Two Bolshevik Central Committee members opposed Lenin. One was Kamenev, who had never been a radical among Bolsheviks either in 1917 or earlier in the war. The other, surprisingly, was Zinoviev, who had been Lenin’s adjutant in the emigration before the February Revolution.2 Kamenev and Zinoviev together carried the dispute to Lenin. They dismissed his extreme optimism and pointed out that many urban soviets had yet to be won by the Bolsheviks. They stressed that the party’s electoral following was all but confined to the towns. They cast doubt on the assumption that the rest of Europe was on the brink of revolution. They feared the outbreak of civil war in Russia.3
Yet the vote went in favour of Lenin by ten votes to two. Stalin was among his supporters; he had left his association with Kamenev entirely behind him. He was convinced that the time had come to seize power. His mood can be gauged by the article he published in Rabochi put (‘The Workers’ Way’ — this was the successor to Pravda and was under his editorial control). Stalin had high hopes:4
The revolution is alive. Having broken up the Kornilov ‘mutiny’ and shaken up the front, it has flown over the towns and enlivened the factory districts — and now it is spreading into the countryside, brushing aside the hateful props of landlord power.
This was not an explicit call for insurrection. Stalin did not want to present Kerenski with a motive to close down the Bolshevik press again; but he warned that Kornilov’s action had been the first attempt at counter-revolution and that more would follow. Collaborationism, by which he meant the assistance given to the Provisional Government by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, had been found politically bankrupt. The Kadets had been shown to be ‘a nest of and a spreader of counter-revolution’. Soviets and army committees should prepare themselves to repel ‘a second conspiracy of the Kornilovshchina’. Stalin was adamant that ‘the full might of the great Revolution’ was available for the struggle.5
The Central Committee met again on 16 October. Representatives of Bolshevik party bodies in Petrograd and the provinces were invited to attend. Lenin again made the case for insurrection. He claimed that the moment was ripe even though there were reports that workers were unenthusiastic about a seizure of power. Lenin argued that ‘the mood of the masses’ was always changeable and that the party should be guided by evidence that ‘the entire European proletariat’ was on its side. He added that the Russian working class had come over to the Bolsheviks since the Kornilov Affair. Ranged against him were Central Committee members inspired by Kamenev and Zinoviev. Lenin’s critics denied that the Bolsheviks were strong enough to move against the Provisional Government and that a revolutionary situation existed elsewhere in Europe. Even Petrograd was an insecure citadel for Bolshevism. Zinoviev maintained: ‘We don’t have the right to take the risk and gamble everything at once.’6
Stalin supported Lenin:7
It could be said that it’s necessary to wait for a [counter-revolutionary] attack, but there must be understanding about what an attack is: the raising of bread prices, the sending of Cossacks into the Donets district and suchlike all constitute an attack. Until when are we to wait if no military attack occurs? What is proposed by Kamenev and Zinoviev objectively leads to the opportunity for the counter-revolution to get organised; we’ll go on to an endless retreat and lose the entire revolution.
He called upon the Central Committee to have ‘more faith’: ‘There are two lines here: one line holds a course for the victory of revolution and relies on Europe, the other doesn’t believe in revolution and counts merely upon staying as an opposition.’8 Sverdlov and other Central Committee members also came to Lenin’s aid; and although Trotski was absent because of his duties in the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, Lenin won the debate after midnight. The voting again went ten to two in his favour.
Lenin went back into hiding and sent furious letters to comrades in the Smolny Institute. This was the former girls’ secondary school in the centre of the capital where the Petrograd Soviet and the central bodies of the various parties — including the Bolsheviks — were based. Lenin was keeping up the pressure for armed action. Kerenski was considering his options and came to the conclusion that drastic action was required before the Bolsheviks moved against him. Tension rose on 18 October when Kamenev breached party discipline by stating the case against insurrection in the radical left-wing newspaper Novaya zhizn (‘New Life’).9 While not revealing precisely what the Bolshevik Central Committee had decided, he dropped very heavy hints. Lenin wrote to the Smolny Institute demanding the expulsion of the ‘strike-breakers’ Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party.10 On 19 October Zinoviev entered the proceedings with a letter to Rabochi put. Its contents were at variance with the position he had so recently espoused. Zinoviev claimed that Lenin had misrepresented his position and that Bolsheviks should ‘close ranks and postpone our disputes until circumstances are more propitious’.11 Quite what was intended by Zinoviev is unclear. Perhaps he wanted to be able to go on arguing the case in the Central Committee (whereas Kamenev had undeniably breached confidentiality and jeopardised the party’s security).
This spat fell into the lap of Stalin as chief editor of Rabochi put. He decided to accept Zinoviev’s conciliatory move and print his letter.12 But neither Zinoviev nor Stalin explained how Kamenev and Zinoviev as opponents of armed action could work with Lenin, Trotski and those committed to insurrection. On 20 October the Central Committee adjudicated. It was a fiery session and the first occasion when Stalin and Trotski seriously fell out with each other. Trotski was blunt. Stalin, he insisted, had been out of order in publishing Zinoviev’s letter. Sokolnikov, Stalin’s editor of Rabochi put, denied involvement in the editorial decision. Stalin stood exposed as the person responsible.13 Kamenev resigned from the Central Committee in despair at the policy of insurrection. Stalin continued to support Lenin’s policy, but the indignities of the debate induced him to present his resignation from the editorial board.14
He recovered his poise only when his request was rejected. This seemed the end of the matter; nobody knew how deeply he resented any shock to his self-esteem — and Trotski in 1940 was to pay the ultimate personal price. In terms of Bolshevik political strategy it remains unclear why Stalin was indulgent to Kamenev and Zinoviev. He never explained his thinking. But it would be in accord with his usual attitude to regard Kamenev and Zinoviev as allies in the struggle to reduce Trotski’s influence to a minimum. Lenin’s growing penchant for Trotski was a threat to the authority of Central Committee veterans. Another possibility is that Stalin sensed that the opponents of insurrection would ultimately stay with the party. Milyutin quickly moved back into line with official policy. Perhaps Stalin believed that a disunited party could not carry through the necessary armed manoeuvres against the Provisional Government. At any rate it was on his best form that he returned to the Central Committee on 21 October. Stalin, not Trotski, drew up the agenda for the forthcoming Second Congress of Soviets. His scheme marked down Lenin to speak on ‘land, war and power’, Milyutin on workers’ control, Trotski on ‘the current situation’ and Stalin himself on the ‘national question’.15
At the same Central Committee meeting Stalin was included in the list of ten members deputed to reinforce the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He was at the centre of political operations.16 Already he belonged to the Military-Revolutionary Committee. He also had a vibrant influence in the Party Central Committee and, despite the contretemps over Zinoviev, was among its most trusted leaders.
The Provisional Government was the first to act in the contest with the Bolsheviks. On the morning of 24 October, on Kerenski’s orders, troops arrived at the premises of Soldat and Rabochi put, broke some machinery and seized equipment. Stalin was present. He watched as the edition which he had signed into print was seized and an armed guard stationed at the door. He can hardly have been surprised by Kerenski’s measures. Stalin’s anonymous editorial had stated:17
The existing government of landlo
rds and capitalists must be replaced by a new government, a government of workers and peasants.
The existing pseudo-government which was not elected by the people and which is not accountable to the people must be replaced by a government recognised by the people, elected by representatives of the workers, soldiers and peasants and held accountable to their representatives.
The Kishkin–Konovalov government should be replaced by a government of soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies.
Kishkin was Minister of Internal Affairs, Konovalov the Minister of Industry. Stalin recommended readers to ‘organise your meetings and elect your delegations’, ending with the invocation: ‘If all of you act solidly and staunchly, nobody will dare to resist the will of the people.’18 The revolutionary intent was obvious even if Stalin pragmatically refrained from spelling it out.
Presumably it was his editorial duties that prevented him from attending the Central Committee on the same day. Trotski too was absent, but this did not inhibit him from denigrating Stalin as a man who avoided participation in the decisions and activities connected with the seizure of power.19 The story got around — and has kept its currency — that Stalin was ‘the man who missed the revolution’.20 Proof was thought to lie in the assignments given by the Central Committee to its own members. Here is the list of assignments:21
Bubnovv – railways
Dzierżyński – post and telegraph
Milyutin – food supplies
Podvoiski (changed to Sverdlov after objection by Podvoiski) – surveillance of Provisional Government
Kamenev and Vinter – negotiations with Left SRs [who were on the radical extreme of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries]
Lomov and Nogin – information to Moscow
Trotski thought this demonstrated the marginality of Joseph Stalin to the historic occasion being planned.
Yet if inclusion on the list was crucial, why were Trotski and Lenin omitted? And if commitment to the insurrection was a criterion, why did the Central Committee involve Kamenev? The point was that Lenin had to remain in hiding and Trotski was busy in the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Stalin as newspaper editor also had tasks which preoccupied him, and these tasks were not unimportant. As soon as he had the time, he returned to the Smolny Institute and rejoined his leading comrades. There he was instantly given a job, being sent with Trotski to brief the Bolshevik delegates who had arrived in the building for the Second Congress of Soviets. Stalin spoke about information coming into the Central Committee offices. He emphasised the support available for the insurrection from the armed forces as well as the disarray in the Provisional Government. Stalin and Trotski performed their task well. There was recognition in the Central Committee of the need for tactical finesse. A premature rising was to be avoided; and in order to gain the acquiescence of the Left SRs it was sensible to act as if every measure was merely an attempt to defend the interests of the Revolution against its militant enemies.22
The Petrograd situation was dangerously fluid. Troops were on their way from outside the capital to help the Military-Revolutionary Committee, which already controlled the central post office. Stalin was confident that facilities could be established to restore Rabochi put despite the raid on the press earlier in the day.23 Everything would depend on the balance of forces assembled next day by the Military-Revolutionary Committee and the Provisional Government. Kerenski faced a decisive trial of strength.
Stalin went back to the Alliluevs’ apartment for the night. There was no time for jokes or story-telling. He was tired out. Yet he had carried out his duties more than satisfactorily. Anna Allilueva heard him saying: ‘Yes, everything’s ready. We take action tomorrow. We’ve got all the city districts in our hands. We shall seize power!’24 He lay down for the last few hours of undisturbed rest he would have for several days. He did not sleep very long. An emergency Central Committee meeting was called before dawn on 25 October and Stalin had to be present. Even the ‘strike-breakers’ Kamenev and Zinoviev attended. The minutes have not survived the October Revolution, but the agenda must surely have been devoted to the practical side of seizing power. The military planning was finalised and discussion took place about the new revolutionary government, its personnel and its decrees. Lenin was charged with drafting decrees on land and peace. When the moment came, the Council of People’s Commissars had to be able to make its purposes clear.25
The fact that Stalin was not asked to direct any armed activity has perpetuated a legend that he counted for nothing in the Central Committee. This is to ignore the broader scope of the meeting. The Military-Revolutionary Committee had already made its dispositions of the garrisons and Red Guards. Stalin’s functions had previously precluded him from involvement in such activity and it would have been folly to insert him at the last moment. Yet the meeting also deliberated on what was to happen when the Provisional Government was declared overthrown later in the day. Stalin took part in the deliberations as light began to dawn. Already he knew he would have immense tasks to discharge when daylight came.26 Expectancy intensified. He and his Central Committee comrades snatched food and drink as they talked. They went on consulting each other. They greeted messengers from all over Petrograd and sent others out on errands. Although their eyes were red with lack of sleep, their concentration was acute. This was the time of their lives. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat was about to be proclaimed and Revolution was going to spread across Russia and would soon break out in Europe.
The events of 25 October 1917 were historic by any standard. Acting through the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotski and other Bolshevik leaders controlled the garrisons of the capital and directed troops loyal to them to seize post and telegraph offices, government buildings and the Winter Palace. In the night of the 24th– 25th Lenin returned to the Smolny Institute to resume command of the Central Committee. It was he who coaxed and ordered Bolsheviks to stick to the agreed purpose. Power had to be seized without delay. Across the capital the Military-Revolutionary Committee secured important buildings of administration and communications. Meanwhile hundreds of delegates had gathered for the opening of the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. At Lenin’s insistence the overthrow of the Provisional Government was brought forward. He sensed there might be trouble at the Congress if the seizure of power were not a fait accompli, and he continued to cajole his Central Committee comrades into action. The Provisional Government was no more. Although the Bolsheviks were not an absolute majority at the Congress, they were easily the largest party — and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were so annoyed by the night’s events that they walked out. Power fell comfortably into the hand of the Bolshevik party.
Stalin had no role visible to the public eye. He did not speak at the Congress. He did not direct the Military-Revolutionary Committee. He did not move around Petrograd. Much as he had enjoyed the politics of revolution in earlier months, he was little to be seen on that historic night. Characteristically he got on with his assignments and did not poke his nose into the business of others. Here is the testimony of Fëdor Alliluev:27
At the time of the October [seizure of power] comrade Stalin didn’t sleep for five days. Crushed by tiredness, he finally fell asleep while sitting in a chair behind his table. The enraptured Lunacharski tiptoed up to him as he slept and planted a kiss on his forehead. Comrade Stalin woke up and jovially laughed at A. V. Lunacharski for a long time.
Such joviality seems odd only if the later myths about him are believed. When he came back from Siberia, acquaintances had warned of the unpleasant features in his character, and these had been discussed at the April Party Conference. But he had gained a better reputation in following months. Not once did he come to notice for bad temper, insensitivity or egocentricity. If anything was held against him, it was that he was too supportive towards Lenin on the national question.
He had done his jobs — important party jobs — w
ith diligence and efficiency. With Sverdlov he had run the Central Committee in July and August. He had edited the central party newspaper through to the seizure of power in October. Since April he had helped to bring about the pragmatic adjustment of party policy to popular demands. He felt at home in the environment of revolutionary Russia; and when he came back to the Alliluev flat he was greeted by admirers. He wrote, edited, discussed and planned with eagerness.
The composition of the new revolutionary authority reflected this. The Council of People’s Commissars — or Sovnarkom in its Russian acronymic form — was announced on 26 October. The title was a joint idea of Lenin and Trotski. Lenin was delighted: ‘That’s wonderful: it has the terrible smell of revolution!’28 The Bolsheviks wanted to avoid associating themselves with ‘capitalist’ political culture with its cabinets, ministers and portfolios. There would not be a premier but a chairman. This would be Lenin. The People’s Commissar for External Affairs would be Trotski. Rykov, Shlyapnikov, Lunacharski, Milyutin and Nogin were other original members. Stalin too was on the list. His post was newly invented and had no precedent under Nicholas II or Kerenski. Stalin was to be People’s Commissar for Nationalities’ Affairs. Although his functions and powers were yet to be defined, the basic objective was to set up an institution with a view towards winning over the non-Russians in the former empire to the side of Sovnarkom. When Pravda resumed publication, Stalin was relieved of the editorship. His energies had to be reserved for the Central Committee, Sovnarkom and his own People’s Commissariat. Stalin’s position at the centre of revolutionary politics was confirmed.
Stalin: A Biography Page 19