by Philip Haney
In addition, I noted there was no mention of the Hadith, a required source of reference for every theological and political policy in the Islamic world. In other words, it would be like trying to write new laws in America without referring to the US Constitution.
“No one, even ‘American Muslims,’ can create bona fide policy that excludes or contradicts the Hadith,” I wrote.
As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the position paper about the Quran itself. Who could blame someone reading this paper for getting the impression that the Quran is so inscrutable and sacred that it can’t be discussed? However, the Quran, combined with the Hadith, form the Sharia, which is the foundation of Islam everywhere in the world, and has been since Muhammad died in 632. They are immutable and irrefutable – not subject to rational (secular) diplomacy or current political trends.
I noted that the early US ambassadors in Europe, including Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, all knew this from firsthand experience. All three of them had encountered the dey – the Muslim leader – of the Barbary pirates, who was based in Tripoli.
In each of his encounters with the Americans, the dey plainly declared that he was leading a jihad against America and Europe. Ever the curious researcher, Ambassador Jefferson used a copy of the Quran to verify that what the dey had said aligned with Islamic theology and practice.
In response, the famous ship USS Constitution, better known as “Old Ironsides,” was sent to Tripoli in the late 1790s to recover the crew and cargo of the freighter USS Philadelphia, which had been captured by the Barbary pirates and was being held for ransom, or jizya. In Islamic jurisprudence, the jizya, also translated “tax,” is a tribute that conquered non-Muslims must pay as an act of submission to their Muslim overlords.
In the early years of the United States, the fledgling federal government paid up to 25 percent of its gross national product to ransom ships and crews held by the Mediterranean jihadi pirates.
Returning to the memo to my ICE colleague, I also wrote that it “follows, therefore, that any discussion of political policy, as per proposed ‘Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims,’ must be based on principles derived from sharia law,” which is composed of both the Quran and the Hadith, as well as a large volume of theological and legal commentary, known as the tafsir.
“They are inseparable,” I wrote. “Otherwise, we’ll discover to our possible horror that we’ve been misled, and our naive misconceptions will be smashed to pieces by the powerful hammer of sharia.”
I also argued that despite the obvious efforts of the writers of the “Words Matter” memo to diffuse the potency of the word jihad, all four of the most authoritative sources of the Hadith were saturated with teachings endorsing violent jihad against unbelievers – just as the dey of Tripoli had declared to America’s early ambassadors.
“The legacy of Jihad is a fact of history, which cannot be diminished (or whitewashed) by a position paper prepared by ‘American Muslims,’” I wrote.
In the memo, I also referenced the influential Islamic scholar Sayyid Qutb and his essay “Jihad in the Cause of God,” which was first published in English by scholar Andrew Bostom on January 16, 2006. I referred to Qutb as the “Thomas Jefferson of modern jihad,” for his carefully written declaration that gathered all of the thoughts and ideas of Islam’s “founding fathers.”
Continuing, I wrote that as a political theorist and recognized Islamic theologian, Qutb was very clear on what may be called the “four stages of Jihad.”
In the United States, I said, we are now in stage one, which centers on the promotion of Islam through mostly nonviolent means, called da’wah in Arabic, which then lays the cornerstone and foundation for the remaining three stages. The “Terminology to Define the Terrorists” policy paper was a “classic example” of stage one jihad, as defined by Qutb.
I noted that no individual Muslim or Islamic organization anywhere in the world had ever accused Qutb of committing takfir, meaning the serious crime of doctrinal deviation from orthodox Islam.
In closing, I offered that if anyone higher up in the chain of command would like to discuss these concepts in further detail, I would be happy to do so.
I never received feedback from higher-ups, and to this day no one with DHS, CBP, or the administration has ever addressed any of my questions or concerns.
Most important, while the e-mail string noted that the “Words Matter” memo “neither reflects DHS-wide policy, nor represents the final word on this topic,” it soon became obvious to subject matter experts like me that the recommendations would become official DHS policy.
“WORDS THAT WORK”
A little more than a month later, on March 14, 2008, another internal memo, “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” began circulating around the administrative and law enforcement officer community.
Originally released by the Extremist Messaging Branch of the Counter-Terrorism Communications Center for “use in conversations with target audiences,”7 the memo was also approved for diplomatic use by the US State Department, which planned to distribute it to all of its foreign consulates and embassies.
The State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Communications Center was described in a November 1, 2007, dispatch as an office “staffed with experts from different agencies” that “develops culturally sensitive messages to undermine and discredit terrorists.”8
A similar unit, the US State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), was established on September 9, 2011, “at the direction of the President and the Secretary of State to coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents.”9
Today, it appears that the CSCC is “guided by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) under the policy direction of the White House and interagency leadership.” The CSCC coordinator “reports to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and works closely with the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, other [Department of] State bureaus and many government agencies. CSCC liaises with agencies with domestic responsibilities to ensure coordination and consistency of message.”10
The NSCT, which originated the frequently heard mantra “We are not at war with Islam; we are at war with al-Qaeda,” narrowly defines the principal threat Americans face as al-Qaeda and its affiliates:
This Strategy recognizes there are numerous nations and groups that support terrorism to oppose U.S. interests, including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and HAMAS, and we will use the full range of our foreign policy tools to protect the United States against these threats.
However, the principal focus of this counterterrorism strategy is the network that poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States – al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and its adherents.11
Remarkably, on February 8, 2015, the State Department appointed Rashad Hussain, a Muslim Brotherhood–linked leader who turns up later in my story, as the United States special envoy and coordinator of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.12
Hussain – who declared in 2004 that the prosecution of University of South Florida professor Sami al-Arian on terrorism charges was “politically motivated persecution” to “squash dissent”13 – now leads a staff drawn from a number of US departments and agencies to expand international engagement and partnerships to “counter violent extremism” and to “develop strategic counterterrorism communications around the world.”14
Al-Arian later pleaded guilty to charges related to his leadership in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist group and was deported.
As with the “Words Matter” memo, my colleagues and I were assured that the “Words that Work” memo’s “advice is not binding and is for use with our audiences.” We were also informed that the memo “does not affect other areas such as polic
y papers, research analysis, scholarly writing, etc. The purpose of this paper,” it said, “is to raise awareness among communicators of the language issues that may enhance or detract from successful engagement.”15
Nevertheless, the memo included the following very specific “guidelines”:
• Don’t Invoke Islam: Although the al-Qaida network exploits religious sentiments and tries to use religion to justify its actions, we should treat it as an illegitimate political organization, both terrorist and criminal.16
• Use the terms “violent extremist” or “terrorist.” Both are widely understood terms that define our enemies appropriately and simultaneously deny them any level of legitimacy.17
• When possible, avoid using terms drawn from Islamic theology in a conversation unless you are prepared to discuss their varying meanings over the centuries.
Examples: salafi, wahhabist, caliphate, sufi, ummah. Do not use “ummah” to mean “the Muslim world.” It is not a sociological term, rather, it is a theological construct not used in everyday life.18
It wasn’t very long before we also told to stop using the word terrorist altogether, especially within the US government data systems, such as TECS. At the same time, the term violent extremist soon rose to prominence as the favored term in the emerging Countering Violent Extremism policy.
ADVANCED TARGETING
In September 2008, I traveled once again to Herzliya, Israel, to attend the ICT’s annual World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, which focused on “Terrorism’s Global Impact.” As with every other ICT conference, I brought home valuable intelligence on developing terrorism trends around the world, but as I mentioned earlier, I was never able to share any of it with port management.
In early October 2008, I was assigned to the Advanced Targeting Unit (ATU), a specialty team that focuses on the movement of cargo instead of passengers. Robert Harer was our ATU supervisor, and we soon got to work developing new leads while continuing to follow up on cases that were already in progress.
I was also still receiving many e-mails every day from colleagues around the country who were looking at records related to the Hamas Network report or other linked reports, such as on the Deobandi-Tablighi Jamaat network in the United States.
I worked the night shift at the time, and late in the evening of November 23, 2008, I found an article reporting that officials with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) had been served a summons and complaint for various civil and criminal offenses. I had already devoted more than two years of law enforcement–based research to CAIR, so I knew how closely the leaders of this organization were linked to Hamas and other supremacist groups.
It was no secret that in 1994, CAIR was incorporated by three leaders of the Islamic Association for Palestine: Omar Ahmad, Nihad Awad, and Rafeeq Jaber. An INS memo from 2001 documented at length the IAP’s support for Hamas, while noting that the “facts strongly suggest” that IAP is “part of Hamas’ propaganda apparatus.”19
Nor was it a secret that Mousa Abu Marzook, a senior leader of Hamas to this day, once served on the IAP board of directors and provided the group with at least $490,000.20
A couple of days later, on November 25, 2008, I discovered an FBI story titled “No Cash for Terror: Convictions Returned in Holy Land Case,” which informed us that the Department of Justice had convicted the Richardson, Texas–based Holy Land Foundation and 108 of its members and associates for funneling at least $12 million to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.21
I have to admit that, as a federal law enforcement officer, I found it gratifying to realize that, two years earlier, I had put a detailed report on CAIR and the entire Hamas network in the United States into the system.
Now, my colleagues in the FBI and DOJ had just successfully convicted five top Holy Land Foundation leaders of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization; conspiracy to provide funds, goods, and services to a specially designated terrorist organization; and conspiracy to commit money laundering.
As soon as the HLF verdicts were announced, Mustafaa Carroll, director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations’ branch in Dallas, held a press conference and warned that the verdicts could have a chilling effect on America’s already traumatized Muslim community. “Muslims are concerned about how this is going to affect them,” he said. “By criminalizing charity, it may even have an impact on American charities in general. People are really afraid.”22
What Carroll didn’t mention was that not only was CAIR named as an unindicted coconspirator in the HLF trial, but unlike the charities from other religions, Islamic charities, including CAIR, fund Islamic holy war. In fact, Islamic law requires that one-eighth of all the proceeds of Islamic charity – known as zakat – be designated for the support of jihad and/or jihad warriors, the mujahideen.23
However, as would become evident in the next few months, Carroll’s complaint of possible infringement of civil rights and civil liberties was echoed by many other Muslim leaders in the United States and was soon given top priority by the Obama administration.
Perhaps even more important than the conviction for funding jihad was the evidence presented during the Holy Land Foundation trial of a plot to “destroy Western Civilization from within.” This evidence implicated virtually every prominent Islamic institution in America, from the leading Islamic civil rights and political interest groups – including CAIR, the Islamic Society of North America, and the North American Islamic Trust – to the nationwide Muslim Student Association and the system for certifying military chaplaincies.
CAIR’s parent organization, IAP, was named in the May 1991 Muslim Brotherhood document, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” as one of the Brotherhood’s likeminded organizations that shared the aim of teaching Muslims that “that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands … so that … [Allah’s] religion is made victorious over all other religions.”24
The Holy Land Foundation trial should have been a turning point in America’s counterterrorism efforts, allowing federal law enforcement officers to keep a sharp eye on individuals and organization who now had proven ties to terrorist groups such as Hamas.
But in fact, the exact opposite transpired.
5
INTEL SCRUB
On January 17, 2009, I wrote the first of a series of articles published in mass media under the pen name of Bruce Phillips. I used a pseudonym because I didn’t want a repeat of what had happened in 2006, when I was investigated and endured an adverse action for publishing “Green Tide Rising.”
Of course, even federal employees have a constitutional right to freedom of expression, but rather than belabor the point while I was still active duty, I simply chose to write under a different identity.
I wrote because I considered it my duty to inform my countrymen and to document some of the major historic events in the Middle East that were affecting the safety and security of America and the world.
The article, titled “The War Against Hamas: Why Does It Matter?” and published by WND, addressed a major military campaign called Operation Cast Lead, which began December 19, 2008, when Hamas operatives in Gaza began barraging Israel with rockets. Israel responded January 3, 2009, with a ground offensive into Gaza, which continued until January 18, when Israel unilaterally ended the conflict.
“The War Against Hamas” was published just one day before Operation Cast Lead was halted. At the time, I believed it was important to publish the article before the conflict ended, so I could not be accused of retroactive analysis.
As you can see in the concluding paragraphs of “The War Against Hamas,” my underlying premise was shown to be correct:
To conclude, if Hamas cannot be defeated in Gaza (when everyone in the world should know exactly who they are and what they stand for), then how ca
n anyone else hope to defeat jihadists who are subtly diffused through the populations of nearly every other country in the world? Stated another way, if we can’t defeat an enemy we can clearly see, then how will we ever defeat an enemy we cannot clearly see, who often enjoys the protection of governments operating under Islamic Shariah law, or at least cleverly and cynically hides behind the protections and benefits provided so generously by democratic, liberal Western governments?
Or, if we lack the political will (and discernment) necessary to defeat an avowed, well-defined and unapologetic jihad group such as Hamas – concentrated as they are at this moment in space and time – then when and how will we ever find the will to engage the threat of jihad (in all of its myriad subtle expressions) against jihad groups and individuals that we can’t even see, let alone define?
What’s more, in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s failure to defeat Hamas, the leaders of every jihadist group in the world will come to a sudden (and thrilling) realization … that no power on earth can defeat them. Yes, they may suffer loss of life and property, and they may have to endure hardships and deprivations, but in the end, Islam will prevail. Of that, they will be resolute and certain.1
For much of January 2009, I also worked with my colleagues in other law enforcement agencies on a case involving a global-level Hamas leader, Salah Sultan (variously spelled Soltan).2
A onetime lawful permanent resident (LPR), Sultan is linked to several United States and European Muslim Brotherhood organizations, including the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), and the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), which is led by Youssef Qaradawi, another top Muslim Brotherhood leader.
While living in America, Sultan was also closely affiliated with the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), the Islamic American University (IAU), and the Muslim American Society (MAS).