe during the breakthrough that it had become combat ineffective, the division asserted, and the infantry had no choice but to use the armor that was available, the 894th’s tank destroyers.94
The Fifth Army review concluded that problems in TD cooperation with tank units evident early in the period had generally been overcome by summer. Surprisingly, the early troubles were attributed to a lack of aggressiveness on the part of TD commanders.
Perhaps this impression resulted from a key lesson learned by the TD crews. The 3-inch gun was able to destroy enemy armor and installations at a greater range than other mounted direct-fire weapons, and the tank killers concluded that M10s should remain to the rear of advancing tanks, from which they could provide effective supporting fire. Tank destroyers, they observed, should operate about four hundred yards behind friendly tanks in typical Italian terrain. Any closer and the TDs would be subject to the same fire hitting the unit supported; any farther and effective support would be impossible.
There were also two sides to the tanker complaints of lagging TDs. The 701st noted in a lessons-learned memo, “Tanks will sometimes storm ahead and seemingly forget about their supporting TDs. However, this need not occasion any worry among the TDs; the tanks will always be glad to send back a guide as soon as the TDs are needed.”95
Poor-to-nonexistent radio communications between the two types of armor continued to plague operations. Several battalion commanders from tank and TD battalions had proposed a new approach to mixed operations: Rather than attach a tank destroyer element to the tank unit, the TD commander should be ordered to support the tanks and be held responsible for executing the mission effectively. They would then have the flexibility to provide close support even when communications broke down.96
The M18 Arrives
The first two Hellcats—still sporting their T70 test designation—arrived in Italy in April and were issued for battle trials to the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion at the Anzio beachhead.97 In June, the 805th—a towed battalion—became the first to re-equip with the M18.
Buick had designed the M18 with much input from the Tank Destroyer Force. The vehicle embodied the doctrine: fast, light, and lethal. At 40,000 pounds, the M18 was little more than half as heavy as the M10, and it could reach the remarkable speed of 50 miles per hour. The tradeoff was that armor was thin—a mere half-inch on the hull front (less than on the M8 armored car). The Hellcat carried a 76mm gun (a lighter version of the 3-inch gun) in a full-traverse open-topped turret, and, like the M10, had no machine guns other than an antiaircraft .50-caliber mounted at the turret rear.98 The turret traverse speed was so high that gunners had to make final aiming corrections manually.99
Lieutenant Colonel Peter K. Kopcsak, CO of the 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion, opined that the Hellcat “was the best vehicle to come out of Detroit during the war.”100
Buick, however, claimed it had designed the Hellcat as the answer to the Tiger which—since its gun could not penetrate the Mark VI front armor—it was not.101 Some, moreover, disliked the Hellcat’s thin armor and thus preferred the M10. One battalion—the 813th—in early 1945 fought conversion from the M10 to the M18 so vigorously that it was moved to the M36 instead. The battalion judged that “the M10 is a superior TD to the M18 in every particular.”102
Much to the dismay of the crews, many American infantrymen thought the M18 resembled a German tank because of its barrel length and suspension. At least some crews responded by painting the white identification stars bigger and brighter.103
Coiling for the Next Strike
Several tank destroyer battalions slipped out of sight during the hot days of mid-summer 1944.
The 636th was typical. It moved to the Salerno area in early July. There, maintenance crews gave the M10s thorough overhauls and replaced worn guns and tracks. Vehicles were painted, camouflaged, and waterproofed. In view of the problems in combined arms operations experienced to date, all companies conducted training problems with the 753d Tank Battalion and the infantry battalions and regiments of the 36th Infantry Division. Recon taught its men to use 81mm mortars. The 636th took the unusual (but not unique) decision to get rid of all of its M20 armored cars and replace them with old M3 halftracks, which the battalion concluded had proved more suitable.104
Veterans of Salerno and Anzio thought, “Here we go again.” The men did not know the destination, but they had learned that amphibious operations could be hazardous to one’s health.105
The U.S. Army allowed that some of the first soldiers had made their contributions at the front and were needed more now at home. Lieutenant Arthur Edson, who had landed at Oran, rotated home in July 1944. The European war was over for him. He took up duties at the Tank Destroyer School at Camp Hood, Texas.
* * *
The battalions that remained behind in Italy—the 701st, 804th, 805th, and 894th—would continue to support the infantry and armored divisions as they pushed the Germans back to their last defensive stronghold before the Alps. The Gothic Line ran through the Apennine Mountains from north of Pisa to Rimini. American troops again began the grueling job of attacking pillboxes, concrete emplacements, and other strongpoints supported by tank destroyer fire. Progress would again be measured in yards, and casualties would again spike. This time, however, the Allies would decide to hunker down during the horrible winter weather and attack again in the spring. All they had to do in Italy was tie down German forces while events in northwestern Europe decided the outcome of the war.
Chapter 6
Storming Fortress Europe
“You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you…. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely…. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!”
— General Dwight Eisenhower’s message to Allied soldiers, sailors, and airmen, 6 June 1944
Just after midnight on 6 June 1944, men of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, stationed at Tilshead, England, were disturbed by the deep, soul-shaking roar of hundreds of planes passing overhead on their way to France. The men knew that this was it.1
Soon, the parachutes of the British 6th Airborne Division caught the air in the dark sky northeast of Caen, while the men of the American 101st and 82d Airborne divisions leapt into the unknown near Ste. Mere-Eglise and Carentan. Their mission was to secure road junctions and exit routes from the invasion beaches on the coast of Normandy. When the sky brightened, gliders bearing more paratroopers landed in hedgerow-bounded fields, and Allied bombers and fighter-bombers
began the first of the eleven thousand sorties they would fly that day against German emplacements, troop concentrations, and transportation nodes.2
At 0530 hours, those warships with fire missions among the seven hundred in the vast Allied armada off the choppy Norman coast turned their guns toward land and bombarded the beaches assigned to Commonwealth forces. Twenty minutes later, shells began to crash into the German defenses along the American beaches, codenamed Omaha and Utah.
At 0630, doughs of the 4th Infantry Division and amphibious Duplex Drive (DD) Sherman tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion hit the beach at Utah, the VII Corps landing area. Within three hours, they had overwhelmed the defenses and were moving inland to link up with the airborne, all at a cost of only one hundred ninety-seven ground-force casualties.
The V Corps landing at Omaha, conducted by elements of the 1st and 29th Infantry divisions and the 741st and 743d Tank battalions, encountered heavy seas and an extraordinarily difficult job. Most of the 741st’s DD tanks sank and, as General Eisenhower had predicted in his message to the invasion force, the Germans along the beach fought savagely. Nevertheless, by the afternoon the doughs and tanks clawed their way off the sand. They left twenty-five hundred casualties in their wake.3
The North Africa veterans of the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Reconnaissance and B companies and the administrative elements, rolled off their landing craft at Utah Beach as part of the twenty-fifth wave on 6 June. About 2015 hours, the TDs—attached to 4th Infantry Division artillery—moved into positions just south of Audoville La Hubert to provide antitank defense to division and artillery headquarters. One platoon encountered sporadic light machine-gun and some small-arms fire.4