Obviously, Maximilian's troops were experiencing discipline problems as early as 1865, and it would only get worse, especially in the Legion. The above anecdotes also suggest that, perhaps for the first time since Spain, desertion from the Legion was serious enough to undermine its combat efficiency. “As long as we are ten to twelve days’ march from the frontier, they will only leave in small bands,” General Douay wrote to his brother from San Luis Potosí on February 2, 1866. “In almost all the units, they leave in twos with arms and baggage when they are on guard in the advanced posts. But they have long distances to cover. Several have been taken and shot, which keeps most of the others in line. I don't know what will happen when they only have a few kilometers to cover to reach safety.”70
The obvious question to ask, then, is, Why were legionnaires deserting in such large numbers? As already suggested, the official explanation was that these deserters had enlisted in the Legion with that very purpose in mind. Bazaine believed that “a good many of them enrolled in the corps [Foreign Legion] to get a free trip, but it will cost them dearly if caught,”71 an assertion repeated by French historian Pierre Sergent.72 Therefore, the problem of Legion desertion in Mexico appears to have been considered both by officers at the time and historians since as an exceptional phenomenon, attributable to the fact that many recruits simply joined up for the ocean voyage. Of course, it is fair to point out that the Legion had (and has) a vested interest in propagating this view, as other explanations might suggest that the Legion might be unsuitable for certain types of operations.
So, was the inordinate amount of Legion desertion in Mexico simply a product of a short-term influx of would-be immigrants? Of course, it is always possible that some men saw enlistment as a cheap ticket to the New World. But there were far easier ways to get to the United States than enlisting in the Foreign Legion—after all, tens of thousands of impoverished immigrants did it every year. With the War Between the States raging, even if a man of military age could not get assisted passage from the American consul in any European port city (which is by no means certain), he found instant employment once setting foot in North America where the war had created an acute labor shortage and where a quarter of the 2 million white troops in Union Armies were made up of immigrants. If, as General Douay claimed, two-thirds of the Legion in 1866 were Germans,73 it may have been that they were simply too broke, too lazy or not allowed by French frontier police to go further without enlisting. However, a more likely explanation seems to be that these deserters had enlisted in the Legion and then had second thoughts about military life, or that, once in Mexico, they seized the opportunity to desert without much premeditation.
The archives of the temporary Legion depot at Aix-en-Provence suggest that, rather than being eager to get to Mexico to desert, Legion recruits were eager to desert before they could be sent to Mexico. Serious problems obviously had been brewing for some time before they finally erupted in the spring of 1865, for on March 29, two hundred legionnaires rioted after five of their number were arrested.74 The cause of the trouble is not apparent from the report, but morale was obviously low, for two days later the general commanding at Marseille suggested that Legion replacements for Mexico be sent via Toulon on the Mediterranean coast rather than marched across the country to Saint-Nazaire on the Atlantic, because “the men only want to desert and that, on the road from Aix to Saint Nazaire, they will probably seize the first opportunity to evade the surveillance.”75
On April 11, the 4th Corps again complained that “The foreigners enlisted in the Legion in general do not want to embark for Mexico and to avoid it use all means at their disposal. A rather large number call upon either their families or the Minister of Foreign Affairs to cancel their contract.” The general warned that men should not be excluded from the regiment for indiscipline, for this would simply encourage other men to misbehave so that they could become civilians once again. Many legionnaires deserted to Marseille, where they enlisted in the Pontifical forces or the American army, “which is being recruited clandestinely.... I profit from this opportunity to call the attention of Your Excellency to the paltry help such poor elements will give to the government of the Emperor of Mexico.”76 The following day, the general at Marseille noted that the announcement of a draft for Mexico invariably produced a wave of desertions at Aix—twenty-four on April 12 alone.77
The growing unpopularity of the Mexican War in France might also have cooled the original military enthusiasm of some recruits. Town-garrison relations at Aix deteriorated seriously due to the growing unpopularity of the war and the problems caused by the unenthusiastic legionnaires. The downward slide was apparent in January 1865, when three legionnaires offered to treat the clients of a local bar to a spectacle of “prestidigitation.” The locals were sent out to collect a number of articles, “such as dresses, shawls, jackets, coats, dresses, rings, money, eggs, vegetables, etc.,” which were then taken into a back room to be “prepared” by one of the legionnaires prior to the act. By this time, “a numerous public” had gathered, according to the Messager de Provence, which reported the event. After a rather long wait, the legionnaire failed to reappear, so his two colleagues disappeared into the back room to hurry him along. By the time a Parisian could have recited the Edict of Nantes from memory, these good citizens of Aix finally realized that they had been duped. Few legionnaires had ever been provided with such a bountiful means of desertion— “You are mystified and robbed!” concluded the Messager de Provence.78
By summer, relations had hit rock bottom. Fights between legionnaires and townsfolk appeared to be such a principal evening pastime that the Messager de Provence demanded the soldiers be stripped of their bayonets, which gave them an unfair advantage in these encounters. The minister of the interior sent along a petition signed by the local population requesting the removal of the Legion from Aix to his colleague in the War Ministry.79 It did not happen. Even as late as February 1867, Louis Aubin, a “landowner” at Aix, wrote directly to Emperor Napoleon HI to complain that legionnaires were “breaking into houses in the country, stealing men's clothes, to dress in mufti so they can desert, which happens every day. They drink, eat and, when they find nothing to eat, or drink, and nothing of value, they break everything up.”80
The conclusion suggested by all these troubles at Aix is that most recruits did not view the Legion as a form of assisted passage to the New World. If ever this had been their intention upon enlistment, they quickly regretted their decision and sought to bail out before they reached the ports of embarkation. Reluctant recruits may also have contributed to what some saw as the declining performance of the Legion in Mexico. It is certain that the end of the War Between the States in April 1865 saw the tempo of combat increase in Mexico, and that most of these engagements were victorious ones for the Legion. Nevertheless, this provides an inadequate indication of performance, as the Mexicans, like most guerrilla forces, were not interested in dominating the battlefield in a traditional European sense, but concentrated upon harassing actions. The growing desertion rate would seem to indicate that the heart had gone out of the French effort generally, and that this was felt acutely in the Legion. “When we leave, [Maximilian] will only have the support of the Foreign Legion and the Cazadores,” General Douay wrote on September 27, 1866. “The Legion, made up of rather mediocre troops who are quick to desert, is still under strength.... More, most of the officers of the Legion serving au titre français have asked to leave Mexico the day that our flag is lowered, and it is impossible to leave them after the departure of the Marshal [Bazaine] and of the national troops.”81
The waning enthusiasm of the legionnaires, rather than the premeditated desire to travel at French government expense to Mexico, appears to have been the cause of the numerous desertions in Mexico. Many no doubt enlisted on a whim, in the belief that soldiering was a life of romantic adventure, and were bound to be in for a rude shock when confronted with the harsh realities of Legion life. The shock was increased
by the 1864 decision to raise the enlistment in the Legion from two to five years, where it has remained ever since. Of course, the infusion of large numbers of new recruits into a military force at war always brings problems of integration in its wake. However, these problems especially affected the Legion, which depended upon a rather long socialization process during which regimental loyalty would gradually supersede parochial and potentially divisive nationalism among heterogeneous recruits. The temporary depot at Aix fulfilled this socialization function poorly, in part because responsibility for the care of Legion recruits fell upon the shoulders of the 7th Infantry Regiment stationed in Aix.82 As the Legion expanded from three to six battalions for the war, other regiments no doubt seized the opportunity to unload unpopular or inefficient officers and NCOs into these new formations. Moreover, while the Crimean and Italian campaigns were relatively brief and popular, Mexico appeared to present the possibility of an almost endless military commitment, which served to lower the war's popularity in France, which must also have played a part in lowering morale in the Legion.
The nature of the war in Mexico also placed particular strains on Legion morale and efficiency. In the first place, the Legion may not have been able to reforge the unity and esprit de corps it had exhibited at Sidi-bel-Abbès in 1863. Much of the original force was destroyed by the vomito. From mid-18 64, many of the replacements, all of whom came from Aix, were of dubious value. Nor did the contingent of old Legion hands exist to initiate them into the rituals and lore of the regiment, thereby speeding their integration by developing regimental pride. The lack of homogeneity of the Legion could be extended to the government forces in general, a motley collection that included not only the diverse units—Arab, French and foreign—of the Armée d'Afrique, but also Mexicans, Belgians, Austrians and even a unit of Egyptians. Friction, duels and a general lack of cooperation were fairly frequent among them. Santa Isabel probably provided the most spectacular failure of such a combined Legion-Mexican operation. But there were others, in particular in June 1866 when the Franco-Belgian convoy marching from Monterrey to Mier failed to support a convoy of Austrians and Mexicans that was attacked and destroyed near Matamoros. The failure of the French to run to the rescue was put down to low morale in the French camp.83 However, had the Matamoros convoy been composed of Frenchmen, they almost certainly would have been supported.
But these large operations aside, much of the Legion was scattered about in small, isolated garrisons. This undoubtedly had several effects. As in Algeria before the arrival of Bugeaud, discipline and morale were no doubt harder to maintain in these small detachments, isolated from the main body of troops and feeling very vulnerable indeed, especially as the Mexicans were more agile and far better armed, and therefore more dangerous, than the Algerians had been in the days of Algerian conquest. Furthermore, scattering troops about in penny packets violated the principle upon which the efficiency of the Legion, as well as that of other corps, had been based—namely, rigorous selection. In Mexico, the Legion was not always permitted the luxury of leaving its least able soldiers behind and operating with picked troops. So while its mobile corps might continue to perform credibly, its garrison troops could lack initiative and élan.
All or some of these factors may have set legionnaires to thinking of alternative careers. As in Algeria, virtually the only option open to many deserters in Mexico was to defect to the enemy. But unlike Algeria, desertion to the enemy was a fairly risk-free option in Mexico. Furthermore, it might even be an attractive one: “What is very clear is that the profession of guerrilla is one of the most lucrative in Mexico,” war minister Marshal Randon wrote to Bazaine, “and that the leaders of bands are never bothered about finding soldiers and money—two elements of a war in which the Mexican government is in default.”84 Indeed, in the spring of 1865, the Legion sought to dry up a potential source of guerrilla support as well as solve its own recruitment problems by enlisting Confederate soldiers who had sought asylum in Mexico. The idea was dropped, however, when only one came forward, and even he insisted on a six-month trial period.85
The Mexicans sensed early on that the dubious loyalty of legionnaires to their cause and to their corps might be exploited, and began to encourage desertion. Diesbach de Torny began shooting Mexicans for encouraging desertion from his company in early 1864.86 Amiable reported that Mexicans had fair success encouraging desertions around Monterrey, until a legionnaire denounced the principal agent, who was shot.87 As has been seen, French deserters, many but not all from the Legion, were to be found in many Mexican bands.88 Indeed, General Daudignac discovered an old legionnaire at Sidi-bel-Abbès in 1895 who had served with the guerrillas in Mexico, but who was incapable of remembering whether he had fought for or against the French.89
The risks of desertion may have increased from October 1865, when Maximilian, probably prompted by Marshal Bazaine, ordered all captured partisans to be shot.90 Some credited this order with the increasing vicious-ness of the war, although the fact that the Mexicans were becoming better armed, and no doubt more aggressive, may also have been a factor. When, on July 3, 1866, a large group of Mexicans withdrew after a two-day attack upon two Legion companies near Matehuala, they reportedly left behind ten dead and thirty wounded, two-thirds of whom, according to the French divisional order, “have been recognized as miserable men who left the French ranks to fight against their old comrades. No one can ignore that, in all of their engagements with us, the Mexicans force the French deserters to march before them by beating them. This is the way that these unfortunates pay, in an ignoble death, the price of their crime.”91 This may have been true in a few instances. However, there is no evidence that this was liberal policy or practice. On the contrary, it is far more likely that the army wished deliberately to paint a black picture of the fate of deserters by distortion or deliberate falsehood. In any case, it seems fairly clear that desertion to the enemy in Mexico was a viable option for the disgruntled.
A second way in which Mexico, especially northern Mexico, differed from Algeria was that the United States actually offered somewhere to desert to, without having to worry about an inhospitable reception from the enemy. This meant that a campaign in the northern states of Mexico particularly provoked a hemorrhage of desertion serious enough to threaten Legion efficiency.
Last, it was becoming increasingly clear that the war was unwinnable. It took no Napoleon to realize, especially after the Union victory of 1865, that no matter how well they fought, victory must elude them because Washington now actively aided the Juaristas. The Imperial forces were too few, and attempts to create a viable Mexican force had collapsed. Even Mexican officials and soldiers who supposedly supported the government defected to the liberals at the first opportunity. American “immigrants” flooded in to aid the Juaristas. Furthermore, the feeling was strong among Legion officers, at least, that they were backing the wrong horse. Zédé called the whole business “une mauvaise affaire” and while it did not prevent the Legion from fighting hard, the enemy was given “the esteem merited by a party which defends the liberty of its country” against foreigners and priests, whom the legionnaires, not religious men as a rule, despised. The sentiment was unanimous that Maximilian should abdicate and that the French should leave.92 “Let's try to leave before the house falls in on us,” Legion officers said openly, according to Major Clemmer. “There is no longer any point in trying to hold it up.”93 Diesbach de Torny, never a barrel of laughs at the best of times, quickly soured on the Mexican adventure, declaring that “There is enough here to put one off the profession.” As early as 1864, he condemned “This damned war This damned country.”94
Many officers, like Diesbach de Torny, resigned or transferred out of the Legion, to get out while the gettin’ was good. Of one hundred officers in the régiment étranger in 1863, sixteen died during the campaign. Thirty-one of the original one hundred still remained with the unit in 1867, including Saussier, Zédé and Giovanielli, all future generals. The remai
nder had transferred out, often as the result of a promotion, which usually required a change of corps.95 Of course, resignation is the officer's option. Soldiers can only serve out their enlistment, or desert. Many of those officers who remained probably allowed discipline to relax. French General Thoumas noted a certain laissezaller in the Legion, symptomatic of deteriorating discipline. He complained that officers—and even NCOs—were riding horses, contrary to regulations, and dressed in sombreros and “costumes de fantaisie.” “Gambling caused many victims among the officers and l'aguardiente [alcohol] ravaged the soldiers,” he noted. He blamed the relaxation of discipline on the “dispersion of troops” in isolated garrisons.96
The increasing violence of the war from the summer of 1865 on lowered morale further.97 Furthermore, the Prussian victory over the Austrians at Sadowa in 1866 fell like a thunderclap over the army in Mexico. American diplomatic and military pressure, the deteriorating military situation in Mexico and the war's increasing unpopularity in France combined with the worsening diplomatic situation in Europe to cause the French government to decide on a withdrawal in late 1866. The Belgian government also called its troops home, and they left with the first group of departing French troops in January 1867. As France too began to introduce military legislation to strengthen her army, French officers must have feared that they might be forced to sit out the next European conflict, with all of its attendant promotion and glory, in a Latin American backwater.
The combination of low morale, declining discipline and the proximity of the American frontier led to a large number of desertions from the Legion in August 1866. On August 12, the Legion entered the town of Mier, abandoned in haste by the frightened inhabitants, and began to pillage. “This pillage was the most productive of all Mexico,” Amiable recounted. “We discovered gold and silver hidden everywhere. For my part, I discovered an old sock hidden in the trunk of a tree containing five American ounces, about 800 francs, as well as a clock and a pair of dueling pistols which I sold at Monterrey, and from which I feasted with my cousin.” For a week, the soldiers wandered the streets taking anything they fancied: “Several of them picked up a fortune. My captain resigned on our return: which led us to believe that he feathered his nest at Mier.”98 The Mexicans shot at them from the hills above the town, but no one paid any attention. This is when ninety-three French soldiers, their finances now in good order, decided to opt for American citizenship. Worse, according to Douay, was that those legionnaires who deserted from Mier in June 1866 were among the best: “[The column from Matamoros] had to come back quickly because already 89 soldiers of the Legion, and the best soldiers [all elite, artillerymen above all] seeing American territory near, deserted,” he wrote on July 9, 1866. “It's around a tenth of the infantry [of the column] and that gives you some idea of what we can expect of these troops.”99 After eight days, those who remained loaded their wagons with loot and made their way slowly south.
French Foreign Legion Page 27