by Philip Haney
It is important to note that the initiative had been authorized by the DHS chief counsel on August 30, 2011.
Along with the chief counsel’s authorization and my port director’s approval, I received an invitation letter from the NTC on November 7, 2011:
The intent of this memorandum is to solicit assistance in the operation and research associated to NTC-P Event [author’s redaction] regarding research related to the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) organization. I have been working extensively with CBPO P. B. Haney assigned to CBP-ATL and he has been instrumental in providing a background on TJ, as well as research dating back over two years of possible TJ member encounters and suspected destination addresses which have links to terrorism. CBPO Haney has been an essential part of this operation and his research is still being looked at for further links and possible Visa/ESTA denials and revocations. CBPO Haney continues to be a valuable asset in developing more names, addresses, and leads of TJ members.
The spreadsheet that formed the heart of the initiative became larger each day, soon expanding into hundreds of entries. We began to refuse admission to groups of three or four Tablighi Jamaat members at a time as they attempted to enter America at airports or land border stations.
Underscoring the importance of the case, we also found that about 25 percent of remaining detainees at the US prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, were affiliated with Tablighi Jamaat.
COMMENDATION
At NTC, I continued to enter Tablighi Jamaat–affiliated subjects into the system, eventually expanding the entries to more than sixteen hundred, while also identifying more than three hundred individuals with potential ties to terrorism.
John Maulella, NTC’s program manager for training, became one of my NTC friends, as well as a colleague who knew about my work with the TJ Initiative. One afternoon in February 2012, I took my wife, Dr. Francesca Maria, on a mini-tour of NTC, and we went and sat in his office.
He looked right at my wife, then pointed at me and said, “Your husband is a superstar.”
She said, “I know.”
Maulella told her, “We never send TDY’ers over to the Advanced Targeting Team. It’s unprecedented. And not only is he on the team, but he’s working on his own case. This has never happened before.”
At the end of my six-month TDY assignment, June 8, 2012, I received a commendation letter from NTC director Donald Conroy, for my “outstanding contributions.”
“Your display of dedication and effort in the fight against terrorism have been exemplary,” he wrote, adding that my “expertise and experience have been invaluable while assigned to the Advanced Targeting Team (ATT).
“Your research on the ‘Tablighi Jamaat Initiative’ has assisted in the identification of over 300 persons with possible connections to terrorism,” he said. “The NTC-P looks forward to your continuing support and assistance in the Program.”
CASE DESTROYED
Before my tour of duty ended in June 2012, management at NTC offered to let me extend for another three-month tour. I tried to persuade my port director in writing and on the phone to let me stay, but my request was denied, and I had to return back home to the Port of Atlanta.
Almost immediately, Port Director Kremer assigned me to work with Supervisor Smith (not his real name), who was in charge of a newly formed special detail to analyze the statistics on the port’s annual seizures of drugs, currency, and other contraband.
After we finished the initial assignment, we started working on other unsolved cases. One example was the theft of airport rental cars by a suspect with at least fifteen different names and ten different birthdates, who would rent the cars under a false ID and never bring them back.
Up to that point, no one could break the case, but I found the culprit. He was a naturalized citizen with a US passport who was originally from the West African country of Mauritania. And not only did we find the suspect; we also found his entire network of accomplices.
Breaking a case of that kind requires the same kind of intense database research and analysis that made our Tablighi Jamaat case so successful.
As Smith and I continued working together, I happened to come across an individual I recognized from an earlier case who was also linked to the Institute for Islamic Education. One of many US organizations in the Tablighi Jamaat network, the IIE was educating young American Muslim boys, just like the Madrassa Boys I interviewed, in the fine points of Islamic theology and sharia.
As I reviewed the IIE website, I noticed that it was offering these young students the option of memorizing the entire Quran, to become hafiz. The discovery was doubly important because I could see the IIE tied not only to the Madrassa Boys’ case but also to the TJ Initiative. I brought this to the attention of Smith, and he immediately told me to go ahead and develop the case.
By the time I had finished researching and compiling all the links, I had found sixty-seven individuals or organizations that were linked to the IIE network, including some of the same Darul Uloom madrassas we had already included in the Madrassa Boys case and the TJ Initiative.
To make the case stronger, I sent all of the raw data up to a colleague at NTC. After he ran it through the “high side” and added relevant details to the spreadsheet for the case, I saw that virtually every single organization and individual in the IIE case had what we call “derogatory information.”
It was a very solid case, verifying the same trends we were already tracking in the TJ Initiative. As some might say, it was a grand slam, a classic “connect the dots” law enforcement case.
So, we put the case report and all 67 linked records into the system on August 22, 2012. As soon as we downloaded it into TECS, we started getting hits back from our colleagues across the country, who were reading the report and cross-checking the information for possible links to individuals and organizations in their own regions.
Right after that, I took two weeks of annual leave and went to see my family in California.
Before I even got back from vacation, Smith called me.
“Haney, we’ve got a problem,” he said. “They deleted all of your records out of the system. All 67 of them.”
This time, I thought, they didn’t just modify them, as happened in 2009 with 818 TECS records (more about that later). Instead, they completely obliterated the case by removing all 67 of the linked records from the system.
I know it happened, because my records were all tagged, so that whenever anyone else looked at them, I received an e-mail notification. The function was designed to help the original record owner keep track of how his or her case was developing in other ports.
Deleting TECS records requires hitting a precise series of keystrokes. Since all 67 records were removed from the system in fewer than forty-five minutes, they literally deleted them as fast as they could go from one record to the next.
But by the time they were finished, I had 67 e-mail notifications stacked in my in-box.
Smith and I had put together a strong law-enforcement case, with numerous solid ties to other ongoing cases. They completely destroyed the work we did, including all of the updated passport numbers, personal data, and background information I had entered on all of the individuals affiliated with the IIE network.
As my first-line supervisor, Smith had approved the records. When ordered by upper management to remove the records himself, he refused, he later told me.
Normally, refusing such a direct order would be a serious infraction, but he was never written up for what he did. Perhaps it was because upper management also knew that removing the records was wrong.
But deleting records was just the beginning. As soon as I returned from vacation on October 1, 2012, I was called into the port director’s office, where members of management laid several papers on the table and told me to sign them.
“You are now being investigated for misuse of TECS.”
The Madrassa Boys case, the Tablighi Jamaat Initiative, and the IIE case had all demonstrated the legitimacy of the
concerns Congress expressed publicly about the “radicalization” of US citizens and the failure to connect the dots, particularly following the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “Underwear Bomber.”
But, now, here I was, being investigated once again by my own agency, for doing exactly what Congress had commissioned us to do.
Three years later, on December 10, 2015, as details of the San Bernardino shooting were still emerging, I appeared on Megyn Kelly’s Fox News Channel program, The Kelly File, to talk about the Tablighi Jamaat case and its relationship to the massacre. The next morning, Smith called me, saying that all he could think about were the families of the people who were killed by Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik.
2
FINDING THE TRAIL
On the morning of September 11, 2001, I was checking e-mails and reviewing the news headlines at my desk in the Department of Agriculture headquarters in downtown Atlanta. I was managing about twenty employees at the time in the department’s nursery inspection program. From my window, I could see the sunrise reflecting off the gold dome of Georgia’s capitol building.
At 8:46 a.m., American Airlines flight 11 flew into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at more than 460 miles per hour. Moments later, Yahoo! posted a photograph of black smoke billowing out of a huge hole near the top of the North Tower, and I knew the world would never be the same.
I stood up from my desk, walked into the hallway that led to the other offices in our group, and found my colleagues gathered there. “There’s going to be a war,” I told them.
A few days later, I met with Sen. Max Cleland, D-GA, and his staff in his Atlanta office, and offered my services to help protect our country.
Cleland was personally familiar with war. A triple amputee, he had received the Silver Star and the Bronze Star for his actions in combat in Vietnam.
In response to my offer, Cleland wrote a letter on my behalf to Tom Ridge, the assistant to President George W. Bush in the Office of Homeland Security, which was created just eleven days after 9/11 and was still located in the White House.
In his December 17, 2001, letter, Cleland wrote:
It is a pleasure to call your attention to the résumé of Mr. Philip Haney. Mr. Haney is interested in offering what services he can to our government. He is familiar with Middle Eastern culture, and feels he could be of value in our country’s cause. I’m forwarding his information to you in hope that you will give him every consideration, for a position with the Office of Homeland Defense.
Yes, Cleland really did say Office of Homeland Defense. It was just the beginning of an unprecedented effort to unite disparate agencies tasked with protecting the nation’s borders and keeping the peace.
A few days after the letter was sent, Ridge announced that the White House had settled on “substantial increases in spending” that would place the greatest emphasis on prevention of “renewed terrorism” and on bolstering the capacity of first responders and public health care agencies.1
On January 8, 2002, I sent a follow-up letter to Ridge, stating that I was “both encouraged and impressed by Senator Cleland’s actions on my behalf, and look forward to what opportunities may develop from his kind endorsement.”
A couple of months later, on March 26, 2002, Clay Johnson, assistant to the president for presidential personnel and deputy to the chief of staff, replied to Cleland:
The outpouring of support nationwide has been exceptional as we continue to receive thousands of resumes from qualified candidates. Please be assured that your candidate will receive full consideration as we work to select those to serve the President and the country.
Cleland sent me a personal note assuring me I was still under consideration. But never one to sit idly by, I had also applied for a new position with the United States Department of Agriculture’s Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) division and was selected as a PPQ officer on May 16, 2002. I was to be stationed at the Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International Airport.
It was to become just one of many remarkable confluences of events that led me into the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection division, where I eventually became an armed law enforcement officer (LEO) and subject matter expert (SME) in counterterrorism, and in the strategy and tactics of the global Islamic movement, with an emphasis on Quranic Arabic.
On May 28, 2002, I submitted my letter of resignation from the Georgia Department of Agriculture to commissioner Tommy Irvin and reported for duty at my new position as a PPQ officer on June 3, 2002.
Later that year, Cleland lost his Senate seat to Republican Saxby Chambliss, and he wrote me a kind letter on December 19, 2002, suggesting who to contact if I wished to pursue an appointment to the Office of Homeland Security. He said it was “a particular honor that you allowed me to help you personally. Thank you for the privilege, and I wish you all the best.”
I’m grateful to Max Cleland for his encouragement and support, which helped lead to the remarkable events that were to unfold in my life.
THE HALCYON YEARS
Meanwhile, as I was settling into my new job as a PPQ officer, the brandnew Department of Homeland Security was beginning to take shape.
The formal proposal to create the DHS, submitted in June 2002, characterized it as the “most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century” and “one more key step in the President’s national strategy for homeland security.”2
Next came the Homeland Security Act, a 187-page bill announced by President Bush on November 25, 2002.3 Passed by the House July 25–26, 2002, it went through numerous revisions before it was considered and passed by the Senate on November 19, 2002, then reconsidered and passed in its final version by the House on November 22, 2002.
In January 2003, a list of the twenty-two federal agencies that would soon be consolidated into DHS was published,4 followed by the March 1, 2003, announcement that DHS would become a “stand-alone, Cabinet-level department, to further coordinate and unify national homeland security efforts, opening its doors.”5
As it turned out, one of the twenty-two federal agencies that would be blended into DHS was a relatively small USDA subagency called Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Snuggled within APHIS was an even smaller subagency, called Plant Protection and Quarantine, which was precisely the agency that had just employed me.
I was now poised to become part of the agency for which Senator Cleland had recommended me, except that it would happen in a way that neither one of us had imagined.
A DIFFERENT ERA
In the process of becoming a stand-alone agency on March 1, 2003, about twelve hundred PPQ officers were enfolded into what became known as Customs and Border Protection. The new CBP brought under its umbrella career personnel from three formerly independent agencies: the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was formerly part of the Department of Justice; the US Customs Service, previously part of the Department of the Treasury; and the selected officers from the PPQ.
The PPQ itself is still part of the Department of Agriculture. Since DHS never intended to absorb all of USDA-PPQ into CBP, those of us who were selected had to be given a new title and officially converted from GS-0401 federal agricultural officers to CBP agricultural specialists (CBPAS).
On February 19, 2003, we received a formal notification:
The events of September 11, 2001, and others that have followed, demonstrated to all American that we are living in a different era with different threats. All Americans now realize that border security is no longer something to be taken for granted. Your position has been identified as one of the APHIS positions to be transferred; therefore, you will be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003.
To reinforce the seriousness of our mission, Secretary Ridge sent each new member of DHS an attractive signed and dated certificate that read:
Be it known that Philip B. Haney is a Founding Member of the Dep
artment of Homeland Security, dedicated to preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters.
It was a simple, straightforward mandate, with a threefold emphasis on terrorism.
In addition, all of us – at ICE, Customs, and PPQ – retired our old uniforms and began wearing the now-familiar blue uniform and gold badge.
On March 21, 2003, my colleagues and I in “legacy agriculture” received a formal notification from PPQ deputy administrator Richard L. Dunkle:
Your work and commitment to the [PPQ] mission honor that history. Now, you are part of another historic moment. In transferring to … DHS, you are part of the largest Government reorganization since the establishment of the Department of Defense. As part of DHS, you are playing a key role in a broader mission and the preservation of our way of life. I hope your career in DHS is rewarding, and I hope you continue to carry the proud history of PPQ with you.
As a student of history, in particular the history of the Middle East and of America’s early encounters with the Muslim Barbary pirates, I recognized we were part of another historic moment.
My familiarity with the languages and religions of the Middle East was also why I took so seriously our new mandate to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters.
As a field entomologist, I worked in countries all over the world but was particularly focused on the Middle East. I traveled and interacted with mostly poor farmers in countries such as Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, and Yemen. I was introduced to cultures that were unfamiliar to most of my colleagues in Customs and Border Protection, except for some of the younger military veterans who had served tours of duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.