by Harry Yeide
By 29 September, the Fifth Panzer Army’s offensive efforts had run out of steam. Hitler called off the operation and ordered most of his surviving armor northward. The Allies by now held a 20:1 advantage in tanks along the Western Front.136
Changes in the Force
Combat experience caused commanders to settle on a major realignment of the Tank Destroyer Force in the ETO. The U.S. 12th Army Group requested that the number of towed battalions be cut to twelve and that ten be reequipped with T5E1 90mm guns. On 29 September, HQS, European Theater, approved the conversion of all twelve towed battalions to 90mm guns. How close the tank killers came to fielding an even more unwieldy weapon! Fortunately, no 90mm towed guns were immediately available.
Of the remaining forty battalions, twenty were to receive the M36 TD and the remainder to retain M10s or M18s at the discretion of the army commanders and within the constraints of supply of the weapons.137
A Gun for Hunting Big Game
Standardized in June 1944, the M36 Jackson was an adaptation of the M10A1 (the gasoline-powered variant), and many were in fact returreted M10A1s. The vehicle mounted the 90mm M3 gun in an open-topped turret equipped with power traverse.
The gun was rated as capable of penetrating three inches of homogenous armor at forty-seven hundred yards. In practice, it could kill most big cats—the Tiger I and Panther—at typical combat ranges. A crew from the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion made the New York Daily News when gunner Cpl Anthony Pinto (1st Platoon, Company A) destroyed a Panther with a remarkable shot from forty-two hundred yards.138 Lieutenant Alfred Rose from the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion on 1 December 1944 scored a panzer kill at forty-six hundred yards—the maximum range of the telescopic sight—with eight rounds.
Tests conducted by the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion in early December using captured Mark Vs, however, indicated that the Panther’s front armor could deflect some shots fired from as little as one hundred fifty yards. The battalion concluded that the M36 should still maneuver for side shots even against the Panther, that if that were not possible two TDs should engage the target, and that the 90mm gun would not penetrate the front armor of the Royal Tiger (Tiger II) at any range. The battalion called for better ammunition rather than a bigger gun.
Once again, the only machine gun was a rear-mounted .50-caliber for antiaircraft defense.
The hull was identical to that of the M10, except for minor modifications to provide stowage for the larger ammunition, and the vehicle was equipped with a small auxiliary generator, which had often been requested by M10 crews. The pressing requirement for 90mm antitank weapons at the front convinced the Army to put M36 turrets onto one hundred eighty-seven M4A3 Sherman chassis, which retained the thick armor and hull machine gun. This variant, dubbed the M36B1, further blurred the distinction between the tank and the tank destroyer.
Production of the M36B2 began in early 1945. This series used retired M10 hulls (diesel engines), provided folding flaps of steel to cover the turret top, and incorporated a muzzle brake on the main gun.139
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The first M36 Jacksons arrived in the ETO in September. The First and Ninth armies channeled arriving M36s to TD battalions supporting armored divisions, while Third Army used them to convert towed battalions. The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed) was the first to reequip, beginning 25 September.140 (The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion—in Naples to prepare for transfer to France—was probably the first outfit in Europe to actually receive the M36 in September, but it did not arrive in the ETO until early October.) The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10s) began the transition on 30 September and first used the new TDs in combat in October. The 703d almost immediately cut the .50-caliber machine-gun mounts off the backs of the turrets and welded them to the left front corners. By year’s end, only seven battalions had received the M36.141
The first trickle of Hyper-Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) ammunition for the 3-inch and 76mm guns began to arrive in September, as well. The tungsten-core round offered TDs and tankers the possibility of destroying the Panther and Tiger from the front, but combat reports indicate the American vehicle still had to close, in most cases, to within several hundred yards. The ammunition remained extremely scarce until the end of the war. Anecdotal reports on ammunition supplies in TD and separate tank battalions suggest there is some truth to the assertion that tank destroyer outfits received top priority in allocation of the “soupedup” ammo.
Chapter 8
The Battle for the Border
“It was the doughboy, the tanker, and the TD who cracked ‘The Line, and broke through the vaunted defense system.”
— History of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion
The German High Command judged that the West Wall would hold if the Americans failed to break through immediately. The generals anticipated a concentrated American thrust through the line at Aachen in mid-September. By 25 September, the High Command concluded the immediate crisis had passed.1 On 27 September, Ultra codebreakers deciphered a message sent several days earlier directing that all SS divisions—beginning with four panzer and one panzergrenadier divisions and three Tiger battalions—be withdrawn for rest and refitting.2
A war of attrition took hold in October 1944 that engulfed the front along or near the German border from British and Canadian positions in the Dutch tidal lowlands to American and French foxholes near Switzerland. The tank destroyer crews were intimately involved, although for months the fighting bore no resemblance to the conditions postulated by doctrine.
Montgomery had tried to flank the German border defenses with Operation Market-Garden beginning 17 September. His uncharacteristically bold plan to leap the lower Rhine by using American and British airborne divisions to capture a series of strategic bridges for use by follow-on armor had fallen just short. Monty’s offensive effectively ended on 23 September. In the aftermath, Eisenhower opted to continue his strategy of applying pressure along the entire front. The Wehrmacht, however, was no longer hopelessly fragmented and reeling. The Siegfried Line provided the bracing a defending army needed to plant its feet and fight back.
The West Wall, construction of which began in 1936, ran nearly 400 miles from north of Aachen along the German frontier to the Swiss border. The Germans had neglected the defenses after 1940, so Hitler worked furiously during the collapse in France to put together a scratch force of 135,000 men to partially rebuild and man the line. The rehabilitated defenses were, on average, three miles deep. The strongest portion faced Patton along the Saar River between the Moselle and the Rhine. The second most formidable section was a double band of defenses protecting the Aachen gap, with the city of Aachen lying between the two. Immediately behind the West Wall in this sector was the Roer River, which gave the Germans a backstop that they could flood by releasing water from dams farther south near Schmidt.3
Pillboxes in the West Wall typically had reinforced concrete walls and roofs three to eight feet thick and were generally twenty to thirty feet wide, forty to fifty feet deep, and twenty to twenty-five feet high, with at least half of the structure under the ground. In some areas, rows of “dragon’s teeth”—reinforced concrete pyramids—acted as antitank obstacles. In other areas, the defenses relied on natural features—rivers, lakes, forests, defiles, and so on—to provide passive antitank protection.4
The 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion recorded one view of the Siegfried Line in the area near Übach, Germany, in October: “The average pillbox had only one, or at most, two apertures, from which the enemy was able to deliver small-arms, machine-gun, and AT fire. Much more dangerous than the pillboxes, which could usually be reduced without much difficulty, were numerous AT guns—dug in and skillfully camouflaged between the pillboxes, and protected by infantry in firing trenches and bomb-proof dugouts.”5
The defenders also had artillery. Lt Leon Neel of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion said of the incoming shells, “There wasn’t enough room in the sky for any more.”6
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The official U.S. Army history noted, “The fighting during September, October, November, and early December belonged to the small units and individual soldiers…. A company, battalion, or regiment fighting alone and often unaided was more the rule than the exception.”7 The period also marked the point at which the American combined-arms team began to gel in the ETO. Riflemen, tanks, and TDs supported by artillery worked together better than they had in the bocage. Shared experience had much to do with the improvement.
Panzers appeared rarely and then in small numbers, while pillboxes, fortifications, towns, cities, and trench lines posed the main challenges to infantry and armored divisions along the border. The result was that, as in the bocage, the self-propelled tank destroyers frequently filled in as assault guns, little different from the role played by the tanks.
A memo from the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion described a typical action in which the TDs of Company B, one company of tanks, and doughs from the 30th Infantry Division’s 119th Infantry attacked the Siegfried Line near Rimburg on 2 October: “Each platoon was equipped with a 300-series radio borrowed from the infantry battalion whom they were supporting…. All pillboxes were encountered in pairs, mutually supporting. The TD platoon was employed with two guns firing, one into each of the pillbox embrasures, and the other two guns overwatching. This pinned down the enemy personnel and allowed our infantry to infiltrate to the blind side. When in position to make the final assault, infantry would call by radio for fire to be lifted. In a few cases, fire from the M10 would drive the enemy out of his position…. Unless the M10 could get into position to fire into the embrasure, [it] was useless. No amount of fire from the 3-inch gun could penetrate the thickness of these defenses.”8
Company C of the 803d, meanwhile, coordinated fire plans with the infantry and acted as the forward observer for artillery via a telephone link at one of the infantry battalion CPs. Company A provided fire control for a platoon of Sherman tanks from the 747th Tank Battalion.9
The widespread installation in infantry-support tanks starting in October of SCR-300 radios compatible with the walkie-talkie used by the doughs contributed tremendously to battlefield cooperation, and the case of Company B at Rimburg showed that the TDs were more effective when so equipped, too. Oddly, however, TD units were not issued the SCR-300, despite pleas from at least some battalion commanders for the radios.10
The Battle of Aachen
Of the four American armies along the front, only First Army was able to claim a major milestone in October. Ninth Army, having finished clearing Brest, entered the line between the First Army and the British beginning in early October and—short of men and supplies—dug in. Third Army began its first frustrating and bloody attacks aimed at capturing Metz—which became an obsession to Patton—while Seventh Army probed the German defenses along the Vosges Mountains.
First Army CG MajGen Courtney Hodges took aim at Aachen, which had been the seat of Germany’s First Reich under Charlemagne. Hodges judged that he lacked the resources to both contain the city and drive through the German defenses before the Rhine River. Prominent military historian Stephen Ambrose concluded, however, “The Battle of Aachen benefited no one. The Americans never should have attacked. The Germans never should have defended. Neither side had a choice. This was war at its worst, wanton destruction for no purpose.”11
Hodges ordered XIX Corps to punch through the West Wall north of Aachen and complete the encirclement of the city. After days of artillery preparation and a substantial but generally ineffective air strike, the 30th Infantry Division crossed the Würm River and began working through the West Wall on 2 October. The doughs suffered heavy casualties and were on their own the first day because tanks and TDs were unable to advance through the deep muck to provide fire support. The 29th Infantry Division aided the assault on the left with limited-objective attacks.
Combat Command B/2d Armored Division entered the fray through the 30th Infantry Division’s sector in the fiercely contested town of Übach on 4 October. The M10s from the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion provided overwatch while the Shermans pounded pillboxes from close range in support of the advancing riflemen. The attackers finally began to make noticeable progress the next day and soon cut the main highway to Aachen.12
On 5 October, the men and towed 3-inch guns of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion crossed the Würm River and passed through a gap in the Siegfried line opened by the 30th Infantry Division. The battalion CP set up shop in the basement of a schoolhouse in Übach. The gun platoons deployed into defensive positions with the line battalions of the 29th Infantry Division, and then with their usual partners in the 30th Infantry Division. The guns fired direct missions against pillboxes and indirect ones against more distant German targets.
Covered on the left by the 2d Armored Division, the 30th Infantry Division now pushed south to link up with the 1st Infantry Division east of Aachen. The doughs from the Big Red One, meanwhile, were clawing their way through heavy resistance southeast of the city. On 10 October, with encirclement seemingly ensured, the Americans delivered a surrender ultimatum to the Aachen garrison. Ordered by Hitler to fight to the last man, the commander refused.13
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The Germans gathered reserves and, after a series of unsuccessful piecemeal counterattacks, struck back in growing strength with the 1st SS Panzer Corps beginning on 10 October. A tank-infantry force hit the lines of 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, at 1300 hours. As Lt Leon Neel directed the action under heavy German fire, a single gun from his 1st Platoon, B/823d, destroyed three Mark IV tanks and two Panthers over six hours, while a second gun KO’d another Mark IV. The battalion’s history claims that Cpl Jose Ulibarri personally accounted for four of the tanks with seven rounds in only sixty seconds. The engagement took place at between thirteen hundred and twenty-three hundred yards, and the 3-inchers required an average of three rounds per panzer destroyed. The platoon was also credited with assisting the 230th Field Artillery in disabling three more German tanks. The platoon suffered no casualties.
The Germans tried again the next day at about 1600 hours but pulled back after losing two more panzers. This time, however, they destroyed one 823d gun with direct fire and killed one man and wounded eight more. The guns of Company A shifted forward to strengthen the antitank defense.
Evidently having learned little about the futility of driving toward emplaced guns with long fields of fire, the panzers tried one last time on 12 October. The determined assault closed to within four hundred yards of the American positions, and 2d Platoon of Company B smashed two Panthers and a Tiger, while Company A’s guns claimed one Mark V and two Mark VIs. Each TD company lost one 3-inch gun in the exchange, while Company B was left to find three new halftracks—including one to replace a vehicle buried beneath a collapsed building.14
Massed artillery fire—capped by a dramatic appearance by American fighter-bombers—smashed German tank-infantry attacks aimed at the 1st Infantry Division on 15 October. The American circle closed around Aachen the next day.15
The Big Red One, meanwhile, had launched its assault on the city itself on 10 October with a bombardment by three hundred fighter-bombers and twelve artillery battalions.
Lieutenant Colonel Derrill Daniel’s 2/26th Infantry Regiment, backed by TDs from A/634th Tank Destroyer Battalion and tanks from the 745th Tank Battalion, was tasked with clearing the south and center of Aachen. While dug in at the outskirts prior to the assault, Daniel had used the tanks as “snipers” against MG nests and the TDs to blow up buildings suspected of harboring OPs.16 But now he had to take the buildings—a lot of them.
Initially, Daniel assigned a mixed force of three or more Shermans and two TDs to support an infantry company. The armor’s job was to blast ahead of the infantry, drive the enemy into cellars, and generally “scare the hell out of them.” Tanks and TDs had prearranged infantry protection in return, but small arms fire forced the doughs to move cautiously, dashing from door to door an
d hole to hole. One 2d Platoon M10 was knocked out approaching Triererstrasse by a bazooka fried from a pile of logs only twenty-five yards away. It took the doughs from Company F some time to spot the offender and take him out with a BAR.
The 3/26th Infantry Regiment, meanwhile cleared a factory district on the east side of the city. M10s from 3d Platoon, 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Shermans played backup. When the doughs came under fire, a tank or TD would return fire until the riflemen moved in and cleared the building with grenades.
The two battalions launched their attack on the city proper on 13 October. Companies F and G from 2d Battalion each had three Shermans and one M10 attached, while Company G had three tanks and two TDs. The armor had difficulty negotiating embankments along the main rail line; several successfully slid down a ten-foot bank, while others went under the tracks only fifteen yards from the main underpass in which German demolitions were visible.17
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel soon developed a more frugal tactical approach for the urban fighting: A tank or tank destroyer went into action beside each infantry platoon. The armor would keep each successive building under fire until the riflemen moved in to assault it. The crews usually fired HE rounds on fuse-delay through doors, windows, or thin walls to explode inside. Only once a building was cleared and the doughs became safe from muzzle blast would the tank or TD fire on its next target. Machine guns mounted to the front of the TD turrets added invaluable support during the street fighting. The process quickly produced tremendous teamwork. Light artillery, meanwhile, crept two or three blocks ahead of the advancing troops, while heavy artillery dropped beyond that.18