by Philip Haney
But Customs agents assigned to the CAIR tour at O’Hare told a reporter they were outraged that headquarters would reveal sensitive counterterrorism procedures to an organization that had seen several of its own officials convicted of terror-related charges since 9/11.
A little more than a month later, in early August 2006, port director Anita Terry-McDonald asked me to help her arrange another VIP tour for CAIR, this time at our Atlanta airport. In response, I wrote her a memo on August 19, 2006, noting that I had been raising concerns about CAIR for some time. I reminded her that it was a Hamas front group – as FBI evidence in the 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial later confirmed – funded by Arab governments that actively support jihadist groups in Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere in the world.
“The more we know about CAIR, and its history, the less comfortable we should feel about having them looking over our shoulder,” I wrote. “With the recent pledge from UAE of at least $74 million to support CAIR, and its new affiliation with the ACLU, we can expect an increase in high-profile obstructionist activities (i.e., PR campaigns and lawsuits) from CAIR in the near future.
“These activities will all have a direct bearing on our efforts here at CBP,” I said.
As we can clearly see now, my warnings were legitimate, but they were not well received at the time.
McDonald responded by sending a copy of the memo directly to DHS headquarters, and I was soon banned from the presence of upper management.
To make matters worse, it turned out that Robert Gomez, our director of field operation, was acting port director at O’Hare when the VIP tour took place. I heard through third parties that I was accused of calling Gomez a terrorism supporter.
During my nearly fourteen-year career at DHS, I was investigated nine times. The first began October 15, 2006, after I attended a specialty class titled Deception Detection and Eliciting Responses, October 4–6, 2006, at the interagency Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. The class was taught by instructors and role players who were either active-duty or retired CIA officers.
Since the course centered on techniques for interviewing individuals with possible links to Islamic terrorism, I assumed that the DDER instructors and role players would be interested in an article I wrote, “Green Tide Rising.” Based solely on my own expertise in Middle East affairs, with factual citations derived only from open-source documents, it had been published by the website FrontPage Magazine on March 16, 2006.2
However, less than two months after graduating from the DDER class – lightning speed in government time – I received an e-mail notifying me that CBP Internal Affairs had opened an investigation on the article. The e-mail also informed me that on December 14, 2006, a GS-13 Internal Affairs fact finder from Newark International Airport, named William Ferri, would be coming down to Atlanta to interview me.
I was accused of unethically accessing classified information to write the article and of violating prohibitions against the use of classified information by posting it on a public website.
After interviewing several of my colleagues and members of upper management, Ferri concluded his investigation and submitted the results up the chain of command.
During the several days that Ferri was in Atlanta, I also was interviewed on the telephone by another investigator from Internal Affairs. He asked me detailed questions about every place I had ever traveled, especially in the Middle East, as well as the websites I regularly queried. He wanted to know why I wrote “Green Tide Rising” and even asked how I “described myself.”
In response, I provided the following answers in an Administrative Inquiry Affidavit, on December 14, 2006:
All the information in the article in question is derived from open sources. Some examples include websites such as MEMRI (Middle East Media & Research Institute), Jihad Watch, and FrontPage Magazine.
None of the information was derived from CBP electronic sources, or from information derived from any other CBP sources, or from any Agencies associated with CBP. None of this type of information is available in the computer programs that we use.
This has been my field of study for 30 years, specifically, the Arab–Israeli Conflict, and the Theology of Islam. I began working in the Middle East in the 1980’s; I have traveled and/or worked in Yemen in 1988 & 1989 and Egypt in 1991. I have been to the Middle East more than 15 times.
I began working in the Middle East as an Entomologist, in the field of Biological Control. This is what introduced me to the culture of Islam & the Middle East.
I submitted the article entitled “Green Tide Rising – Hamas Ascends” because the Internet is the modern forum for discussion.
In answer to your question about how I portray myself, I described myself as a professional observer of the Middle East with 30 years of experience. I wrote this byline in the original article, which still appears in versions that [are] posted on the Web.
To this day, I’ve often wondered, instead of reporting me to DHS headquarters, why didn’t the DDER role player just ask me directly about the article?
In the end, the Green Tide Rising investigation yielded no evidence of wrongdoing, and I was finally cleared on August 2, 2007. Even so, there were serious consequences to face in the weeks, months, and years ahead.
As we moved into 2007, things started out well enough, as seen in this complimentary January 4, 2007, e-mail from Paul Conrad, my first-line supervisor in the Passenger Analysis Unit, where I had been working since November 15, 2005:
You’re all doing great work. I am excited about what you’re doing. You hit the ground running. The information from your reports is being forwarded up and out. This is great stuff. People are noticing, both locally, and in other agencies.
Conrad’s support also is reflected in an August 8, 2006, status report that I sent him regarding my merger into PAU and my initial efforts to convert from a CBP agriculture specialist to a CBP officer:
I’m not sure where this is all taking me. It does appear, however, that the prediction you made during one of our first meetings together in your office is coming true.
You said that I would eventually end up working with NTC and/or HQ, and that it was just a matter of time before it happened. Nothing is official yet, but it does look like things are starting to move in that direction.
A July 20, 2006, memo from my PAU colleague, CBP officer Brown (not her real name), to another colleague in the CBP Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison, showed that I was valued by my colleagues:
In Atlanta we have a legacy Agriculture officer, Philip Haney, who we have on our PAU team. He has not only worked in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Yemen) but has traveled extensively in many Middle East countries.
In addition to his experiences, he has made it his personal mission (obsession) to study Islam and Islamic terrorism, on his own, for the past 20 years or so. On his own he compiles data, writes papers, essays, comparative studies, etc…. and he has a daily regimen of websites and open sources that he monitors and tracks.
He is by far the most knowledgeable person on this subject that I have met or talked with including all the ICE, FBI, etc…. agents.
He is on our team to pursue terrorism only. He is invaluable with research, background information, education, and in interviews.
He knows some basic Arabic, can quote the Koran, and has an extensive knowledge of all aspects of Koranic learning and Islamic studies.
Nevertheless, on February 14, 2007, I was notified by our assistant port director that I would be removed from the IRU and reassigned back to PAU to do agricultural targeting, instead of targeting individuals and organizations with potential links to terrorism.
Assistant port director Robert Scholtens and chief Rickie Evans came to me that Valentine’s Day morning.
“Mr. Haney, you’ve done a great job, taking the IRU from nothing to where it is now … and the database, Jihad Groups in the World, is really great,” Scholtens said.
“But we’re going to have
to make a change. Since you’re legacy Ag [Department of Agriculture], we’re going to send you back to PAU.”
When I told Scholtens and Evans that I didn’t have any agricultural targeting experience, they looked at each other for a moment and both said, “We’re shocked!”
To this day, I still don’t know the real reason why the IRU team was shut down, but at that moment it seemed to me that a decision had been made without any regard for the importance of our work.
As the three of us looked at each other, I held up my hands in a “time out” sign.
“If the reason that I’m being stopped from doing this kind of work is because I’m a legacy agriculture officer, then I want to go to FLETC and convert to be a CBP officer,” I said.
On February 23, 2007, I met with port director Michele James and expressed my concerns about shutting down the IRU, as well as my desire to convert from CBPAS to CBPO so I could continue doing counterterrorism work.
At the time, there was no formal protocol for making such a transition, but somehow James found a way to do it. On June 25, 2007, I received a formal “Conditional Offer of Employment” for the position of CBP officer GS 1895-11 with Customs and Border Protection in Atlanta.
Meanwhile, several of my colleagues who were upset about the decision to close down the IRU put their concerns in writing, including Joseph M. Rogers, my IRU supervisor.
In a February 20, 2007, memo that was sent up the chain of command, he argued that everyone knew that “no one in this Port and probably no one in CBP can replace Mr. Haney’s scholarly knowledge on terrorism.”
Last week when I learned that Mr. Haney was to be taken out of IRU, I requested a meeting with [Port Director Michele] James and Mr. Scholtens.
Not knowing the true nature of why this decision was made, it certainly leads to all kinds of speculation and rumors. I feel that Mr. Haney and I are owed an honest explanation of what is behind this decision and why management wants to disrupt the IRU at this point in time, especially at a time when I will be away at a detail.
Mr. Haney is working on a wonderful INTEL project, where he will be giving not only Atlanta, not only CBP, but perhaps many US government entities involved in the fight on terror, an in depth look at the HAMAS organization in the US and their proxies and how they are involved in a coordinated effort to disrupt the US government’s fight on terror.
I’ve read the first 24 pages and it reads like a well-researched doctoral dissertation with virtually everything he says backed-up by references to other TECS records and Internet Articles. Mr. Haney estimates he has at least three full weeks of additional work to finish this assignment.
Once this MOIR [Memorandum of Information Received] is completed and approved, it will be sent out to all the Officers who currently have TECS Records that are associated to this group. This may assist them with their investigations, provide more leads and give the agents a better insight into the operations of HAMAS. Other INTEL entities will likely also find this MOIR very helpful.
If management is worried about the work Mr. Haney is doing, I can say that I have insisted and Mr. Haney has readily complied with documenting just about everything he has to say in his reports. Mr. Haney has been doing his work in WORD documents that are on the shared drive under IRU Muster Topics. I invite management or other INTEL persons to review his work and give us feedback. The information will not be downloaded into TECS until everyone feels we have a good product.
I appeal to management to put yourself in Mr. Haney’s shoes, if only for a minute. Mr. Haney is a quiet, unassuming Officer who cares deeply about this country and the principles that guide CBP. Mr. Haney wants to put his knowledge and years of experience where it will do us the most good. To force him to go to PAU at this point in time will deeply wound his spirit and likely embitter him.
All of us as Supervisors, have an obligation to stand up and advocate for our employees, especially when decisions are being made that could and probably would have an adverse impact on our operations.
We all know that no one in this Port and probably no one in CBP can replace Mr. Haney’s scholarly knowledge on terrorism. I ask you, to ask yourself the questions, where can Mr. Haney do the most for our mission? Where will he be the most effective in identifying and helping other officers identify possible terrorists? Who among us has the most understanding of “the big picture” when it comes to terrorism? Who at a glance can spot the name of a mosque or village or particular leader and say: “I think I found a piece of the puzzle we have been looking for”?
The IRU without Mr. Haney is just a post-analytical PAU Unit. They can maybe do more research on individuals, but identifying links and knowing where they fit will not be readily apparent and may often be missed. This HAMAS MOIR is likely only one of many great INTEL projects Mr. Haney will be working on, if we give him a chance. With Mr. Haney, we are on the cutting edge of INTEL and the fight against terrorism.
Do you want to drive a Mercedes or Ford Fiesta?
Regards,
Joseph M. Rogers, Supervisory Enforcement Officer
Six days before Rogers’s memo, on February 14, 2007, my PAU colleague, Officer Brown, urged me to “fight like hell.”
I heard … what is going on. Fight like hell. For [management] to act like they don’t know what you have been doing this whole time is BS and a lie.
… If [management] doesn’t back you then you know for sure what kind of people you are dealing with. They are scared of CBP not being politically correct and your level of research surpassing all of the JTTF and other agencies.
Propose to them that you need to be put on the JTTF directly. There is no reason to waste your skills…. But don’t hang your hat on [management] completely. You can never totally trust anyone.
In the end, however, my request to remain on the IRU was denied. In fact, it was never discussed again. The IRU was disbanded simply because no one else at the port thought he or she could take my place.
Management did make one concession, and I was able to remain assigned to the IRU for three more weeks while my friend and colleague officer Martin (not his real name) and I finished compiling The Hamas Network in the United States report. This happened because Martin had the idea of printing a copy of the entire report and showing it to Chief Evans in his office.
Martin said, “They don’t know what we really have here, so let’s show them!”
As soon as Evans saw the Hamas report, he agreed that we should definitely finish what we had started. I’m thankful to Chief Evans for having the foresight and courage to allow us to finish this important project.
By early March, I was back in the Passenger Analysis Unit, but on March 13, 2007, my participation in the weekly CIIG intelligence briefings was abruptly terminated without explanation.
On May 21, 2007, the groundbreaking Hamas report was put into the TECS system, but only in the form of a three-page executive summary. Management apparently was concerned that some of the open-source information in the report was unreliable.
Meanwhile, I received positive feedback about another case I had worked on with our field analysis specialist and JTTF liaison.
In a June 15, 2007, e-mail, he praised the analysis I had prepared for the assistant US attorney:
In addition, the Intel person for the AUSA [Assistant US Attorney’s] Office requested his boss to send [the analysis] to the AUSA’s. He said it should not be a problem. He also told me all the Intel people for the AUSA office were blown away by the paper. Good Work!!!!
Then, my colleague Holly Banks, stationed at the Southeast Field Intelligence Unit (SEFIU) in Miami, Florida, distributed the Hamas report on June 19, 2007, to the resident agents in charge (RACs) and special agents in charge (SACs) in Washington, DC; Atlanta; Baltimore; Norfolk, Virginia; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Miami; and five other field offices in Florida. The cover letter stated that the SEFIU was “assisting CBP in attempts to disseminate this intelligence report to all ICE Office of Investigations, SACs and
RACs whose areas of responsibility are specifically mentioned in this report.”
On Monday, July 9, 2007, I met with Rep. Lynn A. Westmoreland, R-GA, and his aide, John Stacy, at the congressman’s office in Newnan, Georgia. It was the first time I had reached out to a member of Congress, but there would be many more such efforts in the years to come.
After the meeting, I wrote a thank-you note to Westmoreland, which included the following remarks:
Thank you both for meeting with me on Monday, July 09, 2007, at your office in Newnan. It was a pleasure to meet you in person. It is my hope that this will be the beginning of an alliance that will help make our country more secure from Jihad terrorism.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2007, nine months after the Green Tide Rising investigation had started, I received an exoneration letter from Port Director James:
This is to inform you, pursuant to Customs Directive 099 1520-010, dated November 05, 1993, that a Management Referral, OPR Case No. [author’s redaction], regarding alleged improper publication and dissemination of an internet article (Green Tide Rising) has been completed.
Based on the results of the investigation, I have determined that no action pertaining to the publication and dissemination of the above mentioned Internet article is warranted.
Despite the letter, the investigation wasn’t actually over. On August 22, 2007, I was summoned to the DFO’s office to give what became a twenty-one-page affidavit for a parallel investigation that was prompted by the original Green Tide Rising case. This time, I was accused of improperly querying my own name, home address, and travel records in what I understood to be the “training mode” of TECS, during a March 22–23, 2006, Advanced Targeting course at NTC.
The case was finally mitigated on October 16, 2007, from a possible two-day suspension without pay to a formal Letter of Reprimand from Director Gomez, which was placed in my personal file for one year.
Was what I wrote in Green Tide Rising correct? I believe that, read ten years later, it still rings true, especially the closing remarks, in which I wrote that “strategic attacks against the West will increase.”